Mary,

Perhaps Heidegger signifies epistemological structures 'pregnant' with meaning? The generic horizons of understanding (from hammers to hotels) from which Dasein always already tacitly projects the meaning of her/his material environment as equipment (Zeug) can thus be said to be pregnant with potential meaning.

Tony

I'm no specialist, but I think what he means is that the same ontological structures characterize both the authentic and the inauthentic Dasein, even though they have very different ways of being (i.e. they are ontically different). A rock, for example (i.e. a being that can and should be addressed by way of categories) could never ‘go wrong’ without ceasing to be what it is, while the Dasein can (i.e. can be inauthentic without becoming something else altogether). As it is sometimes the case with Heidegger, the whole paragraph seems to be a bit of a tautology (the Dasein is Dasein regardless of its actual mode of being) disguised under some rather pompous words...

I'll give it a go...

As I read the top of page 70 in BT, it's not only 'average structures' that we can speak in terms of when we talk about our kind of being (Dasein) i.e. in our average everyday, factical mode of going about our typical dealings with things in the  everyday mode (basically, Division I is focused on this), but that there is a deeper ontological structure that is 'behind' it i.e. that I am fragile, vulnerable i.e. being-towards-death, have a primordial sense of 'unsettledness' as a Grundstimmung (fundamental mood of anxiety), that I am fundamentally faced with how I am with others (Mitdasein) as an ontological given, and so on, all of which are part of the underlying ontological structure. These are implicit, pregnant, since they provide a more primordial, or fundamental ontological meaning to the ontic everyday mode of being, and are not operating on the average everyday 'level'.  

Thank you all for your answers, they have been very thought provoking..

I don't know what happened but I added an answer twice after Tony's response using my iPad but the answers did not appear?

Tony, do you mean referential structures, "totality of equipment" and how the world is disclosed to Dasein? That perhaps reference involvements are structures full of deeper meaning?

Ciprian, I don't understand what you mean by

" the same ontological structures characterize both the authentic and the inauthentic Dasein, even though they have very different ways of being (i.e. they are ontically different). "

I understand your explanation about ontical structures and the Being of other entities such as the example you gave of a rock. The rock exists ontically as do human beings. However, how are the two modes of Dasein's Being (authentic and inauthentic) ontically different? These are ontological structures, are they not?

Mo, after reading Tony's answer I went back to reading the paragraphs again both in German and in English. Your answer is close to what I was thinking after further reading and reflection on the English translation. When I read the paragraphs in German my interpretation is slightly different, however, my German skills don't translate into philosophical language.

I read "pragnanten Strukturen" as something concise or perhaps something of greater significance. This lead me to look at "The Principles of  Pragnanz" (simplicity and conciseness) which is related to Gestalt theory and is about how humans in reality make sense of  experience. Humans are said to do this by organising and prioritising based on familiarity, what we perceive to be of greatest significance to us; even though this might not be the case. (Stevenson, H. "Emergence: The Gestalt approach to change". internet source: www.clevelandconsultingggroup.com).

I can relate this back to Heidegger and attunement. In our average mode of everydayness, we are not attuned to the world until something disrupts our everyday way of being and we become more attuned to our experience. This triggers the totality of reference structure which is similar to the totality of equipment structure which allows us to make sense of the experience based upon our  concernful dealings with the world and our preontological understanding (which would precede any psychological theory). If we attune ourselves to the experience in a superficial manner, for example trying to make sense of it by making reference to what is already known to us, the true meaning remains hidden. Therefore the true nature of the experience can only be disclosed by delving deeper into the ontological structures which might not be apparent until a deeper level of attunement is reached.

Have I just managed to confuse everyone, or am I barking up the wrong tree?

Mary,

I think I might not have been clear enough. What I was trying to say is that there is an ontological difference between a rock and the Dasein. To be, for a rock, means subsisting (well, in a heideggerian context this might not be the best word, but anyway...), whereas for the Dasein to be means to be preoccupied with/by one's own being. For the Dasein, then, to be is essentially an activity, a 'doing' something. Now, this preoccupation with one's own being can be lived in two different manners, either in the form of running from oneself (i.e. in the form of understanding oneself within the horizon of intra-worldly beings, that is inauthentically), or in the form of coming to oneself (i.e. authentically, with all the characteristics mentioned by Mo above). But the former manner is essentially a way of 'hiding' or of obscuring (to oneself) the second one, which means that both authentic and inauthentic forms are essentially different ways of modulating the same ontological structures implied by the preoccupation with one's own being that is or that constitutes the being itself of the Dasein. This is how I make sense of the authentic/inauthentic relation (which is, no doubt, highly complicated and could probably be read in a number of different ways). But this reading seems to me to make some sense, since otherwise we rapidly get into difficulties (for example, in Mo's reply above, either the deeper ontological structures are 'behind', i.e. they are there, operating even though they are obscured, or they are said to be deeper in the sense that they are 'not operating on the average 'everyday' level', but in that case, if they are not operating, we need to wonder what makes them ontological structures in the first place, i.e. in what way they remain ontologically pertinent for the everyday Dasein for whom they are, precisely, not operating).

