Mammals and birds show pronounced reactions, which point to a variety of emotions. As humans we are familiar with similar responses and we know the importance of emotions for life. Insects also show a series of reactions, such as defense, flight, attack. Are there any experimental references to neural activities that trigger or represent emotions in insects?
I think each creature has emotions but the nature of these emotions or thier definition is not the same like ours and also it depends on the level of the creature (primitive, ....).
You could devise an experiment using drugs that disrupt dopamine and observe what happens?
Wilfred:
In insects the term emotion is called stimuli to pheromones and semiochemicals. Also insects respond to climate change (temperature and humidity) in their distribution, phenology, activity, number of generations and, indirectly,through impact on their natural enemies. Insects also react to plant semiochemicals that produce a wide range of behavioral responses in insects. Some insects sequester or acquire host plant compounds and use them as sex pheromones or sex pheromone precursors. Other insects produce or release sex pheromones in response to specific host plant cues, and chemicals from host plants often synergistically enhance the response of an insect to sex pheromones. Plant volatiles can also have inhibitory or repellent effects that interrupt insect responses to pheromones and attract predators and parasitoids to the attacking species after herbivory injury.
For more information see http://www.cell.com/trends/plant-science/pdf/S1360-1385(04)00063-9.pdf
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/frp.2013.74.issue-4/frp-2013-0033/frp-2013-0033.xml
Please have a look at these researchgate links.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299435679_Emotional_and_sensory_profiling_of_insect-_plant-_and_meat-based_burgers_under_blind_expected_and_informed_conditions
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233830930_An_Exploration_of_the_Social_Brain_Hypothesis_in_Insects
Article Emotional and sensory profiling of insect-, plant- and meat-...
Article An Exploration of the Social Brain Hypothesis in Insects
I think each creature has emotions but the nature of these emotions or thier definition is not the same like ours and also it depends on the level of the creature (primitive, ....).
Luis,
the behavior of insects seems to be "hard-wired" and instinctively. The reactions are triggert by stimuli so there is no necessity for emotions.Pheromones are also only trigger stimuli of a special kind.
Emotions have a special subjective sensation (quale) which is co-related to consciousness. If there are only responses triggered by stimuli (SR-behavior) than the insects do not need "emotions".
Are experiments' needed against what we can just observe?...can we replicate the array of inputs other species experience when behaving 'certain ways'. Is our judgement valid? How do we recognise an emotion based on a species reaction? We can enjoy stretching, does a tree also enjoy the stretching it experiences when being bent by the wind?...does pleasure at surviving flavour change?
If you have not already watched the videos taken of the appalling treatment of cattle in an Indonesian slaughterhouse, doing so and seeing the reactions of the cattle to what is being done to others will answer your question. Human, admiring themselves for their intelligence are largely vacuous when thinking of herd animals birds and invertebrates. A lot of focus is on Meerkats in recent years....their tribal behaviour is quite interesting and intelligently self protective.
Further to that there is also limited knowledge that trees shrubs and plants have intelligence, communication and empowerment. ...for example carbon absorbed by a mature tree is less a requirement than needed by a growing tree. The older will transfer it\ to the younger. Plants will warn others of 'overgrazing' and some plants will then produce chemicals which will deter the creatures feeding there. Orchids are pollenated only by certain wasps and wasps particular to some and not others..
To that interaction one variety has created on its flower a wasp clone to attract others or deter others....I haven't been able to get a clear answer from the plant whether it is either or neither of my suppositions. Perhaps in time it will learn to nod for 'yes' and quiver for 'no'.
Fungi and root systems are like computer networks...however in general mankind is so obsessive it regards itself as primary...or may swing to another obsession...cats, dogs, birds for example, to the point of being considered 'peculiar'...
I recall a neighbour who daily wiped her cat's backside and cleaned-out its ears. Childless but a well educated daughter of a doctor, good conversationalist and a nice, quaint, lady we regarded her as somewhere between 'idiosyncratic and slightly unhinged owing to the cat treatment. Unfortunately when she fell over in her back-yard and spent two days in the sun and three nights in the cold, her cat didn't call for a neighbour of for an ambulance. The cat might have felt emotions however awareness, mindfulness and pro-activity were not of a fashion for it to assist the lady. It's also possible it detested having the ablutions done and resisted drawing attention to the lady's plight by howling.
Billal makes a rational observation, my observation being that humans can have the sensitivity of a funnel web spider eating its mate...and psychopaths known as 'leaders' will kill millions of humans or other species. I think we are amongst the most primitive of occupiers of the planet when the sophistication washes-off. Wilfrid's observation is also interesting with the proviso that we are also 'hard wired' (the famed 'fight or flight') but we also claim emotions.
What is the reaction when one creatures realises it is in a place 'scented' by another to claim territory...Not all just depart...choices are made on the basis perhaps of wisdom, experience, training fear and adventurousness. Perhaps in that forbidden territory might be a 'mate' it can seduce or overpower. Are emotions involved?...I think the creature would weigh-up thepossible outcomes.
On another tack, why do some species mate for life?...Why are creatures, in some well observed cases, caring of their young, feed them teach them, punish unacceptable behaviour..is this learned memory or emotion?. How does a bird learn to build a nest? and how doers it recognise it needs to do so?.. We might regard it as 'instinct' but, is that all it is? Choosing the right materials....is judgement emotion?
Animals we like enough to observe closely are believed to mourn, to be excites, to crave affection.. usually ones that eat similar foods to us. Those that are different and considered dangerous...e.g. spiders, snakes, jellyfish, ants, termites are creatures we are unlikely to become close-enough-to, to judge. That said two examples arise....a chap who places tarantulas in his moth and closes his mouth without being bitten...is that a bond?...a creature setting aside what we believe are its norms, owing to not fearing it's captor? and the second that termites are believed to avoid eating enough of a house wall-studs that would cause the house to collapse...
Ants farm termites for a continuing supply of food. As ants don't just eat 'anything' can I reasonably presume that they must like termite taste enough (emotion) to farm them(rational intelligence) rather than just 'go for it' and eat the lot. My personal view of Charles Darwin was that he was very raw and I have long ago rejected the theory of unintelligent evolution of species. In our case however our intelligence has 'hard-wired' deviousness and empathy and the 'good Samaritan' choice as a choice we have to make.
We have been led into desensitisation to humans outside our sect or cult by inventing 'gods' which excuse our most primitive behaviour towards people outside our tribe and towards animals which are sacrificed for ritual. On the basis of 'comparative intelligence' I have not yet become aware of any other creature which builds shrines and altars or will argue the toss over whether "the Sabbath" is a Saturday or a Sunday. The devices of entice and entrap are significant in religion but also, some plants and creatures, disguise their form to lull a false sense of security to entrap food. Maybe that is from their intelligence observing that creatures they can eat 'hang around' certain scents, stenches, rhythms and colours...and have remanufactured themselves on a dna basis. One might ask "when a creature claims territory by 'marking', is a concept of inheritance' involved?..is it being 'willed-on'? when the creature which marked out its territory, dies.
I'm not sure we should be or have the wisdom to be confident that we are qualitatively judging plants on intelligence and emotion. Response to stimulus we provide may not be what influences other forms of life in their natural surroundings. Voila.
I think the following paper in Science will provide a clue for your question.
Shohat-Ophir, G., Kaun, K.R., Azanchi, R., Mohammed, H. and Heberlein, U. (2012) Sexual deprivation increases ethanol intake in Drosophila. Science, 335, 1351-1355.
Dear Wilfried,
Emotion is difficult to determine not to speak on the thresholds of stimuli producing phenomena called various degrees of emotions. I have been attacked many times by Vespa crabro. It was sufficient to approach their nets. They attacked me even I was about 3-4 m from their nest. However, when V. crabro individuals fed pears in my garden I could approach them until 30-40 cm. Was their attack a kind emotion or their tolerance towards me the lack of it? Or were these situations differently “hard-wired”?
Andreas,
it is difficult to answer your question which has different levels. We can answer with looking on the behavior of the insects and we can speculate about their inner live.
Your story bears the answer inside. The behavior of Vespa crabro depends on the situation. Beside the nest they do not have much tolerance (there in is the queen) but one individual is very tolerant (it does not count very much). This behavior is useful and can be the result of an evolutionary process.
