To my knowledge, "individualistic" views vs. "collectivist" of rights, in general, are mostly discussed as "individual perspectives", rather than "comparative perspectives".

I do not think that lawyers can be accused that their perspective on human rights is more legalistic than sociological. In the international protection of human rights, we are particularly looking for effective instruments of legal protection, especially where other mechanisms fail, such as philosophy, ethics, sociology or religion. This does not mean that one should not look for places where thought and trends meet, which can enrich and broaden the way human rights are perceived. In this context, in my opinion, cultural affiliation or the level of economic and social development of the country of origin of those who speak in the matter of protecting human rights is irrelevant. It is rather a matter of personal sensitivity and intellectual and scientific maturity. But of course this is only my private opinion

Because the pseudoscientists of the international leftist academia are interested only on normative (pseudoscientific) rather than empirical (scientific) research.

Is it because most empirical or sociological studies have a narrower and localised content as compared to the broader international theoretical content afforded by a normative perspective on human rights? Human rights being universal by definition perhaps affords one to transcend regional or other geographical barriers imposed by empirical studies with limited resources by using a broader normative approach. My understanding. I am open to correction.

Thanks for sharing your insights. Lawyers are generally trained in the normative perspective of jurisprudence rather the empirical perspectives and methodologies of the social sciences, although there are lawyers who take advanced degrees that utilize the empirical approaches of sociology and anthropology of law. There is nothing wrong with being normative in one's views on human rights. But one can only encounter difficulties if legal codes on human rights are presumed to be universal when, in fact, there are societies, especially the more primitive ones, which have no notion of human rights. Various cultures around the world do not prescribed to the Western view of human rights. For instance, the early Philippine barangays, the rule of the datu or chieftain is absolute, the subjects have no awareness of human rights. The concept of human rights is recent development with the UN charter on human rights in the 1940's. Cheers and I would appreciate your insights on human rights!

The following overview addresses the empirical nature of “rights”:

https://www.academia.edu/37021128/Scientific_Proof_of_Our_Unalienable_Rights

Evolving from natural law and natural rights, human rights are defined to be universal and inalienable. This kind of definition is normative. In practice, however, social and cultural influences may prevent the full availability of human rights to individuals. Empirical and sociological studies may only affirm this as a fact. Hence human rights as a norm may be the advocated ideal as a resistance to the factual reality of its denial to human beings in various cultural and socio-political contexts. Non recognition of human rights by primitive societies cannot be treated as a negation of its truth. It merely affirms its importance as a normative instrument for achieving the ideal even in such societies. Possibly this is the reason for more work on the normative character of human rights rather than on the empirical truth of it.

Human rights are a social construct. What we now describe as natural law will change dramatically in 100 or 200 years. Legal regulations support the established procedure, prescribing as it should be. Sociologists analyze what is really and how changes in norms and values are taking place.

There are many different questions built into your question. I will answer your direct question in 2) and 3) below, but I need to preface it with an observation in 1)

1) I think one must be very cautious when comparing normative/prescriptive vs. empirical/sociological perspectives on human rights in an attempt to decide which has more ‘truth’ value. Studying human rights as ‘norms’ is entirely different from studying them as ‘facts’. Normative claims about the universality of human rights are important because that is what their moral legitimacy is based upon, but looking for their empirical reality is difficult, except when you treat them as a social construction, as one commentator suggested. However, I emphasize that the two groups you have identified ask very different questions about human rights. Empiricists do not, and cannot, for instance, say whether human rights should exist or whether they are good or bad, they can only speak to whether certain factual claims about human rights are justified or not. Similarly, lawyer-normativists cannot tell you, for instance, whether or not human rights are, empirically, meaningful for a given society to any degree, but they will happily provide normative arguments about why they are good (or not), and can tell you what the outcome of applying human rights norms to a given social context or situation will be, and whether that outcome is desirable or not. But again, neither approach is more ‘true’ than the other. They are asking fundamentally different questions about human rights. They can inform one another, but it is illogical to use one to disprove the other because their methods and research subjects are entirely different.

2) Your question of why are there more normative perspectives rather than empirical perspectives on human rights is probably quite easy to answer empirically. If we recognize that human rights are legal constructs, it makes sense that lawyers, who are trained in understanding and analyzing normative frameworks of rules for specific social purposes, have written a lot about them. In their current juridical form they were either created or recognized (depending on your point of view) at specific moments through juridical acts like international treaties, domestic legislation and jurisprudence. These are fundamentally rule based systems, which explains why lawyers and legal scholars have written a lot about them. The dominance of the international human rights regime, may also, in part, be, as you say, because many human rights scholars either come from or have been educated in Western institutions. But it’s also because it is endorsed by the current power structure of global politics, and many ‘developing or oriental countries’ as you labelled them have signed onto and participate in that regime, and there are many scholars from those regions who are strong advocates of the international human rights regime as well.

