Bell's paper is clear and – above all – accessible. I'm afraid I lack the background in the philosophy of mathematics to make any sensible comments on the mathematical implications, and there are one or two points which seem a little unclear (in other words, I need to do a bit more background reading).
Nonetheless, if we accept for the sake of argument the mathematical principles, the metaphysical implications (and speculations) Bell draws from them are fascinating, and particularly – as Bell suggests - when applied to certain aspects of "the problem of time".
[Before continuing – the "problem of time" breaks down into two, perhaps complementary, 'families of problems': those concerning the (primarily physical) "nature of time" and the ontological and mereological status of entities in time; and those concerning our experience of, and our psychological and social 'construction' of, time. Roberto's "chronotopoid" account tends more to the second family of problems, though no account can avoid the interdependency of the two (and indeed, Roberto reiterates this). For those who'd like a rundown on the problems proper to the first family – to which I'll make reference in the following – I'll be posting a general presentation in the file sharing device. THIS WAS A PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT].
1. THE ORDER OF EVENTS IN TIME
Bell's remarks can be applied to several, related, problems in the philosophy of time. I'd like to start with his remarks (on p 10. of the paper) on the non-applicability of the "law of trichotomy" (the 'law' which states that, for any pair of real numbers x and y, either x < y V x = y V x > y): "In SIA, *R* carries an order relation < which, like =, differs in certain respects from its classical counterpart. For instance, while < is transitive and irreflexive, it fails to satisfy the law of trichotomy".
Setting aside in part the question of infinitesimals, there is a parallelism between this and the question of the 'order' of events in time. Let us imagine that we can give the spatiotemporal location of an event (its "Cartesian coordinates" in spacetime) as a single number. If we have two events E and F, according to the classic account of order in time their coordinates are such that E < F v E = F v E > F. If we can formulate an account in which the trichotomy doesn't apply, then for any pair of events, there is no guarantee that their order is immutably fixed and definite. Roberto has remarked on the apparent correlation between this and our phenomenal experience of events in (short periods of) time; I'll return to his point later. However, the more general observation that there is no particular fixed order of events in time certainly contradicts the A-theoretical intuition that there is a real distinction between past, present, and future events and an immutable passage of time (that which is past can never be present, that which is present can never be future). It would also seem to contradict the conjoined B-theoretical intuitions that B-relations are permanent; that: if an event E is earlier than some other event F, then E is always earlier than F; and that the pairwise ordering of events is atemporally fixed, and static; nevertheless, most contemporary B-theorists would accept that these intuitions are already controverted by the argument from the relativity of simultaneity (see my presentation elsewhere).
Interestingly, if it is indeed the case that we cannot fix the order of events at the 'infinitesimal' level, then there would seem to be a rare parallelism between the putative metaphysical implications of both relativistic and 'particle-level' accounts: if there is no absolute order to events, we cannot make absolute distinctions between past, present, and future events and we cannot fix a single, unambiguous 'direction' to time. These implications are in themselves sufficient to controvert the presentist view that only the present, and the things of the present, are "real"; I would argue most strongly that, if anyone accepted (1) that we can indeed reject trichotomy and (2) that this rejection has a real impact on our understanding of time, then they are constrained to reject – or at least to suggest modifications to – presentism.
2. THE SPECIOUS PRESENT
In the "chronotopoids" thread, Roberto has remarked at several points on the impact of the principle of microstraightness on the notion of the present – to give a quote from a different work by Bell, “the principle of microstraightness … suggests … that time be regarded as a plurality of smoothly overlapping timelets each of which may be held to represent a ‘now’ (or ‘specious present’) and over which time is … still passing” (Roberto has given the source).
Before continuing, let's just review the "problem" of the present on which Roberto and Bell are commenting. We can call the traditional view of the present "Augustinian", as it received its earliest – and perhaps clearest – expression in Augustine's "Confessions" (see the introduction to my paper-in-progress on the file-sharing device). Setting aside Augustine's (and more recent) arguments for the account, the upshot is that we should understand the present as having no extension in time. We should, of course, be wary of any too-hasty assimilation of the Augustinian present which, while instantaneous (= having no extension in time) has full extension in space, and the notion of a "point", which has no extension *whatsoever*.
Nonetheless, the Augustinian present can only reasonably be given in a neo-Newtonian spacetime (one which has absolute time); in a relativistic spacetime, it would seem to degenerate to what has been called 'here-and-now-ism' – an extreme (and generally held as untenable) view that "only one point in spacetime is the *real* present". The reasons why here-and-now-ism should be untenable are pretty self-evident (I develop them in the aforementioned paper). But does a view integrating the "specious present" get us any further?
The "specious present" is an semi-intuitive understanding (first put forward by James) of the present as having "a certain extension"; estimates of its 'actual duration' depend on the author. Michel Treisman (Triesman, 1999, "The Perception of Time : Philosophical Views and Psychological Evidence") remarks :
"Though we may believe, with St Augustine, that what we perceive conforms to a physical model in which the present balances on a knife edge of no extension, separating past and future, if one attentively examines one's perception of the present moment this is not what one finds… The temporal dimension of the bubble of immediate experience [is] a unit of perceived time which includes together as one the events of a short duration without compromising our impressions of their relations of simultaneity or successiveness. James considered it to correspond to a few seconds."
There's an evident difference between James' estimate and the kinds of order of magnitude the principle of microstraightness would imply. Nonetheless, postulating that the present has non-zero temporal extent has evident metaphysical benefits. If the present has no temporal extension, there would be no possibility of any interaction between spatially-separated objects or parts of objects. The 'present' of any entity would be limited to the distance light can travel in no time – which offers an extremely limited 'reality'. Speaking of a somewhat different order of magnitude, Ian Gibson and Oliver Pooley make some very pertinent comments in a recent (2006) paper on "Relativistic Persistence":
"what is the extent of the domain of those objects which, at some moment in our lives, both can act upon us and be acted upon by us? Here by ‘moment’ we mean a temporally extended but short-lived (i.e. momentary) interval, and the answer will depend on its temporal extent. Let us first take it to be the duration of the specious present, the time it takes to have a single thought or enjoy a single experience. This, let us say, is about 0.2 of a second. Call the temporally extended spacetime region you occupy (partially or multiply) during this ‘moment’ NOW. To be something that can affect you in the NOW, an object must be located within the backward lightcone of the future boundary of NOW. To be something that can be affected by you, as located in the NOW, the object must fall within the future light cone of the past boundary of NOW. Call the region bounded by these two lightcones the Stein Present of the NOW.21 The NOW’s Stein Present is a four-dimensional discus-shaped region centred on the NOW. The immediate thing to note about it is that it is, spatially speaking, very wide (of the order of 60,000 kilometres), even though it is, temporally speaking, very thin (no wider that 0.2 seconds, where it overlaps the NOW)".
