Voladamir Zelinsky started out as a comedian and satirist. As a man of the people, he even entered a dancing with the stars competition. So when Ukraine was invaded by Putin, Voladamir Zelinsky was given an opportunity to leave Kyiv. He responded “The fight is here. I need ammunition, not a ride.” Satire, Irony, Parody, and Wit have been used to demonstrate Putin’s failures, and Zelensky’s success during Putin’s war in Ukraine. These rhetorical devices are designed to ridicule Putin and Putin’s senseless war, and to show the resilience and wit of the Ukrainian people in a tragic situation. Are these rhetorical devices effective? Why, or why not?
No, it is not, because the war, i.e. war victims and war destruction is not funny at all. Speaking about Zelensky's response "The war is here I need ammunition, not a ride", I think it is hard to understand such statement to anybody without experience of war. There are situations when you find there is no other solution than to sustain till the end and when you just don't care about yourself. You know if you're sure that situation after the war in case that your country will be defeated will be "Vae victis" you just simply don't care for yourself and you're going straight to the end. No matter if you will win or loose or if you will live or die. You just have no choice and you don't care whether your rhetorical devices are effective or not, because you're quite aware that nobody and nothing will stop aggressor on your country but your people with you. So, this is it.
This is not a satyric, humor, or folkloric subject: we witness the most cowardly fascist aggression to an independent country. It recalls Hitler's invasion of Poland and the tragedy of the Warsaw ghetto.
well, I think satire is a good tool, generally, not only in relation to this war.
As to the political aspects, I hesitate to comment on this more extensively, but my politics is not pro-Zelensky.
Thus far, the guy presented himself as a cocaine-addict who fled his country as late as 26 February. He is a puppet directed by a manager who lives probably in the USA. A good guess is that he has no contact with his general military staff.
All of that would be extremely funny, if the war, like all wars, did not cost so much in terms of human lives and destruction. Hope it will end soon.
And a new era will usher for a more democratic and multipolar world.
Sinisa, Ivo, and Pehar: Thanks for your insightful comments. I'm truly learning some important things.
Until now, all the (false??) diplomatic actions from EU, US, NATO, Russia, Ukraine,.. have a zero impact on ..
-- deaths
-- city destruction
-- refugee
-- advance of conflict
All the country leaders are responsible!!??!!
⚡️ https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig37_359048411
⚡️ https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig38_359048411
⚡️ https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig39_359048411
Satire - comedy - depends on the understanding of psycholinguistics. Here's an essay exploring that. https://rentaquill.co.uk/zelenskyy-comedian-command
Electronic news media of the Persian Gulf countries in cartoons show how the West's position on the Ukrainian crisis affects the global economy.
https://tomatocartoon.com/
https://tomatocartoon.com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%82%d8%aa%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%8a/
https://tomatocartoon.com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%82%d8%aa%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%ba%d8%b1%d9%82/
Merryn: Superb link. I'm attaching our revised PowerPoint. Thanks.
Sergey: Excellent link to give us a new perspective. Thanks for sending it.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_russian_trolls_list_assisting_war_crimes_in_Ukraine
Ridicule can help to reduce psychological tensions, but it may increase tensions in others. With respect to war and armed conflict, it must be mentioned that death is real. Reducing conflict is much more based on rational insights (according to game theory, e.g. T. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict) than on ridicule, but spiritual warfare is always involved in such conflicts of diverging political interests.
Stephen: We need balance and perspective. And we need to understand our audience, because the satire, sarcasm, parody, irony
, etc. can have a widely different effect on different audiences.
When it's not funny
Russian propagandists from RIA Novosti published an article "What Russia should do with Ukraine" on the day when the world learned about the atrocities of russians in Bucha and other cities near Kiev.
The article is one of the evidence for the future tribunal against russian war criminals, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Monday, speaking via video link in the Romanian parliament.