Insects are very little and their brain contains not so much neurons. I tend to think they do not have much degrees of freedom in their behavior but qualia and also a kind of emotions to find the right program to act.
Dear Wilfried,
I like your name because as a kid I read often Ivanhoe written by Walter Scott. Anyway, nervous system particularly the mushroom body in the protocerebrum of eusocial insects is relatively well developed thus hornets must be genial compared with e.g. sawflies.
Andreas,
So do I ... (Ivanhoe) - smile.
Well, they recognize their sisters at the appearance of theire face.
Wilfried,
We assess each other emotion by observing each other. We naturally experience each other experience because we are naturally empathic. We not only have this empathic capacity with humans but with all mammals. We are more empathic with primates than with mouses . More empathic to whales than with fishes. More empathic to feline than with cows. The more we have in common, the more with are empathic and the body part that is giving us the most empathic clues are the eyes. Reptilian eyes are not empathic as the mammalian eyes. The felines have front looking eyes like us. Looking at a whale in the eyes tell us immediatly that they are not like fishes.
If I would observe for long period of time insects, I am convinced that I would develop my empathic capacities with them and would be able to tell you if I feel their emotions. But I already observed that some insects really seem to be suffering if we cut one of their leg and that they really feel to be afraid when I try to catch them. I hear you saying that I am committing the crime of being anthropomorphic and this might be justified with humans and primates or other mammals, but can never be justified with plants or insects. I disagree. I totally trust my empathic capacities and emotions, feelings, consciousness can only be seen within another consciousness. Science cannot assess what a feeling is but only observed physiological correlates. I take the emotions to be physiologically supported through an infinity of physiological embodiements and I take empathy the only method for assessing them and I really think that empathy is reliable although it is like any capacity, it has to be developed through observation. This is a delicate empiricism. Turing had understood that intelligence can only be assess empathically and devise his Turing test based on this assumption.
Louis,
"We naturally experience each other experience because we are naturally empathic"
I agree but we do so by our model of mind. This model is based on your own self-model. And this is also the case here:" I totally trust my empathic capacities and emotions, feelings, consciousness can only be seen within another consciousness."
So do I. If you observe insects in a closed clear box you realize their panic looking to escape. Insects have an exoskeleton so they are not able to show a facial activity like humans do. The indicator for their mood is only seen in the behavior.
I am sure they do have qualia and also a kind of emotions. They are small so they could not be flexible as mammalians or birds.Many reactions are triggert by stimuli but they are not like simple robots.
Wilfried,
We perceive others exactly as we perceive with our eyes and other senses, always through empathy and empathy is always entering the other's shoes/body. Entering other's body is always enacting some of our own sensory-motor schemata for matching the observed phenomena. Theodor Lipps contribute to this conception of
Einfühlung but he did not go far enough. I totally assimilate Einfühlung with imagination and perception and I can trace their biological evolution from the gradual evolution of the mammalian imagination: the neo-cortex being the physiological development. What illustrate best this development is ''music''. We are naturally bodily entrained with music, we naturally dance and our mood is also entrained by it. Why is it the case? What is the relation between music and dance? My hypothesis is that very early in the animal evolution, it was very important to recognize sounds made by other animal movements and that the only way to do that is to use the body motor system to interpret the rythm in the sound as motor movement rythm. Music is thus produce and interpret by the body motor system. Fear is a very strong emotion that trigger/prepare escape behavior and all emotions are closely related to certain aspects of body movements and music is the art of creating sounds entraining these body movements mechanisms. Music is very important in movies. It help focus of attention on certain events and also give us access to the Mind of the actors. If you remove the sound, your unassisted visual perception would not as well penetrate the actor emotions and intentions but the sound track make it evidents and intensify our emotional fusion.
A lot of our emotions are related to behaviors such escaping from predator, sexual union/reproduction, etc behaviors that insects have and so our empathic system while observing these insects in such situations will make us feel corresponding emotions. We cannot have any other access to the emotions than in our own empathic system. Insects have very different body but their bodies and but we have a lot of common behaviors and our empathic system while observing them will make us perceive the emotions of these common behaviors. Insects like us are triggered towards behavior by an emotion. I want to eat because I feel hungry. Why would an insect eat if it does not feel hungry?
Louis,
yes, you are right!
" Why would an insect eat if it does not feel hungry? " I agree and only humans are free enough to eat even they are not hungry ...
Wilfried,
Science never describes world-in-itself but always describes interactions. We ''live'' our bodily interaction with the world and so are insider of this interaction. We experience a what it is like to be in this interaction. Empathy with other human allow us to interpret their behavior in terms of wht is like to be them. Our language allow us to express these what it like because we use words refering to experience, subjective words which cannot find any scientific translation. A scientific narrative do describe an interaction but without any subjective references and only the aspects of interaction that can so be described are accessible to a scientific description. So it is quite a challenge to describe animal empathy objectively. It is possible only up to a point. Empathy gives access to a what is like of another through our own what is like. Science cannot describe both ends but we can describe scientifically the empathic systems supporting this what is like to be other.
Being hungry in a human is a sensasion that is supported by physiological mecanisms that have not much in common with those of insect given our the enormous difference in our digestive systems. But any kind of animal body has to monitor the available energy storage and the result of these monitoring mecanism are necessarily live and experience as hunger when the storage enter a warning zone. Hunger will prioritize the search for food mode of behavior for all animals unless more pressing survival events such a predator arise and trigger fear and then the escape behavior. But humans are not simply behaving with concerns of the near future but have concerns for far future as well or concern for others and not only for ourself. Social insects have also many concern for other as well .
An experiment with drosophila flies
''A similar experiment was conducted with hungry fruit flies. This time the experimenters tried to induce primal fear by casting a shadow over them to mimic the presence of an overhead predator. This was much like the fear we experience when we hear an unexpected gunshot, making us feel and behave apprehensive until we consider the coast is clear and manage to calm down. And this is exactly what seemed to happen with the fruit flies.
When the fake predator was introduced and then removed, potentially freaked out and hungry flies ignored their food until many minutes later when they eventually calmed down. This suggests that an emotion-like state affected their behavior even after the stimulus was gone. Other key building blocks of emotions like scalability were also demonstrated, i.e. repeating the predator’s shadow simulation multiple times making the flies even more freaked out, taking them longer to calm down and dig into their food.
However, the authors of the study made it clear that although the flies’ responses were more complex than a simple avoidance reflex, they will not take the next leap and classify it as a bona fideemotion. What they did say was in the title of the study itself: “Behavioral responses to a repetitive visual threat stimulus express a persistent state of defensive arousal in Drosophila.”
Do insects have empathy?
As we mentioned earlier, a second aspect of emotions is the expression of emotional behavior that allows other individuals to be aware of our emotions and respond to them. As such, in order to detect and understand those emotions we have the ability to empathize and respond in kind.
In an experiment hot off the press, woodlice have shown empathic-like behavior. The researchers demonstrated that calm woodlice reduced their more excited neighbors causing them to also become calm.
One can argue that this is simply the mimicking of behaviors, as opposed to recognizing and then matching emotions. Again however, remember that if one dog barks in what we interpret as an upset nervous manner, and causes the other dog to do the same, we would tend to automatically assume that the first dog passed on its emotion to the second one if they adopt the same postures and emotional behavior. Moreover, a study published this year quite clearly stated that emotional contagion was observed in pigs as a form of empathy.
http://brainblogger.com/2015/06/26/do-insects-have-emotions-and-empathy/
Do Bees Have Feelings?
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-bees-have-feelings/
Dear Dr. Wilfried,
Please check the following resources.
Regards
SM Najim
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4098837/pdf/nihms578606.pdf
http://chemse.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/suppl_1/i285.full
http://www.pnas.org/content/113/18/4900.full
http://jeb.biologists.org/content/216/6/992
Oh, the insects are so busy! I think they enjoy the spring season.
I wrote a reply and then after about 20 paragraphs the site of its own volition switched to a new question, losing all my examples....is that the %$#*&&^% site using its intelligence?...Grrr!!
Anthony,
your experience evokes a lot of negative emotions. Nevertheless, I would be glad if you could write a short version of your answer.
