A GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS
Beyond the Two Millennia
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph. D., Dr. phil.
IS CAUSALITY A SCIENTIFIC OR PRE-SCIENTIFIC LAW?
§§-- Without beings in existence (To Be), there is no science “on them”. Existence is not vacuous. Non-vacuous existents are in Extension (Existence-Category 1), i.e., they have parts, they are composed.
§§-- Both parts and wholes can interact. They cause impacts on a finite number of other existents and on themselves: Change (Existence-Category 2). Change involves motion, but is not motion. Parallel to these two physical-ontological Categories, no other characteristic is thinkable. Hence, Extension and Change ꞊ Exhaustive implications of To Be of Reality-in-total the highest natural kind.
§§-- If Extended+Changing (with parts and with impact formation) entities exist, this is causal existence. Every existent is such. Hence: Universal Causality...! Extension, Change, and Causality are pre-scientific Laws. Now, no Quantum Physicist can tell us that some (observable) processes are causal and the others (partial observables [unobservables] and non-observables) are merely statistically causal or non-causal…!
§§-- Smaller natural kinds (ordered and/or organized parts of Reality-in-total) also have characteristics. These are ontological universals (modes of being of processes). They are primarily in the natural kinds, and only thus in the token enities in the natural kind.
§§-- Space ꞊ measure of extension. Time ꞊ measure of change. These are epistemic concepts. Epistemic space-time cannot curve as physicists make us believe. Extension-Change-wise existent matter-energy conglomerations curve.
Centuries of violent and extremist discussions have taken place as to a Yes or No or Yes-and-No to causality in existent beings, namely, Reality-in-total. In the fray have been mainly philosophy, and only then physics. This state has changed after the genesis of quantum physics. In the above, I have “proved” in a very simple manner that Universal Causality is a pre-scientific Law.
The purely epistemic version of causality can only be a sort of concept and not be that of what happens in the world. It gets formulated due to the sense-related, conceptual, and logical conclusion towards a correlation of some sort between two or more events, but without recourse to the events’ existence.
Any further justification of the epistemological conclusion of causality without involving the purely physical-ontological aspect of existence of the event at question in total and its antecedent and consequent part-events may even be taken as an explanation of the experience of correlation. Historical examples abound, and Hume’s is the most famous example.
But this is not the case if the purely physical-ontological aspect of existence of the event at question in total and its antecedent and consequent part-events may be accepted as the conditio sine qua non of the sensation, conceptualization, and logical argument. Hence the fully physical-ontological status of causality.
Traditionally, causality is the relation between the antecedent and the consequent part-events of the one event at issue. And causation is the act of a cause-event in effecting an effect-event. This is the age-old manner of conceiving the ontology of causality. The former, the epistemic and the explanatory, have been the trend during most of the 20thcentury history of philosophical and physical-philosophical inquiry on causality.
But what I have proposed in the various parts of my five published books is a whole new manner of theorizing Universal Causality. I hope to finally suggest that this is also a game-changer in the history of the concept of causality.
I can understand a "physical-ontological aspect of existence" by the existence of matter in the moment of the observation. But there is the emergence of virtual particles in the empty cosmos according to the unsharpness principle of Heisenberg. These particles are at first only hypothetical and dissolve after a certain time, by the mutual annihilation. They did not exist quasi. But if both particles exist longer than the unsharpness relation allows, by external influences, they become real particles. This shows how unsharp the borders of the "physical ontology" are. Without clear limits.
With the time it is also not so simple. Yes, it is bound to movement.
Your quote: "Change involves motion, but is not motion".
A stone may lie in a well-defined place of the subsoil without movement, but it will change with its form over time, outside by processes of decay (abrasion) and inside by mineral changes. These are very slow processes of movement. There is a very slow real movement of the change of the inside with effect on the outside.
You have written wonderfully well. I am able to recognize it. This is the kind of persons that should also try to criticize my work. Am happy.
The Unsharpness (Unschärfe, Uncertainty) Principle and the various "realities" that arose from the development of QM thereafter, together, have marred the concept of Reality a lot. I am attempting to redeem it in a processual manner -- using a concept of process that is much beyond that of QM and Relativitiy and many more other recent stuff. I do not claim that I am an expert in any of them. But becoming an expert in all of them is the Will-o'-the-wisp that scholars and scientists chase. I would like to circumvent being an expert in all these part-sciences, but not miss their general implications, and then try systemic solutions. For the time, this much in reply. Gute Nacht!
Helmuth Grötzebauch,
In my book "Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology", Chapter 6, I have explained clearly what I would suggest to be a solution for the problems created by QM's manner of seeing causality and its presence or not in nature. If you like, I can send a private pre-publication PDF of it -- of course it is copyrighted in the published form by the publisher.
