Theoretical physics is often distinguished from experimental physics.
Is the philosophy of physics written by philosophers, and theoretical physics something physicists do?
What are the distinctions?
Or are there none, apart from how the author is designated?
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Shour & readers,
You asked:
If a theoretical physicist raises questions about fundamental notions in quantum mechanics, for example, as John Bell did, and if a philosopher raises questions about fundamental notions in quantum mechanics, what is the difference in what they are doing?
The subject matter is the same, but the skill sets and conceptual reference frames differ for the two investigators? If that observation about what is the same and what is different were valid, then the difference between the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics is not the target subject of inquiry, but rather in the approach and perspective.
---End quotation
As I see it, philosophy of physics is about physics--the science of physics, just as the philosophy of science has the various sciences as its subject-matter. A science is what is written up in papers, expounded at conferences and practiced in laboratories. Its a human activity and the results of human activities summed up in its published and generally accepted writings. Physics, on the other hand, takes physical nature as its subject-matter. It is about the natural world. So, on this account, philosophy of physics is a second-order discipline. But none of this is to say that a single person could not be both physicist and philosopher of science. Einstein is a good example of someone practicing both.
Philosophers, including those engaged in the philosophy of physics have a different training and orientation than do physicists. But that it not to say that what is done in the philosophy of physics can cast no light on what physicists are doing or have done. The philosopher of physics may try a hand at physics --usually of the more theoretical variety. But the philosopher is more likely to be focused on questions like "What is explanation?" What counts as good evidence?" What is "confirmation?" Or, perhaps, what are the general presuppositions of this or that approach to problems in physics? Its more a matter of analysis and broad comparisons.
Trying to answer this question it strikes me as important to have a working familiarity with philosophy of science and how it fits into philosophy generally. Philosophy of physics is not a variety of physics, just as philosophy of religion is not itself a religion.
H.G. Callaway
In general Philosophy of Physics does not get into thechnicalities of Physics, its more the relation of Physics to society, and factors driving the development of Physics, or the relation between Physics and more generally science.
In other words they tend to stay on the side of humanities.
EX. As Thomas Kuhn or Popper do it.
Some of them like to delve into the meaning of the quantum.
as John Bell or Hardy.
Theoretical Physics today may be rather speculative, use rather advanced math, and has not been very successfull.
But generally people who delve there know all essentials.
Its an attempt to go beyond, prior to concrete empirics.
Philosophy of physicsis the study of fundamental nature
Theoretical physics aims to explain and predict natural phenomena by using mathematical tools.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Shour & readers,
Philosophy of physics is a branch of the philosophy of science with a special focus on physics. It is "about" physics and a sub-discipline of philosophy. Physics as a science, is the subject-matter of the philosophy of physics, and in consequence, one will expect that philosophical topics from the philosophy of science, such as "confirmation," "explanation," will often take center stage.
Theoretical physics, in contrast, is a branch or sub-discipline of physics, contrasting, say, with "experimental physics." Theoretical physics is "about" physical nature. Theoretical physics is centrally concerned with theories and theoretical developments within physics, including the search for "new physics."
It is not, of course, that individual researchers never pass over from one discipline to the other. But the disciplines are distinct in principle and vary regarding their central problems and the focus of the work.
H.G. Callaway
Q, What is the difference between the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics?
If a theoretical physicist raises questions about fundamental notions in quantum mechanics, for example, as John Bell did, and if a philosopher raises questions about fundamental notions in quantum mechanics, what is the difference in what they are doing?
The subject matter is the same, but the skill sets and conceptual reference frames differ for the two investigators? If that observation about what is the same and what is different were valid, then the difference between the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics is not the target subject of inquiry, but rather in the approach and perspective.
Both approaches might improve theoretical understanding.
Is that right?
"Scientific education as we know it today (...) simplifies 'science' by simplifying its participants: first, a domain of research is defined. (...) [P]hysics, for example, is separated from metaphysics and from theology, and given a 'logic' of its own. A thorough training in such a 'logic' then conditions those working in the domain; it makes their actions more uniform (...)." --Paul Feyerabend (Against Method)
Down to earth physicists only ask how does nature work, not why it works, or what it means.
