Very nice question we may think observational of by testing hypothesis as either or but these are not either or but both. We need to be both testing hypotheses and directed foward hypothesis testing but not lose critical observational modes of pondering things. We we test things we also need to use a divergence of techniques which look at the question in different ways. This of course often depends on getting involved in research teams and teamwork since the capacities needed rarely reside in one person or institution. It also makes things more complicated than we might  desire. Oh well. 

First, I'd like to qualify my comments by saying that I am a native English speaker and I wonder if others here are not. There may be some confusion due to language.

That said: In the scientific process, hypothesis development and testing comes after observing and asking questions about phenomena. I'd venture to say that very little comes from hypotheses themselves, as they need to be tested to result in any new knowledge about the world. It's the tested hypotheses that tell us something--if a "tested hypothesis" is what is meant by the project title, then I might agree--slightly.

"We we test things we also need to use a divergence of techniques which look at the question in different ways."

The way you mention testing here sounds more like experimental design. Yes, you do need to use different techniques to answer different questions, but that should not inform your hypothesis, rather it would be driven by the hypothesis to be tested.

Again, the project title is "Scientific Hypothesis as a source of innovation and discovery". I maintain that hypotheses are not really a source; the questions and observations hypotheses are designed to answer would be a more valid source for innovation and discovery. Tested/Testing hypotheses could be a source, mostly because they result in more observations and questions, but that's not what the project title implies. Untested hypotheses may or may not be valuable for anything at all. So "scientific hypothesis" alone doesn't do much.

I have no idea how it happened but this is not my project.

Do you have any idea how I could dissociate myself from this project?

Incidentally, I totally agree with your comments. Hypotheses are not the source of innovation and discovery. They might stimulate such activities but they are not the source. 

Hypotheses are formulated to explain observations. First we have to observe something and only then we can try to explain it by proposing a hypothesis or a theory. The next step is to test our hypothesis or a theory by other observations. These are the natural steps in research but the source is in observations.

It is unscientific and counterproductive to create hypotheses or theories and ignore contradicting data. Unfortunately, this has happened in the demographic and economic research and if you read my papers on this topic you can see clearly what I mean.

Good and reliable data are of the highest priorities in scientific research. They are the source of our knowledge and innovations. Hypotheses are not. They are only the stepping stones which can be, and often are, replaced by new explanations. Even the best and the most elaborate theory has to give way to reliable and convincing but contradicting observations.

So again, hypotheses are not the source or discoveries and innovations.

Best regards,

Ron

Intuitive perceptions can be the result of recent/previous learning or obtained from a variety of phenomena and therefore precede observation. Einstein's hypotheses came from complicated sources, many preceding any means of justification. 

Are you trying to claim that Einstein's hypotheses were not prompted by or linked to earlier observations and explanations?

Hypotheses link experimental data to existing theories at the time of research. Testing hypotheses is a source of innovations and discoveries: if hypotheses are verified, a scientific explanation for experimental data has been discovered; If hypotheses are refuted, theories need to be revised, and so new innovations and discoveries are made.

The source of our knowledge is the data and observations. Hypotheses are only the stepping stones. They might be useful in explaining our observations but they are not the source of our knowledge.

First we observe and only then we try to explain. Our explanations might be questionable. We then look for better explanations. We might then go back to the source of our knowledge, which is observations.

We do not create the universe by our hypotheses. We only try to explain what is already there.

There is no science without data. They are the source of our knowledge. Any hypothesis or a theory will not advance our knowledge unless it can be verified or tested by observations.

A hypotheses or a theory, which cannot be tested by data, is unscientific. It might be an elegant and beautiful theory but if it cannot be tested by observations, it is just a story, which does not advance our knowledge. One way or another, we have to go back to the source of our knowledge, which is observations of what is already there. 

It is only in the perspective of language that "Scientific Hypotheses" can be thought "as a source of innovation and discovery"; insofar as datas are formulated into a language within social boundaries, it is found as the objective "source of knowledge" arising into consciousness of individual beings.

The questionning of scientific hypotheses thus would be asking about what kind of science and discoveries is permitted by different specific objective appearance given by language to facts - just as we can wonder about the kind of effectivity statistics has developped as, for instance, a way of thinking political trends. Innovations then must be understood in a social perspectives as activities impulsed into communities life by these same special techniques of language, like formulas being able to communicate and prove real what imagination cannot conceive - like big datas, for instance.

...of course, this only insofar as the coherence of "scientific hypotheses" relie on a paradigma of reality, a network of meanings appearing as language  - as meant Foucault with his episteme.

I'm sorry to be blunt here Porry, but even allowing for any "English as a second language" barrier, your post seems little more than a useless word salad. 

You said: "It is only in the perspective of language that "Scientific Hypotheses" can be thought "as a source of innovation and discovery"; insofar as datas are formulated into a language within social boundaries, it is found as the objective "source of knowledge" arising into consciousness of individual beings."

My reponse:

What on Earth does that even mean? We certainly need language to successfully transfer ideas and knowledge from one person to another--but language doesn't change the fact that, as Ron and I have said, hypotheses are not the source of innovation and discovery.

You said: "The questionning of scientific hypotheses thus would be asking about what kind of science and discoveries is permitted by different specific objective appearance given by language to facts - just as we can wonder about the kind of effectivity statistics has developped as, for instance, a way of thinking political trends. Innovations then must be understood in a social perspectives as activities impulsed into communities life by these same special techniques of language, like formulas being able to communicate and prove real what imagination cannot conceive - like big datas, for instance."