Mary,

Thanks for opening up this discussion. You write, 'In our average mode of everydayness, we are not attuned to the world until something disrupts our everyday way of being and we become more attuned to our experience.' We move from habitual pre-reflective experience (in which 'pre-understanding' is embedded) to reflection. In the latter mode, the 'projection' (and production) of participatory understanding ('being-with-others') become apparent - its 'pregnant' meaning is disclosed (or evident?) This meaning is 'deeper' - analysis can reveal its 'horizons of understanding' normally left unconsidered, tacitly incorporated in mundane activity. That's my reading anyway!

May I ask where at Glasgow Caledonian University Heidegger is taught? My PhD on hermeneutics and television audiences was at Glasgow University (published by Polity).

Regards,

Tony

Once again, thank you for your responses. The plot thickens as we present our individual interpretations of Heidegger's thought.

Ciprian, I especially like your explanation of the two modes of Dasein's Being (authenticity and inauthenticity) put this way, it is much easier for me to relate this to the context of my research. If I may, I might use this explanation in my thesis, providing you have no objections?

Your argument about deeper ontological structures in relation to Mo's response is interesting. I could clearly understand Mo's perspective until you added a twist to the mix. In my own research which involves exploring the decision-phase experience of women who have experienced a first AMI (acute myocardial infarction - heart attack) in an out of hospital context, Mo's perspective fits to what I have found.

In Tony's response, he suggests a movement from the habitual to reflective experience, and I think this is where what lies 'behind' can be exposed.

For example, when I arrived to interview one of my participants in her own home, she greeted me and asked if I found the street without difficulty. I laughed and told her that after looking up the address on the internet and looking at what information my sat nav had to offer, I remained totally confused as all the streets leading to the house were no longer in existence. In a redevelopment programme, new housing estates and roads had been built all around the small area where the participant lived. I commented that my husband had said that with my lack of a sense of direction, I would never find it. Due to confidentiality issues, I refused to let my husband have the address to help me locate the house, instead I used my good Scottish tongue and friendly people to make my way to the house; once in the general area.

I light heartedly commented that my husband had called me stupid for now allowing him to help me. The word stupid triggered an angry response from the woman. She 'reflected' on past experience and told me not to allow my husband to call me stupid because her husband had always called her stupid. Adding that it wasn't until after his death a few years earlier that she realised the lasting damage this remark had caused.

Bearing this in mind, I proceeded with the interview. The ontological structures of what it meant for this woman to be in a potentially life threatening situation became more evident as she revealed the decisions she had made. Each decision was tinged with issues of self worth and she revealed that her mood prior to, during and after the AMI experience was one of depression.

The explication of rich data from this woman's experiences provided me with a deeper understanding of what it meant for this woman to be in this particular situation. Looking back on my interview notes, I found other examples of how the general conversation prior to the interviews provided clues to deeper meaning.

So perhaps in answer to your question Ciprian about what makes these hidden structure ontological in the first place, lies in "mineness". If the woman's life choices and circumstances had been different, her decisions and choices during her illness trajectory might also have taken an alternative course. However, in each case the choice was her own and her habitual way of experiencing life appeared to be a method of coping. Nonetheless, the deeper structures were there to be explicated, with a casual word, thought or deed.

Tony, Heidegger is not taught formally at GCU, only a superficial introduction to his philosophy is offered. In preparation for my PhD experience, I undertook an advanced course in research methods and methodology. As part of this course, I was encouraged to explore the various underpinnings of different methodologies and  expand my knowledge. The controversy surrounding Heidegger's philosophy intrigued me and I delved further into his work. Secondary sources confused me more so I opted to study his original (early) works to guide my thesis.Therefore, I am self-taught which might explain why I get so confused.

Mary,

Thanks for a most thought provoking response. As you are probably already aware, Heidegger uses the idea of 'Lichtung' to designate moments of insight or enlightening - amidst the darkness of (inauthentic) habit (perhaps he had in mind a forest).