I agree with Juan here: (the science of) physics is all about *how* the world (i.e.: nature) works, while the philosophy of physics is about *what* the world is and (but here we reach into metaphysics and/or theology) *why* it is that and *why* it works like that. Hence, *practical physics* is all about *how* the world works as far as we can test it or experience it, while *theoretical physics* is all about *how* the world works according to our current (possibly erroneous) theories about it. In practical terms, it means that *theoretical physics* is simply what might next become the bleeding edge of physics research.
You should improve your question because when you ask: What is the difference between the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics? You need to specify the 'historical facts' that determines it. For example if you consider Mach an physicist, so the difference between physics and philosophy must be reduced from the popular definitions. The problem is that when you select the 'historical facts' that determines what is physics you need a 'background theory' about this, otherwise everything could be physics. How to solve this problem? I'm the one that have two answers: 1. It's impossible to solve, and the definitions will be used for political purposes 2. It's impossible to solve, and the definitions will reflect the ideal of those who define. I use the second one because knowledge can't be politically justified (but it's often used this way). Then i like to differentiate theoretical physics and philosophy using the 'neopopperianism theory of science': "Science and Scepticism" written by John W. N. Watkins. Reading this book should help you in those questions.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Klava & readers,
You quote Feyerabend:
"Scientific education as we know it today (...) simplifies 'science' by simplifying its participants: first, a domain of research is defined. (...) [P]hysics, for example, is separated from metaphysics and from theology, and given a 'logic' of its own. A thorough training in such a 'logic' then conditions those working in the domain; it makes their actions more uniform (...)." --Paul Feyerabend (Against Method)
---End quotation
Note that this is a remark on "scientific education," more than it is a remark on Physics as a science. The point would seem to be a claim to the effect that the science is in a sense corrupted by educational or perhaps institutional practices.
No one doubts, I suppose, that uniform education tends to produce greater uniformity of action. But if our physicists are to "stand on the shoulders of giants," doesn't this suggest an appropriate course of studies? The resulting uniformity of "action" is itself a testable sort of hypothesis. But on the other hand, I see little to object to in the separation of the subject-matter of physics from that of philosophy (metaphysics being a sub-discipline of philosophy), or theology. One recalls, for instance, that Newton managed to keep his theology or theological speculations out of his "natural philosophy," later called physics.
So, what is your point? Are we to object to the "logic" of physics (whatever that may mean in this context) developing within the science of physics? Or are you pressing instead a criticism of "scientific education" and institutional practices?
These would seem to be very different kinds of claims. The science is not to be identified with the particular institutional practices of the times.
H.G. Callaway
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Shour & readers,
You asked:
If a theoretical physicist raises questions about fundamental notions in quantum mechanics, for example, as John Bell did, and if a philosopher raises questions about fundamental notions in quantum mechanics, what is the difference in what they are doing?
The subject matter is the same, but the skill sets and conceptual reference frames differ for the two investigators? If that observation about what is the same and what is different were valid, then the difference between the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics is not the target subject of inquiry, but rather in the approach and perspective.
---End quotation
As I see it, philosophy of physics is about physics--the science of physics, just as the philosophy of science has the various sciences as its subject-matter. A science is what is written up in papers, expounded at conferences and practiced in laboratories. Its a human activity and the results of human activities summed up in its published and generally accepted writings. Physics, on the other hand, takes physical nature as its subject-matter. It is about the natural world. So, on this account, philosophy of physics is a second-order discipline. But none of this is to say that a single person could not be both physicist and philosopher of science. Einstein is a good example of someone practicing both.
Philosophers, including those engaged in the philosophy of physics have a different training and orientation than do physicists. But that it not to say that what is done in the philosophy of physics can cast no light on what physicists are doing or have done. The philosopher of physics may try a hand at physics --usually of the more theoretical variety. But the philosopher is more likely to be focused on questions like "What is explanation?" What counts as good evidence?" What is "confirmation?" Or, perhaps, what are the general presuppositions of this or that approach to problems in physics? Its more a matter of analysis and broad comparisons.