But it is a thick book. As I said, I try to create a system of thinking based on physics and cosmology.
Would like to get hold of your published work, too.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/DEFINITION_OF_THE_ONTOLOGY_BEHIND_PHYSICS_5_Paragraphs
DEFINITION OF THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS (5 Paragraphs)
Dear Raphael Neelamkavil, I read A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS.
There Five fundamental notions: reality, extension, change, causality, and time.
My credo
I think Universal causality is a phantasm. It is never justified speaking about the structure of reality in themselves. We never have access to him. We can only construct assertions we say they are real of. And this construction muss be 'acceptable' this means ‘justified’. then it is circular to begin with a description (by principles) of the reality in self. In the initial situation there are nether external reality nor extension, nor time no objects end eve less causality. All these notions must Be construct. Then the initial situation muss described without these notions. The construction fixe (is) the meanings of the constructed notion. Your fundamental notions have meaning, inclusive causality but not universal causality!
Piergiorgio Quadranti,
Thanks. But as you know, practically all these aspects that you mention have already been discussed in the history of philosophy, mostly by sceptics of various description. Practically none of their premises has much effect today.
But have you noticed that the words 'mental construct' or 'constructed' or 'concepts' mean in fact only that all our concepts have their immediate origin in minds. This does not mean that such constructs are wholly from the mind.
But then some begin to think that it has already been proved that all these constructs / concepts have nothing to do with an existent world.
Despite this, if we say that these concepts are constructs BY the mind, THEN THEY ARE INSISTING THAT THE MIND HAS CAUSED THEM....
But if you insist them to be caused by mind, it means that you believe in the causality of constructs by the mind. Do you think that this is justified?
When you or your child is hospitalized due to an illness, do you ask why and how the illness came? At least the doctor asks. If one undergoes a surgery and is cured, one admits that the surgery is the cause of the cure.
As I told you above, the fallacy of the skeptics is that they substitute the status of minds as partial cause of the constructs and concepts for the status of the whole cause: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL FALLACY OF WHOLE AND PART.
What do you think of these? If a stone falls on us, do we get injured by stone or by the construct-concept of the injury in the mind?
Thanks. But '...if we say that these concepts are constructs BY the mind, THEN THEY ARE INSISTING THAT THE MIND HAS CAUSED THEM..' Mind doesn't costruct concepts, it is this construction and this construction isn't causal. Causality exist and i'm realiist, but not each processes begin causally. I'm realist and not keptical.
'...Practically none of their premises has much effect today....' If my constructions are aceptable, they have effect, as Mioara Mugur-Schàchter thinks.
There are plenty of ambiguities. I don't refuse the scientific results. Exempli gazia, I accept the trasformations rules of the 'relativité restreinte', but y understand they differently as Einstein. I kan understand your fundation on on particular categories. But I think it is possible to goo deeper and this as EFFECT.
Quickly answered but we kan develop it.
You said: "Mind doesn't costruct concepts, it is this construction and this construction isn't causal." What do you mean by "it is this construction"? Do you think that constructions / constructs are not constructed by the mind, and hence constructions / constructs are not causal?
Again, "But I think it is possible to go deeper and this as EFFECT." How do we go deeper and obtain constructs as effects? They are construct-effects not only of the mind but also of the objects. If we do not accept this, we will have to accept either that mind alone constructs concepts or that objects alone construct concepts.
Exactly. Mind or mental constructions are the means of behaviours. Behaviours are the ‘signifiant’ and the means the ‘signifié’ (De Saussure). There is no causality between ‘signifiant’ and ‘signifié. The mental structure evolves in time, but you can’t assert within this construction is causality. But this exacts a construction of the notion af causality. It is possible with the construction of the notion of process and their relations. (I done it). Photon doesn’t exact ether is real as concept doesn’t exact the mind is something real ( a faculty = ?)) different from the construction and constructs.
Mind may be a faculty, because we hold it to be so. But brain is causal, I believe. But now how to connect mind and brain as notions and as existents? Can we say the same as the existence of brain also about the existence of mind?
In both yes and no, we need to manage the connection. This connection is to be solved causally or non-causally?
I see the problem and I have already developed my answer. I will answer to Bas van Fraassen on supervenience (exactly this problem) and Theories, Modelling, and empirical support. I will write one text for both. But this exacts some time.
Nevertheless, I sketch my answer.
Mind may be a faculty, because we hold it to be so. But brain is causal , I believe. But now how to connect mind and brain as notions and as existents? Can we say the same as the existence of brain also about the existence of mind?
