Mathematical Generalities: ‘Number’ may be termed as a general term, but real numbers, a sub-set of numbers, is sub-general. Clearly, it is a quality: “having one member, having two members, etc.”; and here one, two, etc., when taken as nominatives, lose their significance, and are based primarily only on the adjectival use. Hence the justification for the adjectival (qualitative) primacy of numbers as universals. While defining one kind of ‘general’ another sort of ‘general’ may naturally be involved in the definition, insofar as they pertain to an existent process and not when otherwise.
Why are numbers and shapes so exact? ‘One’, ‘two’, ‘point’, ‘line’, etc. are all exact. The operations on these notions are also intended to be exact. But irrational numbers are not so exact in measurement. If notions like ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘point’, ‘line’, etc. are defined to be so exact, then it is not by virtue of the exactness of these substantive notions, but instead, due to their being defined as exact. Their adjectival natures: ‘being a unity’, ‘being two unities’, ‘being a non-extended shape’, etc., are not so exact.
A quality cannot be exact, but may be defined to be exact. It is in terms of the exactness attributed to these notions by definition that the adjectives ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘point’, ‘line’, etc. are exact. This is why the impossibility of fixing these (and other) substantive notions as exact miss our attention. If in fact these are inexact, then there is justification for the inexactness of irrational, transcendental, and other numbers too.
If numbers and shapes are in fact inexact, then not only irrational numbers, transcendental numbers, etc., but all exact numbers and the mathematical structures should remain inexact if they have not been defined as exact. And if behind the exact definitions of exact numbers there are no exact universals, i.e., quantitative qualities? If the formation of numbers is by reference to experience (i.e., not from the absolute vacuum of non-experience), their formation is with respect to the quantitatively qualitative and thus inexact ontological universals of oneness, two-ness, point, line, etc.
Thus, mathematical structures, in all their detail, are a species of qualities, namely, quantitative qualities, defined to be exact and not naturally exact. Quantitative qualities are ontological universals, with their own connotative and denotative versions.
Natural numbers, therefore, are the origin of primitive mathematical experience, although complex numbers may be more general than all others in a purely mathematical manner of definition.
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