Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of language games maintained that each discipline has its own rules for what is true and false. Hence what is false in the field of history may be true in the field of religion. What do you think?
Nothing can be true and untrue simultaneously, but many statements may be apparently true in one discipline but not in another due to different usage of relevant terms: e.g. for an astrophysician sulphur or phosphorus (like any element except hydrogen and helium) are metals, for a gastronomer or economist "salt" is only NaCl - the terminology of chemists is in both cases different, so can their conclusions seemingly be. This is e.g. the source of frequent confusion introduced by some scientists applying philosophical terminology to e.g. biology ("species are individuals" &c.)
I do believe this is true not just between different disciplines but even within a single discipline. This is why we have something called "DEBATE'.
Nooooooooo !!!!
Again I know one thing and only ONE : Universal truths are few the rest is a myth !!
People believe in myths so is true , because a large group believes it or is it false because of contradiction purported by some other !!!
Why Prof !! Why do you want to know my confusion(s) :)
Dear Dr. MacGregor:
I think you are absolutely right and you chose a very good supporting argument.
No, if a thing can be true and false according two disciplines, one is or the two disciplines are false.
Yes, for example, when something is considered convincingly as an alternative treatment to improve cognitive and emotional intelligence, the case of Ginkgo biloba; This is totally false in western medical therapy, where properties such as improving vascular circulation, both general and cerebral due to its antiplatelet effect and platelet adhesive, are recognized, as well as a slight improvement in alertness due to its stimulating effect. of synaptic connections.
Interesting question. Truth is not absolute in research. A considered truth in one field can be refuted as false in the same or different discipline. That has been the beauty and progression of scientific research.
I think this question is one of the most controversial question in the religious and history fields.I believe in theory of course yes but in reality it's not that easy to answer or act.
if you really want to figure it out you must study a lot about history and contradictions in it and ask many opinions from various people until you realize what is going on when one thing is so false in one discipline can be so true in another.
Yes because we in department of earth sciences believe that earth was formed about 3.7billion years ago, a theory Christian religious consider as a false
No. What is believed to be true in one discipline might be believed (or even known) to be false in another discipline, e.g. some claims of astrology vs. the corresponding claims of psychology, or vs. the corresponding claims of astronomy. The beliefs of both disciplines might of course be false but they can't both be true.
Apparent cases of truth relativity that initially seem incontrovertible can be resolved by recognizing that although the words used to express the belief may be the same, the proposition expressed thereby is different, so there is no real conflict. A science like metereology that still employs Newtonian notions is not disagreeing with Einstein. Its propositions have a different implicit ceteris paribus condition.
If words and sentence structure create reality, as some philosophers hold, then false and true are unsupportable terms. While what is false is designated so by a particular frame of reference, it has no value alongside truth, which also has its own frame of reference. There is in addition another problem. I am true is merely subjective, as it has no objective value. Words and sentences you see!
The answers posted thus far support the statement I made earlier! The same truth can be accepted or rejected based on rational reasons.
@Stanley Wilkin
RE: words and sentence structure create reality
You need the reality already there to be carved up by the language. (Reality is the dough; language is a cookie cutter.) If you claim that truth and falsity are within a frame of reference, then you must also concede that one and the same thing cannot be true in one frame and false in another because you'd be expressing different propositions. (The cookie cutters of the different frames will cut out different shapes.)
@Amir W. Al-Khafaji
RE: The answers posted thus far support the statement I made earlier! The same truth can be accepted or rejected based on rational reasons.
Yes, and I'll give you a good example:
Suppose it's true that I am really 60 years old, but I have no rational grounds for believing it. According to my birth certificate and other documents, I am 62, not 60. My parents, long dead, always told me I was born as per my documents, there is an old newspaper birth announcement, etc. So on rational grounds I accept that I am 62. Unbeknownst to me, a scholar on the other side of the globe has unearthed documents, including my original birth certificate, indicating my family was in a witness protection program and establishing that all my evidence was falsified and that I am not 62, but 60. So here we have two people, one who accepts and one who rejects the same true propostion (namely, that I am 60) on rational grounds.
Note, however, that (1) this does not show that the propostion is true in one context and false in a different context, as some people seem to want to say; (2) nor does it show that the same truth can justifiably be accepted and rejected on the very same rational grounds. There is no truth relativism here.