Have a nice day.
Wilfried,
Damasio explains. “I have every reason to believe that invertebrates not only have emotions but also the possibility of feeling those emotions.”
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/i-ll-bee-there-for-you-do-insects-feel-emotions/
It's "DO", not "Does", and perhaps you confuse "instinct" with "emotions". Insects have sensors that inform them, and make them respond, they do certainly not have emotions. Furthermore, insects are insects, not invertebrates.
Instincts transmitted through millions of years of evolution - yes, but emotions ....!?
Freek,
thank you for your kind note.
No, I do not confuse in the expressions "instinct" and "emotion". There are some articles which tend to the hypothesis insects have emotions. In your opinion insects are nothing else than small bionic robots.
Emotion are subjective experiences while instinctive reactions do not need any affektive reaction. Instinct is a simple expression out of the "stimulus-response-box".
It would be nice to see some scientific facts appear @here instead of psychedelic guesswork. Go on line and do some research, you've got the world's library at your fingertips. This is a science forum remember? Good luck.
UPDATE: By the way, I just discovered that you already answered your own question two years ago, stating that insects do not have and need emotions, and that for emotions to arise, one needs awareness. One cannot exist without the other.
Freek,
thank you for your great commitment to this issue and the good advice, even if the topic does not seem to suit your interests. I appreciate that.
Of course, I agree with you, emotions need consciousness - without doubt. However, we can not make sure statements about such subjective states, not even from other people. We accept out of sheer friendliness that you, too, have a consciousness, although we can not really know that. Why should it be different except for quantitative differences and the resulting qualitative differences in insects?
Wilfried,
To say ''emotions need consciousness'' is bizarre since emotions are by definition conscious states. For example, fear is such emotion, it is a feeling induced by the perception of clues signaling the possibility of threath of multiple kinds for an organism. Suppose that the organism would have a totally automated unconscious system of detection of such clues and response to such clues then it would not be conscious and would not be an feeling of the organism. It is necessary to be conscious in cases when the response cannot be automatically selected, in such case the organism attention and thus its consciousness has to be mobilized to be open to a huge range of possibilities of threat. All conscious states are high level of mobilitisation of cognitive resources.
The future of all living organism is for the most part predicable by the very autonomous mecanisms buit-in the organism's body but there is often clues that the organism can sense and which are interpreted as high probability indicator of range of unpredictable futures that the organism thus has to prepare for. This is what consciousness or attention monopolizing is necessary and a whole range of specialize predicting processes of all kind have to compete for the interpretation of what is going on and where many different possibility of behavior have to be selected.
We both have had many discussion about the possibility or not to model consciousness. My answers have always been no. The most fundamental reason for this answer is that if it would possible to provide a model for it then it would negate its need. Consciousness exists exactly because life could not have been totally automated because it always exist into an world with a high amount of very difficult to predict situations. Most life processes are totally automated and thus unconscious but life is totally focus on the most unpredictable aspects and this is not fixed, can't be fixed, can't be automated, and this is the creative conscious core of existence of any living organism. The form it takes is hugely different given the hugely different bodily interaction interface of the different living organisms. Notice that a huge number of aspects of each type of living organisms are fixed and thus can be studied and modeled scientifically. What can't be modeled is what in Nature is not fixed and this is not limited to randomness but is central to the living interface of all life forms and maybe also of all natural entities. Science is limited to what can be modeled, what is relatively fixed or be considered as such in certain contexts. Life have evolved to fixate in living bodies interfaces these relative interface invariants and continue to do so. But the core has never been such fixate aspect. We may argue that nothing in Nature is fixate although all our bodies and all our knowledge is fixate. But we keep increasing our fixate knowledge and this only happen because our knowledge is like animal body, layer of interaction interface being continually augmented by our consciousness. Because the human evolution is an externalisation of bodily interafaces into cultural interfaces and the formation of hugely societal organism through these interfaces.
Louis,
thank you for your clarification:
Sorry, it was not my best post above.
Emotions are a conscious representation of a situative state with effects in body and mind, and you know one of my favorite key words is anticipation.
Now I understand better your position why you do not belief in modeling consciousness. That's very interesting. You know also I agree in most of your arguments but there is a gap, I hope you will clarify.
Your says " if it would possible to provide a model for it then it would negate its need. " and this sentence I do not understand. I can imagine algorithms to handle non predictive situations like attention, hide, production of adrenaline, flight or even fight. We do not have robots with such behavior but there is no principal reason to deny the possibility for such machines.
Wilfried,
We both like the the anticipatory model of living organisms. Whatever is automated in the living do not need to be conscious. Why would it need to be conscious. We observe this in our daily life. When you learn driving a car, you have not yet automated all your behavior and you have to pay so much attention to so many things and in spite of all this effort make a lot of mistake and hopefully we survive this first period and gradually automated all our behavior to the point where we are almost unconscious of what we do while driving. We can listen to music and entertain a conversation while driving. Some even can text on their smart phone!!!!! The same with talking. We are conscious of the words we say and the impression we want to convey but totally unconscious of the movements of our tongues and of our mouth and our breathing because we have totally mastered and thus automated these process although it was not automated at birth. The same with reading. So hard at the beginning but so automatic later in life. We barely notice the words that we read. What is totally automated become unconscious and what is not and is critical is conscious. To talk about a model of consciousness is to talk about something necessarily automated. What is a model? It is necessarily an automated process. Most of those talking about a model of consciousness thus assume of a higher mecanism of learning, i.e. of putting in place of automation processes or of functioning that is automated but not into a limited specialized way. Such higher mecanism would only be used in situations where full usual automated mode can't work. But if it was true then why would we be conscious in such situation and have the impression that we are actually involve. Built a robot, and there is no need to create such a false impression into the robot. Why assume that the natural impression we have to be conscious and what it means to choose is simply an fake impression. Why not assume that our impression is a testimony of the real situation. This require to break a scientific dogma, that all that exist is a mecanism. In reality, all that can be modeled is by definition mecanism-like. No need to extrapolate and to assume that all of reality is potentially mecanism-like. In fact, making this extrapolation is not justify. It is simpler image of reality to assume that no such reduction is possible for even a single natural entity in absolute terms but in practice it is usefull to do so and possible to make a lot of these reduction. In fact this is what life has been doing since the beginning of the Universe. Here the idea of creation which can't exist in science, in a world of models, become actually the core reality of all being and consciousness is what it is for all living. It is not in opposition with mecanism since it is the way mecanism are invented since the beginning of the Universe and the way they are conceived since the beginning of humanity.
I don't know. I am only sure that some insects, like mosquitos, trigger my worst emotions :)
yes they have. they live together, they work together, they fight, they follow, they love and defend themselves. if you disturb their homes insects will bite you
Dear Wilfried,
The answer will depend on how we define consciousness.
In Classical Indian writings such as the Upanishads, "consciousness is thought to be the essence of Atman, a primal, immanent self that is ultimately identified with Brahman—a pure, transcendental, subject-object-less consciousness that underlies and provides the ground of being of both Man and Nature" (Sen as cited in Velmans, 2009, p. 1).
Arka (2013) clarifies this further
"Consciousness manifests itself through physical matter. Similar to bacteria that are able to survive with a complete lack of oxygen and in high temperatures, consciousness lacks boundaries, can take any form or shape and can emerge under challenging life conditions. In spirituality, consciousness is mainly a non-physical yet powerful entity that is the pivotal point of all life and activates the senses in every living being. It is highly responsive and expressive and activates many levels, especially in humans" (Arka, 2013, p. 37).
From this definition insects are conscious although their level of consciousness is different from that of humans. So now we have to look at "e-motion". In a paper I wrote in 2015, Article Emotions Including Anger, Bodily Sensations and The “Living Matrix”
I suggest that in humans, most of the time our thoughts and stories active emotions in humans and do not correspond with what is actually happening in "outside reality". I do not feel that this happens in insects. I feel that they probably live more in the present, and like Ajab Ali Lashari stated, "yes they have. they live together, they work together, they fight, they follow, they love and defend themselves. if you disturb their homes insects will bite you". I do have a bit of a problem with Ajab's use of the word love in this context, and attraction might be a better word. Humans, to regain their e-motions which are oriented to the present moment (and not as a reaction to their inner fantasies and stories) might be able to learn a lot from insects.