In both yes and no, we need to manage the connection This connection is to be solved causally or non-causally? < Supervenience isn’t constructing as causal relation. But, as already said, this exacts the construction of causal relation.>
To my mind, "‘Existent’ means have been a construct and ‘to be real’ means to be an argument of the predicate ‘…is real’" is unacceptable.
To exist means (1) not to be non-vacuous, i.e., to be something extended. If not extended, it is non-existent, and (2) to be impacting from within outwards and inwards, but finitely. This sort of Extension-Change-wise existing is causality. Anything existent -- universally everywhere that there exists anything -- is in Extension-Change-wise existence. This is what I call Universal Causality.
In other words, the primary implications of existence (To Be) are Extension and Change, and these two together constitute Causality as a relation of the antecedent to the consequent. Thus, Universal Causality is pre-scientific and pre-philosophical. No other concept like supervenience can express Causality well enough. Supervenience, e.g., is one manner and form of expression of Causality in language.
That is, even before we speak of the linguistic manner of "to be an argument of the predicate", there is existence. The linguistic formulation of it appears later. If anything being used as the argument of a predicate is real, that 'real' involves both (1) existent realities and (2) non-existent but existents-pertinent realities.
The (2) here are nothing but the qualities / universals / pure attributes that may be attributed of existents. Moreover, qualia / predicates are complex forms of pure qualities / universals. Without these universals we cannot speak at all. Hence, we are used to include them under 'real'. E.g., the redness of this book is real. But it does not mean that redness exists as the book exists. Redness pertains to the existent book.
From this viewpoint, supervenience is just a linguistic-philosophical manner of expressing the conceiving of some causal processes. But even before it all, there is the pre-scientific and pre-philosophical Universal Causality.
I have worked a lot on supervenience, possible worlds, etc. But the many linguistc (say, Saussure) and linguistic-analytic (as you gave the example of the philosopher of science, Van Fraassen) ways of explication of these things are in my opinion a gone affair, a matter of the past.
Please excuse me for this impudence. But after having worked at lot on these (but not much on Saussure), I think so.
AM VERY HAPPY TO CONTINUE TO INTERACT WITH YOU. YOU HAVE BEEN BRINGING TO THE FORE MANY INTERESTING CONCEPTS AND WAYS OF DEALING WITH THINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PHYSICS.
r
To my mind, "‘Existent’ means have been a construct and ‘to be real’ means to be an argument of the predicate ‘…is real’" is unacceptable.
Am not scur, but it seems to me you speak about reality. Am speaking about our knowledge and some parts of it can be real. This means argument of the predicate ‘…is real’. We don’t know reality but our knowledge of them. This knowledge is construct and this construction begin neither with language nor with semantic. If I develop an epistemology of an experimental theory, I develop a normativity allows me to me to accept of refuse it. But this construction is a priori I don’t need semantic for. I need a language I can’t think without. But it can be a private language without communication with other people. This language doesn’t need semantic, only meaning. Ad my epistemology is the meaning of such a text. In this text I can expose the normativity for a construction of knowledge. This means I say (a priori) how an observer can construct this knowledge, without perceiving any observer at all. The observer is the construction (of knowing structures) I realise myself by writing my text. There, each empirical evidence (les données perceptives) is only hypothetical because I perceive nothing else my text and my activity of writing. The existence of the observe is constructed as meaning of my writing and is as real as my text. The reality IN the observer is the subsumptions on the predicate ‘...is real’. Then I can distinguish ‘existence as construction (of the observer, or a priori normativity or rationality) from reality as subsumption on ‘…is real’. An observer (myself inclusive) my have not hypothetical empirical evidence. My a priori construction prescribe to him haw construction the mining on (of this on this non merely hypothetical evidence. Then, constructed mining as so real as this evidence. I now born can have evide3nce without consciousness. Your choice of fundamental categories is realized on a conscious level. But without construction neither this level nor consciousness exist. This level is not vacuous. It exists but only some terms are real. Extension doesn’t exist on each level of construction, and in this case it can be real. But term can be real on some level without extension.
The constructivism distinguishes formal construction from real construction. The real construction is realised (roughly speaking) on change. Change concern only the subsumption on ‘…is real’ and can only be evidence (une donnée) and it is the only apparition (phenomenon) of reality. I have constructed the notions of mass and force on acceleration (a particular change!). Change allows to construct time and time to construct space, and so on… until process, stability, probability, and causality. Formal construction doesn’t need time and change and reality.
Is this unacceptable?
