This is a very interesting question, and I wondered if I can learn something about scientific laws in social sciences on the Internet. Then, I found a link attached below. There, we learn that the Nobel-prize winning physicist Richard Feynman said, "Social science is an example of a science which is not a science... They follow the forms... but they don't get any laws." However, social science has the law of supply and demand or Zipf's law. Feynman seems to have been wrong.

http://bigthink.com/experts-corner/are-there-laws-in-social-science

Mosly on etical matter, and the information rigths on population survey

This is a very interesting question, and I wondered if I can learn something about scientific laws in social sciences on the Internet. Then, I found a link attached below. There, we learn that the Nobel-prize winning physicist Richard Feynman said, "Social science is an example of a science which is not a science... They follow the forms... but they don't get any laws." However, social science has the law of supply and demand or Zipf's law. Feynman seems to have been wrong.

http://bigthink.com/experts-corner/are-there-laws-in-social-science

Dear Ricardo De la Peña Sir,

There are no scientific laws in social sciences. We should not confuse regulation, norms, governing laws and predictions laws with scientific laws.

Laws of economics are an attempt in modelization of economic behavior. Marxism criticized the belief in eternal "laws of economics", which it considered a product of the dominant ideology. It claimed that in fact, those so-called "laws of economics" were only the historical laws of capitalism, that is of a particular historical social formation. With the advent, in the 20th century, of the application of mathematical, statistical, and experimental techniques to economics, economic theory matured into a corpus of knowledge rooted in the scientific method rather than in philosophical argument.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_(principle)

To answer such a question, we should first define what is a "scientific Theory". Science in the strict sense, is based on experiment and observation. In a wider sense, science is any field that deals with the knowledge of some particular phenomena of "reality". There are hard (Physics, Chemistry, Biology, etc), and soft sciences (psychology, social science etc.) In a postmodern science, i.e. science that allow vagueness, fuzziness and many-valued logic, so that the law of excluded middle does not hold everywhere, we may have "laws", "theorems", etc. In this case "soft sciences" get some "soft model" and the articulation of soft science progress as long as the postmodern science progress.

The definition of a "scientific Theory" is based on experiment and observation only. for example, this is true in the case of Einstein Theory of E=mc2, he observed the facts of growth of plant with sun light, then he concluded that energy is proportional to the mass. other scientists taken this view to develop atom bomb. In this way, new findings may lead to destructive or constructive way. Because with intuition only developed science in several instances. Based on these we can assign the theorems.

Take linguistics for example, William Labov discovered in the 1960s that people's use of a particular sound, the /r/ sound in New York English, was closely tied with the social status of people who used or did not use this sound.  30 years after his publication the same relation was again attested by another sociolinguist using the same method, i.e., the results can be replicated. Personally I do think that this can be called a law in social sciences. 

Social Science has certain  general  aims,  including  understanding  and  prediction  of  phenomena;  uses  certain  methodologies,  including  careful  observation,  statistical analysis,  the  requirement  of  repeatability  of  results,  and  perhaps  controlled  experimentation; and has certain forms of institutional organization, including distribution of intellectual authority across a large body of scientists who are  not  beholden  to  political,  religious,  or  other  extra-scientific  authorities  with  respect to the content of their scientific opinion. It should  remain  an  open  question  whether  the  social  sciences  must  discover  laws  in order to qualify as scientific.

I agree with Dr Barbara 

Dear Ricardo De la Peña,

Social laws have the following characteristic features:

the law can come into effect only in the presence of certain, strictly defined conditions;

Under these conditions, the law is valid always and everywhere without any exception;

the conditions under which a law is not being implemented fully and partly about.

In the area of the law can be society as a whole or its parts. In sociology, social action law makes sense only if specific conditions, namely social attitude a willingness to commit certain actions. This setting is measured by an indicator called validity.

Social laws differ in the degree of generality, the time of action, the method of their appearance and other characteristics. General sociological laws relate to society as a whole.

Formational laws due to the peculiarities of a particular formation. A special group of social laws, which reflect the functioning and development of the communities, social relations and relations on different levels of the organization. Different laws of functioning and development laws, the laws of statistical and dynamical laws, etc.

Regards, Shafagat

According to Shafagat, there are scientific laws in social sciences, e.g. sociology.

Mainz, Germany

Dear De la Peña & readers,

Readers of this thread might find the following link of interest:

http://www.edstephan.org/Book/chap17/17.html

This includes a general discussion of the concept of sociological law and several proposed examples.

I'm inclined to content myself with sociological "generalizations and regularities," of which I think there are many, though they are not all of equal intuitive interest. Their scope is here left undefined. But here is a simple example:

For any two institutions A and B, if A generally pays the expenses of B, then over time, there is a tendency for B to become more like A.

A way in which this might be understood is in terms of a lower order generalization, to the effect that the people in B charged with obtaining a flow of finance from A, tend to assimilate to the habits and expectations of the people in A who are charged with the distribution of finance. 

Here is a further plausible sociological regularity. 

For any society, if the accepted religious diversity is greater, then the tendency toward toleration of political dissent will be greater. 

Again, let me provide a short explanation. Acceptance within a society of religious diversity gives a social sanction in degree, to diversity of basic values; and varieties of political positions and attitudes arise from basic values, including those transmitted by religious traditions. In consequence, where there is wider religious tolerance there will also tend to be broader political tolerance.

One more suggestion:

Suppression of the freedom of (dis-)association tends to uniformly reproduce the pre-existing values of social configurations to which the strictures are applied. 

The idea here is very simple. In order to institute any plausible innovation on the array of pre-existing values, new advocate groups are required; but their efficacy will be diminished if the advocates are forced into relationships which tend to resist the innovations.

I hope some of these suggestions may prove to be of some interest.

H.G. Callaway

Yes. It is not so illustrative.

Dear H.G. Callaway,

I read your message and studied your examples. They are clear and logical but there is a question regarding your second example: how this religious and general tolerance works for a long run and what about the surviving of such altruistic societies in the world of egoism, greed and ignorance.  Let us see the present migration trouble, its precedents and conditions. The tolerant societies seem to be on the way of decadence, they are not able to reproduce themselves and progress towards extinction because there are no children, no necessary working/labour power capacity. These tolerant societies need people as workforce from cultures mostly without tolerance and with poorer knowledge backgrounds. As events and experience show the cultural backgrounds of people are very conservative and do not change quickly. It is an open question - regarding the wave of terrorisms and violence – whether the migrants and their offspring accept or not the principles of tolerance. Is the exaggerated tolerance the culture of death or self-annihilation? To survive with intolerance or not to survive with hyperbolic tolerance, this is the question? Or is there a third way?   

Mainz, Germany

Dear Bozsik,

Thank you for your kind comments and your questions.

Let me try to answer your questions by formulating a further sociological generality or regularity. Once again, the exact scope of this is left up in the air a bit. This one concerns the harshness of the political establishment and it relationship to dissent.

In any given society, the ferocity (and tendency toward violence) of dissent increases as a function of the rigidity and exclusionary character of the ruling establishment.

The basic idea here is that the tendencies toward rigidity and ferocity are not everywhere the same, and the dissent typical of one society may not much resemble that in another, if there are significant differences in the manner and means of the social-political reproduction of the existing establishment. 

A connecting point concerns the relationship between political establishment and religious uniformity. Many or most countries with a single dominant religion (there are theocratic exceptions of course), have tended to emphasize secularism. The historical paradigm here is France after the Revolution of 1789. The Revolution tended strongly to regard the church as simply part of the aristocracy. But when they brought this idea to other countries, with Napoleon's armies, there was less than full agreement about the matter --to say the least.

In any case, from a political perspective, the idea of secularization was to prevent political domination of a party supported by and supporting the church. This would be less of a danger in countries having a more pluralistic religious configuration, because the rise in prominence of any one religious group tends to be counter-balanced by the jealousy or competition of the other religious groups. 

 Where religious tolerance is practiced within a country, this tends to support political tolerance in turn, as argued above; and when people leave a society dominated by political and religious intolerance and conflict, they tend to quickly adopt the more tolerant practices of a new social environment--as a great relief from the burden of old conflicts and troubles. There is a genuine strength in openness and tolerance.

What the general regime of tolerance and openness cannot accept, I submit, is tolerance of intolerance. As a matter of fact, though, this is sometimes exactly what is wanted: that an existing establishment should accept the intolerance of new comers or of new social formations. It is a great mistake to do so.

H.G. Callaway

Borrowing from set theory in mathematics, we know that a subset must abide by the same conditions as the larger set it exists within. It can have additional conditions, but cannot violate any conditions of the larger set containing it. Following this logic, if social interactions are a subset of actions that exist within a universe governed by laws, then the social interactions must also be governed by laws...even if we do not yet know them.

Dear all

What are scientific laws? Do they include nature laws? My personal perception, social science must base on scientific laws and do not against scientific laws.  

Mainz, Germany

Dear Kelly & readers,

You make an interesting argument:

Following this logic, if social interactions are a subset of actions that exist within a universe governed by laws, then the social interactions must also be governed by laws...even if we do not yet know them.

---End quotation

I'm inclined to think, though, that this may be a bit misleading. No one pretends to explain the details of human action and interaction alone by reference to physics, chemistry, biology or even all these together. In consequence, from an empirical perspective, it is best to start with the regularities or generalizations which are actually open to our detection or observation. We can't possibly follow the details of the interactions of sub-atomic particles in human interaction, say. 

But consider suicide, say, a topic of repeated sociological attention. What counts as suicide depends on the self-destructive intention of the person. If, in contrast, a person simply steps into the street and is hit by a bus, this is not suicide, if the intention of self-destruction is missing. While there may be various and sundry physiological indications of such an intention, in fact we can't reliably detect it by any "hard" methods. Instead we depend upon inference from an array of behavior to motives. The detection of such a motive is not going to be a very precise matter, and and generalizations or regularities involving reference to suicide and its motives will share in this lack of precision.

Again, we expect sociological regularities, but these are bounded in their scope by particularities of culture and circumstances. Sociology of religion was an early paradigm of sociology, and its not difficult to figure out the reason for this early prominence of sociology of religion. We expect sociological generalities in reference to organized groups of some sort, and religions organize groups. In consequence, where existing organization of a society tends to break down, so do many relevant generalizations keyed to such organization. In consequence, it seems clear that the law-governed character of the physical universe, say, may be a somewhat misleading model of sociological generalizations or prospective laws.  Our expectations of the character of any laws in the social sciences should be keyed to the generalizations and regularities we actually find rather than those we imagine might be found in the light of models provided by the hard sciences.

I assume, however, that no laws of physics will be violated in human action and interaction, even though human action and interaction is not much illuminated by such a constraint. The remarkable fact is that once we understand the laws and regularities governing a particular domain of inquiry, we can make use of what has been learned to re-organize ourselves and do things we had not theretofore been able to do. Nor can we possibly predict the future course of human action so long as we cannot predict the growth of knowledge. That's a fundamental limitation on the generalizations of the social sciences.

H.G. Callaway

The philosopher Auguste Comte was the founder of the discipline of sociology and of the doctrine of positivism in the early 19th century.  Comte argued that, much as the physical world operates according to gravity and other absolute laws, so does society, and further developed positivism into a Religion of Humanity.

"The most important thing to determine was the natural order in which the sciences stand — not how they can be made to stand, but how they must stand, irrespective of the wishes of any one....This Comte accomplished by taking as the criterion of the position of each the degree of what he called "positivity", which is simply the degree to which the phenomena can be exactly determined. This, as may be readily seen, is also a measure of their relative complexity, since the exactness of a science is in inverse proportion to its complexity. The degree of exactness or positivity is, moreover, that to which it can be subjected to mathematical demonstration, and therefore mathematics, which is not itself a concrete science, is the general gauge by which the position of every science is to be determined. Generalizing thus, Comte found that there were five great groups of phenomena of equal classificatory value but of successively decreasing positivity. To these he gave the names astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology."