The interest of these comments justifies quoting them at length: the "present" of any entity can be given spatially by the distance light can travel in the interval one takes as one's "specious present". However, I fear that I must calm any too-great expectations that Bell's remarks might arouse in this particular domain. If, as Bell speculates, there is some relation (even to within one or two orders of magnitude) between 'microstraightness' and the Planck time, we're talking of a region with a "radius" of at the least 1.6 × 10-35 metres (if the order of magnitude chosen were around the attosecond level, light has the time to cross atomic distances; at this level, there would probably be some 'curvature'). There is an evident and striking difference between this and the 60,000 km wide sphere of Gibson and Pooley; in terms that make any impact at our level of awareness, there doesn't seem to be much to choose between infinitely and infinitesimally short periods of time.
***
Nonetheless, the microstraightness account would probably overcome the more technical and traditional reasons for rejecting a presentist revision from *strict* instantaneity to the “specious present”. Let's imagine for the sake of argument say that the specious present had Gibson and Pooley's duration of 0.2s. In the traditional view of time (as represented by Saint Augustine), the present can have no duration, for that which has duration has an earlier and a later part: “If any fraction of time be conceived that cannot now be divided even into the most minute momentary point, this alone is what we may call time present. But this flies so rapidly from future to past that it cannot be extended by any delay. For if it is extended, it is then divided into past and future. But the present has no extension whatever” (Confessions, 11, Ch. XV).
In more contemporary terms, this would imply that a “specious present” comprised *subintervals*: if it has a duration of 0.2s, then it can be sub-divided into, for example, 10 subintervals S 1…10 of 0.02s. But if this is the case, then during S5 (for example) S 1…4 are “in the past” relative to S5 while S 6…10 are “in the future” relative to S5. Quite evidently, if the present can be divided into clearly differentiable sub-intervals, this would suggest that the present has distinguishable temporal parts, and that it is 'temporally extended' by having parts at every subinterval of its 'present' existence. A second strategy would be to deny that the specious present has such ‘parts’ or ‘subintervals’ (though this is evidently incompatible with our ability to measure events well below the millisecond level). However, if we take this latter revision as reflecting a characteristic of the universe (and not just of our perception and experience), this would imply that that the present is *irreducibly* extended.
In either case, we must explain how the universe persists in terms that do not controvert the fundamental presentist intuition that "only the present and the things of the present are real". If the reformist presentist argues for the former understanding, this implies that the universe *perdures* through the specious present. He is, therefore, ipso facto admitting at least a limited form of extension in four, rather than three, dimensions. If he admits four-dimensional entities, then he no longer has any viable arguments against at least a neo-Newtonian four-dimensionalism; furthermore, any response based on spacetime rather than differentiated space and time is open to the objections from special relativity (as our “best candidate theory of spacetime”).
If, however, he holds that the universe *endures* through the specious present, then we’re facing the problem of delimitation: does the universe exist in its entirety for one interval of 0.2s, then exist in its entirety for the next period of 0.2s? This seems rather unlikely – the notion is that the universe is a three-dimensional entity moving through time; if it is a three-dimensional entity, it is ipso facto not a four-dimensional entity. But, if the entire three-dimensional universe occupies a 0.2s interval, what occupies a - for example - 0.1s interval? Half a universe? Evidently not. But if the entire three-dimensional universe occupies a 0.1s subinterval, then its state during this interval can easily differ from its state in the subsequent 0.1s subinterval. The universe can therefore have contradictory properties, and the classic argument against non-presentist endurance carries.
The microstraightness account avoids this by specifying an interval that is long enough for the universe to have temporal orientation but too short for it to have sufficient extension in time for the classic arguments given above to hold. The present is in a real sense "irreducibly extended", and at a level at which spatial distinctions also break down, thus avoiding the classical spatiotemporal arguments against presentism.
IN GUISE OF A CONCLUSION
The metaphysical implications of Bell's remarks are indeed interesting, but I'm not at all sure we can cite them in defence of a presentism in which "only the present and the things of the present" are real in any *absolute* sense; any local understanding of presentism quickly breaks down into the "moving spotlight" view.
The assimilation of the local present to a "timelet" is seductive but, given the order of magnitude at which it operates, of little real import to the psychological or social "experience" of time and its passage. Metaphysically, and taken apart from the putative impact of the rejection of trichotomy, this could nonetheless militate for an *ontologically* fundamental present – rather than allowing the entirely counterintuitive conclusion that "the universe does not exist for any time at all" (which we can easily draw from classical presentism), it limits us to saying that the universe exists for infinitesimally short intervals.
However, if - as seems to be the case - the rejection of trichotomy allows that there is no particular fixed order of events in time, this certainly contradicts the presentist intuition that there is a real distinction between past, present, and future events. The argument is to all intents and purposes a parallel of that from the relativity of simultaneity: if we cannot agree that E precedes F and is neither simultaneous with nor later than F, then we cannot distinguish the order which is fundamental both to ontological distinctions in time and to a universal, immutable, and unidirectional passage of time.
I'm working on Roberto's longer reply, nonetheless, the clarification he gives is fundamental, and entirely correct. I use "metaphysics" in the sense given by Katherine Hawley - the "renewed and vigorous interest" within analytic philosophy "in topics such as time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds". Of the numerous philosophers who influenced this tendency, we can perhaps cite Willard Van Quine and David Lewis among the prime movers.
It follows that (as a good Quinean) I generally tend to restrict 'ontology' to reflection on and around the scope of the existential quantifier. I've tried to bear this in mind while replying to Roberto, but he does well to underline it.
Roberto
[I've noted the terminological clarifications you've made; for ease of writing, I'll continue to use my terminology, but bearing in mind your comments]
The discussion is indeed most rewarding – at each exchange, we touch on more complex issues. The next is a humdinger :
"the subsequent step is to distinguish -- again I am sorry -- ontological issues from scientific issues. This last move is even more difficult than the previous one, because we need scientific evidence for grounding our ontological theories. However, ontology (or philosophy for that matter) is neither science nor math. It needs both but it cannot stay at their level."
This is a central issue, and one that's been kicked around rather inconclusively on the general philosophy site. I'm afraid this will be yet another long answer….
The question of the relation between science and metaphysics has received a lot of attention recently – to quote Katherine Hawley ("Science as a Guide to Metaphysics?", 2003, author's website):
"Analytic metaphysics is in resurgence… We who share this interest often pay lip-service to the idea that metaphysics should be informed by modern science; some take this duty very seriously. But there is also a widespread suspicion that science cannot really contribute to metaphysics, and that scientific findings grossly underdetermine metaphysical claims. For some, this prompts the thought ‘so much the worse for metaphysics’; others mutter ‘so much the worse for science’."
Those who "take the duty seriously" include, if we follow Hawley, such modern luminaries as Balashov, Callender, Hoefer, or Savitt; we could also cite Michael Butterfield, John Earman, Cody Gilmore, Ian Gibson and Oliver Pooley. Many would trace their intellectual lineage back to Quine, and particularly those of us who – in the words of Smart - hold "that philosophy and science are continuous with one another".
