I should guess first, I guess :)

My construction goes like this:

1. I wait till the effects of the outputs are known.

2. Mild selection of respondents that ascribe the outputs sensible consequences

3. A few ethical questions about future generations, international solidarity, animal rights (things respondents may forget to consider, answers are not so important as the thinking about them)

4. Good/ bad survey. Asking: Do you see the ouputs and the effects of the decision-making more as good or bad ?

5. god_1 =  respond_good / respond_total

IDear Michal:

As I see it, this is a reformulation of a previous question you have already raised. So, my answer is not much different from that I gave to your initial answer. In your considerations you say: "Please, do not tell us that goodness does not exist, is too complicated, relative, etc. just do your best guess at what may work."

I know of no one that say that goodness does not exist. Yes, goodness does exist. But what goodness is about depends on what moral approach you espouse. As such, to discuss issues related to the goodness of public decision making is necessarily a complicated issue. Even though there are many definitions of goodness or good/moral actions and good public decisions, this does not mean that we have to end up with a stance of moral relativism. Suffice it to say, that when we claim that all knowledge and value is relative (a constructionist claim) we are committed to what we say cannot be  done.  In other words, to say, for example, that all moral values are relative amounts to make a non-relativistic claim. When we say that all values are relative, we are displaying a non-relative judgment, which is a blatant contradiction in epistemological terms. One the one hand, we say that we cannot display, say, absolute judgments. On the other hand, we make an absolute judgment while arguing that all knowledge and value is relative.

Let me say, again, that a comprehensive answer to your question would imply to write a book's chapter, an entire book or even several books, and hence,´it is beyond the scope of my answer. Accordingly, what follows is a short answer to your challenging question.

To substantiate that the issue you raise is polemic and complicated, I decided to perform a brief digression about the most important theories of morality. Needless to say, a moral public decision making according to a certain moral approach may no be moral according to a different approach.

For example, according to L. Kohlberg's theory of an ethic of justice, whose main injunction is that we should not treat others unfairly, a moral action or public decision is the one that passes, say, the test of reversibility ("Would we advocate the same decision if positions in the public decision at hand were reversed?"), and the universalizability test ("Did we reach a decision that would be acceptable for all at all times and places?"). Note that for Kohlberg justice is the basic moral principle.

According to I. Kant, a moral action or public decision is the one that accords with his categorical imperative, that is, we should act or decide as if our action or decision could be universalized or followed by all people at all places at times. As seems obvious, Kohlberg's tests of reversibility and universalizability are but different formulations of Kant's categorical imperative.

According to J. Habermas, a moral action or public decision is the one that would pass, say, his better argument test, that is, the argument based on rational, not instrumental, communicative action and discourse. Again, Habermas' idea of the better argument echoes Kant's categorical imperative.

According to J. Rawls' theory of justice, a moral action or public decision is moral and just when it takes into account his idea of veil of ignorance or original position. In other words, a public decision is likely to be moral and just when it ignores who is who in the situation of competing claims at hand, Again, Rawls' idea of veil of ignorance and original position is a different way of formulating Kant's categorical imperative.

The above mentioned authors all espouse deontological and procedural moralities. According to these moralities there are some actions that are moral in themselves (e.g., to steal to save a human life).

In contradistinction, teleological and consequentialist moralities, as those adopted, for example, by J. Bentham and S. Mill, advocate the principle of social utility, not the principle of justice. Thus, a moral action or public decision is the one that brings about the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Here a question arises: Who decide what is the greatest good or happiness to the greatest number of people?

According to C. Gilligan's ethic of caring and responsibility, whose main injunction is that we should not turn away from someone in need, an action or public decision is moral when it accords with the principle of benevolence. In other words, in a situation of competing claims, we should act and decide such that no one is hurt in psychological terms in the focal situation.

As Kohlberg argued, benevolence cannot solve conflicts of welfare.

According to Aristotle and contemporary virtue ethics theorists (e.g., Marta Nussbaum), a moral action and decision is the one that is consonant with the principle of eudaimonia. In others words, the more an action or public decision leads to the self-actualization or self-fulfillment  of the focal people, the more it is likely to be moral and just.  Self-actualization is to be seen in terms of A. Maslow's pyramid of one's needs.

From the preceding considerations it is clearly visible that there are several and different ways of approximating the goodness, rightness or fairness of a public decision making. These considerations also show that although generalized agreement is difficult to attain regarding the central moral principles, it is possible to accord on a procedure to appreciate the goodness or rightness of a public-decision making. (e.g., the universalizability and reversibility tests, Kant's categorical imperative, Habermas' idea of the better argument.of a public decision).

