Yes. Without an underlying philosophy, no theory can be of any value. For one thing, practice is the touchstone of theory.

I agree, overall - for obvious reasons. A philosophy provides one with a particular approach to ontology and epistemology and thus to the inclusion and exclusion of certain variables.

However, the reason why I started this discussion is because i suspect there to be more to it.

While one always has a philosophy that guides one’s research, would this not presuppose the conscious application of/ referral to a philosophy? Is a mere passive lingering of a worldview in the mind of a thinker automatically a philosophy? How consciously does one need to refer to one’s worldview in order for it to be regarded a philosophy? This question might link to policy-makers who would create policies and “realities” that would be the inductive foundation for future theories. In such a case, while a philosophy might be consciously applied by the theorist who is explaining the act of the policy-maker, this chain of events would have its ultimate origin not in a philosophy but in a worldview. (And if politicians merely follow their gut-feeling/ experience, is it correct for scholars to be referring to their own philosophies in order to analyze the former's undertakings?)

On a different note, you claim that “without an underlying philosophy, no theory can be of any value.” In my eyes, this judgmental view sounds somewhat Humean and neocolonial. Who is to judge what is of value and what isn’t? Does it mean that theories of no-value are not linked to an underlying philosophy? Arguably, every theory (especially those a priori in nature) once were of no value until they become of value.

I am also struggling to agree with your aposterioric claim that practice is the touchstone of theory. Many theories and concepts in the Social Sciences have a metaphysical origin and are thus initially formulated in a more normative rather than positive manner. In addition, they are rather a priori in nature. Examples are the liberal branch of enlightenment or non-critical Human Security Studies. While the question as to whether or not a normative theory or concept will ever translate into practice can only be answered by time, we can never know whether that particular thought is currently experiencing its dawn or dusk in the minds of people. It would thus be somewhat neocolonial to evaluate a theory based on practice (an act out there, outside the thinker). For example, look at Kant’s perpetual peace, or the initially uncritical realm of Human Security studies.

I am curious, do you imply that a posteriori theories require an underlying philosophy while a priori ones do not?

I think they are different ambits. A theory has a more concrete object, more specific than philosophy, which is "a set of knowledge", according to the RAE. Naturally, I understand philosophy in its authentic, broad sense, precisely as "coexistence" of knowledge. Another thing is the "purpose" of an intellectual or research work on a particular subject, which can be carried out in accordance with "the ideological bases" or "principles of actions" on which the work in question is based, which they are not really "the philosophy" of work.

Philosophy is sometimes confused with ideology and even with methodology.

A theory implies a series of interrelated presuppositions, often, but not a philosophy as such, which has a more abstract and general character.

A theory may not require philosophy sometimes if a new theory is concluded from observation and the new philosophy is just forming in progress in a new context.

Any theory presupposes philosophy. Even if a theory claims to dispense with philosophy, it is following a philosophy - of anarchism.

Western philosophy works like this. This may not be like this in other part of the world. How about theory requires tradition?

Even if the question is narrowed to ‘philosophy’ as more than a mere ‘worldview’, a full-blown answer may depend on what is meant by “having/requiring an underlying philosophy”. If it means “being tailor-made in order to fit one or another of the already existing philosophical conceptions of scientific practice”, then I’m inclined to answer “No” (since many scientists -even in the social sciences- are not fully aware of the [genuine] divide among the extant philosophical alternatives).

If it is read as “being (psychologically) inspired by the ideas of a philosopher or school of thought”, then the answer might be “Yes” (a further interesting question concerns if that source of inspiration is optional to theorizing or constitutive of the scientific tradition).

On the other hand, if it means “fitting (more or less) in one of the considered alternatives in the philosophy of the (e.g., social) sciences”, then the answer might be in the positive again (yet, it may differ from the full-blown answer to the previous question). In this case, it all comes down to just how well philosophers have explored the logical space of views on science (and to just how loose or stringent the “more or less” clause is taken to be).

Marc Jiménez Rolland A fine categorization/ conditionalization of definitional parameters, although it seems to me that, as is the case in your answer, it is inevitable for us to apply some degree of philosophy in order to answer my above question concerning the constitutive nature of philosophy itself.

It therefore appears to be a self-defeating endeavor. Thus, diverting the discussion to a more post-positivist realm seems to be key. While referring back to your point ... perhaps the researcher should be his/ her own philosophy in order not to be bound by philosophical paradigms and not be subject to disguised cognitive manipulations(?)

Nonetheless, it is ironic how post-positivism on the one hand demands greater appreciation for self-awareness and emancipation while itself being a philosophy that appears to imply uniform (/universal?) adherence.

Quale che sia la risposta elaborata da un ricercatore - è comunque filosofica.

Nel senso che il ragionamento e l'argomentazione adottati dal ricercatore che giustifica la propria ricerca rappresenta la sua filosofia fondata sull'esperienza.

Sulla sua esperienza - che può essere empirica o fattuale, etica o spirituale.

Evitare di pretendere una definizione filosofica su base esclusivamente empirica.

Lo scientismo non è più di moda. Gli stessi scienziati della natura si sono spinti verso forme di conoscenza post-empirica.

Vito D'Armento @

A Vito

1. La risposta di un ricercatore non può essere "scientifica", cioè? Penso di sì. Il campo di ricerca è ampio e diversificato.

2. Forse sarebbe più appropriato e preciso dire che il modo di ragionare e di argomentare di un ricercatore rappresenta le sue convinzioni ed esprime i suoi obiettivi intellettuali.

3. In che modo "l'esperienza" può essere "empirica"? Il definito non può inserire la definizione.

L'esperienza è la "Prolungata pratica che fornisce conoscenza". Ed empirico è "Appartenente o relativo all'esperienza". Entrambi del dizionario della lingua spagnola

4. La differenza filosofico / scientifica deve cessare di essere una polemica e un argomento di discussione. Sono diversi e complementari. Questo è tutto.

Lo scientismo è una "teoria secondo cui l'unica conoscenza valida è quella che viene acquisita attraverso la scienza positiva.