I'm uncertain exactly how I should read "we need scientific evidence for grounding our ontological theories". As we agree that ontology is not a scientific concern, I take it that our appeal to science should be epistemological rather than metaphysical. This is fine by me: I share Quine's rejection of "first philosophy", as long as we bear in mind that our acceptance of scientific evidence reposes on an entirely *philosophical* choice.
This is an important point. In his addendum to his longer message, Roberto gave some important clarifications on the distinction between his and my terminology –and, I would surmise, his and my more basic assumptions about what 'justifies' choice in questions of metaphysics.
I'm beginning to get an idea of Roberto's 'conceptual scheme' (forgive the term); as far as mine's concerned, I won't go over the various discussions I've made elsewhere on the adoption of methodological naturalism as a metaphysical hypothesis; suffice it to say that "metaphysical naturalism" is an extension of naturalised epistemology into metaphysical investigation. But, as such – and we must underline this - its adoption is *no more than* a matter of preference. That we should prefer to ground our ontologies in 'scientific' accounts (rather than, say, Gnostic accounts) is as much a matter of what we're willing to accept as 'justification' as a question of what we're prepared to accept as 'evidence'.
Of course, it's a lot easier to identify and to regiment the putative "ontologies" of the sciences, and particularly the physical sciences, than it is with our everyday language - as Quine reminds us, “ontological concern is … foreign to the lay culture, though an outgrowth of it”. Nonetheless, adoption of a rigorous, well-defined terminology is no guarantee of the existence of the entities thus named or described – as one and a half millennia of Catholic theology can testify. Questions about what kinds of thing exist, or what the fundamental distinction is between what exists and what does not, are *philosophical* refinements of our everyday intuitions about the world.
***
As philosophers, we have – or we're supposed in the popular mind to have – 'tools' for extracting ontological schemes from conceptual schemes. [I wrote this part before reading Roberto's clarification; the 'tools' to which I'm referring are, of course, quantificational]. Whether we actually *do* have such tools is highly debatable – at best we've got a few rules-of-thumb, the kind of thing that allows us to extract from "there's a dog in the garden" the pretty strong probability that the speaker's ontology contains 'dogs' and just possibly 'gardens'. What the speaker would consider dogs to 'be' is an entirely different matter, of course – she'd probably reply in terms of 'kinds' rather than 'parts' (i.e. 'mammals not fish' rather than 'instantaneous three-dimensional wholes not instantaneous temporal parts'). Our language is capable of ontological precision, but only when talking of ontology: the pragmatic function of an utterance such as "there's a dog in the garden" is rarely to draw attention to some "act of concrete existence" (unless we're talking to Bertrand Russell).
Science, like philosophy, is also concerned with the 'refinement' of our everyday intuitions – Casati and Varzi put this concisely in a recent paper (“Event Concepts”, 2008) and also underline the distinctions between the two approaches. Science, they suggest, departs from the phenomena and relations postulated by our commonsense notions and examines them “with respect to exogenous empirical considerations”; it has no particular interest in saving or accommodating our pre-theoretical intuitions. Philosophy also departs from our phenomenal experience of the world; however, philosophical refinement of our intuitive or commonsense notions is dictated by “endogenous a priori considerations”, such as certain internal inconsistencies in some commonsense notion. Unlike scientists, philosophers are generally sensitive to the charge that their refinements run counter to our pre-theoretical intuitions about some phenomenon, and will scrupulously weigh the advantages of any given refinement against its cost in terms of subverting some commonly-held intuition.
***
If we were to simplify to the point of parody, we could say that a scientific account saves the observable relation between phenomena (sometimes at the cost of the observer's intuitions). But can we allow that a philosophical account should save the observer's intuitions at the cost of controverting our best approximations of the regularities underlying the organisation of matter and energy in spacetime? In other words, if a scientific account controverts the philosophical account of one of our most intimately-held intuitions, should we be willing to reject the scientific account – or at least, refuse to accept that it has any impact on our metaphysics?
Some philosophers – Peter Hacker, for example - would give an unreserved "yes". Hacker argues that the terminology of, for example, particle physics is appropriate to the limited, well-defined ends of theoretical physics, but that it has no meaning when applied to our everyday lives. Others – the majority of us, I suppose - would juggle with the terms "scientific account", "impact", and "metaphysics". My view – for what it's worth – is that we can give a qualified "yes" - that we cannot determine the order of events at the quantum level doesn't mean that we can't determine the order of events on the level of eating lunch (though whether we can determine them *after* lunch depends on what we've been drinking – I'm talking about observed rather than remembered events here).
We should, I think, restrict our 'scientific' evaluation of a metaphysical thesis to roughly equivalent orders of magnitude. If the account deals with tables and chairs, then we can't fault it for saying "the chair is touching the table" by pointing out the difficulties in distinguishing between them at the particle level. However, if the philosopher claims that the chair is touching the table because both are made of wood, and "likes attract", we can doubt the validity of his account.
We can take "point-events" as an example. Point-events are a useful fiction in what is a purely geometric description of the relations obtaining between different regions of spacetime; indeed, more recent accounts speak more of occurrences "at spacetime points", which isn't much better but at least has the value of concentrating on localisation rather than 'mode of being'. However, if a philosopher were to cite "point-events" as evidence for an ontology of the kinds of event Davidson discusses, he would indeed be guilty of applying technical notions which have no meaning at the order of magnitude under consideration.
***
Nevertheless, and while we should be wary of certain unbridled metaphysical claims made on the back of a (frequently ill-digested) nugget of scientific theory, we can see that certain metaphysical claims – and particularly those claiming universal scope or 'strict instantaneity' – are indeed in contradiction with scientific accounts *at the same order of magnitude* as those accounts. For example, classical presentism requires a *universal* 'now' – at some instant T it cannot be that certain parts of the universe are present at T while others are past or future. Now, while special relativity can allow for local distinctions between past, present, and future, it doesn't allow a *universal* distinction. It would seem to be the case that, given sufficient distances and suitable differences of inertial frame, that observers cannot agree on the simultaneity of events; the account has been seen to accord with observation. Thus, the presentist must either show why the classic interpretation of SR is inappropriate to a metaphysical understanding, or reformulate her presentism.
Similarly, several accounts call for – or require – 'instantaneous events'. An instantaneous event has, by definition, no extension in the temporal dimension; anything we say about it should therefore apply at any order of magnitude we might choose, down to – and below – the Planck time. It is of course highly improbable that we could have any direct experience of events taking place over so short an interval; this objection was answered by – if I remember correctly – Anscombe, who remarked that we could experience the *effects* of such instantaneous events. But are the kinds of event under consideration such that we can make sense of them at such low orders of magnitude? The most usual example given is that of 'change' – and this is frequently developed by talking about 'beginnings, becomings, and endings'. Yet if we look at the examples given – the births, arrivals, deaths, departures and so forth that provide the staple diet of the discipline – few, if any, have meaning at below the yoctosecond level (the level of particle decay), to say nothing of intervals around the Planck time. While there may possibly be instantaneous events (though, like Roberto, I have my doubts), they aren't the kind of event that would make any sense to our intuitions about events.