According to Zelensky, “the article describes a clear and calculated procedure for the destruction of everything that makes Ukrainians Ukrainians. It is said that it is necessary to carry out "de-Ukrainization" and "de-Europeanization" of Ukraine. It is said that even the name of our state should be erased. In fact, it is said that the death of the largest number of our people in the war is only welcome.
I want you to understand me: they are not even hiding. They openly talk about the goal of invading the territory of Ukraine. If our army had not survived, if our people had not risen to defend the state, they would have done what they did in Bucha - but on the entire territory of Ukraine," Zelensky said.
Elena: I totally agree. Russia is now being investigated for many different types of war crimes, including Genocide, Crimes against humanity, targeting and killing civilians, the use of chemical weapons, targeting civilians, targeting hospitals, targeting refugees, etc. I could go on. In my opinion, Putin's war in Ukraine is one of the worst disasters in history. Long live Ukraine and the Ukrainians.
As to ridiculous: "Even Hitler didn’t think of announcing that the Soviet army itself had bombed its cities, taken Leningrad under blockade in order to discredit the peace-loving Reich.” - Andrey Makarevich said.
What's on their minds?
The press secretary of the russian Foreign Ministry called Ukrainian borscht a manifestation of "Nazism and xenophobia"
Maria zakharova substantiated the presence of "Nazism" in Ukraine by the fact that borscht is called a Ukrainian dish in cookbooks. She assured that some cookbooks are prohibited in Ukraine.
"Why? Because it was impossible to share borscht, well, you can’t, it should belong only to one person. That's just one people, one nationality. And so that it is common, so that in every city or region every housewife can cook it according to "To their own, no. They don't want to compromise. So this is what we say - xenophobia, Nazism, extremism in all forms," zakharova said.
Interesting recipes appeared in russian print media.
The Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper published an article entitled “The secrets of making Soviet casseroles are revealed: the perfect dish from leftovers”
“A Soviet-style casserole can be made from anything - this is a universal way to save food that has been stale in the refrigerator (especially if they are no longer suitable for independent consumption): a small piece of boiled meat, a couple of tomatoes that have begun to deteriorate ...”
Congratulations for this powerpoint, Humor has ever been a way to turn the censorship from communist times.
I send you another link on a discussion I opened on the basis of Konstantin's list to ban these trolls from RG. I would be glad if you, could recommend it If you allow me, I would be glad to repost your ppt or you can do it yourself. https://www.researchgate.net/post/Free_RG_from_Putins_trolls_spreading_hate_speech_about_the_war_against_Ukrainian_fascists
Best regards, Xavier
More seriously, a message of solidarity with Ukraine from Sarajevo. As the Major of Sarajevo told during this protest action against the war, no other city knows better what it means to be bombed as Sarajevo, Alep, Mariupol or Kramatorsk. Shame on the Russian army and Putin, who gave the orders, and on all people who support this horrible fratricide war, which led to crimes against humanity, as the French Foreign Minister qualified the bombing of the Kramatorsk train station.
I send you also a satyrical definition of socialism, whish still applies to Putin's Russia, from my book about my experience with Soviet secret services.
Book Code-named "Harry"
Document: "What is socialism" by Leszek Kołakowski
Leszek Kołakowski, a dissident Polish philosopher who died in 2009, who claimed to be Marxist and remained socialist after being communist, published in 1956 a poem, banned by censorship which circulated from hand to hand in Warsaw in the fall of 1956, year of the first major revolts in the Eastern block after the death of Stalin, in Poznan as in Budapest. In this remarkable text, to the question "What is socialism?", Leszek Kołakowski responds with a portrait of socialism as it was realized in the Soviet Union. One can read in it what he always thought possible: true socialism. I will quote below extracts of this text, which denounces better than any other the excesses of he communist regime and still remains actual to a large extent, in particular in Putin’s Russia:
We will say what socialism is.
But first we must tell you what socialism is not.
Well, so, socialism is not:
A society in which someone who has not committed a crime stays at home, waiting for the police.
