I teach Thucydides and U.S.-China in my course on the History of Global Politics. Stephen is exactly correct in his critique of Professor Summers; Chinese history is very much one of expansion of influence and control at various points in history, including now. But you have mischaracterized the trap a different way. The concept of the trap is a *tendency* towards war (and competition), developed to explain what is and will be occurring with the U.S. and China, not a prediction that there *will* be war, and certainly not total war. Another key problem is that the nature of war has changed in the nuclear age, as Andrew pointed out, which tends towards proxy war. The current quasi-proxy war between the U.S. and Russia in Syria and eastern Ukraine, and the Cold War proxy wars with China like Korea, are potentially examples of the trap, although in the Russian case, Russia is not emergent now. But this is in part what we are talking about, proxy wars replacing full blown wars. I think Juan's points are all valid, but they don't answer the larger question because conjunctural conditions against war don't explain "big picture" trends over time that push China and the U.S. into competition and potentially conflict despite those conjunctural mitigating factors. And Andrew is correct about economic symbiosis, but I don't think that is *enough* to eliminate the chance of war and Thucydides would have had a lot to say about that given how Greek states traded. Finally, the other thing to think about is how historical analogies can be useful, as cautionary tales, not as predictors. Which Thucydides would say too. So the question is posed wrongly. The question should be how do we avoid the trap, not whether we are inevitably trapped by the trap.

I think both countries will still be involved in an indirect confrontation. as we know that both of them are still increasing their military involvement to hold exercises in these waters.

I believe this will subside if one side tries to convince its opponent by reducing military activity in these waters.

Wandy Ardiyansyah Hasibuan Thank you for your contribution dear!!!

I think, The U.S. cannot attack China, because then we're running out of iPhones, iMacs, and iPads! China cannot attack the West, because then the chips who power the iPhones, iMacs and iPads will not be delivered to China and then China will be running out of their favorite toys as well!

Simply put, many things are at stake between these two countries,So now the question of war does not arise but the possibility of continuation of trade war still exists !!!

The challenge of answering the question lays in defining "the Thucydides Trap" itself. If the commonly accepted definition is used (that the two strongest military superpowers will eventually come to open general war) then, no. This scenario is by no means inevitable, if for no other reason that China has no cultural history of empire expansion thorough power projection. The question become more complex if one defines the trap as one of motivation for war: honor, fear, or interest (control of economic resources). China has lately been signaling that it is more willing now than in the past to provoke military action over questions of "honor". Another complicating aspect is that neither China nor the US fit neatly into a "Sparta" or "Athens" role. Both modern states have attributes of either ancient powers.

Clark Summers Professor, Very clear and logical explanation. Thanks for your cooperation!!!

Professor Summers - Are you certain that China has no cultural history of empire expansion through power projection? I think the story of what we call China today is one of expansion. It is true, that they have not sought to project power across the Pacific, but certainly the Chinese have expanded into areas of Asia that one would not describe as Han Chinese. I think the entire premise of your argument is undermined by this premise. I also doubt that comparisons to Athens or Sparta are necessary or even useful. The brilliance of Thucydides is that his "Trap" has passed the test of time. Just my humble opinion. I mean no disrespect.

Stephen - A fair criticism regarding China and its history. The Han Chinese "Middle Kingdom" has engaged in expansion vis-a-vis its immediate physical frontiers. However, I would argue that as a matter of government policy, the traditional Chinese approach has been to strengthen centralized control of the frontiers, while expanding cultural hegemony as populations of Han Chinese expand outside those boundaries. This is unlike either the Hellenic practices of colonialism understood by Thucydides, or that of the Western European powers of the 18th, 19th centuries. As regards comparisons with Sparta and Athens, perhaps these are not necessary. However, most references to the "Thucydides Trap" make such comparisons, and tend to try and align one of the two modern states as being analogous with either of the two ancient states. I agree for certain sure that Thucydides' work has passed the test of time, but I am less convinced that the "Trap" adequately describes this situation (China v. US).

Professor Summers - I am listening to a FPRI webinar about China. Robert Kaplan and Parag Khanna addressed this very issue on the periphery of their discussion. I recommend it.