***
To return to the question of what the sciences can contribute to our ontology. Science can certainly correct our ontology – few metaphysicians would seriously contend nowadays that everything is composed of earth, air, fire, or water; it can, in certain cases, also shed light on questions about what does, and does not, exist. When considering the kinds of thing that furnish our world – the dogs, tables, marriages, daffodils, rainstorms, and clouds of our everyday experience – science can tell us a lot about their structure, their composition, and their 'causal history'. However, science can only hint at whether the dog we see in the garden is an entire three-dimensional entity or a temporal slice of a four-dimensional entity… and the closer we get to the contents of our phenomenal experience, the less science can guide us.
While we can defend the view of philosophy as part of a continuum with scientific investigation, we should remain aware of the difference in aims and objects between 'philosophical' and 'scientific' investigation, just as we remain aware of the different ends and objects of the various sciences. Apart from its being naively realistic, a too-hasty assimilation of scientific and philosophical accounts can lead us to lose sight of the strictly philosophical ends of investigation – much as if we were to give "seeing light with a wavelength of roughly 625–740 nm" (or rather, its technical expression) as a description of the phenomenal experience of "red".
We can only continue if we clarify the kinds of thing we're talking about – this is where ontology as "the investigation of what does, and does not, exist" gives way to ontology as "the investigation of the *kinds* of thing that exist". For my money, the nature of existence qua existence is a matter of occupying space and time (for an entity to exist is for it to occupy a certain region of spacetime). But the question of what *kinds* of entity exist, and whether there are dependence relations between the kinds of entity that exist, is a question of an entirely different order (though retaining is foundation in the various ways our language cuts up spacetime).
How useful these comments are depends on taste. I've found the writing useful in clarifying where we are in our discussion, and in opening the way to further discussion on the ontologies we're projecting onto spacetime. In my next message I'll return to Roberto's "chronotopoids" and look at whether they are regions of spacetime, models of regions of spacetime, or models of a more hybrid nature mixing space, time, and probability.
Well, I hope I will…
“Let's be charitable and assume that all [the various sciences] succeed in grasping and modelling the objects of their interest”.
Very charitable indeed – I wonder to what degree QM is a reasonable model of what’s “actually going on down there”; and I have very serious reservations concerning the degree to which we *grasp* the object of quantum theory... nonetheless, if by “models the object of its interest” we understand “provides a reasonably efficient and suitably formalised approximation of whatever regularity underlies the phenomenon under consideration”, then we can perhaps accept the definition.
All the same, we need to bear in mind what “producing a reasonable approximation” entails. It’s not a matter of “describing” or of “representing” the world – these are philosopher’s requirements. I think we could get away with the basic criterion that, in order to be considered as a “reasonable approximation”, a theory should be able to predict phenomena with a statistically significant rate of success. This criterion can apply as well to, say, sociology as to physics – after all, sociologists are supposed to be able to say “in such-and-such a situation, groups of people with such-and-such a shared cultural outlook will react in such-and-such a way”. Social sciences are more susceptible to ceteris paribus clauses, but they still function by emitting predictions that have the general form of a universally quantified conditional.
***
As for Aristotle: Each science seeks regularities “within the field of its particular interest”; but these regularities concern entities at a certain level. Sociology doesn’t concern itself with the quantum state of the various actors in this or that situation; and the relativistic relation between events is unaltered by distinctions between intentional and unintentional actions. “Horses for courses”, you might say – and part of our debate concerns an ontological approach we could call by Democritan analogy the “atomic” approach: what are the “fundamental entities” required by a given scientific theory?
In sociology, some would argue that the individual is a “social atom”, though others have argued for the family, class, or what-have-you... the exact definition is unimportant. But should a theory claim that the family, for example, is the fundamental unit of society, it must still account for any *social* effects resulting from the independent actions of individuals – and likewise, while the atom is frequently described as the fundamental entity for classical chemistry, the existence of (for example) isotopes requires that we take into account effects determined at a ‘lower’ level.
The days of grandiose reductionism would seem to be numbered – our developing understanding of emergent systems testifies to that. Nonetheless, emergent systems don’t float unsupported in some kind of ontological aether – while ontological reduction is frequently meaningless, ontological *dependence* is not. At those points where the ‘causal’ explanations of one science touch those of another, we either can or cannot establish bridging laws; and much of the groundwork of establishing bridging laws depends on finding lawlike or mereological regularities between the entities cited by one account and those cited by the other. Of course, Davidson has famously put a veto on finding strict bridging laws allowing us to pass from physical (brain-based) entities to mental entities; though this is perhaps as much an error of seeking the mental in the brain and the brain alone.
Ontological dependence is necessary if we're going to postulate any kind of real "unity in the constitution of the world" which might correspond to or underlie the apparent unity of our phenomenal experience. The statue might, in some way, be a different "object" from the lump of clay, but it is not at any given moment a different occupant of spacetime.
***
Furthermore, while each science is perhaps more or less autonomous, it’d be an error to consider that they are entirely independent. How “Science” – that hypothetical (and probably illusory) monolithic conceptual scheme – corrects the account of some phenomenon given by any particular science depends largely on the nature of the account under consideration. It’s easy to see that different areas of the same science can affect each other: genetics, for example, corrects Lamarckian evolutionary theory by rendering more explicit the mechanisms underlying evolutionary change (acquired characteristics don’t alter the genetic structure of the individual). But we can also imagine corrections “across sciences” – for example, a psychological theory that postulated that our ‘specious present’ is determined by locally *future* events would have to account for the violation of the restriction imposed by the speed of light. Nonetheless, while the idea of “Science” as a system of “communicating vessels” is an attractive analogy, we probably shouldn’t build too much on it – not all discrepancies are corrected, as the mismatch between relativity and QM testifies.
So, this proviso given, and having underlined my doubts about whether they actually seek to “describe” the world, I agree largely with your comments on the partial view given by the various sciences. The apparent unity of the world is a matter that the particular sciences are generally unable to elucidate – and largely because we don’t really know *where* we should be looking. Is the “unity” a matter of physics or psychology?
There is no clearly identified “metascience”; though to a Quinean this is perhaps precisely the sense of “metaphysics”.
***
On these points, and despite a clear difference of terminology, I think we are in agreement. Contribution from the other traditional fields of philosophical reflection – ethics and aesthetics –would also seem evident; ethics has an evident role in the social sciences and many – following Russell and Quine – would speak of an “aesthetic” choice underlying a preference for a given conceptual scheme.
Good. I feel that the next couple of points are going to be of great interest for us both (see my forthcomng message).
My comments on the scientific bases of the specious present concentrate mainly on the physical level; I've posted them in a new thread. I'll continue here to address more directly Roberto's message of February 10th.