Trying to answer this question it strikes me as important to have a working familiarity with philosophy of science and how it fits into philosophy generally. Philosophy of physics is not a variety of physics, just as philosophy of religion is not itself a religion.
H.G. Callaway
I specifically investigated this problem. There is no true philosophy yet. There is a substitute similar to philosophy. But he is a fake.
See book: Attack on the wave-particle duality
and errors in physics "by V.A. Kuligin ( PAL 978-620-2-39434-5)
Theoretical physics is trying to understand the natural world using mathematics to build models that explain what can be observed. It does not involve experiments to test out a theory; pen and paper should be enough, or the computer nowadays. The subject of study is the natural world, the cosmos.
The philosophy of science busies itself with questions like “what is reality?”, what is knowledge, can we know reality, is there a reality outside of us, is there a reality outside of our senses, outside what we see, smell, hear? The subject of the study is the brain of physicists and what it produces in thoughts and writing, collectively. It is a social science, because it studies people.
ISBN 978-620-2-39434-5
“Attack on the wave-particle duality and errors in physics” by V.A. Kuligin
Abstract. The book formulates the Theory of Knowledge of Scientific Truth, which is based not only on methods of cognition (methodology), but also allows substantiating Criteria, based on which it is possible to separate scientific truth from errors and errors. Using these criteria, fundamental errors were discovered in physical theories.
For instance:
1. It is established that the relativistic integral of action (functional) does not have extreme. He is constant. Because of this, the relativistic principle of least action cannot be realized.
2. It is shown that the instantaneous action cannot be eliminated from Maxwell's equations.
3. It is shown that the stochastic theory of molecular motion is not implemented in the ideal gas model. A revision of the concept of Kinetic Molecular Theory (KMT) is required.
4. It is established that Einstein, in explaining the paradoxes, made a mistake that led to a violation of logic. He did not understand the difference between philosophical categories of "phenomenon and essence" and he gave an incorrect explanation of time-space relations in physics, etc.
The main difference between philosophy of science and any theoretical science, in my view, is that theoreticians of science work with coherent mathematical models either to render them more elegant (simple and without needless assumptions), corroborate them with data (more in line with experimental science), and/or find points of relation between other theoretical models (expansion of explanatory power). On the other hand, philosophers of science try to elucidate upon the specifics of the logical senses of corroboration/substantiation, simplicity, and explanatoriness that scientists often employ.
Another way of conceptualizing the relation between science and philosophy is that the former is about work and speculation within a field of empirical inquiry while the latter is about work and speculation regarding what possibilizes and capacitates said field.
PAL ISBN 978-620-2-39434-5
«Attack on the wave-particle duality and errors in physics» by V.A. Kuligin
You can find out in the book about philosophy and its mistakes. You will also learn about many errors in theoretical physics.
Abstract. The book formulates the Theory of Knowledge of Scientific Truth, which is based not only on methods of cognition (methodology), but also allows substantiating Criteria, based on which it is possible to separate scientific truth from errors and errors. Using these criteria, fundamental errors were discovered in physical theories.
For instance:
1. It is established that the relativistic integral of action (functional) does not have extreme. He is constant. Because of this, the relativistic principle of least action cannot be realized.
2. It is shown that the instantaneous action cannot be eliminated from Maxwell's equations.
3. It is shown that the stochastic theory of molecular motion is not implemented in the ideal gas model. A revision of the concept of Kinetic Molecular Theory (KMT) is required.
4. It is established that Einstein, in explaining the paradoxes, made a mistake that led to a violation of logic. He did not understand the difference between philosophical categories of "phenomenon and essence" and he gave an incorrect explanation of time-space relations in physics, etc.
5. The incorrectness of GRT by A. Einstein is shown. The “maxwellization” of gravitational equations is proposed and justified.
6. The problem of thermal interaction of particles at the micro level is discussed. It is shown that in nature there are no grounds for wave-particle duality , etc.
By the errors of theorists and wave-particle duality ... FIRE!