Maybe the Thucydides Trap isn't the best approach. If a war were to happen between the US and China it wouldn't be in military terms because: first China doesn't have this military expansionist behaviour, second, Donald Trump doesn't have the enough support inside of his own government to conduct a new war, and third, the coronavirus pandemic -and the race for the vaccine- may lay the foundations for a new cold war, and not an armed conflict

Stephen Preston Sir, Thank you for your interesting and uplifting contribution.

Juan Diego Delgado Ortiz Dear, Great Thanks for your opinions.

Not only is nuclear deterrence a major constraint on military conflict, but also the the symbiotic economic relationship which former Treasury Secretary Summers described as Mutually Assured Destruction like the nuclear context, but perhaps Mutually Assured Depression is more apt).

Andrew Kuchins Professor, Thanks a lot for your contribution. We have already praised Professor Summers' statement. Thanks !!

I teach Thucydides and U.S.-China in my course on the History of Global Politics. Stephen is exactly correct in his critique of Professor Summers; Chinese history is very much one of expansion of influence and control at various points in history, including now. But you have mischaracterized the trap a different way. The concept of the trap is a *tendency* towards war (and competition), developed to explain what is and will be occurring with the U.S. and China, not a prediction that there *will* be war, and certainly not total war. Another key problem is that the nature of war has changed in the nuclear age, as Andrew pointed out, which tends towards proxy war. The current quasi-proxy war between the U.S. and Russia in Syria and eastern Ukraine, and the Cold War proxy wars with China like Korea, are potentially examples of the trap, although in the Russian case, Russia is not emergent now. But this is in part what we are talking about, proxy wars replacing full blown wars. I think Juan's points are all valid, but they don't answer the larger question because conjunctural conditions against war don't explain "big picture" trends over time that push China and the U.S. into competition and potentially conflict despite those conjunctural mitigating factors. And Andrew is correct about economic symbiosis, but I don't think that is *enough* to eliminate the chance of war and Thucydides would have had a lot to say about that given how Greek states traded. Finally, the other thing to think about is how historical analogies can be useful, as cautionary tales, not as predictors. Which Thucydides would say too. So the question is posed wrongly. The question should be how do we avoid the trap, not whether we are inevitably trapped by the trap.

William Lawrence Professor, agreed !!! Thanks a lot for the logical explanation. But, Allison used the word war to raise a question when she/he explained the Thucydides trap between China and the United States. Please take a look at the following:

How can the two powers avoid a possible ultimate war? Allison suggests both countries recognize the stakes for each other, and more people will start to see the big picture. “More people in the system, in the congress, in the business community, in the think tank community, in the academic community [will see] we have many vital interests between the US and China. Having a severe competition can be very constructive, but it needs to be within a framework.”

Allison concluded by saying, “In this difficult transition, trying to cope with it requires a great leap of imagination.”

Professor, I agree with all your statements, This is a much deeper explanation even to understand the possible Thucydides trap between the two powers. Can you please share how this question is wrong after reading Allison's statement?

Yes, as William notes, neither nuclear weapons nor economic interdependence eliminate chance of war, they just raise the stakes. Proxy wars have been around a long time; the Cold War was rife with them.

I don't think there will be a physical war with guns and bombs but a defensive act that either took it as preparing for war. It's a strategic rivalry that promotes their superiority and global domination. The main reason is that they both depend on each both economically and politically for stability and continuity. War could mean a destruction to both and is not a good option.

A democratic peace theory also becomes a basis that discourages war on each other. Democratic countries like USA as a democratic ideals ( people's views) that constraint war. Leaders will not make decisions to harm the people or else the people will withdraw their trust during election. All in all war will never have happened to both. They way they operate now makes the world Politics interesting in the 21st century.

Ben Joel Thank you for your great contribution.!!!!

I think the main issue with Allison's comment is that Thucydides is a realist and Allison is making an idealistic appeal. Thucydides is operating in the world of "is" and Allison is admirably operating in the the world of "ought" to be. So, both can be correct; Allison does not prove Thucydides wrong.