The moral correction of a decision is not empirically falsifiable, since it is a quality normative (moral) that predicts the results. However, we can empirically test the conditions that guarantee a greater or lesser rationality of the results, one of the conditions of its legitimacy. Deliberation is usually treated as a decision-making procedure with important cognitive and political benefits. However, this approach falls short to appreciate the full consequences of the deliberative process. The role of empirical evidences in theories of deliberation should not be counted as evidence for or against deliberation, but can show the various dimensions of success and the means of achieving them. A satisfactory answer to this question should entail measures to enhance the democratic capacity of citizens and the group dynamics in different participatory practices within the public sphere. Unless the capacity gained within these practices is visibly and comprehensibly linked to actual decision-making processes, the question of “why deliberate” would remain a continuing dilemma for democratic societies.
http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/papel/v18n1/v18n1a07.pdf
Some additional sources that may be of interest :
Landemore (2013): https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9907.html
Ingham (2013): http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1470594X12460642
Thank you very much. This issue have been my doctoral dissertation. If you want to give me feedback, it would be fantastic
This might also be of interest: Anderson (2006): http://muse.jhu.edu/article/209431
Hi Roberto,
Epistemic value of deliberative process is not that obvious, although it is often taken for granted. For example, some epistemic conceptions of democracy undermine the relation. Two best examples would be: Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and Miracle of Aggregation Theorem (both described competently by Helene Landemore in her Democratic Reason) – it is commonly assumed (David Estlund tends to disagree in his Democratic Authority) that both these theories forbid deliberation before decision-making since it could lead to e.g. information cascades or to systematic biases/errors (see J. Brennan’s, B. Caplan’s, I. Somin’s works) – and this consequently would deprive democratic procedure of any epistemic value. Also should You read a classical paper by Lynn Sanders Against Deliberation (1997), in which she claims that at least in case of a jury system, deliberation tends to reflect all the biases present in a given society, and this obviously undermines its epistemic value.
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This paper has two aims. First I will present the key elements of this epistemic conception of political legitimacy. Second I will show the challenges it faces. On a one hand, the counterfactual of many of its postulates and on the other, the obvious problems of bias consensualist of this model.
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