— Lester F. Ward, The Outlines of Sociology (1898)

Other philosophers of the 19th century such as William Dilthey proposes an alternative view of how we can understand humanities and societies.  Scientific understanding is not the only form of human understanding.   Scientific understanding is most appropriated for the natural science; it is expressed through objective and mathematical and precise model of the world.  But most of human understanding is articulated through human languages and is an historical and cultural mode of understanding.  Here understanding assumes all kind of human realities which have no counterpart into the natural world.  We do not understand our world in purely objective ways but understand our social and human realities through our languages and culture and history.  The objective mode of understanding does not oppose our cultural mode of understanding; they simply do not pertain to the same aspects of the world. The natural world is described by laws while the living cultural world is permeated by intensions and values and is a world we do not simply observed and obey but engage in intentionally may decide to change starting with our own life.

William Shakespeare was an English poet, playwright, or an novelist such Cervantes may also be considered as providing us with an understanding of ourself and our societies although they wrote fictions.  But why is it that these have been told one generation after another?  Maybe because we learn something important about ourself through them?  This is not science but art.

Dear Ricardo,

I was a reading the response from Dr Costas Drossos, articulating the framework of science, which broadly has to do with reality. Your words, “a law in scientific terms", is a key part of your question. As I comprehend, the term, scientific, would signify that which conforms to the principles and techniques of science. It follows then that the word, scientific, would portray these hallmarks: systematic and precise. Science deals with established principles.  In hard sciences (such as physics, chemistry and astronomy), these principles or axioms are self-evident. Examples can be found in atomic physics. The truth of these axioms or principles is clear and they are beyond contention and dispute. We have laws that govern motion, gravity, and so on, including the laws governing thermodynamics. In addition to laws, science has other terms such as principles (Archimedes principle) or theories (the theory of relativity).  In some instances, the term, rule is also applied. One such example is the Hund's rule. The soft sciences, biological sciences, deal with living systems, which are dynamic and subject to change. They deal with the framework of theories. Certain principles and observations in the biological sciences cannot be universally applied. Variations in populations and individuals can be uncovered anytime. That said, the term, scientific law, with its rigor and robustness, may not be applied to the domains of social sciences, in my opinion.

There is an apparent dichotomy in your question. Here, we have to bifurcate between science and social sciences. Science here would denote the natural sciences. Natural sciences endeavor to advance our understanding of nature, natural order, natural systems, and of the universe (and cosmos) with the eventual and ultimate goal of understanding reality. The term sociology now encompasses social sciences. Politics is political science now.  Science in this sense would denote systematized knowledge. The edifice of social sciences would appear to be based on institutions and organizations that are organized and orchestrated by the society at large. Herein is a distinction from the natural sciences. The term, social studies, may also include history, which might complicate this discussion. Social sciences are based on facts, observations, study, etc. However, we cannot verify theories or principles here by means of experimentation. In view of these considerations, it occurs to me that there may be scientific principles in the social sciences but not scientific laws (in considering the profound intensity, rigor and unassailable and indisputable attributes that qualify the term, scientific law).  

Mainz, Germany

Dear Kandaswami,

Interesting discussion. However, I'd suggest that the degree of precision and quantitative expression in the generalizations of sociology and other social sciences varies considerably. But on empirical grounds, we need to attend to the actual generalizations we may actually find and try to make them as precise as possible. It seems something of a red herring, I suspect, to simply insist that only the most formal and mathematical sorts of generalizations could possibly count as science.

We don't bring an a prior conception of what science is to the various subject matters and domains and impose the expectation that they conform to the preconceived idea --on pain of being banned from science; instead we allow the empirical evidence to help form an appropriate concept for generalized knowledge within the particular domain. Sociology doesn't turn out looking just like physics or just like chemistry or just like biology in these terms. But neither do any of these other sciences turn out looking quite like each other.  There is variation in the sciences and that is the fact of the matter.

The idea that we cannot test or verify generalizations put forward in sociology or the social sciences generally seems to be simply a mistake. Generalizations made with respect to particular sub-domains may be reasonably tested by reference to broader domains. For example, general claims have been made concerning the rate of fall-off of population densities in major western cities, and these generalizations seem to hold up very broadly and over decades and centuries of data. Naturally, one might seek to determine if the same generalization holds up regarding cities not in the original data. That is a kind of test. If the generalization were to pass the test, then it would be confirmed; but on the other hand, if exceptions are found, then it would be quite interesting to try to determine the reason for the variation. In either case, we seem to be dealing with a kind of scientific question. Right?

H.G. Callaway

Every natural phenomena that is devoid of thinking capability behaves and displays itself solely based on laws of nature unlike those who think. Although the mechanisms in which all processes that took place  inside of a thinking being obey laws of nature as every phenomena,  but the expressions displayed is not based on laws of nature but based on decisions we make that is concordant with the anticipation of the future to be on our side. An explosion for instance will explode when the forces and reactions inside reach a critical point regardless of what is around, unlike humans who control emotions and mollify the critical condition that might cause explosion, we see here how laws of nature behave freely and in the latter case ho they are bend and controlled. 

Let us take for instance two balls of the same weight and size in every measure possible and through them upwards with the same velocity, at the same leveled ground, we will find that the traces covered by the two balls, the height they reached and the time both took to touch the ground are the same, assuming no wind or any external factor but simply gravity. Likewise let us consider two individuals, give them same rules and regulations, same supplies and same everything and set them towards the north. The paths they took and the distances they traveled will surprise us, one moved up and down, circular way by Gales and tornadoes or even good fortunes anticipated and the other may go simply to the north direction, all based on their own imagination and decisions they make for what they expect. It is true that we act on information that is processed in a natural way in our brain but the decisions made is not based on what we can call natural law. It is true again that all things happen by being natural but some natural things are beyond what we simply call natural. That is why social behaviors (we do not call them natural behaviors as they are not) are complex behaviors distinctly from behaviors of other natural phenomena which make politics, human behaviors of economics as some of the  difficult  social activities. That is why we can not formulate social behaviors mathematically and know predict what they will be with huge degree of certainty but we put laws of humans to create a functioning society of purpose. 

One of the fundamental purposes of mathematical formulations of behaviors of natural phenomena, aside from expression of truth, is the possibility of predictions which will never be valid for human behaviors. We see the unpredictability nature of human behaviors in many spheres of society. For example, economies collapse in a periodic way, not because the numbers and computing machines do not behave naturally  but because humans behave unpredictably and in most cases irrationally. . 

Mainz, Germany

Dear Lakew,

Good to see you posting on this thread. I mostly agreed with what you say in your prior note, however, regarding the quantification issue, you may want to page down a bit on the link I provided earlier on:

http://www.edstephan.org/Book/chap17/17.html

Consider the following, and related text:

Some Examples

Among possible contenders as sociological laws, conforming to Comte's positive stage of explanation and to Pareto's third stage of scientific knowledge at least as regards their form, and derivable from theory, I would suggest the following, all derived from the same Theory of Time-Minimization ("social structures evolve in such a way as to minimize the time required for their operation"):

distribution of service establishments

(10-15)

 center density - "density-density"

(10-16)

 centers per capita

(10-17)

 average area - "size-density"

(10-18)

 average population served

---End quotation

I think these are some typical examples of quantified generalization which hold up over a considerable domain. The generalizations regarding decline of population densities in relation to city centers have, I understand, actually found some use in city planning.

When broad sociological generalizations fail, one may think of this as a matter of finding the conceptual limits of the domain of application.

By analogy, we would not expect the generalizations of chemistry regarding combinations and reactions to hold up in a situation where the chemical elements themselves are degenerating into a plasma. But the physics may still explain the breakdown.

H.G. Callaway

Dear all:

I think that there are scientific laws in social sciences --including sociology, anthropology, social psychology, political science and economics, among others. Those laws are, of course, probabilistic.

For example, when a society starts to follow the path of industrialization, is highly probable that it will experience a set of processes that we can predict: urbanization; increasing division of labor; higher education and life expectancy; diminishing family size, etc.

Psychologists, for example, have found that the basic personality of individuals is shaped early in life --through socialization- and that this core personality changes little during the rest of their life.

These and many other propositions --and systems of propositions- are the equivalent to (probabilistic) natural laws in the social world. 

Dear Ricardo De la Peña Sir,

To add more in answers of your question, 

the Zipf's law, the law of supply and demand states that the market price for a certain good will fluctuate based upon the quantity demanded by consumers and the quantity supplied by producers. The law is based on statistical models. But a scientific law is "a statement based on repeated experimental observations that describes some aspect of the world.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Jorge & readers,

Thanks for your note, Jorge. It seems that most agree about laws (or viable generalizations, regularities) in the social sciences.

However, checking about a bit, I find that there is a good deal of work disputing the idea of the constancy of personality over the life span. See the following, e.g.,:

http://psycnet.apa.org/?&fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/0033-2909.126.1.3

What seems more plausible is that there are persistent initial formative traits which contribute to development of personality. One might think of this as a kind of melioration. Being basically open to new things and people would seem to be a very positive starting position for example.

The opposite of this would be fear, suspicion and disparagement of whatever is different or alien from one's early socialization.  Sometimes, the intensity of initial socialization is so great, presumably in order to preserve values regarded as positive within a group, that it tends to inhibit growth and change. Basically, that's the flaw of puritanisms --which exist in every religious and many social traditions.

H.G. Callaway

With all due respect to Total speakers, it seemed that there is no problem as you can see it and it's big. And it is difficult to identify a solution and a simple answer. With curiosity I look forward to further comments on this question. Regards.

If all remember the evolution of social science, it transist from a philosofic and hollistic point of view to a fractional one. There befor it is hard to think on the posibility of sociological law that can apply for every society or cultural context.

Dear Prof. Callaway:

You're right about the discussions about the constancy of personality --although I think the hypothesis is solid-. However, I think that the possibility that a hypothesis can be empirically tested and may be eventually rejected does not mean that this hypothesis can not be considered a law. After all, many laws in physics and other natural fields have been --and probably will be-- rejected at some moment, but only to be replaced by other hypothesis / laws that are better adjusted to reality. 

Dear H.G.:

Thank you for your interesting discussion, analysis and input. Herewith, I would like to clarify certain points, if I may.  As said previously, science denotes systematized knowledge.  This knowledge is gathered by observation, study, experimentation (when it applies), etc.  In broad terms, science can be any branch of knowledge regarded as a distinct field for the investigation of principles (and facts) that are applicable to it.  The social sciences would be in this realm.  On another issue, one comes across certain laws in the domain of economics. Fields such as economics and psychology are highly analytical and quantitative.  

I agree with you regarding the following. “To simply insist that only the most formal and mathematical sorts of generalizations could possibly count as science” would be a digression from the central theme. Obviously, if we broadly apply this yardstick or benchmark to biology (biological sciences), this area of endeavor would not qualify as a science.

Concerning the question of testing or experimentally verifying a governing principle or law in the field of social sciences, you have provided an excellent example with the issue of population density of cities in Western countries. Your lucid illustration is very well appreciated. Yes, we are dealing with scientific questions in this scenario. This example highlights the role of dynamic forces at play. In this case, it is voluntary human migration.

Scientific laws essentially come from physics; they are generally presented as equations. A scientific law makes a statement about observable occurrences in nature (without human intervention) that seems to be always true. The term, scientific law, is found in all of the natural sciences. Some of the scientific laws are also named after individuals.  A scientific law just describes occurrences that are observable in nature without making explanations about the natural occurrence. Certain principles (or theories) enunciated in atomic physics have remained true.  However, (intriguingly) they have not been characterized as laws.

When natural laws are mentioned Newton's law of universal gravitation often comes to mind.  Natural laws describe how different parts of the natural world function.  A scientific law does not possess absolute certainty. For that matter, nothing in science does. A scientific law can be changed, amended or extended by future observations.  One instance of such a change concerns gravitational forces and gravitational fields. In biology, we come across “Mendel’s Laws of Heredity”; it has been necessary to amend and extend the principles behind these laws. Variations can always occur. Variation is the hallmark of biology.  Facts also require changes or modifications sometimes. That biological catalysts (in body cells) are proteins has remained as a longstanding fact. However, molecules that are not proteins (nucleic acids, catalytic RNA species) have been recognized to function as enzyme proteins.

The following can be said about the crux of the present thread, as exemplified by extensive discussions.   Social sciences obviously operate with sets of principles or laws. Agnieszka’s answer above also seems to point in this direction. Whether such laws or principles, if you will, are to be characterized as scientific laws may depend on individual preferences and reasoning. 