Absolutely yes! But first, one has to be careful to define "true" and "false" correctly. True and false, in answering this questions, refers to whether or not a technique is permitted or encouraged, or whether such a technique is strictly verbotten. The only way to make this point is to provide examples.
It is true that in journalism, in the sciences, one has to use clear and unambiguous language, standard definitions for words. It is also true that in poetry and other forms of creative writing, one is permitted "creative license." One is even permitted to invent words. In poetry, one is even permitted to mispronouce words, to make the rhyme flow better.
It is true that in the sciences, one must question, verify, reproduce results. In religion, instead, one must take facts on faith. Precisely the opposite as science. You make a nuisance of yourself, in religion, if you doggedly demand "proof."
It is true that in English, double negatives are discouraged, create ambiguity, sound ignoramus. In French, double negatives are perfectly acceptable, and in fact, mandatory. In English, "I have never seen this." You don't say "I haven't never seen this." In French, "Je ne l'ai jamais vu." You cannot say, in French, "Je l'ai jamais vu."
There are tons of examples such as these. What holds true in one discipline does not have to hold true in other disciplines.
My evaluation of an historical point, or event, employs a certain language to convey the possibility, improbability, probability of something that happened in the past according to other similar language frames. Those frames are constructed upon other language frames that may or may not be similar to the ones I am using through another frame that seeks to position the information (philosophical, political, aesthetic).
Historical truth is therefore whatever exists at a certain point based upon the frames existing above. The truth therefore remains contingent existing within a particular moment or event.
@Stanley Wilkin,
Highfalutin generalities tend to befuddle me. I can't see what you would make of a simple historical truth like "German armed forces invaded Poland in 1939". It was a contingent event in the sense that it wasn't logically necessary for it to happen, i.e. it might possibly not have happened, had conditions been different. Maybe it was not contingent, in the sense that it was causally necessary that it had to happen given those conditions. But surely it did happen, contingently or not. Frames are contingent, I guess; George Orwell showed that in his 1984. Histories as a cultural product expressed within a language and a frame are contingent and can be revised for good or ill, for accurancy or propaganda. But what happened still happened. I don't think you mean to deny this, but ....
Perhaps we should just adopt the practice of journalists and speak of alleged truth?
@Albert Manfredi
RE: It is true that in English, double negatives are discouraged, create ambiguity, sound ignoramus. In French, double negatives are perfectly acceptable, and in fact, mandatory....What holds true in one discipline does not have to hold true in other disciplines.
Ha ha. Nice move. I like it. You've revealed an ambiguity in the question. Your example is about what holds true of a discipline or a language at a meta-level, i.e. it is a claim about the method and language of a discipline rather than about what is said using that method and language.
Yes: The grammatically correct way to say the English "I have never seen this" is the French "Je ne l'ai jamais vu" and vice versa, and what's true of double-negations in French is false of double-negations in English, and vice versa. However, if I encounter something odd and say "I have never seen this" and then repeat myself in French, I would have said something that is either true both times or else false both times.
Also, we talk in English about other languages by quoting them, so I can in fact deploy French double-negation in English, as you did in your answer, without violating English grammar. However, French double-negations aren't the same as English double-negations (e.g. they are spelt differently), so we aren't really talking about the same things, are we? ;)
Cheers.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear MacGregor & readers,
The question strikes me as an unhappy one. Usage of terms may certainly differ from one discipline to another. Its quite a large step from that to thinking that truths differ from one discipline to another. The question seems not well formed.
You wrote:
Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of language games maintained that each discipline has its own rules for what is true and false.
--End quotation
I doubt that Wittgenstein said any such thing. (Do you have a quotation?) The point of talk of "language games" is substantially to illustrate the interrelations of linguistic usage and relevant activities or practices. "To understand a language," Wittgenstein says, "is to understand a form of life." The idea that everyone has his or her "own game," or that linguistic practices are arbitrary or trivial is alien to Wittgenstein's thought.
H.G. Callaway
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Son,
What exactly is it that "may be possible"?
Do you have an illustration of what you have in mind?
H.G. Callaway
Surely, he was referring to the layered nature of language other than in its obvious forms (rthetorical, directive, written), which surely implies levels of falsification.
Language connected to activity must contain with it false usage in that all activities can be misunderstood and performed poorly.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Wilkin,
It is not exactly clear to me to whom you may be replying or posing questions.
However, once the above attribution to Wittgenstein has been challenged, then in a scholarly context, this would seem to shift the burden of argument to those wanting to defend the cogency of the question above.