In your first question you speak about of a rule of thumb to be followed in public decision making. As I see it, that rule of thumb could be the golden rule, whose general formulation is the following; Don't do unto others what you don't want others to do unto you.

I hope I have got your question and that this helps.

Best regards.

Joseph Osei, Fayetteville State University, inspired me to add one more step, step 2 bellow.

1. I wait till the effects of the outputs are known.

2. remove respondents with net benefits (inspired by Joseph Osei)

3. Mild selection of respondents that ascribe the outputs sensible consequences (may be age limit too),

4. A few ethical questions about future generations, international solidarity, animal rights (things respondents may forget to consider, answers are not so important as the thinking about them)

5. Good/ bad survey. Asking: Do you see the ouputs and the effects of the decision-making more as good or bad ?

6. god_2 =  respond_good / respond_total

Dear Orlando,

I was thinking a little bit and I think I know why we have so different approaches.

What I am doing here is not ethics, it seems to be something like epistemology of social morality (the "prediction of goodness" project is an epistemology of constitutional design).

So, every answer stemming from ethics is not likely what I expect. Anyway thank you for your endurance and patience, your responses were definitely worth thinking about.

Best regards

m.

Have a look at Binmore: Natural Justice.  Rawls's reflective Equilibrium or Paul Edwards The Logic of Moral Discourse are both accounts of how we can arrive at some 'objective' measure of the good.  

It sounds to me like what you are doing is some form of sociology. What you intend to demonstrate escapes me.

yes, Michael, after the initial philosophical phase, it will be sociology, mostly political science, especially constitutional design. I intend to show that science may study relations A causes B, where B is something close to the meaning of our lives, where people are the end-in-itself.

I believe some qualitative research already intends to study what is good, not just what is. Quantitative research is not so precise but offers quantitative comparisons, exploratory data analysis and is surprisingly impressive.

You may see wikipedia for Evidence-based medicine for examples of quantitative-qualitative cooperation and epistemologic strength.

I also attach my first introduction to Prediction of goodness.

Best regards

m.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence-based_medicine

Research Proposal Prediction of goodness - Research proposal, Part 1: Introduction

god_3: change to god_2 in step 2, new step 3

1. I wait till the effects of the outputs are known.

2. remove respondents with exclusive net benefits or losses from decision or previous state of affairs (inspired by Joseph Osei)

3. add respondents with unmet basic needs

4. Mild selection of respondents that ascribe the outputs sensible consequences (may be age limit too),

5. A few ethical questions about future generations, international solidarity, animal rights (just things respondents may forget to consider, answers are not so important as the thinking about them)

6. Good/ bad survey. Asking: Do you see the ouputs and the effects of the decision-making more as good or bad ?

7. god_3 =  respond_good / respond_total

PS: I also would like to thank John Tons for his book recomendations above, I am reading it now.

god_4:  add new step 4, add new step 8, changes to the last step.

1. Wait till the effects of the outputs are known.

2. remove respondents with exclusive net benefits or losses from decision or previous state of affairs (inspired by Joseph Osei)

3. add respondents with unmet basic needs (private is public here)

4. Prepare groups for representative cross-section (take weights)

5. Mild selection of respondents that assign the outputs sensible consequences (may be age limit too)

6. A few ethical questions about future generations, international solidarity, animal rights (just things respondents may forget to consider, answers are not so important as the thinking about them)

7. Good/ bad survey. Asking: Do you see the outputs and the effects of the decision-making more as good or bad?

8. Give groups the weight from step 4.

9. god_4 =  SUM ( group_#_weight * respond_good_in_group_# / respond_total_in_group_#) / groups_total

god_5:  reordered, changed step 2, change to step 7

1. Wait till the effects of the outputs are known.

2. Prepare social groups for representative cross-section (take weights), make sure each group will have enough members after steps 3,4,5 (be statistically reliable)

3. Remove respondents with exclusive net benefits or losses from decision or previous state of affairs (inspired by Joseph Osei)

4. Add respondents with unmet basic needs (private is public here)

5. Mild selection of respondents that assign the outputs sensible consequences (may be age limit too)

6. A few ethical questions about future generations, international solidarity, animal rights (just things respondents may forget to consider, answers are not so important as the thinking about them)

7. Good/ bad survey. Asking: Do you see the outputs and the effects of the decision-making (or non-decision-making) more as good or bad?

8. Give groups the weights from step 2.

9. god_5 =  [ SUM ( group_#_weight * respond_good_in_group_# / respond_total_in_group_#) ] / people_total