As it seems to me Quantum Mechanics is all about experimental design, predictions and observers. Thus Planck length and Plank time can not be interpreted to imply that there are no points closer than the Planck length or events closer than the Planck time. It merely means that one can not design an experiment to measure such lengths or time intervals.
To the physicist, of course, measurement is effectively equivalent to truth. But to the philosopher the two are not necessarily the same.
Good point, Bill - though I must re-read the discussion with Roberto to refresh my memory of what was said
ST: "Well, answers to these questions lead us to philosophy, religion, and spirituality. Unless philosophy, religion, and spirituality is based on the scientific exploration, it can only create chaos as science has done by wrong understanding of nature."
I suppose you have some interesting ideas. It is not clear to me how they relate to the subject, 'infinitesimals & the continuum.'
Bell's paper is an analysis of the mathematics of infinitesimals and the continuum. Where he delves into physics --- Planck length and interval --- is mere speculation. There are real differences between the two types of arguments. For one thing, the Planck scales are not infinitesimal. For another --- as I pointed out earlier --- their meaning is limited to experimental situations.
David loves analysis --- endless analysis. In my humble opinion, there is a point where synthesis is necessary. Perhaps that is what you are aiming at, synthesis.
The whole purpose of the scientific method seems to be the creation of standards for belief. Endless Cartesian skepticism merely frustrates that purpose. Analysis leads to skepticism; synthesis to belief. The Turing Machine analyzes. Man transcends the limitations of analysis by thinking 'outside the box.'
You are cutting at the many branches of David's argument. I am attacking it at the root. To tell the truth, I have not had time to sort through David's argument --- so I can not claim to know how well you have dealt with its branches.
What I know is that Bell's paper does not justify making infinitesimal quantities, distinct. One simply can not have things both ways. It is legitimate to speculate about physical experiments based on theoretical mathematics. But one must recognize that in doing so one is merely speculating. Bell, himself, says that he is speculating where he talks about the Plank scales. The last paragraph in the article is loaded with hypotheticals. Thus, one must read it as very guarded speculation.
How far can one get analyzing something when the starting point is speculative? I fear such an approach. Small errors at the beginning of an argument may lead to the grossest of errors at the end. Speculation should come at the end of an argument, not at the beginning.
I hope I am reading something into David's argument. As I say, I have not read through it all. Perhaps he will show me how I have jumped to the wrong conclusion.
I wish to correct what I said above... I wrote: "What I know is that Bell's paper does not justify making infinitesimal quantities, distinct."
It is characteristic of infinitesimals that they can be distinct without being different. Thus there are infinitely many distinct infinitesimals which equate --- for example --- to the number five.
The Planck scales, on the other hand refer to things which are not only distinct, but actually different, and yet can not be resolved experimentally.
ST: "My objective is to explain the fundamental laws of nature and if our understanding of fundamental laws of nature is correct then we can explain any observed phenomenon through these laws."
The infinitesimal has nothing to do with Quantum Mechanics. It has nothing to do with physics or with the real world. It is a mathematical construct. Bell says as much in his article.
Historically, Calculus was developed from Algebra through the use of infinitesimals. Many mathematicians found the concept repugnant. They could not reconcile the infinitesimal with the rest of Algebra. Eventually they found that they could prove the theorems of Calculus using what came to be called mathematical 'limits.' They were happy.
But engineers continued to use infinitesimals. They provide a convenient way of picturing in one's mind what is going on 'behind the scenes,' as it were. As long as one doesn't care about mathematical niceties one can use them without fear of error. They work.
But why do they work? That is a question that has continued to nag at mathematicians. In recent years there has been mathematical work to explain the magic they seem to work. Bell's article is an attempt to explain some of what mathematicians have come up with.
His foray into Quantum Mechanics is an interesting speculation. In my humble opinion he is saying that infinitesimals may give us some insight into the Planck scales. Once again in my humble opinion it is an insight which will break down under further analysis. One can not have things both ways. Something is either infinitesimal or it is not. Clearly the Planck scales are not infinitesimal. They define a limit to possible experimental design. That is all they do.
To the physicist that is enough. To the 'positivist' that is enough. Clearly it is not enough for you. That is fine with me. My interest is simply to point out the mathematical background for the discussion. I make no claim to the sort of knowledge you are professing. To me such things are but 'veiled realities.' We see them, but darkly.
Sunil - when you say "This is not correct reflection of the reality of time", is the implication that you can actually identify "the correct reflection of time", or are you simply commenting that QM is NOT an accurate "reflection of time"?
Either way, your remark implies that there IS some "fact of the matter" about time. This strikes me as an unwarranted assumption, even within the realm of physics, as you haven't defined the criteria for "timelike qualities or relations". Are we talking about "human time" - the time we spend, pass, waste, save, look back on, look forward to and so forth - or "timelike qualities of the physical world"?
If we're talking about the former - "human" time - WHAT precisely are we talking about? Is there "one" human time, or many? Is such "time" determined culturally? Can we make a distinction between "social" and "psychological" time? What evidence do we have for "human time", and can we establish representative models that allow us to compare "human" and "physical" time?
As for the "timelike qualities of the physical world", I'd recall Einstein's comments (in "Physics and Reality", Journal of the Franklin Institute; 1936) : “An important property of our sense experiences... is its time-like order. This... leads to the mental conception of a subjective time [and this] leads then through the concept of the bodily object and of space, to the concept of objective time”. That we should even seek "timelike qualities" in the physical world is largely determined by the apparent timelike qualities of our phenomenal experience: if we take two events, E and F with timeline but no spacelike separation, our phenomenal experience is such that the two events would seem to occur in "the same place" but at "different times". Our best physical account would tend to show that E and F occur at DIFFERENT "places" (and this doesn't allow for the real spatial displacement of the Earth and the Solar System).
The assumptions underlying the "quantum mechanical view … that time …. jumps from one moment to another" are, I think, based on a confusion between "human time" and whatever timelike qualities the universe has. Asserting that time "jumps" implies that time is a thing that somehow "moves through" the universe. But if the universe is spatiotemporally extended, this "jumping" would imply that time "moves through" spacetime. Bracketing out the spatial dimensions, the assertion reduces to "time moves through time". This is PRECISELY the assumption underlying the "moving spotlight" view of time (I think Bill will recall the view!), and precisely the problem with the view – one has the "temporal-dimension-of–spacetime" (which is extended in the same way as the spatial dimensions) AND the "time-which-moves" in which a three-dimensional universe somehow passes from instant to instant along the temporal-dimension-of-spacetime. The problem is that, if no instant is spatiotemporally privileged, why should any instant be temporally privileged? All instants in spacetime have the same ontological status; but instants of the "time-which-moves" are SEQUENTIALLY privileged: that is, for any sequence of instants of "time-which-moves" , at each successive instant the universe exists IN ITS ENTIRETY (that is, it has all its parts at T1, then it has all its parts at T2, etc.). However, on our prior definition, the "entirety of the universe" is extended in FOUR dimensions, and by this definition it has "a part at T1" AND "a part at T2" AND "a part at T3" etc.