Capobianco comments on 'Lichtung' in Heidegger’s early Being and Time (1927) but translated (1962): ‘by the 1960’s Heidegger had fully purged his understanding of die Lichtung of any relation to Licht, so the translation of Lichtung as “clearing” in his statements of the 1960’s is much more in line with his explicit intentions. Even so, we should keep in mind that the German word Lichtung in the sense of “clearing” does have a linguistic relation to Licht/lichten in the sense of “lighting” and ”brightening”.’

(Capobianco, 2010: 116)

Perhaps when you write that 'the deeper structures were there to be explicated, with a casual word, thought or deed', you are referring to a moment of 'Lichtung'?

Incidentally, and more parochially, philosophy (much shaped towards the continental work of Hegel and Heidegger) thrived in a Social Theory degree at the University of the West of Scotland (formerly Paisley College) until the early 1980's - when it was closed down by the pre-parliamentary Scottish Office in Edinburgh.

Regards,

Tony

Tony,

Sorry for the delay in response and thank you so much for the information re University of the West of Scotland.

Yes, I did mean a moment of clarity 'lichtung' triggered by my words which inadvertently  prompted a response full of  meaning related to a significant happening, a lived experience. The recalled  experience was unrelated to the research question, nevertheless, the lived experience described appeared to shape all future experiences, which made it very relevant to my question. For me, this was a showing of 'pregnant structures', if I have understood this correctly?

I now have a copy of Capobianco's publication that you mentioned above. Thank you, it is a very interesting and enlightening read. Interestingly, Capobianco talks about 'Leicht' which translates into light [Leicht] as opposed to heavy [Schwer], another meaning attributed to  Heidegger's concept. My understanding is that the  author describes this as an unburdening, such as an anchor stuck on the sea bed becoming lighter as it is pulled or wrestled free.

My participant described an unburdening when her husband died, meaning he was no longer around to use the word stupid in a derogatory manner. She not only expressed unburdening, she expressed freedom, like a weight being lifted from her shoulders which is consistent with Capobianco's interpretation. Moreover, the participant expressed power, power resulting from a deep attunement to the lived experience which she projected would shape subsequent experiences. This power was made evident when she scolded me for allowing my husband to use the term "your stupid" when talking to me.

For this woman, awareness of self had been created 'Lichtung' by the death of her husband, a death which for her held a more profound significance than the demise of a spouse. It was uncanny how this moment of personal  significance embedded in her worldly dealings was brought to the surface by the mere mention of the word stupid. A word which did not hold the same personal significance for me.

I could not hold my insignificant  experiences of being called stupid in abeyance, instead, I brought them out and critically challenged them. They became part of the interpretation of the meaningful structures found within the participant's transcribed  text. Through this back and forth  process, I began to understand the dimensions of the decisions that this woman made when faced with a life threatening situation. For example, fears of being labelled as stupid, delayed this woman's decision to seek professional help. The significance of those fears appeared to be rooted in her social role as a wife.

For me, Heidegger has achieved what he has set out to do, to make us think, even if a definitive explanation of his terms are not always possible.

ResearchGate however, has furnished us with a medium to think aloud and let experts like yourself and those contributing above to provide food for thought for novices like myself.

Thank you!

Mary

P.S. husband banned from calling me stupid!

The above text should read "you're stupid" not "your", sorry.

Thank you Artur for your contribution, with each explanation and opinion, Heidegger's words become more accessible to the novice.

Your answer will not only help me to defend my interpretations, it fuels my interest in Heideger's work which I am sure will continue long after the conclusion of my thesis.

Hi Mary,

In addition to the German etymology and semantic analysis offered by Artur Braun, there are Greek resonances you may wish to consider.

Heidegger specifically points out Aristotle's distinctions between Potentiality and Actuality (SZ 38/BT p. 63): what is essential in a preliminary conception of Phenomenology is not "actuality;" for "Higher than actuality stands possibility." This hints at potentiality beyond the modal character of the Dasein of human beings, as well as beyond ontical Seienden. The venerated "incomparable" Greeks named in the subsequent paragraph are interpreted as essentially concerned with more than the "grammar" of Being as indicated in Plato's Parmenides, Aristotle's Metaphysics, VII, 4, and Thucydides. 

But, actually, those "formal indications" and text locations are not at all "simple" distinctions. Nonetheless, they may render some clarity, depending upon your intentions.

Wishing you fortitude in your researches toward the completion of your Thesis project!

Josef