Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), spearheaded by Graham Harman and developed within the broader movement of speculative realism, posits the radical flattening of ontological hierarchy, putting humans and non-human objects on par. In other words, such entities as rocks, books, computers, and human beings exist independently from anything else, and they act independently of human perception or interaction; this is a clear break from anthropocentric philosophies, with profound ethical concerns that must be interrogated.

OOO and the Rejection of Human Exceptionalism

Perhaps one of the more provocative features of OOO is its disregard for human exceptionalism. In the belief that objects exist independently of human use and interaction, OOO seeks to decentre humanity from a philosophical framework. For this reason, OOO provides one way in which ontological hierarchies can be rethought by supplanting traditional human-centred thought with a more equalising view.

But this radical flattening tends to bring forth an ethical challenge. Assuming, then, that an object has an ontological standing equal to that of a human, how do we navigate questions of moral responsibility? Normally, humans bear the weight of ethical decision-making in political and social contexts because they are capable of intentionality. Does not OOO, taken to its logical conclusions and assuming all objects to be equally important, erase the critical distinctions on which our ethical systems depend? In other words, we must also ask how a philosophy that flattens agency responds to environmental degradation, technological advancement, or human rights.

Ethical Dilemmas in the Context of Agency

This flattening of agency introduces what can almost be called an ethical void: a space in which the distinctions necessary for moral decisions have been blurred. Take, for instance, environmental ethics: OOO may say that ontological equality holds between a tree, a river, and a bulldozer. Yet how are we to adjudicate decisions related to deforestation or industrialisation if we treat each with a sense of ontological parity?

Suppose all beings are granted equal moral consideration. In that case, the moral framework to guide whether a forest should be maintained or developed into an industrial site collapses into a space in which no entity can be privileged over another.

That is, in the case of artificial intelligence (AI), this stance of OOO on the issue of object agency would mean that the AI system itself has as much ontological status as its creators and, therefore, may complicate ethical discussions of accountability and responsibility.

If machines themselves are agents, how far would we be permitted to blame human judgements for whatever is carried out by the AI system? The flattening of agency might make the lines of legal and moral responsibility begin to melt away in complex technological environments.

Comparative Perspectives: New Materialism and OOO

When set against New Materialism, which also places great emphasis on the agency of matter yet remains more attached to the interrelations among objects and humans, OOO appears disengaged from meaningful human interests. While New Materialism embeds vitality into the fundamentals of an entity, it still retains a semblance of human agency within its philosophy.

This makes it more adaptable to ethical dilemmas—such as those involving climate change or social justice—where human intervention and interaction with the material world have a central role. Conversely, OOO risks being irrelevant for real moral questions because of its refusal to grant privilege to human agency.

In New Materialism, the emphasis on interconnectivity and relationality retains, through its undermining effects, an idea of responsibility lost in OOO's denial of human agency in response to global crises. From these comparative perspectives, what becomes evident is that this radical detachment from human agency in OOO may not be a strong foundation for ethical decision-making.

The Unintended Consequences of "Withdrawal"

The core of OOO is this idea of withdrawal—that objects exist, somehow, out of full comprehension or interaction with other entities, human ones included. This, while philosophically intriguing, introduces yet another layer of abstraction, thereby complicating how the theory of OOO can conceivably be applied. If objects do not fully disclose themselves, then is it not impossible for us to say anything about their agency?

This runs the risk of withdrawing objects from their greater meaning in human life. Ethical decision-making, especially regarding environmental and technological matters, depends upon a certain understanding between entities. Suppose OOO insists upon the view that objects are always withdrawn from each other. In that case, any human-entity interaction will be mired in uncertainty and will ultimately make it very hard for us to make an informed ethical decision.

Eurocentrism, Colonialism, and OOO

But another point of critique, perhaps most powerfully driven home, is the implications of OOO for postcolonial and decolonial critiques of philosophy insofar as any challenge to Eurocentrism—through the displacement of human centrality—is accompanied by overlooking the ways in which such Eurocentrism, colonialism, and capitalism are part of the relationship between human and entity. The flattening of the ontological hierarchy in OOO loses how the colonial systems objectified human beings themselves as commodities, labour, or whatever was to be exploited.

To be sure, flattening the hierarchy between human and entity in postcolonial contexts risks universalising—under the banner of ontological equalisation—these historical denials and erasures of human agency. More to the point, thinkers like Frantz Fanon or Edward Said have developed frameworks inspired by the violent implications of objectifying humans through colonialist practices that recognised the reduction of humans to entities. By failing to address power dynamics, OOO risks reinforcing precisely that dehumanisation it purports to decry.

Hybridity, Agency, and Human Accountability

Another interesting aspect of the theory of OOO is the way it theorises hybridity. It seems the theory suggests that in interactions between entities, which include humans, a kind of hybrid reality is created wherein no one thing takes precedence. While such a view can be celebrated for its novelty, it does problematise moral accountability. If everything is hybrid, then responsibility lies nowhere.

For instance, in climate change debates, OOO would suggest that industrial factories and carbon emissions are hybrid entities, symmetrical to the atmosphere in agency. In such a flattening, however, it would appear to obscure human decisions in the exacerbation of environmental crises. It does acknowledge hybridity on the part of entities, but OOO needs to wrestle with the disproportionate roles humans have in shaping such realities.

Critique of Cultural and Political Imperialism

Also, OOO's critique of cultural imperialism seems to be quite narrow in its extension to modern political systems. While it does indeed effectively enable the deconstruction of human-entity dominations, it falls short of anything that might contemplate the ethical aftermath of systems that dominate other humans—for instance, American cultural imperialism or global capitalism. The philosophy is still too abstract to produce concrete solutions or critiques of real-world power dynamics, at least when human lives are at stake. But by flattening all entities, OOO ignores the fact that some entities—human beings—have been treated as less than entities in oppressive systems throughout history. Any critique that neglects such power structures cannot reckon with all of the ethical and political nuances of our world.

Concluding Remarks: The Limitations of OOO in Ethical Applications

The above brings me to the conclusion that even while Object-Oriented Ontology does offer a radical re-conceptualisation regarding ontology, its ethical and practical uses are deeply problematic. Flattening agencies demolishes the necessary distinctions that are required for making ethical decisions and dangerously lessen human responsibility in ongoing critical global dilemmas related to climate change, technological advancement, and human rights. In making such object-human ontological equals, OOO runs the risk of erasing the very power dynamics and moral considerations which it aims to confront. Suppose philosophy is ever relevant to the debates at hand. In that case, it needs to both respect the messy nature of human-entity relationships and not eliminate, in turn, the agency of human beings. OOO can provide some interesting insights regarding the nature of entities and will, at some point, turn out not to provide such a framework that will really be able to engage with the ethical, political, and environmental crises of our time. As such, it opens important questions but offers less than satisfactory answers for those concerned with real moral decisions. It is within this expansion of ethical considerations, within a rethinking of the flattening of agency, that OOO can offer a more nuanced and responsible framework for understanding our place within a world of entities.