Such a view requires TWO kinds of time – the extended and the sequential. As Sunil has pointed out, there are numerous arguments for why time should be "unidirectional" (the "arrow of entropy" being one of the most favoured), but none of them require sequential time IN ADDITION TO extended time. That one instant should come "before" or "after" another is no more problematic than one point lying "before" or "after" another on a line – the sequence of instants is not ***geometrically*** different from a sequence of points . The distinction is, it would appear, ***phenomenal*** rather than geometric. In physical terms, the entropy of (closed) systems increases in one temporal direction, and the "entropic arrow" would seem to point in the same direction as the "causal arrow". This might well be the case, but even if it is, it reflects the STRUCTURE of spacetime, not some real "movement" from the past towards the future. A carrot is thicker at one end, but that doesn't mean that there is a "movement" from the thinner towards the thicker end: we can explain its structure uniquely in terms of the spatial extension of its "parts" (that is, topologically and mereologically) – there is no need to make any ontological distinction between its thicker and thinner parts.
The conjunction of the "temporal-dimension-of–spacetime" AND the "time-which-moves" is, I believe, founded on a confusion between temporal and "chronological" qualities, and this confusion was what generated Roberto's initial puzzles. If we take the term "temporal" in the context of spacetime, it characterises location or extension in the non-spatial dimension of spacetime. The term "chronological" characterises events sequenced by some form of chronometry, which in turn depends rather on ***frequency*** than on ***temporal extension*** - though we can and perhaps should argue that frequency depends itself on temporal extension.
Frequency is generally a "cyclical" notion – in the simplest form, when a system S passes from a given state A to a given state B and back in a period of time P. P gives one cycle of S, but "one cycle" of S is the reciprocal of S ***throughout*** time. On the "temporal-dimension-of–spacetime" view, P would be a reciprocal derivate of "the extension of S through time", while on the "time-which-moves" view the persistence of S through time is no more than the mereological sum of each period P1, P2, P3,…, Pn-1, Pn. The assumption of the former view is that spacetime is a totality which can be subdivided; the assumption of the latter is that spacetime is "built up" from fundamental units.
This latter observation corresponds, I think, to the distinction between a "spacetime continuum" and the more "granular" universe of QM. However, even if we accept the "granular" account, there is no reason to hold that the "grains" are ***independent*** mereological atoms (that is, to hold that the universe is built bottom-up by successive accretion of "grains"): the "granularity" might - as Sunil suggests - simply mark the lower limit of our capacity to ***measure*** spacetime intervals, in which case the account is consistent with a "top-down" understanding of spacetime.
Bill - thanks for clarifying the mainly mathematical thrust of Bell's paper; as you (and he) remark, the applications to QM are entirely speculative.
Furthermore, you've put your finger precisely on the problem with Bell's speculation: the Planck time is extremely short, but it's not "infinitesimally short" - as you remark, it defines a limit to possible experimental design.
***
On another point, I must say that the whole "veiled reality" thing strikes me as being a form of noumenalism. How would you distinguish between a "veiled reality" and a "noumenon"?
DH: "Sunil - when you say 'This is not correct reflection of the reality of time,' is the implication that you can actually identify 'the correct reflection of time,' or are you simply commenting that QM is NOT an accurate 'reflection of time?'"
Without answering the question for Sunil, I would note that in my humble opinion, it is right to speculate on such things. The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is largely speculative.
I certainly empathize with Sunil's position. I can not understand what people mean when they propose that the Planck scales are somehow 'ultimate.' I get a picture in my mind which is purely ridiculous --- a 4-dimensional hypercubic array of points separated by one Planck unit. It is ridiculous --- after all, the points on diagonals could not be separated by one Planck unit. But how then are such points arranged in space? There is no sensible 'ultimate' answer to the question. If space is discrete, the points come and go in response to variable situations. That is all one can say. How is that 'ultimate?' Certainly no mathematician would imagine any 'ultimate' truth in such an idea. The words 'space' and 'time' must refer to an abstract potential for points to exist, and not to actual points. Seen in such a light does it make sense to imagine space and time to be discrete?
DH: "Bracketing out the spatial dimensions, the assertion reduces to 'time moves through time.'"
It makes no sense to say that 'time moves' or 'jumps.' Things are said to move through space and time. But neither space nor time are said to move.
One of the best definitions of time was given by Plotinus: "the Life of the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or experience to another." ~***THE SIX ENNEADS;*** 3,7,11
Bill - indeed, the assertion "times moves through time" is meaningless; this is precisely the problem with any account that tries to reconcile a four-dimensional view of spacetime with A-theoretical realism about the distinction between "past", "present", and "future" - you get the temporal dimension of spacetime, plus another "time" - the privileged and unique present - which somehow "moves along" the temporal dimension. It leads untold difficulties (for instance, each instant is atemporally "locally present" but at any time, some unique instant is "universally present").
For my part, I think both analogies - that time moves, or that things move through time - are generally insufficient. We should rather be asking whether some things have all their parts at each instant of their existence or whether they have a different part at each instant. The answer to THIS is more a matter of our language than of a matter of "mind-independent distinctions".
DH: "On another point, I must say that the whole 'veiled reality' thing strikes me as being a form of noumenalism. How would you distinguish between a 'veiled reality' and a 'noumenon?'"
Having no respect for the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, I would not use the word, 'noumenon.' If you wish to use it, so be it.
I derive the term 'veiled reality' from Bernard d'Espagnat, a French theoretical physicist and philosopher of science, winner of the 2009 Templeton Prize for his "work which acknowledges that science cannot fully explain 'the nature of being.'"
He refers back in his works to Socrates' Myth of the Cave.' He does not stress that analogy, however.
He seems to adhere to a very weak form of logical realism and does use the term to mean the 'thing in itself.'
But I use the term for things which I believe are truly unknowable for any number of reasons, not limiting its use to describe things hidden by Quantum effects.
I know where you got it from, Bill; I was rather wondering how you would defend it.
DH: "I know where you got it from, Bill; I was rather wondering how you would defend it."
I would not seek to defend Bernard d'Espagnat. I had a book of his until my wife told my daughter to clean up my office. I have not seen it since then. I had decided that I would read the book at least twice before I came to any opinion of it. So far I have read about half of it, once. At this point I'm afraid I would have to start all over again.
It was not light reading material, but a very technical discussion. I highly recommend his work. I just wish I could find my copy.
As to my belief in realism... I believe that animal senses serve to inform an animal what it needs to know for the survival of the species. That makes 'no sense' to me unless there really is something external to animals for the senses to report.
ST: "Time does not move but measurable time moves - the forward motion is the very essence of the concept of measurable time but not of time."