This is equivalent of the book.
http://www.trinitas.ru/rus/doc/0001/005d/00012454.htm
Anatoly! Take a peek. We bring down dualism and quanta.
No hypotheses (only 2 at the end) . Good luck to you.
If you do Physics, theoretical or not, you just want to understand how nature works.
You dont give that much attention to what it means. Eventually a good theory, well enough understood, will explain itself.
Juan Weiss added an answer
34 minutes ago
"If you are engaged in physics, theoretical or not, you just want to understand how nature works.
You do not pay so much attention to what this means. In the end, a good theory, well understood, will explain itself. "
Your remark is a wish, not a method.
Science has two sides: the qualitative side (explanation) and the quantitative side (calculation).
On the one hand, without formulas, it is difficult for you to explain the laws of nature and give accurate quantitative predictions. This is a branch of mathematics and formal logic in science.
On the other hand, formulas and mathematical symbols are useless if we do not give them a definite meaning. Here logic and philosophy work (theory of knowledge).
These are two sides of any coin.
Unfortunately, this last contribution does not make sense to me. Theoretical physics is not the same as applied mathematics. Maths is the language physicists use to describe their models or to manipulate them to make predictions that you can then test in experiments. The logic is part of physics, even before you do the maths; you don’t just do some formulas and calculations randomly, out of the blue.
The philosophy of science is thinking about science, not doing science, and this started with Popper in the 1960s. From then on, all kinds of philosophers starting writing about science and knowledge, almost giving the impression that they were the only ones who knew what “truth” is, or what “knowledge” is, or what “reality” is.
There are also philosophers in recent years who postulate that philosophy has taken a wrong turn here, and that they should go back to their roots and busy themselves with fundamental life questions, like what is happiness, why does humanity suffer, how to be a good person etc.
I am answering these questions from a background of being an experimental physicist, who moved into organisational science and now in my senior years has moved into social science research, forced to read extensively about methodology and philosophy of science. Although I understand what they are saying, my regard for them has not grown.
Forget Popper, Kuhn, and other positivist philosophers. They do not have a theory of knowledge. They are engaged in methods, not in the search for truth. Only CRITERIA can help separate truth from error. They realized that there were no criteria and engaged in chatter about science.
"[O]pinions (doxa) may be true or false, knowledge (gnosis) only true." --Algis Uždavinys (The Golden Chain)
H.G. Callaway has already given an excellent answer but I'd just like to clarify some things.
Philosophy of physics is not just about the study of knowledge. To say that it is exclusively so is to render epistemology meaningless, as it is the field that studies things regarding knowledge, specifically how we acquire knowledge and how we know, not philosophy of physics.
Philosophy of physics draws from numerous fields: epistemology, metaphysics, sociology of science, feminist theory, etc. As such, it not only deals with problems that concern "confirmation" and "evidence" but also centers its focus on questions like "What is the best possible distribution of workers to different fields in science/physics to yield the best possible outcome (whatever that context may be)?" or even questions like "Does gender affect the role of data collection?" ; although the latter question might be more prevalent in other fields like biology (e.g. look up the case of gender in primatology).
As with philosophy the best way to explain what a field is about is to see what questions it wants to answer. So the questions of philosophy of physics (or even science) wants to answer are:
"What is the best possible distribution of workers to different fields in science/physics to yield the best possible outcome ?"
"Does gender affect the role of data collection?"
"What should a theory of evidence or confirmation seek to answer?"
"What are the merits to a theory in that we'd be able to say that it explains our given phenomena out of all the rival theories?"
"Is it even sensible to prescribe a logic to science, and by extension, physics?"
"What distinguishes science and non-science?"
"What is the valid interpretation of quantum mechanics?"
"Can we deductively deduce a theory of confirmation from the linguistics of confirming theories?"
and a whole other load of questions that deal with combinations from epistemology, metaphysics, gender studies, sociology, and linguistics.
TLDR: Philosophy of physics is about how epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophical aspects of gender studies and sociology, and numerous other different fields in philosophy relate to physics. To say that it only deals with knowledge is to ignore the full breadth of what philosophy of physics has to offer.