3) While the normative nature of human rights is quite unambiguous, their empirical nature is less obvious. The comparatively fewer empirical studies of human rights, therefore, may be due to empirical scholars not being attracted to the field because it isn’t clear at all what the factual bases of human rights are. Whether or not certain people or groups agree with the values underlying the human rights legal regime is a factual question, but as one commentator said, it is irrelevant legally speaking given the philosophical argument that they are eternal and universal, ie. you don’t need to believe in them to be subject to them. On the other hand, empirical scholars might wish to use empirical research to challenge the philosophical claim to universality, but might be dissuaded from doing so given the political/normative implications of doing so (ie. do you want to live in a world where not everybody is entitled to the same fundamental rights?). Other social constructionists might argue that while human rights as norms themselves have no empirical basis other than whether or not people or societies believe in them (which, again, is different from saying they are or are not ‘true’), the global legal regimes and discourses about human rights clearly factual and are available for empirical study. Nevertheless, as you pointed out, critical scholars, and not only from the developing world, have noticed that the dominant international human rights regime does reflect a certain cultural perspective (Western, individualistic, etc.) that is not shared by members of certain societies, like the Philippine barangays you mention. This may be both an empirical or a philosophical/normative critique, depending on how one writes it. But stating that as a fact does not lead to an obvious normative conclusion. The lawyer will say, at the end of the day, "So what? That doesn't make human rights any less valid or important."

Të drejtat e njeriut , duhet të shikohen në shuimë këndvështrime. Nuk mund të bëhet personalizimi apo personifikimi i të drejtave të njeriut vetëm nga perspektiva një filozofie apo të vetëm filozofisë së të drejtës të oksidentalizmit apo vetëm të orientalizmit. Antropologjia e të drejtave të njeriut nuk kufizohet vetëm në një etni, një komb, një fuqi politike ose ekonomike ..Liritë dhe të drejtat e njeriut janë universale dhe ato duhet te përafrohen, të fuzionohen dhe të jenë në unison me kulturën globale .

you can find some ponderations about this here:

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15762.15045

The question is, 'why are there more normative or prescriptive perspectives on human rights than sociological and empirical perspectives?' But then you introduce the argument that there are, 'more prescriptive perspectives on human rights than empirical ones as propagated by the traditional and social media'. In other words, the question seems to be about human rights perspectives [I am intentionally avoiding academic catchwords such as 'normative'] in the media (inclusive of social media). You then propose that legal professionals dominate, ' ...perspectives on law'. Just to be clear, am I to understand that legal professionals dominate perspectives on human rights law in the media?

Greetings,

In the draft 2017's draft of the "Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice", Sarah Marsden and Sarah Buhler wrote about the fact that the problem is not only that lawyers are trained only in the prescriptive aspect of the law, but it's something structural. For a lawyer it's important to be fast and accountable. So, everything that leads to something that implies creativity it's, in the best scenario, not taken in account.

Human rights it's a complex and young theme, like said by Paz Zarate, so it's normally taken in his more essential and normative traits.

1. i doubt this assertion

2. it does no good to ask questions framed in such a binary way

3. "Because the pseudoscientists of the international leftist academia are interested only on normative (pseudoscientific) rather than empirical (scientific) research."

pitiful and not worthy of this venue

Thanks for your insights and sharing! I really appreciate your interests and views on this issue.

This question can indeed divide scholars in their views, depending on the kind discipline you are socialized in understanding human rights, whether in the more normative disciplines like jurisprudence, ethics, theology, etc. or in the more descriptive disciplines like sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences.

The fact remains that with the rise of lawyers in modern society as well as the growing urbanization of society since 19th century, the normative understanding of law became more popular and delegated to the expertise of lawyers. Jurisprudence and Sociology of law were used to be merged together as a discipline in the study of law, but later became separated with the advent of modernity.

A normative approach uses the set of standards of what human rights law must be, but the empirical approach examines it through scientific methods and understands based on actual social practice.

I would appreciate more insights regarding this question. Cheers!

Dear Ven,

Your recent contribution (above) indicates that you already know the answer of your question, which is good.

I would disagree somewhat with your historical narrative there, and argue that Sociology of Law is an entirely modern phenomenon. One could probably say that prior to the 19th Century in legal studies the normative was considered to be the 'real', especially with natural law or religious accounts of law, but that is not the same as saying that there was a pre-modern 'merger' of jurisprudence and sociology of law as you describe it. At least not as established fields of study or research. Science and modernity provided a new understanding of what constituted the 'real' (ie. positivist, empirical reality) which sociologists then used to try to make sense of what the social reality of 'law' was.

Thanks to all your views, especially to Michael for his insight and historical perspective. Of course, Sociology of Law coincided with the birth of Sociology in the 19th century. But the rise of law schools and lawyers is also a modern phenomenon. You're right. Prior to this development, the normative (and discourses on natural law) perspective of law was considered the "real" view. The Catholic Church has long been using the natural law perspective, based on human reason and divine revelation, to understand law. But this view has long been challenged by Sociology and the social sciences. Thanks for being generous in sharing your insights! Cheers and best wishes to all!

One might add that many of the changes in human rights laws are intended to make the law more effective in the face of failures to achieve the aims, due to political interference. This might be called an empirical approach.

It is important to distinguish between what governments do with human rights and what societies or social movements aspire to achieve by applying them. For instance, since September 11, 2001, the U.S. foreign policy has opposed the further extension of the jurisdiction of international human rights organizations such as the International Criminal Court. I’m not sure if American citizens would agree.

You are right that those analyses should not be conducted from a "western" perspective or focusing on societies which do not correspond to this model. As mentioned in other commends HRs are universial and they should be applied equally critical on those societies or political systems where we, by intiution, believe that they fulfil them.

I just did this with France, one of modern Europe's oldest democracies, and its handling of the state-of-exception in the aftermath of the ISIS terror attacks. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2018.1493992