Warm regards Tina
Check this link maybe useful
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/i-ll-bee-there-for-you-do-insects-feel-emotions/
regards
Louis,
thank you for your clarification. I read it twice to understand better.
You wrote: " What is a model? It is necessarily an automated process. "
With this statement I do not agree. IMHO a model is a description of a functionality. Subconscious processes do function automatically but a model does not necessarily have to be an automatic process. The problem here is we do not have an universal formulation what consciousness may be. If we like to define consciousness as 'to put in scene' for cognitive analyse we have an artificial process but with open results. I would deny the term 'automatic' for such a process. Organisms needs also a representation of significant things of their Umwelt (v. Uexküll ) / environment to act useful. They do not need a creative fluidum like vis vitalis of mind for qualia and consciousness. The difference to our robots is in the data processing. An organism uses the total unity of brain and body and our robots only a micro controller and some motors.
"... why would we be conscious in such situations and have the impression that we are actually involve." We do construct with our sensory input a coherent scene free of contradictions of our surrounding. We do not have total control in this theater but we have experiences. This means a representational theory of consciousness which I prefer. Therefor I do not have problems to "... assume that our impression is a testimony of the real situation. "
I asked a question on RG: Is real-time object detection equivalent to qualia?
The answer is naturally no but there is a litte truth in the question. A subconscious process is possible to detect objects automatically and these objects will be put on stage with all associations and characteristics we have to this object. If such an object is interesting or dangerous the focus of our attention is on it. In the relation to the observer and the subjective qualification of the object we can find qualia as a subjective relation. This means a kind of resonance of the object outside and the data stored as experience within the observer. With this representation a cognitive process can be calculated.
Tina,
many thanks for your wonderful citations of the Upanishads. I like them really as well for inspiration. I am sure insects are affected by life to react useful and effective.
The expression consciousness has many aspects depending on the context of its use. My initial question does not prefer any special context so the answers are very miscellaneous and I am very glad about that.
In a scientific discussion metaphysical argumentation does not correlate with arguments of science so I put your answer in my heart and some others in my mind.
Dear Wilfred,
I glad you put some answers in you heart -and I appreciate this.
I also ask you to also look at your statement
"metaphysical argumentation does not correlate with arguments of science"
but the scientific position that matter gives rise consciousness is a metaphysical position. Everything we say think and do rests on a metaphysical basis - science as well. I feel these positions should be made explicit.
Sorry about this excursion in your question, but I really feel it about time that scientists realise they are talking a metaphysical position whether they are aware of their position or not.
Warm regards Tina
Wilfried,
For many years, scientific institutions did not consider the domain of the study of human consciousness, a scientific subject. For many years, the French academy banished the debates on the mind body problems. It is not certain today that the question of the existence of consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) , the hard problem of consciousness is a scientific question. It is not at all certain that the methods used to claim that insects have emotions , such as https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/i-ll-bee-there-for-you-do-insects-feel-emotions/
are really scientific. I did my Ph.D. in visual perception, I studied in particular colour vision and I can tell you that we have no clue scientifically what it is like to experience the colour ''red''. All those experiencing ''red'' knows it but no scientists call tell why. No scientist can tell why we have experience rather than nothing. We all know we have experience but we have not the beginning of a clue why scientifically. We know a lot about physiologies of bodies but why these have experience, no. We know why our colour space that we experience has the stucture it has based on our physiology but we have not the beginning of a clue why such experience exist.
''The material world has only been constructed at the price of taking the self, that is, mind, out of it, removing it; mind is not part of it. ''
Erwin Schrodinger ¨
Dear Wilfred
Please considered this quote from one of the "greats" of science -
"As a man who has devoted his whole life to the most clear headed science, to the study of matter, I can tell you as a result of my research about atoms this much: There is no matter as such. All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind. This mind is the matrix of all matter".
— Max Planck
KInd regards Tina
Louis,
qualia is one of the most interesting mysteries of mind. You know I believe the understanding of qualia will solve also the hard problem of consciousness. I agree, we do not understand the experience of color or "What is it like to be a bat?" (Nagel) and so on ...
I am convinced there is a meaningful hard scientific explanation for this phenomenon and it is a pleasure to discuss and think about it. Without this and other questions, I would never have met such nice and competent people with whom an exchange brings so many suggestions and to whom I have great sympathy.
Tina and Louis,
thank you for the two awesome quotations of two of the greatest scientists ever. I appreciate them highly.
Great scientists have a deep religious feeling when they think about matter. Their science, however, is logical and without mystic speculation in their formulas.
@Louis Brassard Animals SENSE fear, even though - save for the great apes and a few other marine mammals - they aren't conscious beings, so Wilfried's assumption that for an animal to experience fear it needs consciousness is incorrect, and yours that "emotions are by definition conscious states" as well. Fear is not necessarily a conscious state. It is a conscious state only in the above mentioned animals and in humans, ONLY because we possess conscious awareness. Fireworks for example instill great fear in dogs, yet they do not possess consciousness.
Freek,
You seem to be using the word ''consciousness'' in a different way than most peoples. For my dog to be afraid of something necessarily implies for my dog to first be aware or conscious of that this something. For me this is just common sense of how I use this word.
While I personally do not agree with Freek's point, I'd like to play devil's advocate here (which is also not to say Freek is anything close to the devil):
There is a rather popular way in which we may ascribe mental predicates like "sense" or "fear" without implying consciousness. For example, Daniel Dennett’s deeply pragmatical view accommodates ascribing the intention to make a chess move to Deep Blue and the belief that the room is too cold to thermostats (cf. Dennett 1987: 22 ff.). The ascribed state may be “an attenuated sort of belief” (Dennett 2007: 87) and merely ascribe “hemi-semi-demi-proto-quasi-pseudo intentionality” (ibid.: 88) in contrast to full-fledged intentionality: “Just as a young child can sort of believe that her daddy is a doctor (without full comprehension of what a daddy or a doctor is), so a robot – or some part of a person’s brain – can sort of believe that there is an open door a few feet ahead, or that something is amiss over there to the right, and so forth” (ibid.: 87 f.).
Hence, animals may fear or sense something without being (phenomenally) conscious.
References:
- Dennett, D. (1987): The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
- Dennett, D. (2007): “Philosophy as naïve anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker”, in: M. Bennett, D. Dennett, P. Hacker, & J. Searle, eds., Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. New York, NY.: Columbia University Press: 73-95.
Joachim,
we cannot solve this problem without a convincingly hypothesis of the benefit of qualia and consciousness. The lack of such a hypothesis is the real gap in all such philosophical discussions. The simplest solution is to deny the reality of consciousness or qualia (Dennett). In this case the gap implodes. I am not satisfied with this position.
Wilfried,
it's true that Dennett denies the reality of phenomenal consciousness altogether. However, the position I sketched above does not imply this denial. It just means that we tend to ascribe mental attributes to beings without consciousness (i.e. computers or thermostats). The claim is this: If a being behaves as if it has mental state so-and-so, and ascribing so-and-so to this being is (predictively/explanatorily) useful, then so-and-so's ascription is often done (and justifiedly so!) in an attenuated way.
Personally, I believe this claim is correct, while I believe Dennett's denial of phenomenal consciousness is wrong.
Joachim,
''For example, Daniel Dennett’s deeply pragmatical view accommodates ascribing the intention to make a chess move to Deep Blue and the belief that the room is too cold to thermostats (cf. Dennett 1987: 22 ff.). The ascribed state may be “an attenuated sort of belief” (Dennett 2007: 87) and merely ascribe “hemi-semi-demi-proto-quasi-pseudo intentionality” (ibid.: 88) in contrast to full-fledged intentionality: “
Inanimate objects such as thermostats or Deep Blue or hammer do not have intentions. It is ridiculous to assume that a hammer has an hammering intention. THese objects were made for purposes and they fullfill it in the eyes of those making use of them. HUman babies started to make this Aninimate Inanimate distinction by 6 months of age. Only the living has will or intentions of its own. This is just common sense.