It is a matter of controversy. If Scientific Laws can be applied to so-called "Social Sciences" such as psychology, education and human communication.

You can conduct research in the humanities and social disciplines applying models, designs, methods and tools of science, so that using these tools, the "soft variables" "tougher variables", ie turn migrate from the subjective to the objective and how little tangible to the concrete.

I think that in a few situations, if they could be formulated Scientific Laws issued by the Social Sciences. For example, in the Economic Models (in the free market economy), the dynamics observed in the value of the currency according to supply and demand (Law of Supply and Demand).

regards

Dr. Jose Luis Garcia Vigil

Dear Dr. Vigil,

One such well known principle, if you will, in economic sciences concerns the "law of diminishing returns".

Regards...

I would like to add some food for thought to this very interesting discussion. The ideas are not my own. The following are excerpts from the Introduction and Chapter 1 (“Acting Man”) of “Human Action: A Treatise of Economics”, 3rd revised edition (1963) by Ludwig von Mises. What follows may qualify as a “law” in the sense meant here. Although not referred to as such in “Human Action”, the exposition below could be referred to as the “Law of Unease”, with unease being analogous to force in Newton’s Second Law of Motion –  “acceleration = force/mass” is analogous to “willful human action ~ unease/(constraints on action)”. Whether the latter is a law, a theory, an axiom (an “ultimate given”) or something else, it is hard to dispute. The insight’s reached by Mises over 65 years ago appear to underlie much of the nature of human interactions.

With the exception of a few comments (italics in  parentheses) and added emphasis, I turn the floor over to the late Prof. Mises:

“. . . Action is will put in to operation and transformed in to an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego’s meaningful response to stimuli and the conditions of its environment, is a person’s conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life . . . ” Id. p. 11.

(Mises developed “the general theory of human action” wherein the central theme is “action as such”. Id. p 12. To distinguish this general field of inquiry from the specialized social sciences, Mises used the term “praxeology, which was coined in the late 19th century (1).)

“Praxeology consequently does not distinguish between “active” . . . and “passive” . . . Whenever the conditions for human interference are present, man acts no matter whether he interferes or refrains from interfering . . . “ Id. p. 13.

“We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will. But this would not add anything to our knowledge. For the term “will” means nothing else than man’s faculty to choose between different states of affairs . . .” Id. p. 13.

“We call contentment or satisfaction that state of a human being which does not and cannot result in any action. Acting man is eager to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory . . . THE INCENTIVE THAT IMPELS MAN TO ACT IS ALWAYS SOME UNEASINESS. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would have no incentive to change things . . . He would not act; he would simply live free from care. ” Id. pp. 13-14.

(This "Law of Unease" seems to further support the notion that Feynman had indeed overlooked (or dismissed) important relations in the social sciences. Mises commented at length with regard to the nature of his insights and where they might “fit” in to the universe of knowledge as it existed in the mid 20th century. His questions/remarks on this seem particularly relevant to the current discussion.)

“. . . The progress of scientific research may succeed in demonstrating that something previously considered as an ultimate given can be reduced to components. But there will always be some irreducible and unanalyzable phenomena, some ultimate given.” Id. p. 17. (The latter contention is debated still.)

“. . . In the present state of our knowledge the fundamental statements . . . [theories relating  mind and body] . . . are mere metaphysical postulates devoid of any scientific foundation and both meaningless and useless for scientific research. Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the external world of physical, chemical and physiological phenomena and the internal world of thought, feeling, valuation and purposeful action. No bridge connects – AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE TODAY – these two spheres . . .”  Id. p. 18.

(While some of the apparent foundations of this bridge, if it exists, have been found since Mises wrote “Human Action”, and the "useless" remark no longer applies, it is still not at a clear (to me, anyway) that a complete understanding of what makes us human can ultimately be derived from physics alone.)

It’s been a while since I’ve opened “Human Action”. Regrettably, I have to put it down and get back to more immediate concerns.

Regards,

   Keith

(1). Espinas, “Les Origines de la technologie”, Revue Philosophique XVth year, XXX, 114-115 (1890).

Mainz, Germany

Dear all,

My impression is that the immediate need in this discussion concerns the definition of "law" in the sciences and how or whether this concept applies to the generalities and regularities of the social sciences. In the philosophy of science, the question of "laws" has produced much discussion over many years. But I think there are two very salient points worth special emphasis in the present context.

First off, there is a regular distinction made between "laws" and "law-like generalizations." If we speak of "the laws of nature" then the regular presumption is that we mean something like "the true law of nature." But in contrast to this there is a frequently competing usage, in which we speak of "laws" formerly held to be true, but subsequently found wanting in some fashion. To avoid injecting distracting controversy regarding which supposed laws are actually true, one sound practice is to back off to discussion of "law-like generalization." For example, Newton's laws of motion are "law-like generalizations" whatever made be said concerning subsequent criticism of them within physics. Basically, "law-like generalizations" contrast with "accidental generalizations." How are these distinguished?

A fundamental element of the characterization of "law-like generalizations" is often stated as a matter of their "supporting counter-factuals." This is a somewhat intuitive criterion, but generally useful. In general terms, if our supposed law-like statement is something like "All F's are G's," then a corresponding counter factual might be "if a were an F, then a would be a G."  Law-like statements generally stand up to the intuitive test. But consider in contrast, something like the following:

All the members of the City Council are bald and have a beard.

This might be true in some case, though accidentally. In consequence, it fails the intuitive test for law-like generalizations. We would not find it plausible to think , say, that "If Mrs. Jones were a member of the City Council, then she would be bald and have a beard." (seems false.)

If you will think through similar examples, making use of your favorite law or law-like generalization, I think you will see that it will stand up to a similar intuitive test. For example,

All planets of the solar system circle the Sun in elliptical orbits.

A counter-factual, supported by this generalization is,

If the Moon were a planet in the solar system, then it would circle the Sun in an elliptical orbit. (seems true.)

By this reasoning, the generalization about the members of the City Council is not law-like, while the generalization about the planets of the solar system is a law-like generalization.

One way to understand this difference is in terms of the relationship of a given statement deemed "law-like" to related systems of statements--e.g., we may know of some underlying "mechanism" of the generalization, or there may be other, well-supported generalizations in the same domain which support the law-like generalization of interest. These things tend to go missing with mere accidental generalizations.

I suspect that there is also some need here to discuss the idea of statistical generalizations as laws. These are especially relevant to the social sciences. The connected theme would be that they support counter-factuals formulated in terms of sub-groups or related groups--having the same or a similar incidence of some character. Obviously, in the case of statistical generalizations, individual instances to the contrary do not show the generalization false, though they can be tested by reference to groups of instances.

Many thanks for the interesting discussion and contributions, since I last looked in on this thread.

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear Jacono,

Let me suggest a bit of skepticism on your "totally arbitrary" claim. You got mje searching through physics webpages, looking at the definition of "action" on offer. Here's what the Encyclopedia Britannica says about "action" in physics:

Action, in theoretical physics, an abstract quantity that describes the overall motion of a physical system. Motion, in physics, may be described from at least two points of view: the close-up view and the panoramic view. The close-up view involves an instant-by-instant charting of the behaviour of an object. The panoramic view, on the other hand, reveals not only a complete picture of the actual behaviour of an object but also all the possible routes of development connecting an initial situation with a final situation. From the panoramic view, each route between the two situations is characterized by a specific numerical quantity called its action. Action may be thought of as twice the average kinetic energy of the system multiplied by the time interval between the initial and final position under study or, again, as the average momentum of the system multiplied by the length of the path between the initial and final positions.

---End quotation

See:

http://www.britannica.com/science/action-physics

I suspect that the analogy between "action" in physics and social science concern with human action, may be somewhat strained.

In cases of conflicts between individuals or groups, it strikes me, there may or may not be an "equal and opposite reaction." Consider, for example, the teaching of Christ to "turn the other cheek," if slapped. This teaching, as it seems to me, is designed (or may function) to break cycles of aggression and aggressive reaction or revenge. Whatever may be thought of that teaching, it seems clear that some people (and peoples) are more reactive and others more passive. So it is not clearly true that in social sciences there is always an equal and opposite reaction to any action. Right?

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear Constantine,

Thanks for your note concerning von Mises. I actually once read von Mises' book, Human Action, but this was so long ago that I have chiefly forgotten most of it, I suspect. What struck me as particularly interesting was the idea that action arises from discontent. You quote von Mises, as follows:

“We call contentment or satisfaction that state of a human being which does not and cannot result in any action. Acting man is eager to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory . . . THE INCENTIVE THAT IMPELS MAN TO ACT IS ALWAYS SOME UNEASINESS. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would have no incentive to change things . . . He would not act; he would simply live free from care. ” Id. pp. 13-14.

---End quotation

This reminded me of C.S. Peirce on the relationship between inquiry and doubt. Where there is no genuine doubt, then there is no need or felt need for inquiry and to the settlement of doubt by "fixing belief." Inquiry is then that sort of thought devoted to settling the discomfort of genuine doubt, it would seem.

It may be, though that the analogy is somehow imperfect. According to your quotation, where there is no unease, there is "no incentive to change things," and thus no "act" --the person would "simply live free from care." But it seems that this introduces an ambiguity concerning "action." A person "perfectly content" might still act, say, by playing a musical instrument or generally for amusement. On the other hand, might not positive motives impel action even when there is no felt unease? If you get up on a sunny Saturday morning with a very positive attitude or feeling, might that very sunny situation lead you to make a lovely breakfast (act), not out of hunger or unease, but simply to enjoy the morning? 

Do you think that von Mises could answer such objections? Generally, it seems that he aims at a general conception of social science, as "praxeology," but has this work been followed up? If so, by whom?

H.G. Callaway   

H.G. Callaway,

Engaging into easy pleasurable actions do not require UNEASINESS. Engating into hard action most likely to bring uneasiness for a long time in the future  do require UNEASINESS.   Not the kind of short time uneasiness such as kicking my foot but the long time uneasiness that one is born with, the racial prejudices, the poverty of his/her parents and the consequences it had on them and on you, the ideological prejudices, etc.  These type of UNEASINESS may motivate someone to search to fight them in all kind of ways in spite of the UNEASINESS that such course of action will necessary have.  Othere person simply tries to num these UNEASINESS by violence against themself: drugs, despair and suicide or violence against others.  Jesus describes as UNEASY (carrying a cross) the road of a christian and recommend a social focus of attention to the most underprivileges and so to carry part of their UNEASINESS. Gautama was first moved out of ist happy life slumber out of the realisation of death and the path he proposed the end of UNEASINESS was UNEASY all the way.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Brassard,

You wrote:

Engaging into easy pleasurable actions do not require UNEASINESS.

You appear to agree with my criticisms directed to Constantine, and "praxeology," above.

But you go on. Perhaps there is something else you'd care to say?

How would you count life-long persecution, continual gossip campaigns, exclusion and defamation against outsiders? Even for those who turn the other cheek? I think there are many who would simply stop believing the cycling rationalizations for continual aggression. There are some who would not believe second-hand self-aggrandizement to begin with.

Can you actually tell the difference between those continually engaged in aggression and those who merely defend themselves --by going on with work and life? Does it matter?

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear Jorge,

Generally, I think I agree with what you say here:

You're right about the discussions about the constancy of personality --although I think the hypothesis is solid-. However, I think that the possibility that a hypothesis can be empirically tested and may be eventually rejected does not mean that this hypothesis can not be considered a law. After all, many laws in physics and other natural fields have been --and probably will be-- rejected at some moment, but only to be replaced by other hypothesis / laws that are better adjusted to reality.

---End quotation

I would say, though, that there is something of a standard academic ideology regarding "origins," in accordance with which the first work of an academic contains all the rest and attention to the early work is sufficient to encompass the whole subsequent production and its significance. I don't believe this, generally, for a moment; there may be cases in which it holds up, though. This idea seems to be based in the notion of the constancy of the basic elements of personality.

But what are the basic elements of personality in any given case? Does it include curiosity, systematic thought, openness to diverse influences and sources? Or is it more something set in a single course and only unfolding in details? Is it based on fear and aversion to everything not already known and under control, or is it open to differences and development?

Consider artistic style. Brahms, for example does develop over his career, but I think it fair to say that to those who know and enjoy his work, will almost instantly recognize it in any example to which they may be newly exposed. The wonder of Brahms, in part, is the consistency of style.