My response:

Scientific hypotheses are questioned when they are tested (when data and observations pertaining to them are analyzed). You can question the result of a test of an hypothesis; or you can ask whether or not the hypothesis was well constructed (thus resulting in a poorly designed test); but simply questioning an hypothesis to see what is "permitted" is not scientific (sounds more like science denial to me).

Language does not give credence or objectivity to facts, it merely describes. Facts are facts. Language is a tool, just like a hammer. Language allows us to describe things. Our cultures decide on the meanings of the words in our language then those cultures demand the words be used accurately. Ascribing any more power to language than that is foolish and ultimately misleading. 

Formulas do not "prove real what imagination cannot conceive". They too describe observations and facts. Formulas allow us to convey information about those observations and facts to others--just a form of language. If we cannot conceive it, we certainly cannot describe it, with or without a formula.

Definitions that might help you with your use of language in further responses (both from Merriam-Webster):

innovation: noun, 1. the introduction of something new 2. a new idea, method or device.

discover: verb, 1. to make known or visible 2. to obtain sight or knowledge of for the first time

You might also look up "language" - too much to write here.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Word_salad

Lynn, sorry, but language is more than a tool-such an idea is extremely old fashioned surely ignoring whole developments in philosophy? As correct language use has also been raised, what is all this doubling of consonants-pp and nn? Is this American spellings perhaps?

Stanley, I'm certainly not trying to ignore contributions in philosophy. I'll admit that I am not well-versed in the philosophy of language.

The fact that language may be more than a tool does not contradict anything I said in response to Porry, does it? If you think it does, please explain. Saying my description of language is old fashioned doesn't mean it's false, does it? It's still true that language is a tool and I doubt even modern philosophy denies that. If there's any theory in philosophy that attempts to give language the power to give credence to facts or allow formulas to "prove real what imaginations cannot conceive", I'd love to hear about it. I only ask that you describe such ideas using clear, concise language--pretend I'm stupid (or maybe that I'm Trump) and explain it carefully. Feel free to rewrite Porry's post if you can determine what she really meant to say and I'll respond to that.

I'm not sure what spelling issues in my writing you're noting. I quoted some of Porry's text (I've edited my post a bit to make the quoted bits and my responses more obvious) and she had some odd spellings--which I attributed to English probably not being her 1st language.

Stanley, it would also be nice if you'd respond to Ron's response to your comment about Einstein (13/14 July).

Good and really appreciating question by Mam Lynn 

Its obviously hypothesis and innovations are not a source of research but these innovation give us a idea that how we research which parameters we used for this and many more parameters which we know by this.

Greetings.

I have trouble following who is adopting which position--I guess that is because I am not a native speaker :)  So, my post is addressed to the Baconian position that asserts :

(a) observations are always prior to hypotheses

For competing views on the relationship between observations and hypotheses, this is useful:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/#HowObsEviMigTheLad

But even if in some sense, observations of some amount have to be prior to generating hypothesis, this is not the end of the story.  At some point in a scientific investigation, one might just have to say "enough with the pursuit of more data, this is not productive.  What we need at this point in time is some high-powered daydreaming".  To illustrate:

Let us say that I am a detective trying to find the culprit in a murder case.

My sidekick has gathered data about the case, a set of observations by him and numerous "witnesses".  Cal these {O1...On}

I have also somehow formulated two hypotheses, H1 and H2, which purport to explain these observations.

To simplify, let us assume that H1 and H2 both actually explain {O1...On}.  Let us call this property of being capable of explaining the relevant data  "empirical adequacy".

But hypotheses have other properties like simplicity, conservativeness, and fecundity (see for example Carl Hempel's and Rudolf Carnap's classic discussions of these).  And according to many thinkers on the subject, these "superempirical" properties of hypotheses (as Paul Churchland calls them) are also very important in guiding science.

So I, the detective, consider H1 and H2 and find them lacking in some superempirical properties, even though they are both empirically adequate and internally consistent.  They are both too convoluted (not simple enough), and lack fecundity.  They do not in some way suggest avenues (see footnote 1) for gathering "new data"  In other words, they do not make predictions that could be converted to new observations after taking suitable steps--but also remember that sometimes, the predictions entail that you just have to wait until the next eclipse to garner new observations!!

I need to come up with a new hypothesis that will hopefully be simpler and more fecund.  That way I can tell my sidekick where to go to look for new observations, instead of him running around like a headless chicken.  So in the name of advancing scientific inquiry,  I light my pipe and snuggle in my armchair to ponder.  I am on the path that leads to innovations and scientific discovery!

This is what used to be called "the creative component of science".  Since there is no algorithm that carries us from a set of observations to a hypothesis, generating the latter is a "creative" process more akin to daydreaming than busybodying (if you allow me to use an archaic word).  A significant portion of what we call "the advancement of science" is indebted to such "idle" creativity.  At some point in the process of scientific inquiry, expending effort to generate new hypotheses is prior to just searching for some new observations.

footnote 1:  Some years ago, I would have said "They do not allow us to deductively or inductively infer potential observations.  I now use a less precise expression about the relation between hypotheses and actual and potential observations because of the issues raised in this article:  "Limits of a Deductive Construal of the Function of Scientific Theories " (pp. 237-249) in The Philosophy of Carl Hempel, Fetzer, James H.(ed).  Oxford Uinversity Press (2001)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/#HowObsEviMigTheLad