'' It just means that we tend to ascribe mental attributes to beings without consciousness (i.e. computers or thermostats). ''
No we don't. Psychological studies has demonstrated that babies makes the Animate Inanimate distinction by the age of 6 months. I never met someone so confused that he thought that the thermostats or the computers is alive.
Louis,
the point is not that we have to think of Deep Blue as being alive in order for us to ascribe intentions to it. Its exhibiting systematic context-dependent behavior suffices. A hammer does not show such behavior, but Deep Blue or a thermostat does. Of course, a hammer does not want to hammer - after all, it only does so when we force it to, which hardly fits the description of someone wanting to do something -, but haven't we learned from countless experiences that hammers "want to hurt us", or that they "want to fall on the ground"?
Well, of course they don't actually want that - they only want it in an attenuated sense.
The idea is that the differences between Deep Blue's intention, a bee's intention, a dog's intention, a monkey's intention, and your or my intentions, come in degrees (hence the attenuation), rather than in principled distinctions.
Further, it is far from clear that there is a principled distinction between alive and inanimate -- in this case, it helps not to construe "animate" as "alive", but as "behaving systematically". We tend to ascribe mental predicates to things which seem in this sense "animate" to us; many things which are not alive can seem "animate" and hence worthy of mental ascriptions (computer graphics, fictional characters, Siri, etc.).
Also, while I believe we are often wrong about ascribing intentions to things, I have encountered quite the opposite phenomenon to what you describe: I see persons readily ascribing "souls" and "intentions" all the time to anything that comes their way, including nature, the stars, and their technological gadgets.
Now I'll just go and click "add answer", because apparently this website wants me to.
Joachim,
It makes sense that animals have evolved to make a Inanimate Animate distinctions and all of our our capacity in this regard is probably the same than the one of all primates.
''We tend to ascribe mental predicates to things which seem in this sense "animate" to us; many things which are not alive can seem "animate" and hence worthy of mental ascriptions (computer graphics, fictional characters, Siri, etc.).''
You are right to say that our AI distinction instincts get confused when some objects exibit behaviors that similar to the living. It is why that it is so easy for science fiction movies to make us believe that a robot is actually sentient and intelligent. The same confusion is at work in you when you see a glimpse of intention in deep blue. Deep Blue is chess playing tool that is as inanimate as a hammer, the only difference is that it is self-actuated. If you automate the hammer into a carpenter's robot, this toll has no more hammering intention than the hammer, the only difference is that it is design so to be autonomously operated. It easily confuse the Animate Inanimate distinction of some people like you into seeing a glimpse of intention. Big Blue is has zero intention of its own although it operate autonously. Confusing? Not really for me. Our animist roots are powerfull and irrational and play tricks in some minds , especially minds impressed by science fiction. This animist tendency to ascribe souls to objects such as our own autonomous tools is stronger in those of us which denies souls and consciousness in ourself. Is'nt it fantastic? I think that it is not a coincidence but an important characteristic of this modern machinistic animist. It consider human and all that is alive as machines and consider machines as alife!!!
Joachim,
I do not agree with the idea of the graduated differences of intentions between Deep Blue, bees, dogs and humans. There is a crucial distinction we have to note. A biological system has intrinsic intentions because of the needs to stay alive. A computer program does not have such needs. The algorithm is blind and there is no feedback if the goal is reached, it stops and that's all. In biological systems are multiple loops with feedback regulation to find solutions.
May be insects are constructed like robots and there is no emotion therein. We have to be careful because sometimes the language does not differ so sharply that we are inclined to interpret more in a behavior than is really present. To clarify this, however, is philosophically and scientifically interesting, but not trivial.
Louis,
thanks for your elaboration. While it may seem that way, I don't think there is a fundamental disagreement between our positions. I think the root of its seeming that way is because I think of mental ascriptions as fundamentally dependent on context/behavior-functions- - no matter the "inner" root of the behavior (whether organic, mechanic, associated with conscious states or not, etc.).
However, unlike Dennett, I do not deny that consciousness exists. I simply think that the having of consciousness is not implied by the having of mental states, such as having an intention. In humans, the two phenomena are connected, for all we now, but metaphysically, they do not have to be.
Wilfried,
just as I just replied to Louis, I think there is great commonality in our views. I also believe that, whenever applicable, evolutionary, organismic facts are the root of our intentions. That is, if you ask: Why do humans, or animals, have intentions?, then the answer should at some point refer to organismic/evolutionary facts. However, for the reasons I just mentioned in my reply to Louis, I do not think that evolutionary backgrounds and organismic facts are the only way one can have intentions. Mental states are theoretical concepts in context/behavior-explanations and -predictions, and hence they can be "implemented" in various ways, including non-organismic ones.
It's rather or completely beside the point to involve inanimate objects to this discussion, since the objective is to determine whether animals, and (eusocial) insects in particular, have the ability to feel emotions.
Joachim,
''mental ascriptions as fundamentally dependent on context/behavior-functions- - no matter the "inner" root of the behavior''.
I agree and it is at the root of human fascination with automaton.
''However, unlike Dennett, I do not deny that consciousness exists.''
I do not agree much with Dennett. Consciousness is hard to deny giving that is the most basic fact of all.
''I simply think that the having of consciousness is not implied by the having of mental states, such as having an intention. In humans, the two phenomena are connected, for all we now, but metaphysically, they do not have to be.''
I do not understand. Having intention is normally considered as a mental state and a mental state is part of what we call consciousness. Please elaborate.
Joachim,
you wrote " I simply think that the having of consciousness is not implied by the having of mental states, "
I do not understand this statement fully. IMHO a mental state is such a subjective phenomenon we call by some expressions like 'consciousness' or 'qualia'. Metaphysically there are many possibilities to realize functionality but we should mention Occams razor. Only the simplest version is acceptable. I deny all supra natural explications and also quantum phenomena to understand consciousness or qualia.
A biological inspired attempt to understand both consciousness and qualia is therefore a promising idea. Therein are some millions of years of optimization.
Louis, Wilfried,
the idea that the attribution of mental states can be independent from the attribution of consciousness has many roots, and I believe it has been the most popular view in analytic philosophy since the early 20th century. There have been many views which shared this idea. the first and most radical (and also, by today's lights, most misguided) was behaviorism; the most popular and enduring has been functionalism. One of the earlier examples of this root is Wittgenstein's "beetle in a box" (http://virtualphilosopher.com/2006/09/wittgenstein_an.html). Personally, the most applicable example is Sellar's "myth of Jones", which (in my opinion, aptly) describes how people without a concept of the mind would come to use mental ascriptions simply because such ascriptions are supremely useful in dealing with other people.
Most popular non-reductive views of the mind are descendants of such views (e.g. token physicalism, the multiple realization view, the mainstream action theory views à la Davidson etc.).
If you believe anything remotely resembling such views (again, predominantly functionalism), then you should also believe that the connection between mental states and consciousness is to some degree accidental. There are several ways to make this connection, of which I will mention only two:
1.) An inference from your own introspection to the observation of others (which has motivated classic skeptic views like Descartes' - because it seems you can never really know whether anyone beside you has consciousness).
2.) Some kind of deduction from a mix of metaphysics and natural law, such as: There is a metaphysical connection between consciousness and the material (e.g. a supervenience of consciusness and mentality on organismic facts, especially facts about the brain). If so, then there likely are natural laws connecting empirical facts about brains and organisms and consciousness; we can discover those empirical facts about other brains (e.g. animal brains); ergo we can conclude that they have consciousness.
Crucially, all of these views allow for diverse (multiple) realizations of mental states, and the having of mental states independently of consciousness. Putnam famously made the polemic remark that even a piece of cheese could realize any mental state. (Which is not to say anyone needs to agree with that - it just illustrates the basic idea in one of its more radical extremes.)
Consequently, it is not true that mental states just are conscious states. This is not even true in humans: Many dormant mental dispositions are not conscious. For instance, I may believe that there is no crocodile on the moon, but I have never (until now) been conscious of this belief.
Of course, I agree with Wilfried that whenever we deal with human consciousness, looking for the biological prerequisites is the best way to explain this kind of consciousness.