This contrasts sharply with many other composers. Take Stravinsky, for example. This was a composer, who, like Picasso in painting, went through a great variety of stylistic periods. The influences on his work are very broad, and in general, I would say that we do not recognize the works of a later period, merely knowing those of an earlier period.

Much the same could be said about many a philosopher. Some show a consistency of approach and content over a life-time; and other change with the decades. Examples are not far to seek.

It is sometimes said that we have 7 or 9 lives, and the later can be so different from the earlier periods that we may hardly recognize ourselves in the later development. Whether this is generally true for most people in everyday circumstances is a a different question of course.  We are off into the domain of individual differences.

What we come to know widens what we become able to do. But in spite of that there are many, absolutely dedicated to the predictability and control of human history; and this, often enough, involves the inclination to destroy whatever is not submitted to control. Determinism can become a social program of control and subjugation. Its a horrendous arrogance. 

H.G. Callaway

Dear all,

Mise's uses the terms "uneasiness" and "action" in a way that conveys exactly what he intended. ". . . He thus used many words and foreign phrases with which many readers may be unfamiliar, particularly in the exact sense that Mises had in mind." (1). The glossary for Human Action (1) does not contain definitions for "uneasiness" and "action" since, by the time the reader encounters these terms, the "exact sense" that Mises intended is clear. This requires some clarification here.

D. W. MacKenzie wrote an on-line customer review in 2009 that provides a good explanation. "Human Action concerns dynamics. The opposite to action is not inaction. Rather, the opposite to action is contentment. In a fully contented state there would be no action, no effort to change the existing order of things . . ." By purposeful action, Mises meant an "effort to change the existing order of things". This definition encompasses inaction in the usual sense in certain contexts. MacKenzie further comments ". . . We act because we are never fully satisfied, and will never stop because we can never be fully satisfied . . .". The motivation for undertaking a pleasurable activity falls within the scope of "uneasiness" in the sense that Mises used the term. "Uneasiness" and "lack of full satisfaction" are equivalent in this context. Pleasurable activities are motivated by the expected attainment  of some degree of satisfaction.

In the early statements on action and uneasiness, Mises makes it clear that he is distinguishing purposeful action only from involuntary physiological actions. He is not making moral/immoral, reasonable/unreasonable or pleasant/unpleasant distinctions with regard to the actions in this context. Before proposing the general connection between uneasiness and action, Mises discusses at length the "epistemological problems" associated with a general science of human action. Human Action pp. 1 - 10. In the Introduction, values and ideologies are discussed, and many are attacked without apology. (The historical and cultural context should be taken in to account when reading this). Near the end of the Introduction Mises states ". . . Ultimate decisions, the valuations and choosing of ends, are beyond the scope of any science. Science never tells a man how he should act; it merely shows how a man must act if he wants to attain definite ends." Id. p. 10. 

By making a general connection between action and uneasiness (in the intended sense) early in the book, Mises provides a common reference frame for the arguments that follow. These arguments focus on reason, on various ideas in economics, economic policies and social policies, on how these ideas and their associated choices have affected the general human condition in the past, and on how they are likely to affect the human condition in the future if followed.

Although many may disagree with Mises' specific conclusions and political views (which are diametrically opposed to social control and subjugation), the final two sentences should resonate with everyone concerned with the human condition. Mises is referring here to economic knowledge specifically here, but these statements are applicable to all critical branches of human knowledge". . . It rests with men whether they will make proper use of the rich treasure with which this knowledge provides them or whether they will leave it unused. But if they fail to take the best advantage of it and disregard its teachings and warnings, they will not annul economics; they will stamp out society and the human race." 

(1) P. L. Greaves, Mises Made Easier: A Glossary for Ludwig von Mises' Human Action, Free Market Books, 1974.

H.G. Callaway,

''You appear to agree with my criticisms directed to Constantine, and "praxeology," above.''

I did agree that the type of  pleasurable action you mentioned do not require UNEASINESS but for  "effort to change the existing order of things" the UNEASINESS is necessary. The last of Keith's comment seems to show that Mises had made such clarifications.  

I do not understand your other questions and comments.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Constantine & readers,

I doubt that a fuller discussion of von Mises and his book Human Action should take up too much space in this thread. It is interesting chiefly, I think, as an example of a proposed general scheme of social science. Mises' was, himself chiefly an economist--of the "Austrian school." This will have its interest to some, I think, but I doubt that we will want to make it the general focus of the thread. Our question is not, after all, whether von Mises thinks there are laws of the social sciences, but whether there are such laws.

The following passage in reply to my question, above, is still somewhat less than satisfactory to me at least. The statement is:

The motivation for undertaking a pleasurable activity falls within the scope of "uneasiness" in the sense that Mises used the term. "Uneasiness" and "lack of full satisfaction" are equivalent in this context. Pleasurable activities are motivated by the expected attainment of some degree of satisfaction.

---End quotation

The way this strikes me, it seems that we are leaving empirical science behind. If we question whether "uneasiness" is involved in all action, and give plausible examples where it is not, then the answer, apparently is that "uneasiness" will encompass any apparently more positive motive. It appears to be not an empirical question whether uneasiness is involved in all action, but on the contrary, the definition of "uneasiness" is meant to encompass any motivation for action that might be mentioned. But consider my example again. You get up on a sunny Saturday morning, let us say, feeling refreshed and well, looking forward to the day, and you decide to start out making a nice breakfast. Aside from the stipulated definition of "uneasiness," I basically see no lack of ease or even any "lack of full satisfaction" in the situation I described. In consequence the definition seems arbitrary. We don't seem to have an empirically based law to the effect that action arises from uneasiness," but instead a definition.

I can imagine, perhaps, that such a definition might be well-motivated, or appear so, in light of the success of theory in its related explanatory achievements or predictions. I'm not against definitions which adjust theoretical terms to well motivated theoretical uses. But I do not see in this case that the proposed definition is empirically or theoretically well motivated.  

I wonder, does von Mises propose any specific laws of social science that might be of general interest here? I seem to recall an emphasis on "marginal utility."

In any case, what is of greater interest here, I think are clear paradigm cases of laws in the social sciences, and I don't think we would do well to focus on cases less broadly accepted.

H.G. Callaway

Is "Social Science" an Oxymoron? Will That Ever Change?,ScientificJ American,

John Horgan

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/is-social-science-an-oxymoron-will-that-ever-change/

''Here is the biggest difference between social and hard science: Protons, plasmas and planets are oblivious to what scientists say about them. Social systems, on the other hand, consist of objects that watch television; listen to the radio; read newspapers, journals, books, and blogs; and consequently change their behavior. In other words, social-science theories can transform societies if people believe in them.

...

Here's a more specific suggestion: Social scientists should consider identifying not with the harder sciences or the humanities but with engineering.

I started my career writing for an engineering magazine, and now I teach at an engineering school, so I know and respect engineers. They don't seek "the truth," a unique and universal explanation of a phenomenon or solution to a problem. In fact, engineers would scoff at such a formulation of their work. They seek merely answers to specific, localized, temporary problems, whether building a bridge with less steel or a more efficient solar panel or a smartphone with a bigger memory. Whatever works, works.

In the same way, social scientists should eschew the quest for truths about human behavior. They should instead focus more intensely on finding answers to specific problems, whether our current economic woes, the inefficiency of our health-care system or our reliance on military force to resolve disputes.''

Mainz, Germany

Dear Horgan,

I am going to resist the assimilation of social science to social engineering. No doubt, results of social science may be helpful in solving particular outstanding problems, but likewise, results of the natural sciences may be useful in solving particular outstanding social problems. This is nothing against the engineers.

The difference, you suggest, is that "social-science theories can transform societies if people believe in them." But, on the contrary, you seem to merely take for granted our believing in natural science theories; and natural science theories can also transform societies if people believe in them--which we hope they may. We can build bridges across mighty river, sky scrapers, remake city landscapes, etc. --all those things the engineers are so good at. 

It is true, as you say that "Social systems, on the other hand, consist of objects that watch television; listen to the radio; read newspapers, journals, books, and blogs; and consequently change their behavior." No doubt social systems may change, and they may even change in light of what the social sciences discover about them. But what does this tell us about the viability of the concept of "law" in the social sciences? Very little, I think. Presumably, social systems will not change everything at once, so that change is consistent with underlying regularities and generalities. In fact, people are usually quite conservative when it comes to changing basic values and elements of their own ways of life. Again, consistent with everything you say, it may be that particular regularities are more basic and especially resistant to change or manipulation. That, in fact would be a very interesting result of social science; but so would the opposite claim be pretty interesting. Now, is this an empirical question, or no? How do we decide? Shall we simply let the social engineers have a go at changing everything they will and wait to see the results? As for myself, I wouldn't advise this course of action.

 H.G. Callaway

I am not an expert in the field, but in my opinion if it is a science - social or other , the scientific laws will be universal for each type of science

Mainz, Germany

Dear Shahsuvaryan,

I think you make an intuitive response: something initially plausible, but which may or may not recognize the genuine complexities of social sciences.

Consider, say, economics. Would we think that the highly sophisticated development of economics in application to markets and market oriented societies would directly apply to a hunter-gathering society? Might particular developments of economics arising from highly developed trading relations and finance equally apply to a society which is chiefly isolated and makes no use of money? How do we divide the domains here --regarding "universal" results?

"Scientific laws," you say, "will be universal for each type of science." O.k. suppose that is true. What then are the principles for individuating and distinguishing "each type of science"? Might sociology of religion count as a science? Is that, too specific? To general? Why? what constitutes a field of study as a distinct science? Wouldn't it ultimately be a matter of the coherence and distinctiveness of its subject-matter? But, if so, then we cannot judge of the boundaries of distinct sciences a priori, but only in relation to actual results. Over which domains do we actually get "universal" or even constant statistical generalizations? Without attention to such fine points, social sciences won't cohere or develop.

H.G. Callaway

H.G. Callaway,

Horgan's contribution was about the nature of the social sciences.  His emphasis was to underline the difference between the hard sciences and the social sciences.  In this thread, the question is to explore to what extend the social sciences can resemble the hard sciences along the positivistic philosophy.  

'' But what does this tell us about the viability of the concept of "law" in the social sciences? Very little, I think. ''  You are right.

Horgan might be right that the social sciences should be practice more in the spirit of exploring possible social engineering/transformation than being similar to a hard science but even if he is right, it does not preclude that some laws existed in the social sciences.  

  If we are not social engineers then who is?  But this is another question.

It is probable that, once data-driven discovery is a widespread activity in the social areas, these might allow the extraction of laws. The notion of a law -that of a prototypical regularity that can be instanced in specific forms according to cases- is usually hidden when the signal/noise ratio is sufficiently high and when non-evident inner structures exist. Part of our inability to extract laws also follows from the poor comprehension of hierarchical modularity in dynamical networks. There is, however, no theoretical objection rendering the existence of such laws as impossible: the world appears to have layers of epiphenomena whose exact workings are a result of entities and interactions at more fundamental scales. We also may lack sufficient population sizes for those inferences to be sound.

Social science laws are scientific laws, they based on systematic study of observations like laws in natural science.In economics law of demand is good example.Every law based on certain assumptions, which is true to both science and social science laws.

Not to throw a monkey ranch here. But are there really, I meant really absolute laws in "hard" sciences? There have definitely been errors and miscalculations. "Laws" in physics and chemistry were were plagued by researcher bias. I'm a pure mathematician, who has finally in his old age accepted that even mathematical theorems are not absolute. They're (concepts, problems, proofs) beautiful, they're handy and they're helpful but they do follow a kind of a tautology which ultimately makes them as deep and as illuminating as their ancestral creators. Social scientists have suffered for not accepting their own nomenclature. One may argue (and many have) that natural and physical sciences have benefitted greatly from blindly accepting mathematical tools and found it worthwhile to invest time and brain space for a good grasp of mathematical principles. Social scientists have been extremely slow and suspicious (or uncomfortable and anxious) to use mathematics freely in their research, but this is changing. Many of my colleagues are putting their big boy/girl pants and are learning the foundations of probability and logic to fully grasp time series analysis; they are finally embracing real and complex Dynamics as an amazing tool, which by the way has taken advantage of probability for decades.  Bayesian methods are being taught. Mathematical psychology is a thing, and a PhD program. "Laws" as you refer to them take time to discover,.... and then just as much time until they "need a tune up".  So, my dear psychologists, anthropologists, ecomicsts, criminologists, ... you are scientist... start acting like it :-)

Dear Cecilia,

Regarding the Abraham Lincoln's quote I would “correct” it like that: if you fool yourself all the time, this cannot be as dangerous as to fool other people because you destroy your own world.  