To me this is sociology of the field of research or the community of researchers, or social psychology of the community of researchers. Then, in sociology, you can ask “who is asking which question in physics” and who gets to be heard? Who gets their work printed etc etc, power politics; all valid. But don’t conflate it with philosophy or methodology, Then we go back to the Middle Ages when everything was either Theology, philosophy or metaphysics.
I stressed meaning in Physics, because that side would be of most interest to Philosophers.
Of course, in every day physics, you get your hands on anything that may turn out usefull, like math computers or techniques.
Only rather older branches of Physics are well and intuitively understood, we still
fight with the meaning of GR or QM, not to mention even more esoterical things.
Historians tend to think we are the confusers of normal persons.
What could have added to the confusion around physics, knowledge and philosophy is that people have misunderstood certain “stories” of physicists, taken them literally and re-interpreted them in strange ways to support their own views.
Examples I have followed in my own life time are the following: the thought experiment about putting an electron in a box and then reasoning on what will happen if it behaves like a particle or a wave. In that thought experiment the electron will behave differently if you take a peek. For a physicist this means Q.E.D. that neither model is a good one because the electron is certainly not going to take any notice of a mere human being.
To my surprise, read disgust, this was seized upon by the New Age disciples in the 1990s to claim that reality is what you want it to be; later I read literally that physicists have discovered that electrons change their behaviour if you look at them, and more recently that it proves in a postmodern world that reality only exists if you are there to look at it, and in the New York Times yesterday an article that says that physicists can only explain the world with quantum physics assuming that particles are in one state or the other depending on whether someone is there to look at it. That same article introduces an Italian who wants to change Schrödingers equation because of this, the journalist was so sure and so proud of himself that he had understood it all perfectly! There were so many mistakes in that lengthy article that the fillings nearly dropped out of my teeth.
When physics is so simplified, misunderstood and distorted, then no wonder that some start to think that theoretical physics is no different than philosophy or worse. Then you can unleash all kinds of ontological and epistemological jargon on that distorted image and consider yourself very smart indeed. Even smarter than Einstein. Only, it has nothing to do with physics, but coloured lantern images projected on a wall.
H.G. Callaway had already provided a very good answer. I would like to add a few points from a physicist perspective, and a passionate of phylosophy of physics.
First, let us not confuse Phylosophy of Physics, which is an academic discipline on its own, with the general understatement of "phylosophy" as a bunch of ground-less thoughts, or a collection of oversimplifications. It is sadly true that those examples listed by Lilian Hupkens have been often called phylosophical, and that many existentialist philosophers have taken handfuls of physical knowledge, and distorted its formal interpretation into something questionable by physicists. However, this has nothing to do with phylosophy of physics.
The latter is an inquiry on Physics as a science, the same way Physics has nature as an object of observation. And, as Physics has its own specializations - quantum, nuclear, astro- , statistical etc., all related to shed light to a certain subject on a certain scale -, Phylosophy of Science has its own branches like Epistemology, Sociology-related fields an so on. The way they developed and differred from pure Sociology, for instance, is quite subtle and depends on methodology, focus ond so on, the same way physicists work differently from engineers, although looking at very similar objects with the same instruments.
Overall, as Theoretical Physics questions "what is the best model to describe reality?", phylosophy of physics asks "what is the best way to describe the work of physicists as they pursue the 'ultimate model'?" This is no easy feat: as history of Physics already showed, referring to a model as "good" or "bad" to describe reality is not only a matter of confronting with data, but also a matter of giving meaning to variables, set the proper assumptions, and reaching consensus within the community. Whether the outcome is "true" or "valid" or just "working", this is also a matter of phylosophy of physics, and I think most of us already exercise it implicitly.
I have long analyzed the philosophy of natural science. Materialism has been restored, and positivist philosophy is a poison for science. The results are presented in book 10. V. Kuligin. 2020. Attack on the Wave-Particle Duality and Errors in Physics. Publising Polmarum. # (5281), ISBN 978-620-2-39434-5.