Joachim,
What was confusing me was your used of the expression ''mental state'' . From your last post, I take that ''mental state'' means the physiological state of the body, especially the state of the central nervous system and consciousness would not be into a 1 to 1 relation with the physiological states. I am not a fan of analytical philosophy and so not in a position to comment on the philosophers you mentioned. It is clear that there consciousness and bodily states are related but I do not believe that it is possible even to enter the concept of consciousness in science. Science epistemologically eliminate the possibility to even point to consciousness. Remember that science begin with objectivisation: elimination of what is subjective or reference to any such thing.
''The material world has only been constructed at the price of taking the self, that is, mind, out of it, removing it; mind is not part of it. ''
Erwin Schrodinger
A lot of philosophical problems dissapears when one realize the epistemological limit of the scientific methods and cease to assume that its reach are limitless. It is this later assumption which force those holding this scientistic metaphysics that consciousness is the type of stuff that can be expressed scientifically. I am a naturalist but I do not assume that Nature can be fully understood scientifically in principle. You may refer to Michel Bitbol and many other for a full justification of the fundamental nature of consciousness. There is no way to explain consciousness since it is fundamental although it has to be assumed but it can be conceptualized since it is not the type of things concepts can talk about. I take conciousness as the coming into being, what make things to exist. Whatever exist in more or else fixed way can be described scientifically, not what fundamentally allow this to happen.
@Anthony Clancy You wrote, "..., and the second that termites are believed to avoid eating enough of a house wall-studs that would cause the house to collapse..."
Believe me, they'll eat anything that they can turn into pulp. I've seen them doing it. Do you "believe" they have meetings to discuss which parts of the house should not be eaten?
Behaviorism was the attempt to eliminate subjectivity from interpretation of behavioral observation. However, this approach has its limits, which is why its importance is limited to behavioral change (dressage). There is no model of the management of sensor data, there is only a black box without structure.
Most philosophical or ethological attempts to understand behavior are made top down. To solve the hard nut of subjective experience we need a bottom up approach. Naturally there is no guaranty that the solution is identical to the biological original but we can define some indicators to verify the quality. This is natural science and there is no subjectivity at all.
The formulas in physics are not like the behavior of natural phenomena but the combination of the observables again gives an observable value we can calculate by the formula.
Wilfried,
Early ethologists, most especially Von Uexkull, were a kind of behaviorist but they did not consider organisms as black boxes without structure. In fact they were early cyberneticians and were at the same time animal phenomenologist. Human phenomenology is natural to us since we have privilege access to our our experience. But animal phenomenology , accessing the experience of other animals than ourself is less direct. Von Uexkull used the biological structure of the animal and its behavior that is contrainted by this animal structure and its relation with other life and non-life. All pet owner can testify that animal phenomenology is not as difficult than it first appear to be. The reason is that we are biologically and emotionally very similar to our pets and so are able to effectively empathise with them. But very few of us have insects as pet. This say that we have less in common with them and so this render our empathy more difficult. It is why most people assume that insects have no emotions. If you look at any mammals we natually empathise with them and so directly experience the kind of emotions they experience. The eye contacts of dogs or cats is very expressive. The eye contacts with insect is not for us. Their faces are almost monstruous for us and they are many circumstances when we have to walk on them and crush them. All that do not prepare us positively to consider seriously that they are living being with emotions. Do you sympathise with bed bugs or with the mosquitos? They are a few cultural exception to this general prejudice against insects: Jainism. '' Mahavira taught that the doctrine of non-injury must cover all living beings, and causing injury to any being in any form creates bad karma which affects one's rebirth and future well-being and suffering.'' First ethical principle:
''Ahimsa (Non-violence or Non-injury). Mahavira taught that every living being has sanctity and dignity of its own and it should be respected just as one expects one's own sanctity and dignity to be respected. Ahimsa is formalised into Jain doctrine as the first and foremost vow. The concept applies to action, speech, and thought.''
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahavira
This is in stark contrast to the modern anti-life zeitgeist.
The appearance of emotion, a particularly human trait defined particularly for human behaviour, is not necessarily there because it appears to be. Nevertheless, there are some animals that demonstrate emotion of a limited kind to do with limited environmental reactions. A lion expresses cognitive traits (different I know but pertinent) when hunting but no obvious cognitive traits otherwise. Animals have been observed mourning, but does it bear the same related relevance of human beings? Do they realise Mother or just protector? Can they embody affection? Externalise emotion for reference? an essential part of human emotion.
the way they react to climate change like temperature and humidity indicates that are well versed with emotions.
Stanley,
we do not know really but the mammalian animals are not so far from us in evolution that they are totally different. With insects the evolutionary distance is greater and their bodily constitution, communication and social life is also very different. The behavior may indicate emotional states but we are not sure in that point. So the initial question is a good possibility to discuss the problem.
Louis,
thank you for your information about Hinduism. I know Jainism as extrem part of Hinduism. Ahimsa was a central point in the philosophy of Gandhi.
You may be right with Behaviorism. To reduce Behaviorism to the black box is not totally correct even if Skinner did it.
Wilfried, Louis,
we seem to agree on several important premises in this debate. However, we seem to differ on whether mental states must include conscious qualities or not. So, I will try to sketch my reasons more clearly:
The view that the mind seems to include radically subjective qualities is what fueled classic (e.g. Cartesian) skepticism. Here, the idea is that another person can never really know whether anyone else has a mind. An extreme related position is solipsism.
However, this skeptic position fell out of favor when philosophers and scientists began to look more closely to what we actually do when we attribute mental states: Obviously, we do not look "inside" another person in order to gather evidence for our mental state attributions. Therefore, anything that can only be "on the inside", i.e. inaccessible to an observer, can play no part in the attribution (this was Wittgenstein's point: it can play no part in the "Sprachspiel/language game"). Hence, the common-sense attribution of mental properties, such as "he/she thinks this or that", or "he/she feels this or that", must be based on objective criteria -- criteria accessible to observation.
It is common to think of behaviorists as having gone too far in the opposite direction: they tried to focus on laws underlying observable behavior only. Subsequent philosophical traditions after the "cognitive turn", such as functionalists, took the more moderate stance, which is common till this day:
The idea is that mental states are indeed something cognitive (i.e. not reducible to outward behavior), but that they are whatever explains the outward behavior.
And from this idea, multiple realization was born: Whatever realizes the observable phenomena in question is the mental state.
This functionalist idea that the attribution of mental states serves the explanation of observable phenomena is perhaps the presently most successful view of the mind, and I admit that I am personally quite partial to it. It seems the reasons for accepting functionalism, as sketched above, are sound; are they not? We want to avoid subjectivist conceptions of mental states, since they seem to shed doubt on the validity of our common-sense mental state attributions. Yet, consciousness is real from a first-person perspective. What better reason for judging first person attribution of consciousness to be independent from functional mental state attribution?
Again, this is not to say that mental states often do have subjective, phenomenal qualities. It just says that they do not need to have them in order for us to attribute them.
And this becomes virulent in the case of judging whether animals have certain mental states: Obviously, observation alone is not enough to judge whether they have private mental states - only that they have the mental states which explain the outward behavior, e.g. functional (possibly non-conscious) mental states.
Joachim,
Wittgenstein had probably an Aspergers’s Syndrome and thus a deficience in its ability to judge the mental state of others which does not mean that he is wrong in its theorizing on this but …
It is in fact quite obvious that our empathic capacities are partly based on observable evidence. Note that all mammals express their feeling and this essential into their living together.. All mammals are able to interprete the mental state of their fellow mammals. Take the sense of vision.. Vision is partly based on the images formed in the eyes, but it bring forth an amoungous amount of visual knowledge to the task and the task is done into the context of the action being performed. Since we have more or less the same body of our fellow human and share a common culture, this render our perception of their emotion and feeling and intentions of our fellow humans natural. Babies started this kind of mutual mental state attribution with the mother eye contact while breast feeding. So even without language we are like all primate expect at inferring other feeling from bodily expression. With language, and other forms of arts, the possibilities of entering each other consciousness become complete. Reading my text here make you share my mental vision, so we live a common dream here. This dream is enacted not entirely by the text but mostly by what you bring forth towards its interpretation.