Dear All,

When speaking on social sciences, it is indispensable to have a working definition. I am afraid that many general approaches of supposed social laws in this discussion cannot be really general and concern only quite a limited area of the social discipline. For me – being as ignorant as I am - social “sciences” are not sciences. Only natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) are sciences. The main reason may be that social “sciences” have no objective laws.  I think the social discipline must be nearer to the arts than to sciences.    

Dear Ross,

Good reading!

Is it necessary for social science laws to simulate the mode of operation (mathematical derivation and expression) of scientific laws (prototypes) in physical sciences? In the case of biology, the complexities of living things, and the inherent and pervasive variability (variation is the hallmark of living entities), in general,  cannot simply be explained in mathematical terms.

Cheers...

Dear all,

Dr. Ricardo De la Peña is seeking answers to the question of whether there are scientific laws in social sciences. He has asked whether it is possible to talk about something that can constitute a law in scientific terms within the field of social sciences. The question has prompted an array of answers, and the forms of response accrued thus far may amount to a pantheon.

 “A law in scientific terms", is a key part of this question. As said before, the term, scientific, would signify that which conforms to the principles and techniques of science. It follows then that the word, scientific, would portray these hallmarks: systematic and precise. Science denotes systematized knowledge or body of knowledge. It also paves the way for discovery. This knowledge is gathered by observation, study, experimentation (when it applies), etc.  In broad terms, science can be any branch of knowledge regarded as a distinct field for the investigation of principles (and facts) that are applicable to it.  By this token, the sphere of social sciences would be in this realm.

Observations have been made in this thread concerning how several scientific laws in physics (natural sciences) have been later “disproved” and “rejected”. Herewith, I would like to state the following, in an attempt to put things in perspective. On a related issue, I thought that this would be germane to Dr. Ricardo De la Peña’s question here, which zeros in on “scientific laws”.  The use of the term, “law” (as in scientific law), may itself be arbitrary or imprecise in this scenario, and what it states may not be complete. Not being proven right or being rejected is not a negative thing. Science thrives on questioning. Scientific laws are not sacrosanct. Scientific laws that are found to be deficient or incomplete are replaced by new ones. This signals growth and leads to progress. A scientific law does not possess absolute certainty. For that matter, nothing in science does. A scientific law can be defied, tweaked, changed, amended or extended by future observations.   

A scientific law states an observable occurrence in nature (without human intervention), and is not concerned with the explanation of “why” and “how” this occurrence takes happens (or the observed phenomenon takes place). A scientific law generally appears to be always applicable at the “time” that the law is formulated; the observable thing always occurs when some conditions prevail and abound. Let us consider the time aspect here. Newton's law of universal gravitation was formulated in the 17th century; I understand that an exception to this law came up when dealing at the quantum (sub-atomic) level, some 300 years later (when the theory of relativity was advanced).  On a different issue, Mendel’s Law of Independent Assortment had to be modified in a certain sense when considering genetic traits that were linked on the same chromosome. During Mendel’s lifetime, nothing was known about chromosomes or DNA. These examples are not capricious but illustrate how revisions to laws occur, how laws evolve (with the advent of new theories) and how knowledge advances. They also highlight crucial factors in the application of scientific laws, the time at which they are made, and the conditions necessary for these laws to be applicable. 

A scientific law plays a crucial role in the progress and evolution of knowledge. It may be a path to map out a concept and enunciate it. It is an initiating (originating) point from which interest sparks as a prelude to critical thinking. Scientific laws formulate concepts taking into account the totality of observations in nature, sort out occurrences, fine tune, and mold and define a concept. These laws may provide a framework to unify observations. Scientific theories come along thereafter, and may lead to coherent and comprehensive understanding of observable phenomena in nature.  When most individuals talk about a law they have in mind something that is absolute. A scientific law is much more flexible, as discussed in a previous paragraph.

At this juncture, the question of whether social sciences need to simulate the (stereotyped) mode of operation of scientific laws occurs.

Regards...     

Mainz, Germany

Dear Kandaswami,

I take it that your discussion of the question amounts to a "yes" regarding scientific laws in the social sciences.

I wonder, though, if there might not be scientific laws relating unobervable or merely postulated elements of scientific theories. That seems to be ruled out by some of what you say. Also, I think it may be doubted that just any systematic field of study and knowledge will count as a science. History comes to mind as a possible counter-example. 

Might you may have any comment on the distinction, brought in earlier on this thread, between "law-like" and "non-law-like" generalizations? This is a more or less standard element in discussion of the concept of law in the philosophy of science. Law-like statements are said to "support" counter-factual conditionals. For example, we might consider something of the following form, given the social science law regarding population densities: "If location L, were within M miles of the nearest City center, then it would have density D:" 

Plausibly, the kind of social science laws we were considering above would support this kind of counter-factual conditional. It would be interesting, I think, to consider contrasting "accidental" generalizations from the social sciences.

H.G. Callaway

Dear H.G.C.,

Thank you for your interesting discussion!

As I mentioned, my observations were mainly on scientific laws that were repudiated or discarded (as observed by certain answers/responses in this thread). As I set out to frame my answer above, I was focusing on well known (or universal) scientific laws based on natural phenomenon (as noted in my examples), some of which subsequently or after a prolonged time period underwent revision or changes. The fact is that scientific laws, irrespective of how they are made, have been the cornerstone of natural sciences. These laws are concise. They are objective. They are general statements concerning phenomena in nature; it is a single observable aspect of fact (for example, the law of gravity).  Observation is the bedrock of conceptualizing natural laws; science describes the universe as it is, and not as we conceptualize it. Based on my earlier reflections, I am in no way ruling out scientific and natural laws based on other criteria.  Moreover, it is beyond my capacity to diligently distinguish the nature and differential conceptualization of various categories of scientific/natural laws.  A law may also be predicated on theoretical principles. In such a case, it is a deduction from a set of facts that have to do with a distinct phenomenon, which is stated to occur when some conditions are present.

Natural sciences endeavor to advance our understanding of nature and natural phenomenon (without human intervention).  The edifice of social sciences would appear to be based on institutions and organizations that are organized and orchestrated by the society at large.

I learn that social sciences operate with sets of general principles or (governing) laws, if you will. It is not within my capacity, however, to evaluate whether these laws conform to scientific laws in nature (natural laws), which are imbued with objectivity.  

Earlier, I observed the following.  It occurs to me that there might be scientific principles in the social sciences but not scientific laws (as one generally understands).   I also wrote the following.  “The following can be said about the crux of the present thread, as exemplified by extensive discussions.   Social sciences obviously operate with sets of principles or laws. Agnieszka’s answer above also seems to point in this direction. Whether such laws or principles, if you will, are to be characterized as scientific laws may depend on individual preferences and reasoning.” The above principles have also been characterized as “generalities” in this thread. I am curious as to what Dr. Ricardo’s answer to his question, based on the gamut of discussions in this thread.  

I am reflecting on your earlier comments: “… I'd suggest that the degree of precision and quantitative expression in the generalizations of sociology and other social sciences varies considerably. But on empirical grounds, we need to attend to the actual generalizations we may actually find and try to make them as precise as possible.”  In view of the momentous discussion on this question, might you have answers (considered views) to these questions? Do social sciences belong in the realm of science? Are there scientific laws in the social sciences? I am looking forward to your enlightening answers.

Thank you!

Dear Callaway,

You have observed: “Also, I think it may be doubted that just any systematic field of study and knowledge will count as a science. History comes to mind as a possible counter-example. ”

This is what I wrote: “Science denotes systematized knowledge or body of knowledge. It also paves the way for discovery. This knowledge is gathered by observation, study, experimentation (when it applies), etc.  In broad terms, science can be any branch of knowledge regarded as a distinct field for the investigation of principles (and facts) that are applicable to it.”  This is the key here: this body of knowledge is gathered by observation, study, experimentation, etc.  The body of knowledge sets relationship between cause and effect. Systematic knowledge of the natural and material world is gained through observation and experimentation. Gathering of facts, observation and experimentation provide the foundation for evidence. Evidence is the cornerstone of scientific discovery. The body of systematic knowledge, accrued by observation, study, experimentation, etc., leads to the process of discovery. Science is a process of discovery. This is the scientific process. The body of knowledge primes the scientific process.  There was no need to go into these details as everyone is aware of the scientific process and of the scientific methods.

What I had observed needed to be taken in its totality. I would reiterate this: the systematic body of knowledge paves the way for discovery. In essence, discovery is what science is all about. It is needless to say that history hardly meets the criteria described above. Science can have any number of operational definitions, not to mention descriptions.

This is what the National Academy Press says about the nature of science. “In broadest terms, scientists seek a systematic organization of knowledge about the universe and its parts. This knowledge is based on explanatory principles whose verifiable consequences can be tested by independent observers. Science encompasses a large body of evidence collected by repeated observations and experiments.”

 http://www.nap.edu/read/1864/chapter/4#38

http://www.nap.edu/read/1864/chapter/4#37 

Regards.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Kandaswami,

Perhaps you would care to comment more directly on some of the following?

I'm inclined to content myself with sociological "generalizations and regularities," of which I think there are many, though they are not all of equal intuitive interest. Their scope is here left undefined. But here is a simple example:

For any two institutions A and B, if A generally pays the expenses of B, then over time, there is a tendency for B to become more like A.

A way in which this might be understood is in terms of a lower order generalization, to the effect that the people in B charged with obtaining a flow of finance from A, tend to assimilate to the habits and expectations of the people in A who are charged with the distribution of finance. 

Here is a further plausible sociological regularity. 

For any society, if the accepted religious diversity is greater, then the tendency toward toleration of political dissent will be greater. 

Again, let me provide a short explanation. Acceptance within a society of religious diversity gives a social sanction in degree, to diversity of basic values; and varieties of political positions and attitudes arise from basic values, including those transmitted by religious traditions. In consequence, where there is wider religious tolerance there will also tend to be broader political tolerance.

One more suggestion:

Suppression of the freedom of (dis-)association tends to uniformly reproduce the pre-existing values of social configurations to which the strictures are applied. 

The idea here is very simple. In order to institute any plausible innovation on the array of pre-existing values, new advocate groups are required; but their efficacy will be diminished if the advocates are forced into relationships which tend to resist the innovations.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Ricardo,

Greetings!

Your question concerns the issue of scientific laws in social sciences. Naturally, the question of which of the social sciences (sociology, politics/political science, anthropology, psychology, economics, etc.) you have in mind arises. Presumably, it is sociology that you have in mind. The wide range of answers also point in this direction. Obviously, the group, social sciences, comprises heterogeneous disciplines. This could have a bearing on your question. Some broader classifications also tend to include history in this group. 

Certain answers in this thread have tended to include social sciences in the realm of arts. In this context, historically, the connection of alchemy to chemistry, and of astrology to astronomy comes up. Some hybrid disciplines involve sociology and science. Examples include social medicine (refer to the term, social & preventive medicine), biological psychology, etc. Anthropology employs the tools of sciences, particularly those of molecular biology and molecular genetics. Psychology and economics are highly analytical, and use well defined and specific tools of investigation, which are thought to be conventional scientific tools. Certain considerations raise the issue of weather your question needs to be narrowed down to the field of sociology. This is just a reflection, and I hasten to point out that I am no expert in these fields. 

Regards and thanks.

Dear All

Scientific methodology is not confined to number crunching or quantitative method.  Qualitative methods are essential in many sciences, it is an artificial construct to place science within strictures of pure numerical analysis.

Taxonomy is a scientific tool without which much of biology would be unintelligible but taxonomy is not exact and would not function if it were.  

Epidemiology is a science employing both quantitative and qualitative research methodology.  The study of disease in populations could not work by quantitative methods alone and the 1918 flu epidemic proved that beyond doubt.  Without epidemiology medicine would be as ineffective as it was in the middle ages.