A society in which someone is unhappy, because he says what he thinks and someone else happy because he does not say what he thinks.
A society where someone is better because he does not think at all.
A state whose soldiers enter the territory of another country first.
A state where anyone who praises the leaders is in a better situation.
A state where one can be sentenced without judgment.
A company whose leaders call themselves to their posts.
A state that has more spies than nannies, and more people in prison than in hospitals.
A state where one is forced to resort to lies.
A state where one is forced to resort to crime.
A state that has colonies.
A state whose neighbours are cursing geography.
A state in which cowards live better than brave ones.
A state in which lawyers almost always agree with the prosecutor.
A nation that oppresses other nations.
A state that wants all its citizens to have the same opinion in philosophy, foreign policy, economics, literature and morality.
A state whose government defines the rights of its citizens, but whose citizens do not define the rights of the government.
A state that uses nationalistic slogans.
A state whose governments think nothing is more important than their power.
A state that makes a pact with crime and then adapts its ideology to this pact.
A State that would like to see its Ministry of Foreign Affairs determine the political opinion of all humanity.
A state that finds it difficult to distinguish between enslavement and liberation.
A state where racist agitators enjoy complete freedom.
A state that hardly distinguishes a social revolution from an armed aggression.
A state that always knows the will of people before asking them.
A state that can mistreat them with impunity.
A state in which a conception of history is law.
A state in which philosophers and writers always say the same thing as generals and ministers, but always after them.
A state in which the results of parliamentary elections can always be predicted.
A state where an entire people, against their will, can be transplanted elsewhere.
This is the first part. But now, be careful, we'll tell you what socialism is.
Well, socialism is a good thing
Xavier: The material you're sending is superb--extremely insightful. Thanks for these insights. Much appreciated.
Unfortunately, some areas of this world reproduce totalitarian dictatorship through past centuries. As a result, civilians are getting slaughtered on hourly basis under totalitarian dictatorship regimes. How not to be scared of such a no end situation!!!
Our support for Ukrainians against totalitarian dictatorship regime of RuSSian Federation demonstrates solidarity for humanity against dictatorship around the globe.
Mockery and ridicule are a very important factor in political struggle and war. There are many examples in history. I invite you to read the book "Laughter of life and death ...", in which I described examples of ridiculing the enemy during the Second World War.
I discovered a very interesting utopian Russian novel which predicted Putin’s war plan : Putin Is Just Following the Manual, by Dina Khapaeva, The Atlantic, March 26, 2022
No one can read Vladimir Putin’s mind. But we can read the book that foretells the Russian leader’s imperialist foreign policy. Mikhail Yuriev’s 2006 utopian novel, The Third Empire: Russia as It Ought to Be, anticipates—with astonishing precision—Russia’s strategy of hybrid war and its recent military campaigns: the 2008 war with Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the incursion into the Donetsk and Luhansk regions the same year, and Russia’s current assault on Ukraine.
Yuriev’s book, like Putin’s war with Ukraine, is an expression of post-Soviet neo-medievalism, a far-right, anti-Western, and antidemocratic ideology that assigns “Russian Orthodox civilization” a dominant role over Europe and America. Yuriev, a businessman and former deputy speaker of the state Duma who died in 2019, was a member of the political council of the Eurasia Party, which envisions an essentially feudal social order overseen by a political class that rules through fear. Putin and Yuriev knew each other. The Third Empire is rumored to be popular and highly influential in the Russian leader’s circle; one Russian publication described it as “the Kremlin’s favorite book.”