Where is the quotation from Wittgenstein?
H.G. Callaway
It is possible that one and the same thing is considered correct in one discipline and false in another. This should give rise to further scientific investigations.
Yes ! You can assume the earth to be spherical in some surveying applications, or even flat , you can’t do that in applied gravimetry. Or geodesy.
Dear Kirk,
As H.G. Callaway stressed, it is only a terminological question. Eg. what do you think under true and false? And so we can start a long academic discussion.
My short answer is No. May aspect of thinking is different.
Nothing can be true and untrue simultaneously, but many statements may be apparently true in one discipline but not in another due to different usage of relevant terms: e.g. for an astrophysician sulphur or phosphorus (like any element except hydrogen and helium) are metals, for a gastronomer or economist "salt" is only NaCl - the terminology of chemists is in both cases different, so can their conclusions seemingly be. This is e.g. the source of frequent confusion introduced by some scientists applying philosophical terminology to e.g. biology ("species are individuals" &c.)
I would like to respond, but I do not specialize in this topic. I will also read the answers of fellow researchers, to learn from them. Greetings.
In fact the original question leads itself to the above concerns, as the example from Wittgenstein poses additional problems in the nature of true and false assertions from one discipline to another.
Aside from the above, the term analyse changes if used within various disciplines as if history/or classics (which I teach) was approached from the use made of the word in business (which I have taught) than very little investigation of a perceived problem would be done. Were the Israelites mentioned by king Mernephah the same as those in the Bible would be analysed for its use, not its truth, while in history the matter would be considered for its truth (that is if there is evidence of a relationship that can be constantly verified) and relationship. Entirely different matters.
Responding to Karl Pfeifer:
It's perhaps true that the question is ambiguous, but then, that's why I began by explaining what "truth" means, in this context. I really do not think that my three examples were far-fetched. And as I said, there are many, many such examples.
Let's take table manners. In some parts of the world, it is "true," and in no uncertain terms, that slurping your soup, or making loud chewing noises, are considered quite rude. You don't want to sit next to people doing that, let's say at a restaurant. It grates. And yet, in other parts of the world, such table manners are completely accepted, indicating that you are fully relishing the meal. (In fact, in Europe, table manners are far more codified than they are in the US, and such practices as constantly shifting your fork from right hand to left hand, say as you cut your meat, is considered quite rude too. Like, where did he grow up? Fork in left hand, knife in right hand, and learn to be just a little ambidextrous.)
So really, this answers Kirk's question. If I asked you, "Is it true that you must not slurp your soup in polite company?" The only correct answer is, "Yes or no, depending where you are."
Or, more precisely responding to the "disciplines" aspect of the question. When assembling the frame of a house, you must drive nails all the way, to make joints tight. That is true. But when installing siding, you must not drive home nails. You must leave some slack, to permit the siding to expand and contract.
Two disciplines, two sets of truths, concerning how nails must be installed.
Hello again, Albert Manfredi:
Okay, here's what we've got so far and which is not in dispute:
True: When assembling the frame of a house, you must drive nails all the way, to make joints tight.
False: When assembling the frame of a house, you must not drive home nails. You must leave some slack, to permit the siding to expand and contract.
True: When installing siding, you must not drive home nails. You must leave some slack, to permit the siding to expand and contract.
False: When installing siding, you must not drive home nails, you must drive nails all the way, to make joints tight.
From this you've concluded: "Two disciplines, two sets of truths, concerning how nails must be installed". I’m tempted to say it’s all about one discipline, building construction, and “you must (not) drive home nails” simply is an incomplete description of what must be done. Moreover, you've chosen prescriptive truths, which again seem to be methodological here. I don't know how to pursue your example further in a way that mirrors academic or scientific disciplines which have both methodological/metalevel truths and conclusions arrived at by implementing those truths in conducting their scholarly or empirical research. However, Kirk’s question was about the disciplines of History and Religion. So let’s try those, with a toy example:
Religion: Events described in the bible should be accepted on faith. (True methodological/metalevel claim)
History: Events described in the bible should be not accepted on faith. (True methodological/metalevel claim)
So you would be right as regards the methodological or metalevel; something is true of religion that is false of history and vice versa. However, these methodological or metalevel truths/falsehoods, when implemented, will also result in opposed conclusions about events, with Religion claiming that a certain event did or did not happen and History claiming the opposite. I am arguing that such opposed conclusions cannot both be true, even if, as you correctly allow, a methodological truth of one discipline might be a methodological falsehood in another. I.e. while it might be true (or false) that a certain methodological principle obtains in a certain discipline, its truth (or falsity) does not necessarily transfer to the results of deploying that principle in a way that supports truth-relativity of those results.