Pharmacology also employs both quantitative data and real world research based on observational studies, many of which are qualitative.  Drug interactions and adverse reactions are determined by both quantitative and qualitative data.  Neither would produce any meaningful data on their own.

It is time to abandon the false dichotomy of quantitative over qualitative methodology.  

It is also a myth that quantitative analysis eliminates bias.  I have seen staggering manipulation of quantitative data going well beyond the fraudulent.  As a lecturer in research methodology I warn students of the subjectivity of research and how to spot where it is going on.  

Dear All,

Kandaswami stated “I would reiterate this: the systematic body of knowledge paves the way for discovery. In essence, discovery is what science is all about.” If “knowledge” in the above statement is narrowed to “objective knowledge of the physical universe”, this statement appears to capture key distinctions between “science” and other fields of study. Also, as Kandaswami mentioned, the National Academy Press defines activities of scientists, and hence the nature of science, as follow: “In broadest terms, scientists seek a systematic organization of knowledge about the universe and its parts. This knowledge is based on explanatory principles whose verifiable consequences can be tested by independent observers. Science encompasses a large body of evidence collected by repeated observations and experiments.”

Many would argue that the above definition by the National Academy Press does not state what science is in the broadest terms. It encompasses only empirical, non-historical fields of study, and appears to excluding all purely theoretical (axiom-based) and historical fields of study. The subjective, non-systematic nature of many intellectual pursuits (Art, for example) quite clearly places them, as general fields of study, outside of anything that could be called science. Other areas are debatable, which is probably on reason this thread has generated so much input. More questions may at least point the way to a satisfactory answer.

Are Logic and Mathematics science? The propositions and statements of Logic and Mathematics arise in the mind without any necessary relation to knowledge of the physical universe. There are arguments for and against regarding Logic and Mathematics as sciences. In an admittedly cursory review, most practitioners of Logic or Mathematics do not generally consider these fields to be science. There are exceptions. For example, see http://www.mathinst.hu/~nemeti/whatislogic.html for an argument considering Logic as a science.

Mathematics is usually not considered a science. There are areas of applied Mathematics and Statistics (the “Mathematical Sciences”), such as Theoretical Physics and some areas of Computer Science, Epidemiology and Population Genetics, that are considered sciences since they deal with objective aspects the physical world. Developments in both Logic and Mathematics are subject to objective methods of validation by proofs (and more recently by “computational experiments’), but not by empirical experiments in the physical universe. Defining Mathematics and Logic as sciences per se would require defining a third type of science – an “axiom-based” or “a priori” science. In any case, Logic and Mathematics follow scientific methods much more closely that other many other areas of study, such as the Arts and Philosophy. These focus primarily on skills and/or are governed by subjective value judgments.

As Barry Turner mentioned, “It is time to abandon the false dichotomy of quantitative over qualitative methodology.” This is certainly true with regard to defining what qualifies as a science. Further, this thread has been focusing the “operational” sciences. A subject that may not have been mentioned this thread is the distinction between “operational” and “historical” sciences. (I apologize if I am misstating here –this thread has grown rather long and I haven’t read every contribution.) The RationalWiki entry (http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Historical_and_operational_science ) provides a concise summary of this topic.

This thread has been focusing the operational sciences. Regarding the historical sciences, the RationalWiki entry quotes Dr. Carol Cleland. The quote is repeated here:

“Many scientists believe that there is a uniform, interdisciplinary method for the practice of good science. The paradigmatic examples, however, are drawn from classical experimental science. Insofar as historical hypotheses cannot be tested in controlled laboratory settings, historical research is sometimes said to be inferior to experimental research. Using examples from diverse historical disciplines, this paper demonstrates that such claims are misguided. First, the reputed superiority of experimental research is based upon accounts of scientific methodology (Baconian inductivism or falsificationism) that are deeply flawed, both logically and as accounts of the actual practices of scientists. Second, although there are fundamental differences in methodology between experimental scientists and historical scientists, they are keyed to a pervasive feature of nature, a time asymmetry of causation. As a consequence, the claim that historical science is methodologically inferior to experimental science cannot be sustained.”  Cleland, Carol, Historical science, experimental science, and the scientific method (2001).

The RationalWiki entry includes “cosmology, astronomy, geology, paleontology and archaeology” among the historical sciences. These historical sciences have developed their own theories (e.g., plate tectonics) without any possibility of experimental duplication. The sciences mentioned above (with the exception of archaeology) aim to interpret evidence of non-repeatable historical events in terms of the laws and theories of the operational physical sciences. These historical sciences have certainly “paved the way for new discoveries” and have provided much more than “"generalizations and regularities”.  One of the more recent developments in the natural historical sciences is the recognition of the critical roles played by catastrophic events. Since they are physical phenomena, these events were/are governed by physical rules. As discussed below, the impact of catastrophic events has implications for the social sciences as well.

Are the Social Sciences (in particular, Economics) really sciences? This is another area of much discussion and debate. A strong argument for the inclusion of Mathematical Economics within the realm of science was recently given by Robert J. Shiller, a 2013 Nobel Laureate in Economics. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/robert-j--shilleron-whether-he-is-a-scientist.

Dr. Shiller specifically defends Mathematical Economics as a science. This field has progressed greatly since the 1940’s. In the 1940’s, the primary methods used in Mathematical Economics were parameter optimization of various differential equation models of imaginary "equilibrium" economic states. Since these early days, the additional of new approaches, most notable probabilistic models, game theory models and agent-based “complex adaptive system” models, have made significant contributions to the predictive capabilities of Mathematical Economics. With appropriate caveats and limitations recognized, Mathematical Economics arguably fits within a broad definition of a science.

The Wikepedia entry on Mathematical Economics presents a relatively complete discussion and reference list (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_economics). The early efforts (up through the 1940’s,) in Mathematical Economics were widely criticized, notably by the philosopher Karl Popper (1) and economists Ludwig von Mises (2) and Friedrich Hayek (3). (More recently, Mathematical Economics was criticized by Robert Heilbroner, who argued that qualitative economic data is not suitable for mathematical modeling.) Popper considered Mathematical Economics to be based on tautologies; i. e., it was based axioms and formal mathematical proofs that do not reflect the real world situations. Hayek argued essentially that the mathematical methods could not be applied to real economic situations because the amount of information needed for accurate models could never be obtained.

To explain Mise’s criticisms on Mathematical Economics, it must be pointed out that Mises considered his approach to Economics (and to economic calculation) to be founded upon “literary Psychology”. L. Mises, Human Action 3rd Edition, (1963) preface. He also viewed psychological-based Economics (and the wider study of purposeful human action; Mises’ “Praxeology”) to be an “axiom-based” science, more similar to Logic and Mathematics (which Mises considered to be sciences also) than to the historical or operational natural sciences. The main axiom that Mises basis his thesis on is that the logical structures of all human minds are essentially the same. This subsumes differences in values judgments, abilities, specific ends and specific means to attain those ends, etc. All humans (except for those who are mentally incapacitated) recognize at some level that our world and our lives are governed by causation (and not by teleology). All human minds evaluate and grade various options, and all apply some form of reasoning (which may be sound or flawed) to reach their most desired ends. As mentioned before, Mises further postulates that we all act purposely in order to achieve our desired ends, and that the ends are always changing, because we are never fully satisfied with our current state of affairs. These forgoing axioms were regarded by Mises as “ultimate givens”. 

In distinguishing Economics/Praxeology from the natural operational and natural historical sciences, Mises (2) notes that “. . . For some time economists believed that they had discovered such a constant relation in the effects of changes in the quantity of money upon commodity prices . . . There are, in the field of economics, no constant relations . . . a statistician . . . has not “measured” the “elasticity of demand” of potatoes. He has established a unique individual historical fact. No intelligent man can doubt that the behavior of men with regard to potatoes and every other commodity is variable. Different individuals value the same things in different ways, and valuations change with the same individuals with changing conditions . . .

. . . Statistical figures referring to economic events are historical data. They tell us what happened in a non-repeatable historical case. Physical events [including historic physical events] can be interpreted on the ground of our knowledge concerning constant relations established by experiments. Historical [economic] events are not open to such an interpretation . . .” The bracketed notations are mine.

Based on his axioms, and upon “. . . subtlety and penetration of economic insight and interpretation . . .” Mises developed “. . . his flagrantly controversial philosophy of the social sciences, his brilliant entrepreneurial theory of the market process, and his devastatingly consistent classical liberal perspective on political economy, into an overarching system of extraordinarily impressive scope . . .” I.M. Kirzner in L. Mises, Human Action 3rd Edition (1963), back cover.

Does Mises’ “his brilliant entrepreneurial theory of the market process” qualify as science? Does it “pave the way for new discoveries”? Does it provide more than "generalizations and regularities”? Is the objective study of subjective value judgments and their effects an objective field worthy of being called a science?

As we all agree, a science must produce objective rules rules (laws or theories) that are predictive. As in the natural world, catastrophic events also occur in the economic world. In both cases, there are usually warning signs for those astute enough to pick up on them. Volcanologists monitor volcanoes and astronomers monitor the skies for evidence of danger. Economists look for warning signs as well. It is noteworthy that mathematical economists have failed dismally at predicting economic disasters; e.g. see https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-03-05/economics-can-t-predict-the-big-things-like-recessions. Why? Mathematical Economics may be too divorced from the vagaries, the nuances and the "gritty details" of human actions to predict these rare events. On the other hand, practitioners of Austrian School Economics have consistently predicted one economic disaster after another. So as not to provide just one (potentially biased) reference to verify this claim, I would suggest a Google search using “mises austrian school predict financial collapse” or something similar.  

I’m still not sure if this answers Dr. Ricardo De la Peña’s original question about scientific laws in the social sciences. As there are no constant relations in human interactions, there does not appear to be anything strictly equivalent to a Law of Physics in the Social Sciences. However, if by a “scientific law” we simply mean that a body of knowledge exists that provides systematic, logical, causal explanations for certain observations, and that also provides some means for predicting - possibly with imperfect but with nevertheless meaningful accuracy - future events, then the answer is probably “yes”.

   Keith

(1)  Boland, L. A. (2007). "Seven Decades of Economic Methodology". In I. C. Jarvie, K. Milford, D.W. Miller. Karl Popper:A Centenary Assessment. London: Ashgate Publishing. p. 219.

(2)  Von Mises, L. (1998). Human Action A Treatise on Economics (The Scholar’s Edition). The Ludwig von Mises Institute. p 55 - 57. A pdf version is available online at https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Human%20Action_3.pdf (pages 92-94 in the online pdf)

(3)   Hayek, Friedrich (September 1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society". American Economic Review 35 (4): 519–530. JSTOR 180937

(4)   Heilbroner, Robert "The end of the Dismal Science?". (May–June 1999). Challenge Magazine.

Bravo Keith!

You ought to join Derek Abbot's thread on mathematics as a human contrivance

Mainz, Germany

Dear Constantine,

I notice that in part of your note, above, you quoted a definition of science which departed from one which had been suggested by an earlier writer. In any case, it seems clear that there are more and less mathematical or quantitatively oriented sciences: also there are scholarly disciplines which do not, plausibly, count as sciences. There seems to be a good deal of agreement that history is not a science, though it is systematic and depends on collection of evidence. Part of the difference is that it is only weakly predictive at best.

That mathematics and logic are not sciences is more debatable, I believe. What seems clear is that they are neither natural or social sciences and do not much depend on the collection of evaluation of empirical evidence. In spite of that, both logic and mathematics, being rather rigorous, are disciplines of discovery and exploration. Once given assumptions of systems of mathematics and logic are established, their consequences and elaborations can be studied and explored in a reasonably objective fashion. This remains true whatever one may think of the ontological status of mathematical objects. 

It is not clear, at this point, to what degree these issues above may require further discussion here. I do not think for a moment that we will come up with a strict and definitive definition of science. In any case, I liked your ending:

if by a “scientific law” we simply mean that a body of knowledge exists that provides systematic, logical, causal explanations for certain observations, and that also provides some means for predicting - possibly with imperfect but with nevertheless meaningful accuracy - future events, then the answer is probably “yes”.