The narrator of the novel, which unfolds in 2054, is a Brazilian historian who describes the origins of the Russian resurgence begun by Vladimir II the Restorer and completed by his successor, Gavriil the Great. (The first empire referenced in the book’s title was that of the czars; the second was the Soviet Union.) In The Third Empire, Joseph Stalin is Iosif the Great, whom Yuriev lauds for conquering new lands, destroying worthless elites and the “internal enemies of Russia” during the purges of the 1930s, and deporting entire peoples during and after the Second World War—which resulted in mass death. Over the past 20 years, the Kremlin has carried out projects of re-Stalinization in Russia, rebranding the former dictator as an effective manager and a harsh but fair ruler. Putin is using Stalin’s tactics in the current war too. Authorities in Mariupol report that Russian forces are forcibly deporting the beleaguered city’s inhabitants.
Early in The Third Empire, a pro-Russian, Kremlin-sponsored uprising occurs in Ukraine. Its goals include “reunification with Russia and the abandonment of involuntary integration into Europe, as well as the rejection of the anti-Russian NATO bloc.” This uprising results in an undeclared war, with Russian troops marching into Ukraine. Soon, nine regions in eastern and southern Ukraine—including Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and other areas under Russian occupation today—announce their “non-recognition of Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian statehood” and proclaim a pro-Russia “Donetsk–Black Sea Republic.” In the referendum that follows, “82 percent of the population [vote] in favor of joining Russia.” And in Russia, 93 percent vote for “the admission of Eastern Ukraine into Russia.” Perhaps not coincidentally, in Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and incursion into Donetsk and Luhansk, Russian forces similarly took over Ukrainian territory under the guise of a locally driven initiative.
Since 2008, Putin has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine is “not even a state.” His reasoning resembles that of Yuriev’s Emperor Gavriil, who “categorically refused Ukrainians … and Belarusians the status of separate nations.” In Gavriil’s eyes, “attempts to consider them as ethnicities separate from the Russian” are “part of the centuries-old Western plot to destroy Russia.”
Although Yuriev did not anticipate the barrage of sanctions and the unified front presented by the West, he did foresee Russia’s willingness to engage in nuclear blackmail. In The Third Empire, Russia wins World War III because the West fears nuclear war. “American leaders hesitated to order an assault,” Yuriev writes, “while the Russians clearly showed their willingness to go to the end.” Today, Putin is counting on the accuracy of Yuriev’s prognosis. In recent years, Russia’s president has been threatening the world with nuclear weapons. For example, in 2018, he said that, in the case of nuclear Armageddon, “Russians would be victims and martyrs and go to heaven”; the West would “just croak” and “wouldn’t even have time to repent.” Few other governments treat their own people with such frank disdain.
Yuriev also imagined, with disturbing accuracy, how Europe’s dependence on Russian energy exports limited how far it would go to punish Russia. Statements by Vladimir II in The Third Empire are nearly indiscernible from contemporary speeches by Putin. “You don’t like us?” the emperor mocks a French-television interviewer. “All right then, go to war with us and conquer us … Or refuse to buy our energy products, oil and gas, so that we starve to death.” The narrator notes that the loss of Russian oil would have raised prices and “brought down the European economy.”
Putin made a similar point in 2014 about the prospect of Europe doing without Russian oil and gas. “It’ll simply kill their ability to compete,” he said. Putin is right. Resisting the international pressure to ban Russian energy imports, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz keeps explaining the “essential importance” of Russian oil and gas to the European (read: German) economy. Above all, Yuriev’s fantasy is disconcerting because it has anticipated the pusillanimity of the West.
In 2006, Yuriev predicted that the West would react to the Russian invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by appeasing the aggressor. Indeed, the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 were mild. More alarming is that Yuriev also expected that Russia would not stop with the partial annexation of Ukraine. The invasion that began last month proved this forecast to be equally accurate. Today, alarmed by Russian aggression, the West may seek to stop the war by pressuring the Zelensky administration to accept at least some of Russia’s terms. Yuriev revels in Russia’s ability to take advantage of Western diplomacy. He writes:
Although Russia’s annexation of Eastern Ukraine was not officially recognized … the demarcation line [that] the parties undertook not to violate … was fixed. It was stipulated that Russia renounced any encroachment on the territory to the west of that demarcation. This was pure PR on the part of the United States because they knew perfectly well that Russia had no such thing in mind.
