Thank you Artur! I'll take a look at Luchte's article. 

Hi Matias, and thanks for the question.

This is a quotation from the Zollikon Seminars that may shed some light on the issue: ‘to exist as Da-sein means to hold open a domain through its capacity to receive-perceive the significance of the things that are given to it [Da-sein] and that address it [Da-sein] by virtue of its own “clearing” [Gelichtetheit]’ (Heidegger, 2001: 4)

In Mladenov (2015: 11) I interpreted this as follows: 'to be Dasein means to be able to relate to entities as entities of a particular kind, for example, as instruments – available, ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden) things (Heidegger, 1962: 98); or else as objects – self-contained, occurrent, ‘present-at-hand’ (vorhanden) things (pp. 67-8). Dasein understands being. That is why the definitive feature of Dasein on the ontic level – that is, the feature that distinguishes Dasein from other entities – is that it is ontological: ‘Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.’ (p. 32) On the one hand, Dasein’s abilities at understanding being are realised by engaging with entities and others within the world – that is, by inhabiting a world. That is why the most basic state of Dasein is being-in-the-world (p. 78). On the other hand, in its being-in-the-world Dasein gets involved with entities and others in such a way as to let them be as entities and others.'

I hope this makes sense. Best wishes,

Teodor

Heidegger, M. (2001 [1959-69]) Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters, ed. M. Boss, trans. F. Mayr and R. Askay. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1962 [1927]) Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.

Mladenov, T. (2015) Critical Theory and Disability: A Phenomenological Approach. New York: Bloomsbury.

This question is central to what I would call Heidegger’s theodicy - and there are numerous instances in Heidegger's reflection on Being, where it can be substituted by another word, God. Being, then, which does not let itself be seen or in any way become evident to phenomenology is nevertheless placed insistently on the stage by man, who probably cannot properly know himself, except by orientation towards, indeed circumspection’ of Being. He writes in Being and Time that ‘Da-sein initially finds 'itself in what it does, needs, expects, has charge of, in the things at hand which it initially takes care of in the surrounding world’ (112). So far as knowing is concerned, Being is central to what Da-sein needs, has charge of, and takes care of. I also find the following remark relevant: ‘As circumspect taking care of things in the world, Da-sein can change things around, remove them or "make room" for them only because making room—understood as an existential—belongs to its being-in-the-world' (103). The thinking of Da-sein shepherding of Being is facilitated only in thinking through again Being and Time, especially where Da-sein exercises its being, as in the following: ‘When Da-sein in taking care brings something near, this does not mean that it fixes upon something at a position in space which has the least measurable distance from a point of its body. To be near means to be in the range of what is initially at hand for circumspection. Bringing near is not oriented toward the I-thing encumbered with a body, but rather toward heedful being-in-the-world, that is, what that being-in-the-world initially encounters’ (100).

Heidegger's text is a basic theology, a negative theology. So, if you want to follow his theological thoughts, just replace every place where he puts "Being" by the term God. So, everything will be clear.  

Shepherds lead by following, which l think would apply to both good and evil.