In the aftermath of the classical publication (see attachment) there were, and perhaps still are, a debate on which conclusions that poissibly could be drawn from the experiment conducted by Libet et al.
I´m most interested in your evaluation of the result that were presented!
Dear Dr. Hoglund,
In my opinion, two conclusions can be drawn from Libet's work:
1) Physical actions implementation is complex: when we move, we have to coordinate multiple micro-processes (e.g.: multiple joint displacements). This happens at a semi-unconscious level. Otherwise, such a process would be too much onerous for our conscious awareness to monitor, in terms of computation.
2) (because of 1), to recall and verbally-report the exact timing of an action implementation is a process that recruits cognitive abilities (e.g.: learn the clock: watch it; think about your own action; identify a timing for it; translate it in oscilloscope clock terms; say it; make the researcher happy with an acceptable response). These are conscious and necessarily slower processes than the action implementation itself. That's the reason for the delay Libet finds between readiness potential and the participants' self-reported timing.
Therefore, I think that Libet's experiments do not give us information about conscious voluntariness. Specifically, the idea of the brain autonomously generating intention before conscious awareness does not explain high-level intentions (proximal and distal).
For example: I'm not consciously planning to write the letter "x" in the word "example", nor the other letters. So, if I would have to recall the time of my "intention to write x" on an oscilloscope clock, that timing would probably be delayed in respect to my brain activating to "simply" guide my finger.
...but, I am sufficiently sure of having formulated my (proximal) intention to write a response for your question way before my brain put effort in moving a given finger or the others; and, I would say that I decided to become a psychology researcher, and to study in order to be able to provide some response for such questions (distal intention), even before of that (...fifteen years ago maybe?).
In my opinion, we can still say that intentions generate actions, and intentions generate intentions, in the context of intentional hierarchies; the brain, and the external world, are just something that gets in between as opportunities, priming or obstacles to action implementation.
Dear Dr. Triberti
Thank you for a most thorough and vise answer. Your example is excellent and casts ligft on both the (possible) weakness of the method used but also on how complex the whole Theatre of human intentions and actions really is. Their are interactions not only of an inmesureable amount of non-human factors and circumstances but also of other humans intentions, misunderstandings - both forseeable and not.
I had a quick look at your publications and I will most definitely download and read several of them.
Until further notice, Pontus
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