‘’ The idea is that mental states are indeed something cognitive (i.e. not reducible to outward behavior), but that they are whatever explains the outward behavior.’’
They do not explan all the outward behavior. For example, if I lace my show lace with my fingers. I do not have have particular mental states about the movement of my fingers, in fact I am not conscious of the exact movement of my fingers and have no mental state about these movements and the observer should not try to infer my feeling from these movement. But the fact that I lace my shoe is obviously an intention that I have and that I carrying on while lacing my shoe. When I observe other persons, I do it not as an objective observer but primarily as an insider of what it is like to be a person and interpret them from this insider stand point. All the senses operate that way. When you hear the sound of animal step, the sound are interpreted by your own motor system and so can be interpreted as a walking animal through the very sensory-motor of a walking animal. Music and dance stem from this. The mammalian imagination is a system of empathic sensing of other mammals and the transition to humanity is the capacity to consciously self-enact the mammalian imagination a bit like in dream indepently of the contexts of actions where it came from.. The attribution of mental state is at the basis of mammalian imagination. When you look at boxer, you do not only look with you eyes, you enact their movements with your own motor system in order to feel what they feel.
And from this idea, multiple realization was born: Whatever realizes the observable phenomena in question is the mental state.
This functionalist idea that the attribution of mental states serves the explanation of observable phenomena is perhaps the presently most successful view of the mind, and I admit that I am personally quite partial to it. It seems the reasons for accepting functionalism, as sketched above, are sound; are they not? We want to avoid subjectivist conceptions of mental states, since they seem to shed doubt on the validity of our common-sense mental state attributions. Yet, consciousness is real from a first-person perspective. What better reason for judging first person attribution of consciousness to be independent from functional mental state attribution?
‘’
The modern cognitive scientists have a kind of memory lost. They rarely remember 19th century romantic ideas. For example:
For Dilthey, Hodges argues, "it is a fundamental characteristic of mental life that in one way or another it expresses or “objectifies” itself: " and "expression is the medium through which we know other minds.” He offers the following instance:
''. . . I see a human figure in a downcast attitude, the face marked with tears ; these are the expressions of grief, and I cannot normally perceive them without feeling in myself a reverberation of the grief which they express. Though native to another mind than mine, and forming part of a mental history which is not mine, it none the less comes alive in me, or sets up an image or reproduction of itself (Nachbild) in my consciousness. Upon this foundation all my understanding of the other person is built.
.....This power of expressions to evoke what they express is the basis of all communication and all sharing of experience between human beings. It is not an inferential process. When I see the stricken figure I do not begin by recognizing the attitude as the attitude typical of grief, and conclude from this that the person before me is experiencing grief. The mere sight of the expression awakens in me an immediate response, not intellectual, but emotional, feeling arouses feeling with no other intermediary than the expression itself. Dilthey remarks that what happens in me on such an occasion is the same as what happens in the other person whom I understand, only as it were in reverse. In him a lived experience has externalized itself in an expression. in me, a perceived expression has internalized itself in the shape of a Nachbild of the experience expressed. Guided by the other person 's expression, I live over 'again (nacherlebe) his experience in my own consciousness, and this is the essence of understanding. “To reproduce is to re live" (Nachbilden ist eben ein Nacherleben).
.....When I thus re live someone's experience, the Nachbild of his experience in my mind both is and is not a part of my own mental history. It is, in the sense that it is I who am conscious of it, it belongs to my unity of apperception. It is not, in the sense that it is not my personal response to circumstances affecting me personally, but a reflection in me of someone else's response to circumstances affecting him. It is, so to say, distanced from the stream of my own life, eingeklammert or bracketed off', and ascribed by me to the other person. This again is not an act of deliberate judgment. I do not begin by observing the presence of a feeling in my mind and then judge that it is a reflection of something in his, but it is immediately projected and perceived by me as his. This projection Dilthey calls a “transposition of myself “(Uebertragung, Transposition, Sichhineinversetzen). It means perceiving the other person as possessed of an inner life essentially like my own, and so “rediscovering myself in the Thou " (das Verstehen ist ein Wiederfinden des Ich im Du). (Hodges, 1949, 14-15)
Source: http://c-cs.us/configuring/Dilthey.html
Louis,
I agree.
" The mammalian imagination is a system of emphatic sensing of other mammals ...". We know the mental state of others enabled by the mirror neurons which activate the same expression we see and in this way we understand. This means to understand our surrounding with our bodily reactions. Self we are the key to interpret our living fellows.
Joachim,
" The idea is that mental states are indeed something cognitive ..."
The cognitive turn is the only way to find reasons for the activity of mammalian creatures. Naturally we do not know what is in the mind of our fellows but we try to explain the bodily expressions by mental states in a sense we would have showing the observed behavior. This is the scientific method of ethology. I agree with you, neither we do not know whether the mentioned states are true or not, nor whether there are such mental states.
The same problem is with subjective experiences. We do not know. However, there are good reasons to believe that they exist - simply because we have them as well, and we are not completely different from other beings we are descended from (unless you belong to an extreme religious belief).
The cognitive turn in ethology is extremely important but not enough. The abstruse idea of zombies, which behave like humans, but had no subjective sensation, was able to thrive on this newly acquired breeding ground. This is just nonsense.
I am sure there is a very good reason to have subjective experiences and we should try to find them. This would mark the next turn in ethology and in artificial ethology as well.
Louis,
thank you very much for the interesting quote! It is probably true that cognitive scientists suffer from this memory loss you describe; yet, the idea you describe - that some perceptions automatically trigger mental states in us, especially perceptions of expressions of these very same mental states - is very much alive, e.g. in neuroscience with the notion of "mirror neurons" (as Wilfried noted).
I will comment on what I think is a key paragraph in what you quoted:
"This power of expressions to evoke what they express is the basis of all communication and all sharing of experience between human beings. It is not an inferential process. (...) The mere sight of the expression awakens in me an immediate response, not intellectual, but emotional, feeling arouses feeling with no other intermediary than the expression itself."
This notion of "inference" here is ambiguous. It is of course not a conscious, rational inference. This distinction between inferential and automatic mirrors the distinction between fast and slow cognitive processes (made popular by Kahnemann, but actually at work in a lot of academic psychological work today). Yet, it is clearly not the case that the mental state of person A directly causes that same mental state in person B who observes person A. The idea is more along the following lines:
Mental state of person A causes bodily expression by person A; person B perceives/observes bodily expression of A; there is some causal relation between B's perception and B's mental states which ensures that a mental state is evoked in B which "mirrors" that of A.
The "inference" in this case is the causal relation between B's perception and B's "mirrror mental state". The principles underlying this relation form what I called a "theory", and, with expression and observation serving as mediators, it makes most sense to think of both as functional: Whatever causes the expression is the mental state in question, and whatever causes B to mirror A is the "mental mirror process".
In sum, functionalism is alive and well in this picture, and nowhere do we need to postulate some necessary connection between the sketched process of mental-state-attribution and consciousness; indeed, Occam's Razor suggests we should do away with it.
Wilfried,
I agree with you. However, I think the perception of philosophical thought experiments involving "zombies" is somewhat distorted. In my view, at least, the idea is simply that the metaphysics of mental states (e.g. functionalism) allows there to be such zombies. Of course, this does not mean that it is at all reasonable to expect us to meet such zombies, or to even think that we might go wrong in our attributions of consciousness to one another, on the risk that our peers might be "zombies"!
Rather, it is the success of the theory of mental state attribution which justifies our attributions. It is inductive success, I believe. Similarly, skepticism is based on a fallacy when stressing that we might go wrong in our attributions. It's the same as going wrong when doing empirical science: The mere fact that we can go wrong does not undermine the entire endeavor.
Joachim,
"... the idea is simply that the metaphysics of mental states (e.g. functionalism) allows there to be such zombies. Of course, this does not mean that it is at all reasonable to expect us to meet such zombies ".
I agree with you, it is only a thought experiment or an extreme expression of functionalism. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking has followers in the AI scene which try to program human like robotic systems. It's a challenge, but the effort will be limited unless we do not understand subjective experiences.
I also deny the possibility of these so-called zombies, without consciousness and without qualia (which amounts to the same thing) to act exactly the same way humans or other beings do, who have qualia and a form of consciousness. Here functionalism is not detailed enough and the evidence is incomplete, it's just an assertion.