But I'm still intrigued by your nailing example. Can you see a way of extending the analogy to mirror academic or scientific disciplines? Thank you.
I think that the common ground to all disciplines is logic or at least it should be. Without going any deeper what is exactly true or false, generally the truth and falsehood is the result of propositions that must be proved.
Propositions include assertions about relations amongst elements included in propositions. Assuming laws of logic are common and immutable, the meaning and scope of the elements included in proposition depends on assumptions, knowledge and interpretation. Given uncertainty in meanings and irrational bias of some disciplines, the result may vary. For example:
Theological proofs of God stay in conflict with Kant's philosophical claims that God can never be proved or disproved. At least one side must be wrong.
H Karl, it's not entirely clear to me that you can differentiate between "methodological" and other types of truths. Or said another way, I could probably make the case that just about any type of "truth" can be argued to be "methodological." For instance, in the matter of religion vs history, it's not just raw "facts" that may be in disagreement, but perhaps more importantly, it is the methodology.
In history and in science, you are required to examine multiple independent sources to even pretend to come up with "truth." If you don't see concurrence, you don't proclaim "truth." Cold fusion is in doubt, for example, because it couldn't be independently verified. Whereas in religion, you examine only one text, or one set of "approved" texts, and ignore the rest.
I've used this example before. In religion, you are expected to argue what consitutes "truth" very much like a physicist would argue that classical mechanics is "truth," while relativity is "false," by concentrating only on classical mechanics texts. So for example, such a physicist would claim that time dilation is false, because his classical physics texts, and Isaac Newton, didn't consider it.
This seems similar to the nail issue. You could argue that we are talking "methodology," i.e. the "methodology" of determining what constitutes "truth," but isn't that going to extremes? In fact, one side says time dilation is real, the other says it is false.
I'd say, the veracity of what the Bible describes, as opposed to what history books might describe as being actual events, is just barely scratching the surface. The more fundamental problem is how we determine "truth." If that methodology doesn't agree, then nothing else matters.
Hi Albert,
I used the term methodological for want of a better word. What the so-called methodological truths have in common is that they are prescriptive, rather than descriptive: they tell us what we "ought" , "should" or "must" do to be operating within a certain discipline. Some people even take the view that prescriptions are really disguised imperatives and therefore don't really have a truth-value, although I myself don't hold that view.
The classical texts in religion and physics, even though they may be used similarly, they are arrived at differently (e.g. revelation vs empirical research), and in physics they are revisable, so the analogy only takes you a short distance. But I do see a problem with truth per se. Most truth claims in science should be considered tentative. Rather than claiming for some P, that P is true, they should really be claiming only that probably-P is true.
Yes, some physicists do treat their classical texts as inviolable, in effect treating them as prescriptive. (I guess that’s why we end up having scientific revolutions, or at least changings of the guard.)
You say ‘The more fundamental problem is how we determine "truth." If that methodology doesn't agree, then nothing else matters.’ I think I agree with that. The trouble is that when methodologies don’t agree, people want to make it matter, which leads to truth relativism. With some conflicting methodologies, such relativism doesn’t matter; there may be no independent fact of the matter, e.g. whether parallel lines meet, and what one accepts as “true” is pragmatic rather than categorical. But in such cases we can still qualify and say, with geometry G they meet, with geometry H they don’t, thus resolving the conflict. For many opposed historical and religious claims, however, there are in principle independent facts of the matter that preclude such resolution.
Hmm, this question has generated a lot of heat and perhaps some light. I agree with those writers who have sought to differentiate between contextually and contingently defined knowledge and knowledge that represents a "higher order." The first knowledge domain consists of propositions derived on the basis of observations made within a particular context and under specific conditions (contingencies). The second knowledge domain might either "approach TRUTH" or be "TRUTH" because it represents facts that transcend multiple contexts and/or sets of contingencies. So, my response to the question is that there are clearly principles and propositions that are relevant and useful to one domain and irrelevant or problematic in another domain.
The rules in each game are independent of any other. Then I think it should not be because it is.
Regards!!
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