Aristotle lists four types of movement: locomotion, alteration, growth and decay. The first, locomotion is the most general of the four. The others represent local motions of the parts of a thing.
To me saying that something moves by locomotion would imply that at one time it was in one place and at another time it was in another place. Thus you seem to be saying that at one 'time,' measurabe time is at one place and at another 'time,' measurable time is at another place.
Is that what you mean? If so I am a bit confused... Could you give an example or two to clear up what you mean? There is nothing like an example to elucidate one's meaning.
ST: "Creation and annihilation, birth and death, development and deterioration, and order and disorder are not scientific terms. Nothing develops or deteriorates in nature; everything changes form and change of form is a continuous process. What is, always was, and always will be!"
Aristotle believed that matter is eternal. I see nothing contradictory in the opposing belief, that matter was created and can be destroyed. Steady state physics, in fact, posits a continuing process of creation.
ST: "As I mentioned earlier, time is a process that is causing an irreversible change in the space."
By 'time' do you mean time or measurable time?
Bill - remember the eternalist hypothesis that each instant is locally and atemporally "present". In this sense, a given event (say the assassination of Julius Caesar) "always was, is, and will be" - but it "always was, is, and will be" an event ***which takes place on 15th March 44 BC***. Because some event is locally "atemporally present" doesn't mean that it is universally present - the assassination of Caesar takes place in a particular region of spacetime, not EVERYWHERE in spacetime.
ST: "Nature does not hide the reality from us but since science rightly puts a self-imposed restriction on itself that proposals of science should be demonstrable, therefore, reality remains unexplainable through scientific exploration."
How would you have us escape from this "self-imposed restriction?"
ST: "By time I mean the process through which entropy of universe is constantly increasing and by measurable time mean, time that is measured by a clock."
Forgive me, but I am still confused... I interpret your statement that measurable time moves to mean that at one time, time measured by a clock, is at one place and at another time, time measured by a clock, is at another place.
Is that what you mean?
Please give an example or two to elucidate your meaning.
"I interpret your statement that measurable time moves to mean that at one time, time measured by a clock, is at one place and at another time, time measured by a clock, is at another place."
There is a distinction between "time" - the temporal dimension of spacetime - and "a time", which latter is given by its spacetime coordinates and which is generally considered as being instant-like. On this latter distinction, a "time" is one "place" and another "time" is another "place". I still don't see where the idea of "movement" comes in, though.
ST: "You cannot view spacetime coordinate or fourth dimension (which is a process) as the remaining three dimensions."
I generally do not use the four-dimensional 'spacetime' analogy. David does, but not I.
ST: "I do not know what you mean when you say a time is at one place and another time is at another place. Time is not a physical entity that can occupy a place. Heating of water is not a physical entity. Heating is a process; so is time."
I do not know what you mean when you say time moves. The example you gave of heating water clearly is of a thing, water, changing to steam. I see no movement of time. Time gives me a way of marking off the change. For example one might say that at 3:00 PM water was in a pot; at 3:15 PM the water had been converted to a vapor.
ST: "I have explained that apparent motion of time is an impression created in our mind or you may probably say that it is a way of describing a process that is taking place constantly. Movement of time is not physical and hence is not real."
So time doesn't move?
It seems to me, Sunil, that what you are saying is that there is a distinction between physical time and psychological time. I get that. What I don't understand is how time measured by entropy is different from time measured by clocks.
A clarification, Bill: when Sunil says "I have explained that apparent motion of time is an impression created in our mind", I think he's talking about the FLOW of time - "movement" is not the appropriate term.
If you remember our discussions on the philosophy of time, the question of "flow" is largely subsumed to the A-theory/B-theory opposition: the question is not whether our experience suggests a phenomenal "passage of time", but whether this "phenomenal experience" reflects a real characteristic of the universe. In the terms of the debate, can we reduce the sequence of A-properties "past – present – future" to the B-relations "before – simultaneous with – after".
I'd suggest that Sunil is simply asserting his preference for the B-series!
Sunil: I think that discussion would be easier if we reformulated the philosophical problem of time. Indeed, the problem is predominantly philosophical – as you remark, the "phenomenal flow of time" is more a matter of psychology than physics; this being the case, the various physical accounts should be treated with respect to the philosophical problem. To clarify my point, I'd like to quote the philosopher of physics Craig Callender yet again (http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/ccallender/Time'sOnticVoltage.doc) :
"There really are an interesting set of problems motivating philosophical study of time. We do treat time and space very differently, despite their both being modes of extension treated similarly by our fundamental scientific theories. We imagine time to have a much richer structure than space. If anything about time calls for explanation, clearly this fact does. As it turns out, philosophy of time rises to the call by framing a debate among three metaphysical positions, positions that are empirically equivalent to one another, explanatorily equivalent to one another and may even be metaphysically equivalent to one another.
There is a better way to conceive of the debate. Philosophers of time should model the debate the way philosophers of mind frame theirs. The natural sciences don’t have sophisticated theories of intentionality and consciousness, for instance. There seems to be an explanatory gap between our experience and the so-far incomplete description of our experience provided by the natural sciences. There is an honest-to-goodness problem over how to explain consciousness, for instance. Philosophers of mind then suggest explanations using naturalistic resources to explain consciousness (which, if picked up, might develop as parts of natural science) or they look elsewhere and supplement the naturalistic resources, either with new ‘naturalistic’ resources or ‘non-naturalistic’ resources. They then argue about whether the explanation actually succeeds in accounting for consciousness. Similarly, philosophy of time ought to refine our description of what needs to be explained, carefully examine science and the way it treats time, compare the two, and then try to account for any explanatory gap that arises. The gap may be filled in with scientific or metaphysical resources. However it works out, it’s now clear that presentism, possibilism and eternalism need more resources to close the gap. The eternalism debate need not itself be eternal."
This, to my way of thinking, is a lapidary formulation of what's really at stake in our debates on time.
***
I'll start a new topic in order to clarify (yet again!) the various "problems with time"…
"I do not look at the things from scientific point of view or philosophical point of view. I examine nature and try to find out how nature manages the universe."
Sunil: "nature" is a human notion. Nothing "manages" the universe - and any claim to the contrary is a pathetic fallacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy). The universe doesn't need explanation - WE do.
Your claim (to examine nature) is that of the "natural philosopher" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_philosophy). This gets you to the epoch of Hook, Boyle and Newton. Both philosophy and science have evolved since then.
And if I tell you you're preferring one series over another, then you're preferring one series over another, and there's an end 'ont. Quelle lèse-majesté!!!
Only kidding ;-)
"For me, the word 'Nature' means nature"
How very informative. So, you want to use terms without defining them?
***
It seems strange to say this in the age of the Web 2.0, but it's usually a good idea to check unknown terms before claiming that they do otr do not apply to one's position. For all its shortcomings, Wikipedia is still very useful...
I'm of the opinion that, although there is a common understanding of the sets or terms involved in the topic - this being a global research site there IS a danger of misunderstanding distinctions. The sets related to the research topic could be assumed as attracting a common understanding - yet, grammatically speaking, the distinctions may be relative to the field of expertise of each researcher.