The theory of knowledge of materialism has two important functions. The first function is the formation of general scientific methods of cognition. The second function is the criteria for separating scientific truth from errors.
The theory of knowledge allows us to show that modern physics could not get out of the crisis. The crisis began at the end of the 19th century.
Dialectical materialism is a powerful method of cognition for physics.
Philosophy is a way of life that, for Proclus, leads the soul to a union with the Intellect. Plato defines philosophy as a training for death (Phaed. 67cd).
The philosophy of physics is a rational doctrine supported naturally by deep knowledge and strong ethics.
Theoretical physics basically aims at understanding the fundamental principles involved in different phenomena in the universe rather than developing rigorous practical applications.
Your opinion is the opinion of a person who knows a little about philosophy and is completely unable to use it.
For me, if we discuss anything, the first step is philosophy (hypothesis) the root and the question which arises for anything questionable. Second step is theory, the outcome, the possibilities, facts and figures and third step is experiment/application on the basis of philosophy and theory. May be I am wrong but this is my own observation while studying and relating Physics and other subjects.
Look all the role of philosophy in the development of physics. Not all any philosophy is a scientific discipline.
Mathematics can be seen as a language of logic with its own vocabulary and grammar. By this understanding, equations are a mathematical conversation. Physics then becomes a journey—not a solitary and silent one, but rather a thoughtful dialog with other travelers. "Did you see that photon?" "Perhaps…" "Are you uncertain?" "Of course!"
Wave Particle Duality - Consider wave nature as Philosophy of Physics & Particle
nature as theory of Physics - The duality is the Probabity theory of Mathematics .
The difference between the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics, is that the philosophy of physics is an attempt to find a logical understanding of what has been proven in theoretical physics, and the latter is interested in finding new answers to questions that have not yet been answered.
Dear Robert,
I really, really, dislike your question. I fully, fully understand the undercurrent why you asked it, though. Your very robust activity (at least on the RG) contrast starkly with your formal publishing record. I can sympathize with this angle, as after loosing a job in academia several years ago, I had number of papers rejected from reputable journals with a sole motivation, that I do not have an academic affiliation, therefore they would not consider my contribution. But that is an institutional science, where people are fighting for money and influence no matter how little they contribute to the body of an individual "science". Let's consider a bit wider, and broader context.
What is really interesting in your question is a philosophical approach to what we commonly call: what are the sciences, and even more specifically, what is philosophy.
On the first approximation all intellectual (involving thinking) activities of humanity must be appreciated. However, neither science nor philosophy is a well defined (by a simple natural nor formal language) human/societal activity. Defining words is awfully difficult. Defining the whole branches of human activity is even more difficult. We rely more on culturally merging historical use of words rather than as philosophers prefer more formal use of language.
So I have to emphatically disagree with the most recommended response of H.G. Callaway nor simplistic answers of representatives of Materialistic line of thinking V. Kuligin nor with even more primitive statements of M. Said. In absence of well defined language defining the domain, methodology and results of separate fields is even more difficult to discuss the foundation of such an incongruent question.
To give several examples: Einstein always loved to say that only theory can determine what is measurable. It is pure nonsense. There always would exist people like Faraday who took thousands of observations describing them in his own language. So suddenly the best theoretical mind missed something? Another example: Mr Kuligin is saying "Materialism has been restored, and positivist philosophy is a poison for science." Nonsense, as there are always questions to which we do not have any answers, as well as questions the we will never be able to formulate as the cardinality of a set of all possible questions is really an aleph zero, at least according to Cantor. Mr Kuligin would have really difficult time even answering where the laws of nature are coming from without an ascending hierarchy of beings that govern our universe. Actually his materialism would have a lot of attributes that religious people would assign to the deity. So we must somehow simplify our views on our existence and our ability to describe it (ontological and epistemological ability). Unlike, Mr. Callaway I would not dare to say "The subject matter is the same" for theoretical physics and philosophy of physics. I even thought that Mr. Calaway would not be brave enough to "define" what physics is. Physics is not concerned with the "real world" as access to this "reality" is only through our senses and "mathematics" the most formal tool we humans built so far (that include one of its subbranches : logic).