This video will leave no doubt although few insects were part in it https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tussa6KKCZU
Wilfried,
I agree: given an explanation of human organisms in a broadly evolutionary framework, phenomenal consciousness should serve some purpose.
In my opinion, the current version of functionalism (i.e. that which implies independence of having a mental state from having phenomenal consciousness) is implied by a theory of what we do when we ascribe mental states. And it is absolutely impossible for our attribution of mental states to require knowledge of someone else's phenomenal consciousness. Otherwise, - since having concepts is an intersubjective matter - we would not even have concepts of mental states.
If in the future we would find out that there is a natural law linking phenomenal consciousness and observable behaviour, then this situation would change, and functionalism would not imply anymore that we can attribute mental states without knowledge of phenomenal consciousness. But if that natural law does exist, we are far from discovering it. (And I would agree with classic Thomas Nagel that we do not even know how we could discover it!)
Hence, while there are perhaps ways to attribute mental states to insects based on our observations of them, there is no way to attribute phenomenal consciousness to them.
It's already long established how to simply determine self-awareness in animals, by getting them to confront themselves in a mirror. If an animal that comes to understand that what they see in the mirror is but a reflection of itself, then this is seen as proof of animal self-awareness. Dogs for example keep barking at their reflection since they think it's another dog. Insects surely haven't come to recognize themselves in mirrors. However, the question pertains to whether they have the ability to feel emotions. The question itself should be more specific in the first place, and for instance focus on the eu-social insects, that exhibit complex behaviour within complex societies, where some practice agriculture and rear other animals for their milk, while others built giant constructions complete with climate control systems to keep cool, and even underground networks to such an extend that they cover several continents.
Freek,
I think there is an ambiguity in the concept "emotion" similar to that in "mental state": Some will believe that having an emotion necessarily involve having the phenomenal experience characteristic of that emotion, whereas others will think that the attribution of emotions works via their functional characteristic (e.g. fear: aversion, anger: heightened aggression, etc.).
What I wrote above applies mutatis mutandis to emotions: The phenomenal quality cannot be a necessary part of the attribution, for we can never check whether anyone else "really" feels the phenomenal quality of the emotion.
Joachim,
I fully understand your statement above. Functionalism can principally not argue with phenomenal consciousness because it is not observable.
On the other side we try to understand reasons why some reactions are observed. Functionalism therefore try to assume some mental states (whatever it is) which are also not observable.
What is the difference between the attribution of 'mental states' and 'conscious mental states'?
The problem seems to be the lack of a theory of the need of subjective phenomenal states. Functionalism does not need such phenomenal states and functionalism is a powerful tool.
Insects Joachim, the question is about insects. "Some will believe". Who are some? It would be nice to see some sources. "Some believe" might have some meaning in an episode of "Ancient Aliens", but it means nothing, nada, when trying to construct a satisfactory scientific analysis or alike.
(By the way, you cannot use "mutatis mutandis" in this context, since the term refers to specific changes made to something or changes that occurred to something, and that are then applied to what follows in the same manner, e.g.changes proposed for a first contract apply mutatis mutandis to all other contracts.)
Wilfried,
I agree with you. I further believe that the concept of "realization" does the important job of relating function to actual object of empirical inquiry in cognitive science. If, say, a brain process qualifies as a realizer of a given mental state, then perhaps there is no principle way to separate phenomenal experience from function, since we should assume they are in some (to be discovered) way realized together in the brain. As a non-pathological human being, perhaps having a mental state of so-and-so kind just is having the associated phenomenal experience.
Freek,
in case you're not just deliberately trying to misconstrue my points in order to be able to patronize me, I'll offer some clarifications:
- Yes, I was indeed talking about insects. Insects are sub-group of animals, humans are another, and we tend to attribute mental states to all of them, but primarily humans. Many important things have already been said in this thread, such as how their similarity or dissimilarity to us affects our willingness to attribute mental states to animals.
- "Some believe" just means that it is a matter of what you choose as your basic premises, or axioms, or conceptual definitions (such as "the meaning of an emotion term necessarily encompasses the characteristic phenomenal quality"), and we have seen both positions I mention already defended in this very thread. If you prefer an argument from authority, I will leave it to you to scour the debate on emotions in philosophical psychology for the respective positions. Off the top of my head, I believe James, Damasio, Dennett and Fodor will (pair-wise) fall on the relevant opposing ends in the spectrum I opened above.
- I used mutatis mutandis in exactly that way: We swap the kind of mental state (e.g. thoughts with emotions), then the rest applies in the same manner.
Joachim,
'''perhaps having a mental state of so-and-so kind just is having the associated phenomenal experience.''
Some of our phenomenal experiences are about our body states (being tired, hunger, pain, being touched, etc, difficulty with an articulation, etc) but most of our experiences are about our action in the world, what is going on totally outside of our body and for humans most particularly what is going on with other humans around us and our societies, etc... We may argued the same for other animals. So when in the above state a correlation is made between a particular physiological state in the brain and an experience, is left out of the correlation with the action in the world which is the one Nature evolution has established. Organism are not self-contained entities which can be understood in their internal organisation but are agents in interaction in the world which can only understood through this interaction in the world and our phenomenal experience is a direct testimony of that. The designer of a machine, or a robot does need to understand the interaction of the machine of the robot in order to design it but the machine itself do not include these considerations. The machine can be described in itself leaving out the interaction. Living organisms are growing interactions and are about what is going on mostly in this interaction which is not contain within the physical boundary of the organism body. The organism body do not contain the whole of the life of the organism, the life of the organism is in the interaction, the action in the world and not only within the limit of the bodily surface. The phenomenal consciousness is about the whole interaction and most of it is physically located outside the organism body.
We are told that all living organisms strive to survive or to contnue their life and this is very deep into our physiology. But it also seem t be very deep, ever deeper in ourself that the life of our love one, our children or parents or group may be even more important as is testified by heroic deeds where one put risk his life to save other life. Even animals often do these kind of heroic deeds. This is natural in the paradigm that at a deepest level of all organism, the organism does not see the most important part of his life as under his skin but in the family group it participated into and that part survive biological death, a higher form of life seem to be internal to all forms of life. This view does not easily enter the machine metaphor that is at the core of all sciences by necessity of language and method.
Joachim, your speculations don't get you - or any of us - anywhere. You'll have to come up with sources to back up your meanderings. After all, this is a science forum.
Louis,
there are indeed many important differences between organisms and machines. The most important, for this discussion, is perhaps that machines have designers (/engineers), and organisms do not. However, I do believe a combination of teleological approaches, which says that the intentional content of a mental state depends on its function - which is of course in some way relational (i.e. depends on things external to the state's bearer), and in the case of organisms, etiological, (i.e. depending on evolutionary history) -, and computationalism, which not so much stresses the similarity between organism and machine, but between computational processes in machines and minds, is up to the challenge.
Roughly, the idea is that mental content is determined by etiological relations. Dretske's old example is that some bacteria have organismic processes/states directed at anoxic water, because evolutionary pressure has shaped their organismic makeup in that way. This is not to say that human mental states are exhaustively shaped by evolution (clearly, we do learn maths and so on), but the analogy should go far enough with a few adjustments.
And computationalism just says that internal organismic processes "compute" input in order to form an output conforming to the teleological (evolutionary/social(...) function.
And in order to satisfy Freek's craving for references:
- Dretske, F. (1986): “Misrepresentation”, in: R. Bogdan, ed., Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 17-36.
- Millikan, R. (1989): “Biosemantics”, in Journal of Philosophy 86: 281–97.
- Millikan, R. (1993): White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
- Neander, K. (1995): “Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning”, in: Philosophical Studies 79: 109–41.
- Gualtiero Piccinini (2015). Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yes, they do have emotions and even they feel them..
Please follow the links, may helpful and useful
http://chittkalab.sbcs.qmul.ac.uk/ClintPub/2017_Clint_JExB.pdf
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5561/251342cbdbee8bd9a7045c843af6a3efbe9e.pdf
http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1213&context=asj
Gopikrshna,
thank you for your interesting links. They are indeed helpful.
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