---End quote

But why the qualification "probably."? It is not as though we could reasonably assign a mathematical or statistical probability to possible answers to the question. Right? You seem to mean "I think so," or "plausibly," or something on that order? But this may distract from your argument.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Dr. Constantine,

Thank you for your elaborate, penetrating and engaging discussion.

You stated as follows. “Kandaswami stated …” “I would reiterate this: the systematic body of knowledge paves the way for discovery. In essence, discovery is what science is all about.” “If “knowledge” in the above statement is narrowed to “objective knowledge of the physical universe”, this statement appears to capture key distinctions between “science” and other fields of study.”

In my answer or response preceding the above particular answer I stated the following: “The fact is that scientific laws, irrespective of how they are made, have been the cornerstone of natural sciences. These laws are concise. They are objective. They are general statements concerning phenomena in nature; it is a single observable aspect of fact (for example, the law of gravity).  Observation is the bedrock of conceptualizing natural laws; science describes the universe as it is, and not as we conceptualize it.

I agree with what you have stated about the position of the National Academy Press (NAP) on science. The NAP seems to provide a somewhat restrictive definition/description of science; the NAP, in this instance, is more concerned with what kind of activities scientists are generally engaged in.  In its preamble, the NAP makes a couple of statements about the nature of science, as follows. "In broadest terms, scientists seek a systematic organization of knowledge about the universe and its parts. This knowledge is based on explanatory principles whose verifiable consequences can be tested by independent observers. Science encompasses a large body of evidence collected by repeated observations and experiments.” One may employ these statements to arrive at a general description (or broad definition) of science as follows. Science concerns the "systematic organization of knowledge about the universe and its parts", and "encompasses a large body of evidence collected by repeated observations and experiments."

I am in agreement with the following statement of yours. “As there are no constant relations in human interactions, there does not appear to be anything strictly equivalent to a Law of Physics in the Social Sciences.”

I had stated as follows in my first two answers to Dr. Dr. Ricardo De la Peña’s question. “It occurs to me that there might be scientific principles in the social sciences but not scientific laws (as one generally understands). Scientific laws essentially come from physics; they are generally presented as equations. Natural sciences endeavor to advance our understanding of nature, natural order, natural systems, and of the universe with the eventual and ultimate goal of understanding reality.” A law made as a postulate, in the natural sciences, forms the basis of the scientific method in these disciplines. I also stated the following.  “The following can be said about the crux of the present thread, as exemplified by extensive discussions.   Social sciences obviously operate with sets of principles or laws. Whether such laws or principles, if you will, are to be characterized as scientific laws may depend on individual preferences and reasoning.”

Regards…CK

Mainz, Germany

Dear Kandaswami,

You write:

“The following can be said about the crux of the present thread, as exemplified by extensive discussions. Social sciences obviously operate with sets of principles or laws. Whether such laws or principles, if you will, are to be characterized as scientific laws may depend on individual preferences and reasoning.”

---End quotation

This may be accurate as an overview of possible answers to the present question. But since it does not make an argument among the alternatives under discussion, it seems it is not itself an answer to the question. Right?

What we want to know is whether there are laws of the social sciences. It seems that though you go on at some length, in sympathy with one contribution or another, you do not yourself risk an answer?

But on the other hand, you also wrote, in the same contribution to this thread:

I am in agreement with the following statement of yours. “As there are no constant relations in human interactions, there does not appear to be anything strictly equivalent to a Law of Physics in the Social Sciences.”

---End quotation

This, as it seems leaves unaddressed the question of whether laws in the social sciences would have to be "strictly equivalent to a Law of Physics," in order to count as laws. Moreover, it does not seem that this question itself is very clear.

If you will forgive my saying so, it seems that the question on this thread has only been clouded. We are left wondering whether there may be laws which are not "strictly equivalent to laws of physics" and wondering what exactly you may intend by the phrase.

H.G. Callaway

A law in the social sciences is the freedom of the citizens, for example, before a democratic election.

Dear all,

I am of the firm opinion that Social science is science. Between the present discussion, my concern is that why we are comparing te scientific approach of social science with that of Physics? As you all learned professors are very much clear that the scientific study of society stand entirely different footings and can't be compared to physics as the subject matter of social science is the person and their behavior.  Human behaviour varies with person to person and even of the same persons in different times.

I think the science is the pattern of study and in reference to social sciences, it should not be compared to the hardcore science subjects having lab testability.

Dear Callaway,

You wrote: “What we want to know is whether there are laws of the social sciences. It seems that though you go on at some length, in sympathy with one contribution or another, you do not yourself risk an answer?” 

Dr. Ricardo De la Peña’s question is not simply “whether there are laws of the social sciences” (your words). His question is: are there scientific laws in the social sciences. “There are scientific laws in social sciences?” -  Ricardo De la Peña.

You went on to write as follows:

Here is what I had stated: “I am in agreement with the following statement of yours.” This means that I agree with Constantine’s statement (as follows): “As there are no constant relations in human interactions, there does not appear to be anything strictly equivalent to a Law of Physics in the Social Sciences.”

The following statement came from Constantine.

• “As there are no constant relations in human interactions, there does not appear to be anything strictly equivalent to a Law of Physics in the Social Sciences.
• "However, if by a “scientific law” we simply mean that a body of knowledge exists that provides systematic, logical, causal explanations for certain observations, and that also provides some means for predicting - possibly with imperfect but with nevertheless meaningful accuracy - future events, then the answer is probably “yes”."

Any questions (or clarifications) concerning Constantine's statement/observation are to be directed to him.   

Dear all,

The following thread could be of interest to members here (ResearchGate).

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_sociology_a_science_Explain

Mainz, Germany

Dear Kandaswami,

I take it for granted that we are interested in "scientific laws in the social sciences."  Laws in the social sciences, would quite naturally be scientific laws.

Would you like to defend a position on whether there are such laws?

H.G. Callaway

Social sciences are as subject to ‘laws’ as physical sciences.  There are many definitions of the concept of law relating to human interactions in a society.  John Austin, 18th century jurist describes laws as follows

“A rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him”. 

Such a statement of course relates to judicial law rather than scientific laws but nevertheless it can be applied in social sciences.  For power we can substitute ‘influence’.  Our research endeavors are guided by the literature, in other words by observations made by others during their research over time.  As such Austin’s law will apply.

Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century described law as:

“Nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated”.  

Aquinas’s definition will also apply to law in the social sciences.  The words “ordinance of reason” suggest a consensus on methodology, a structure around which a hypothesis would be tested.  This commonality of reason is a clear reflection of the jurisprudential laws that govern our societies and the conduct of individuals within them.  That such a law would be “promulgated” relates once again to the idea of publication of research findings in academic/scientific literature where again consensus can be found.

Going further back to classical times and the foundation of scientific thinking law was described as such by both Plato and Aristotle

“An embodiment of Reason”, whether in the individual or the community”  

This ‘reason’ being easily interpreted to mean a consensus among individuals in a (scientific) community.

Scientific laws are based on observation where a phenomenon is observed and interpreted and where that phenomenon always operates within strict observed parameters and complies with the constantly repeated observations of other observers.  Newton’s laws of motion are a supreme example and to the best of anyone’s knowledge operate everywhere within the physical universe. 

The ‘laws’ observed in the social sciences are much more prone to change than those in physics but the principles are the same.  Scientific laws are not immutable and the philosophy of science insists that we accept that scientific laws can be changed where contradictory observations and empirical experiment indicate they are incorrect or inaccurate.  Even the laws of physics are not immune to challenge.

We can quite reasonably argue that social sciences are governed by something we could call ‘laws’.

They are laws if one takes the view that self and sociality are functions of deeply embedded anatomy and physiology. They are tendencies or even opportunities to be taken and carried through if the social domain allows degrees of autonomy. Best Paul

Mainz, Germany

Dear Turner,

You make an interesting shift in the discussion by explicitly opening up the topic of legally binding and politically instituted laws, let me say, "laws of the land" --though the category would also include international law.

It seems clear that legally binding laws might be part of the explanation of social regularities in a given society. Again, some regularities in particular societies might make reference to legally binding law though concerned with the incidence of activities outside the law --say, the incidence of corruption. Again, changes in the statutes of the laws of the land might explain changes in the observed regularities of social activities. But on the other hand, it does not seem to be the case that every regularity of human behavior makes reference to the law of the land. Moreover, arguments in justification of legally binding law often make reference to pre-existing mores, which also involve regularities of the social sciences.

I imagine for example regularities in family life. It seems true, say, that children brought up in a given household will first acquire the language(s) of the household in question. The point seems so obvious that it may be difficult to imagine exceptions. Moreover, the generalization appears to support counter-factual conditionals, such as,

"If this American child C, had been brought up in a monolingual French-speaking household, then C would have first acquired French."

That is to say that the generalization appears not only true but also law-like. Yet, many countries have no official language, and as a rule, the law of the land does not intrude into households or concern itself with first language acquisition of children. So it seems that we have a law-like generalization, subject to empirical counter-example, which has little or no relation to the law of the land. 

I think that similar examples could be multiplied --almost at will. Some might be somewhat less universal, and have relation to particularities of one society or another, but if there are obvious exceptions to such generalizations, then they might be quantified in terms of statistical generalizations. 

It looks like there ought to be many laws of the social sciences, some related to the law of the land and others not.

H.G. Callaway

Estimado Señor Catedrático Callaway

It is interesting that you raise and issue in linguistics to illustrate laws in social sciences.  I wrote a paper a few years ago about acquired characteristics in childhood behaviour, in particular to do with the absurd phenomenon of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Then sweeping the United States.

I criticizing the absurd suggestions that this ‘condition’ was a hereditary or congenital defect based on a faulty genes I used a linguistic analogy.  A child born to Chinese parents in Beijing would of course be ‘genetically’ Chinese.  Itself of course an artificial construct based on the concept that China exists as a natural phenomenon rather than as a political/cultural entity.

My argument was that such a child taken at several days old and placed with an American family in Chicago would grow up speaking English, or perhaps Spanish and not Mandarin.  The child would grow up in among the cultural norms of The US and would not acquire, by way of genetics any Chinese language or culture.

My point was that behavior like language and culture is acquired largely by a learning process and not through genetics, that genetics itself had only a small part to play in human development and that the behaviour demonstrated by children labeled with ADHD was in the large part environmentally and culturally acquired.   ADHD at the time had hardly been acknowledged in France for instance and the absence of it could hardly be ‘genetic’.

The moral of the story is that while science, in this particular instance the somewhat dubious sciences of psychology and psychiatry may purport to be founded on rules or laws more often than not they are founded on opinions.

Going back to our comparison between scientific law and jurisprudential law the analogy can be extended. We have in law limits on the speed we may drive on our roads and people break them.  Many of the purported laws in social sciences and soft sciences like medicine are adhered to and broken at will.  It just depends on who is the highest paid ‘key opinion leader’

Mainz, Germany

Dear Turner,

Many thanks for your reply. (For a salutation, simple, "Dear H.G." will do, BTW.)

I sympathize in degree with your critical analysis of ADHD, though I can't claim to be an expert on the matter. But, it has often seemed to me that various popular or trendy  "diagnoses" have had a strangely political character on occasion.

You agree with my proposed social science law of first language acquisition--or at least in the particular case you mention from your writings. Yet the fact that this is so nearly a universal phenomenon, in spite of all differences in the specifics of purely hereditary-genetic human background, seems significant. Although specific languages are specific cultural products, and learned from the immediate environment usually, still the uniformity of the way first languages are acquired does not seem to differ much from one culture to another.

Such generalizations are of interest partly because they are so rarely "broken." I take it that your example of the ethnically Chinese child brought up in Chicago, and coming to speak like the natives of Chicago confirms the generalization I mentioned above. Right?

There is no doubt a great deal of plasticity in human behavior, and we get a glimpse of this in crossing cultural boundaries. Yet some traits seem to be nearly universal and other seem to be remarkably persistent in particular cultural populations.

None of what I say about this is intended to suggest that these persistent traits are themselves genetic, and none of this is intended to suggest that existing regularities or purported regularities are not sometime exploited in the media or in politics. On the contrary, quite the opposite seems too often the case.

But even Aristotle knew that human beings are social animals--unlike, say, tigers which are lone hunters only meeting up to breed and then separating. To attempt to interfere with such a human generality promises only grief. By the same token, a proposed piece of legislation, designed to interrupt the acquisition of the first language in the household would not seem to recommend itself. I think this does not depend merely on "who is the highest paid 'key opinion leader.'"