But we have to start somewhere. So as practicing physicists we have to agree with the most basic philosophical "belief" that the world exist, and its is describable. Once we admit these simple starting points, life becomes easier, and we can use any model (almost mathematics) to "describe" "the real world". In order to do so, we create different crutches like and Ockham razor to allow us to "abstract" and allow us to "describe" the very complex in simpler or the simples terms. Theoretical physics to start building any theory must take a "religious" stand to assume that a certain Mathematical entity is true and truly exist. For instance an entity such as a symmetry, a geometry, number of dimensions, (what is a dimension), number of fields (what is the field). All these choices are completely arbitrary and do not differ from any religious approach that people believe in. The consequences are that arbitrary thoughts appear as not so arbitrary, that the rules become well determined, and more mathematical (formal) inferences can be used. But real existence of assumptions never can be proved.
So philosophy, and subsequently philosophers start asking questions not only what is the basic entity (like the "real world") and whether it exists, but rather a simpler and more amenable questions about how physicists work and what are the mechanisms that allow them to state what they state. But at the same token this is rather human anthropology not really physics nor philosophy. A question about Bell inequalities or probabilistic interpretation becomes questions about what humans are, not what entities objectively exist. A really serious physicist should ask a basic question: where the probabilistic aspect of QM is coming from ? Very few physicists are asking this question (maybe with a notable but very primitive approach of people like Angelo Bassi). So in essence philosophy can help a bit physics but stressing the existential question where some obvious interpretational qualities of physics are coming from even if physics itself is unable to accommodate these notions from basic principles. This fact also testifies to the reality that these basic principles must be at least defective if not completely wrong. Viva Philosophy!
So in essence theoretical physics is concerned with building plus or minus arbitrary model of reality (that we call mathematics) in order to derive all pseudo experimental predictions resulting from a particular model , while philosophy of physics is more preoccupied with understanding why physicists made such a choice not the another. Both activities in a trivial language are in essence guessing without well defined metrics. But because physicists are more societally useful, as in the past they provided the basis for technology developments they are more aloof and consider themselves more important in societal dealings. Unfortunately, the time of physics is in the past. New time is reserved for biology, so philosophers should suddenly switch to studying why and how biologists work and abandon simplistic thematic divisions, while biology, by engaging more and more mathematics, would eventually merge with all other sciences by creating a common intellectual conceptual basis of sciences.
So in essence the question does not make much sense in general framework of things, and most answers in this stream are deeply missing the point.
Keep discussing.
Bog
I keep my point of view. The theory of knowledge, which the opponent did not understand and rejects, exists.
But the main thing from philosophy is the METHODS of knowledge and CRITERIA for the search for truth.
We are powerless to talk about truth without criteria. Such reasoning is scholasticism. We see this in questions of photon theories and general relativity. These theories are in the swamp. Only clear criteria can provide a path. They are the principle of formal logic, causality and others.
Victor Kuligin,
If I may add to your reply.
Along the way to improving understanding of different aspects of the universe, if not for the benefit of current generations then for the benefit of future ones, wrong questions, dead end questions, and bad questions, and imperfect, wrong, and not even wrong answers will be proposed.
Appraisal and eventual consensus adverse judgment (remembering that even a consensus can be in error) will modestly channel further investigation to a smaller set of ideas, some of which might even turn out to advance knowledge. If we forbid the possibility of error, then we inhibit progress, however fitful and uncertain. I am influenced in my point of view by the experience of having learned a lot from some wrong methods, ideas or perspectives, despite them being wrong.
Thank you to you, and to all those who have so far shared their knowledge and ideas.
Regards
" I am influenced in my point of view by the experience of having learned a lot from some wrong methods, ideas or perspectives, despite them being wrong. "
Have you corrected mistakes or developed wrong directions until you reached the limit of stupidity (method of making results to the point of absurdity)?
Victor Kuligin,
I have learned from mistakes of other people. As for my own ideas, what seems like a possible approach is revealed as wrong by finding a logical inconsistency.
Regards.
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