To exist means (1) not to be non-vacuous, i.e., to be something extended. If not extended, it is non-existent, and (2) to be impacting from within outwards and inwards, but finitely. This sort of Extension-Change-wise existing is causality. Anything existent -- universally everywhere that there exists anything -- is in Extension-Change-wise existence. This is what I call Universal Causality.
In other words, the primary implications of existence (To Be) are Extension and Change, and these two together constitute Causality as a relation of the antecedent to the consequent.
Thus, Universal Causality is pre-scientific and pre-philosophical. No other concept like supervenience can express Causality well enough. Supervenience, e.g., is one manner and form of expression of Causality in language.
< Supervenience, in my construction, is something else as causality>
That is, even before we speak of the linguistic manner of "to be an argument of the predicate", there is existence. The linguistic formulation of it appears later. If anything being used as the argument of a predicate is real, that 'real' involves both (1) existent realities and (2) non-existent but existents-pertinent realities.
The (2) here are nothing but the qualities / universals / pure attributes that may be attributed of existents. Moreover, qualia / predicates are complex forms of pure qualities / universals. Without these universals we cannot speak at all. Hence, we are used to include them under 'real'. E.g., the redness of this book is real. But it does not mean that redness exists as the book exists. Redness pertains to the existent book.
From this viewpoint, supervenience is just a linguistic-philosophical manner of expressing the conceiving of some causal processes. But even before it all, there is the pre-scientific and pre-philosophical Universal Causality.
I have worked a lot on supervenience, possible worlds, etc. But the many linguistic (say, Saussure) and linguistic-analytic (as you gave the example of the philosopher of science, Van Fraassen) ways of explication of these things are in my opinion a gone affair, a matter of the past.
Please excuse me for this impudence. But after having worked at lot on these (but not much on Saussure), I think so.
AM VERY HAPPY TO CONTINUE TO INTERACT WITH YOU. YOU HAVE BEEN BRINGING TO THE FORE MANY INTERESTING CONCEPTS AND WAYS OF DEALING WITH THINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PHYSICS.
If you equate physical existence with reality, how can "being argument of a predicate" denote real?
If we do not know reality, of which some are existent, then how do we know our knowledge (or about our knowledge)? If knowing our knowledge is possible directly, then the former too is clearly possible. If you want to strictly follow the Cartesian, Humean, and Kantian arguments for the fact of knowledge, then, accordingly, knowing our knowledge and knowing the existence of real existents will only be different in the sense that the latter will have less truth probability. Otherwise, there is no absolute certainty for our knowledge of our own knowledge! That is, our knowledge and our knowledge of our knowledge must be constructs, if I follow your line of arguments!
If you need for certain purposes only a private language, how does the private language take shape and work without previous experiences and thoughts? I think the questionof private language has been discussed for almost a century in the analytic tradition and nothing great has come out of it.
You say: "And my epistemology is the meaning of such a text. In this text I can expose the normativity for a construction of knowledge."
How can an epistemology be the meaning of a text (or of anything, however you interpret 'text')? I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO GET.
In any case, through the above questions arguments from me, I hope you now see clearly the differences between French philosophies and the philosophies of science.
Arguments like the following are terrific: "There, each empirical evidence (les données perceptives) is only hypothetical because I perceive nothing else my text and my activity of writing." These are the kind we often find in many French philosophers, especially postmoderns, semioticians, and hermeneuticians. I have had a lot of these during my Master studies in philosophy. This is why I say this.
The observer does not construct concepts and languages in the usual manner of constructing. It has not only a personal and social history but also a history of relationships with the existent physical world!!!
When you say "a particular change", and insist that it is a spceific singular construct, does it not also mean that the term 'change' automatically refers to other changes, and without a knowledge of similar changes (however vague), none can have the notion of change? Hence, there is universality (need not always be absolute universality meaning applicability to all existents) in the nominal, verbal, adjectival, and other terms that we use! Do you find this a good manner of showing another aspect?
Today it is too late to answer. I will do, I must clarify my conception, to dissipate the ambiguities. The most important is to clarify the Level I work on....
But it is a pleasure to continue the discussion.
THE ANOMALY IN MATHEMATICAL / THEORETICAL PHYSICS (Short Text)
https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_ANOMALY_IN_MATHEMATICAL_THEORETICAL_PHYSICS_Short_Text
This is a very serious and somewhat complex matter to discuss:
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Yordan Epitropov
I wrote: "Smaller natural kinds (ordered and/or organized parts of Reality-in-total) also have characteristics."
The term "the composed" is not clear enough. Why not we say Reality-in-total? Its main characteristics should be applicable to all its parts. That is all. This is the ontological connection.
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