H.G. Callaway

Anyone. Please provide a robustly verifiable Social Law. Empirical and/or Logical reasoning will do!

Best wishes, Paul

Mainz, Germany

Dear Stephens,

You seem to call my example in question! What is the problem with it? It is certainly social and quite robust.

I think that what you may mean is that you would like to see a "robust verifiable social law" with high political relevancy and interest, perhaps? That we have already seen social laws of undoubted validity goes without question by this point. Right?

Have you missed the earlier posting?

I'm inclined to content myself with sociological "generalizations and regularities," of which I think there are many, though they are not all of equal intuitive interest. Their scope is here left undefined. But here is a simple example:

For any two institutions A and B, if A generally pays the expenses of B, then over time, there is a tendency for B to become more like A.

A way in which this might be understood is in terms of a lower order generalization, to the effect that the people in B charged with obtaining a flow of finance from A, tend to assimilate to the habits and expectations of the people in A who are charged with the distribution of finance. 

Here is a further plausible sociological regularity. 

For any society, if the accepted religious diversity is greater, then the tendency toward toleration of political dissent will be greater. 

Again, let me provide a short explanation. Acceptance within a society of religious diversity gives a social sanction in degree, to diversity of basic values; and varieties of political positions and attitudes arise from basic values, including those transmitted by religious traditions. In consequence, where there is wider religious tolerance there will also tend to be broader political tolerance.

One more suggestion:

Suppression of the freedom of (dis-)association tends to uniformly reproduce the pre-existing values of social configurations to which the strictures are applied. 

The idea here is very simple. In order to institute any plausible innovation on the array of pre-existing values, new advocate groups are required; but their efficacy will be diminished if the advocates are forced into relationships which tend to resist the innovations.

H.G. Callaway

Barry,

These self-regulative laws that humans institutes for their societies are territorially/culturally bounded and can be broken and suffer exception more or less frequent.  They do not have the characters of universality and exception-less of the natural laws.  Natural science is about discovering natural laws but there is no need for social sciences to discover self-institute laws. To discover the self-institute laws we just need to read the laws or ask lawyers or consult crime statistics to see the level of conformity.  Not all self-institute laws are judiciaries, many are religious and many just emerged as customs and this is the job of anthropology to describe these.

Thank you for your enlightening and comprehensive reply, Mr Callaway. For all that, the contention that if in the case of any two institutions A and B, A generally pays the expenses of B, then over time, there is a tendency for B to become more like A, is theoretical and presumptive. Can you cite empirical examples that support the veracity of your argument?. Paul

Yes,with the only difference of Wide-Ranges in behavior along inconsistent-instantaneousness; as social beings are also made by cosmos ingredients.

Dear Louis,

Thanks, you have finely formulated the very basis of social science laws. Congratulations, indeed.

Stimate Domnule Academician Dr. Stephens

One such 'law' might be the Peter Principle and that would support HG’s proposition that B frequently becomes like A.

The Peter principle is an observation that in an organizational hierarchy, every employee will rise or get promoted to his or her level of incompetence.

This principle is very often seen within the modern university where an individual is promoted to a management position based on their ability to generate publications for puffed up academic journals.  It usually ends in disaster for those who end up under their leadership. 

Mainz, Germany

Dear Stephens,

As it seems to me, whenever conformity pays, it tends to propagate. This may be good, in certain cases and not so good in others. But surely it is an interesting sort of social science generalization. It is the basis of much regulative, social legislation.

Specifically regarding my proposal that,

For any two institutions A and B, if A pays the expenses of B, then B tends to become more like A.

This is a case in point. You asked for either empirical or logical support. If you don't find this proposal convincing, then you might consider the other proposals.

Since this is a more theoretical discussion, we only need single paradigm cases to illustrate the possibility of laws in the social sciences. They need not be politically interesting or salient.

I would say, by the way, that just because some social generalizations are socially or legally constituted, and instituted, this definitely does not show that they do not illustrate the thesis of laws in the social sciences. That regularities may change over time is neither here nor there, and it tells us nothing about the advisability of any proposed change in the laws of the land. That laws in the social sciences have this sort of variability, in contrast to physical laws, say, does not make them any less law-like or predictive and explanatory --so long as they hold.

H.G. Callaway

Social sciences have a vast magnitude .If aim is to catch up the need & also creating the responsibility for the member of social fabrics .The road of scientist do not play in one direction as it cattle the need of requirement of various different type of individual .

In order to evaluate the moral of social sciences for certain areas a systematic & a scientific approach is very much essential  as it offer the valuable to the members of the society .

Social sciences deal in the smallest to the highest sphere for the member of the society .It covers a small area of civil code - human relation under the moral & ethical code ,a guideline for behavior for maintaining  the dignity of Law & order for which such practices may help to establish a proper mode of discipline in the society .

This is my personal opinion 

I think the fundamental question should be: Are there scientific laws in any area of inquiry? "Law" is a strong word when used within the scientific paradigm, the essence of which is to doubt, and which at best gives us falsifiable hypotheses that haven't (yet) been falsified.

Human beings --and all they are, think, do, and create-- are part of the natural universe. Science is a perspective for understanding the natural universe. Concepts like "natural" or "exact" sciences and "human" or "social" sciences are artificial constructs; the borders between them are so blurry as to be insignificant, outside of an institutional context. We are a biological species; this alone dissolves any barrier that may have been erected between biology and any of the "social" sciences." Physics underlie biology and thus also "social" and "human" sciences.

In any field there are studies that may be classified as scientific, peudoscientific (when claiming to be scientific but not complying with the basic ground rules of science), and unscientific (when no scientific pretense is made). No area of inquiry in itself may be considered "scientific," "pseudoscientific," or "unscientific." It is individual studies that may be classified in this way.

If it is accepted that there can be laws in "natural" sciences, then there can be laws in "social" sciences. Some examples have already been given on this thread.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Wright-Carr,

You present a prevalent skeptical perspective. It is true, I think, that "law" is a strong word in the sciences, but is a word which has its uses, and that is prima facie grounds to accept such usage. We may doubt that what is claimed to be a law is in fact a law, but this is best effected on grounds of the specifics of a particular case in question and the particular law being challenged, and not wholesale, as you suggest. In effect, you equate the fallibility of the sciences with general uncertainty of everything in the sciences. But these are two quite different matters.

Given general fallibility, all we are saying is that particular claims once established or generally accepted have been found false and subsequently rejected. But in the process, much of interest was presupposed as true and reliable, and employed in the arguments and criticism. These elements employed did not fall under any particular or pressing grounds for doubt.  The appropriate image is that of rebuilding the ship of knowledge, plank by plank, while always remaining afloat.

You wrote:

Concepts like "natural" or "exact" sciences and "human" or "social" sciences are artificial constructs; the borders between them are so blurry as to be insignificant, outside of an institutional context.

---End quotation

But I would think that your concept of "artificial construct" is so broad in its application as to be more doubtful than the concepts which you seek to challenge in making use of it. You claim that the borders between the natural, exact and the human and social sciences are "so blurry as to be insignificant." But you certainly have not demonstrated anything similar. You seem to merely state a claim. I see little reason to accept it. In the first place, the various sciences are distinguished in terms of their typical vocabulary, results and the domains implied. 

I suppose that the boundaries of the various sciences are constituted from within, by the actual practice, results and successes of the various disciplines themselves. So, if anyone doubt of the cogency of related concepts, the thing to do is look to the paradigms of the various disciplines; and regarding the social sciences that is what we have been doing here.

H.G. Callaway

Dear H.G.:

You seem to take a conservative stance, with a deep respect for established institutions. I can understand that; it seems to be the prevailing attitude in Academia. My perspective is a bit more radical, in that I seek to transcend the limitations inherent in this system. Both sorts of contributions can be fruitful: without focused, unidisciplinary work, we would have less knowledge; without broader inter-, multi-, and transdisciplinary work, we would be unable to integrate this knowledge into a coherent worldview.

When one works on a problem from a transdisciplinary perspective, the fundamental ground rules of science provide a structure that permits the integration of theories, concepts, and evidence from diverse disciplines. The blurriness of the borders then becomes evident. You are welcome not to accept this. I won't attempt to convince you on this question page, in abstract terms. I think this is best done in formal publications and presentations, focused on concrete problems. (It is solving problems that interests me, rather than practicing an academic "trade" within a particular disciplinary perspective.) I shall keep at it, uploading the results to ResearchGate's web servers, with the goal of making at least modest contributions to the discussions at hand.

Warm regards,

David

Mainz, Germany

Dear Wright-Carr,

In general terms, I sometimes say I'm a constitutional liberal. I do have a deep respect for historical continuities which can be usefully projected as (fallible) guidelines for change and development. That implies some resistance to simply jumping on the going bandwagon --from time to time.

If people see the need to change something, then it stands to reason that they should first know how things got to the present situation and know something of the broader consequences of particular proposals. Expediency must have its limits, though this implies putting up reasoned objections.

H.G. Callaway

This is an important but highly complex discussion. It invites attention to the following crucial question. Can we know truth in different ways? I have in mind, sociology, physics, English Literature; Sport, Physics, Chemistry ... and the list continues. Paul

This is as grand a question as if asking ' Is there salvation outside of Church?' Yes?  Scientific laws delineate inquiries and practices imposed by scientific giants just as if Pope giving his blessings to flocks of believers.  I agree with Paul's take, can we know God without reading the Bible ?

Mainz, Germany

Dear all,

I am beginning to see some drift in recent contributions away from the question under discussion in this thread. If people want to discuss some other questions, then there is nothing to stop them, of course; and they can start a new question elsewhere on RG. But I would suggest that contributions to this thread focus on the question at hand concerning laws in the social sciences.

I am sure that cross-disciplinary studies can sometimes be useful. But that is no proper grounds for putting the distinctions between the sciences and scholarly disciplines in question more generally. "Good fences make good neighbors," as the saying goes, though on occasion, the fences will fall for a time, and in beneficial ways. This beneficial effect depends on basic respect for the substantial autonomy of the various sciences and scholarly disciplines. If we find anomalies or exceptions regarding the generalizations and regularities of the social sciences, then that may call for looking across boundaries into some underlying science or scholarly discipline, just as anomalies or problems in biology may look to bio-chemistry, or anomalies in chemical regularities may require looking into physics. Similarly, we might imagine that anomalies affecting the generalizations of sociology, say, may require looking into psychology. 

Wright-Carr wrote:

When one works on a problem from a transdisciplinary perspective, the fundamental ground rules of science provide a structure that permits the integration of theories, concepts, and evidence from diverse disciplines. The blurriness of the borders then becomes evident.

---End quotation

What is unwelcome, I think, is to presuppose so much "blurriness" that the distinctive judgements and relevancies of the particular sciences and scholarly disciplines simply fall away. Our question is whether there are scientific laws in the social sciences; and answering that question in a reasonable way is going to depend on accepting and respecting the judgements made in those disciplines.

Wright-Carr gives no argument, and one problem with that situation is it makes it much more difficult to determine exactly what is being claimed. The claim itself is ambiguous. The ambiguity is a problem.

H.G. Callaway

I think it is time in this debate to try to settle on a generally agreed upon definition, if one might call it so, of what science is. Paul

Science is a search for the truth, it is a philosophy not a 'methodology'.  Until technology and engineering entered the world of science in the late 18th and 19th centuries science was classified as natural philosophy and this included all disciplines.

The industrialisation of the world placed scientific disciplines in an artificial construct whereby 'hard sciences' 'quantitative' sciences were pushed as being some how superior, more difficult and therefore more exclusive and even immutable.  This was a deviation from the concept of science as a humanistic pursuit.

Not all scientific methodology is based on number crunching and quantitative analysis.  In fact it has long since been accepted that statistics, mathematics and number crunching are only 'some' of the tools we use in science.  Equally important is observation and the reasoned analysis of those observations which are just as empirical as 'bean counting' data sets.  

Science is search for the truth, not the finding of it.  If the correct philosophies of empiricism, epistemology and doxasticism are applied in all such searches for truth then all of them are scientific be they theoretical physics, psychology or social sciences.  

Returning to Paul's request for an agreement on what science is, perhaps we should ask what truth is.