It's therefore perfectly understandable for members to request definitions for the benefit of the discourse. However, it remains our responsibility to ensure as simple a formulation and discourse as possible not only for every member's sake but for the progression of the topic at hand. What I would agree to being an irritation is when an otherwise 'obvious' set gets siderailed into a reductionist argument that imposes on the otherwise natural flow of the research. Am I correct in assuming that, if a topic is in this thread [as opposed to the Parent 'Philosophy' group] that it is an already formulated problem and just requires dialectic?
Dear Natasha,
I concur with most of what you said and I think that most researchers here already know it. But it is quite easy to come up with topics that have not already been "officially formulated". The challenge is in the organization, deliberation and composition - not to mention the research.
These last few comments are a good example too look at. Read them. You might notice that the problem isn't that researchers are talking to each other in different jargon but that particularly on Sunil's part there is a certain lack of clarity that he refuses to acknowledge.
Sincerely,
Oliver Kayende
Dear Everyone,
I suggest that in doing 'philosophical research' we accommodate our fellow researchers if and when we're asked by providing at least a rudimentary description or definition of 'special' terms we introduce into the discourse. Also, let us know if you're speaking logically and/or scientifically or otherwise. For example,
If one researcher says "science can explain everything" and another researcher responds,
"How can science explain EVERYTHING if there are limitations to axiomatization..." and the first says again,
"Well, then science can't explain everything" and proceeds on promoting this logical contradiction by describing the "zen" of the universe.
THEN THE FIRST RESEARCHER SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE SECOND THAT THEY ARE NOT SPEAKING SCIENTIFICALLY OR IN A LOGICAL MANNER.
MOREOVER, ONE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO NOT HOPSCOTCH BACK AND FORTH IN AND OUT OF LOGIC - TO THEN COME TO COME TO VERY EXCLUSIVE ALLEGEDLY "SCIENTIFIC" OR "LOGICAL" CONCLUSIONS.
Sincerely,
Oliver Kayende
Dear everyone,
I guess we're supposed to be putting together research in some way. I'm sorry to say that we absolutely must have some (more) common terms between us in order to be constructive. I'm going to write down some terms that we've been using that I think we should come to some general agreement on:
(1) Science
(2) Time
In discussing time, let us first acknowledge the current 'working' definitions there are now of time in our language(s) and in modern science. Then let us offer other descriptions, definitions, etc.
Sincerely,
Oliver Kayende
Dear everyone,
I don't mean to 'pick' on anyone but for the sake of the integrity of our discourse I will highlight the kinds of statements or issues I was talking about before.
Consider Some of Sunil's claims:
(1) Science cannot explain everything
(2) Science can explain every quality of God
(3) Time is not real
(4) Time has a flow RATE and it is not uniform (a RATE is a quantity relative to 2 parameters - not one.
Like 3 miles per hour (miles,hours) or 10 joules per
cubic meter (joules, meters). So, what's the other
parameter ?)
(5) Time does not exist
(6) Time exists independent of clocks and observers
This is why Sunil's position is not scientific in the sense of science as the conventional modern science and is not logical in the sense where logic has no contradictions.
Instead of a simple explanation of these remarks, Sunil will undoubtedly give us a 6 to 7 paragraph description of the "zen" of the universe which should move us to accept any poetic statement he makes as "scientific" and "logical".
Not only is this not scientific or logical but it's illusory and counter-productive.
Sincerely,
Oliver Kayende
Dear All - I rather fear it's time for one of David's brief exposés of the "Problems of Time" (with links to external resources)... and I was just about to attack the probllm of "the contents of experience" as a problem of indexicality. Ah well, the best laid schemes o' mice an' supermen gang aft agley...
On the other hand, why bother to keep a dog and bark yourself? I've used Wikipedia where I can, but some points are only available at Stanford
I'd point out that these are the PHILOSOPHICAL problems with time, and that they thereby concern our everyday use of "temporal notions" as much as, if not more than, our scientific notions; I'm also respecting classical philosophical practice in recognising a real distinction between the philosophies of time and of space save where the theories accept a "spacetime". I'll add one or two links to resources which deal with the interface with scientific notions (though the Callender is a good example)
So, the areas of debate are:
Is there any difference in the ontological status of "past", "present", and "future" entities? This debate opposes two main views: presentism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presentism_%28philosophy_of_time%29), the view that only "the present and the things of the present" are real; and eternalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_%28philosophy_of_time%29), the view that "past", "present", and "future" are at best local distinctions, and that the distinction between "now" and "other times" has no more ontological force than the distinction between "here" and "other places". (there is a third, intermediate view, known as "the growing block", which holds that the present and the past are real ("actualised"), but that the future is not). Many presentists hold to a "3+1D" view of space and time in which there is a real distinction of "kind" between space and time; those who accept the spacetime account have the difficulty of explaining why any instant (hyperplane) should be the sole, universal present. The vast majority of eternalists prefer the four-dimensional view of spacetime.
Persistence through time - do entities persist by having all their parts at each instant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endurance_%28philosophy%29) or do they persist by having a part at each instant? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perdurantism)
The passage of time: are the temporal properties "is past", "is present", and "is future" fundamental, or can they be reduced to the temporal relation "earlier than - simultaneous with - later than"? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-series_and_B-series)
Is spacetime a substance, or does it reduce to the relations obtaining between physical entities? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_space_and_time#Absolutism_and_relationalism)
What is the status of verbal tense? This is, for my money, one of the most interesting areas at present, as it examines the relation between language and time. There are two areas of investigation: the first examines whether there are "tensed propositions" or whether tense modifies propositions in the way alethic modal operators modify propositions (this debate bears a great deal of resemblance to the de re/de dicto opposition in alethic modal logic and has certain links with both the eternalist/presentist and the perdurantist/endurantist oppositions). The second examines verbal tense as the expression of an "irreducible temporal perspective", and is linked to the A-series/B-series opposition and to the whole question of "the experience and perception of time" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/). This second area also examines representation of verbal tense and its correlations with other representations of time (for example, the timeline representation of events lying in a given speaker's local "past" and "present" bears striking similarities to light-cone representation of causal structure in a spacetime diagram. Is this merely coincidental?)
What is the evidence from our best physical theories of time? Special relativity – which is our best theory of local conditions at our order of magnitude – contradicts our intuitive understanding of time, but can we find "human time" in general relativity or in quantum mechanics? (cf. the Callender paper I quoted in an earlier message, also http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-bebecome/)
Does the thermodynamic arrow found the temporal arrow, and the other time-asymmetric relations (knowledge, causation etc.)? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-thermo/
These are the main areas; evidently, I haven't given the details of the various view or the arguments for and against; if anyone wants any clarification, I'd be happy to give it!
For a further development, of the basic oppositions, I'd suggest Ned Markosian's http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/
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