Yuriev’s road map for Putin’s foreign policy makes clear the futility of Western attempts at a diplomatic solution without regime change in Russia. Under Putin, Russia will attack again.
In The Third Empire, Russian geopolitical ambitions force the United States and the European Union to declare war. Yuriev imagines that Russia has a secret weapon that makes the country invincible to nuclear attack. (Putin is trying to alter the logic of nuclear deterrence in a somewhat different way, via the hypersonic-missile system he described in December 2018 as “invulnerable to a potential enemy’s air-defense and missile-defense systems” and “a wonderful, excellent gift to our country for the New Year.”) Ultimately, the Americans and Europeans surrender. The world comes under Russian domination. The high point of the novel is a parade on Red Square. Among the forced participants are representatives of the American elite: President [George] Bush III and former presidents Bill Clinton, Bush Junior, and Hillary Clinton; current and former members of the cabinet, the House, and the Senate; bankers and industrialists; newspaper commentators and television anchors; famous attorneys and top models; pop singers and Hollywood actresses. All of them passed through Red Square in shackles and with nameplates around their necks. … The Russian government was letting its own citizens and the whole world know that Russia had fought with and vanquished not only the American army but the American civilization.
With such scenes, Yuriev offers important insights into the mentality of the Kremlin, the way Putin and his circle think about the West, and their attitudes toward neighboring countries. Perhaps Putin doesn’t really expect to haul the Clintons in chains through Red Square. But when Volodymyr Zelensky warns that if Ukraine falls, war will move farther into Europe, he should be believed.
Even if Russia’s recent setbacks result in a military defeat in Ukraine, Putin may attack one of the Baltic countries to undermine NATO. Western nations may decide not to risk World War III for the sake of, say, Estonia. If NATO does not respond militarily to Russia’s aggression on one of its members, the de facto disintegration of the alliance might counterbalance the military disaster in Ukraine, thereby saving Putin’s regime.
Yuriev’s novel is fiction, of course, but should still help the West calculate the risks of appeasing Putin’s aggression. Understanding Russia’s expansionist vision should play an important role in Western decisions regarding the war in Ukraine: Ukraine is not Putin’s only target.
Dina Khapaeva is the director of the Russian-studies program at Georgia Tech’s School of Modern Language. She is the author of The Celebration of Death in Contemporary Culture
The Russian State TV declared that the third World War has begun with the sinking of Moskva cruiser in the Black Sea.
The sinking of the ship led to meltdown on the Kremlin's main propaganda mouthpiece Russia 1. Presenter Olga Skabeyeva made the chilling statement, informing the viewers that "what it's escalated into can safely be called World War III" and insisted "that's entirely for sure." Commentators called for all out war after sinking of Moscow, including bombing and possibly discussing dropping "a single bomb on Kyiv" to keep world leaders from visiting. “Now we're definitely fighting against Nato infrastructure, if not Nato itself. We need to recognise that,” Skabeyeva further said
Przemyslaw: Thanks for your insightful comment. I love your new book. It's the best I've seen on this particular topic: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Przemyslaw-Grzybowski/post/Many_people_use_ridicule_to_criticize_Putins_war_in_Ukraine_Is_ridicule_an_effective_critical_device_Why_or_why_not/attachment/62585ecd33d0f000f76d0d88/AS%3A1144823520215040%401649958605410/download/Grzybowski+-+The+Laughter+of+Life+and+Death.pdf
Dear Pzemyslaw,
Very interesting book, I wonder if you also worked on laughter during communism, there would be much to say. Gratuluje,
Xavier
Any totalitarian regime is always accompanied by attempts to correct the language.
UNIAN continues to compile a dictionary of putin's Newspeak. This time there is an actual update - if you think that the cruiser "Moskva" has sunk, then you do not understand anything. In fact, it "submerged under the water."
We remind you of previous dictionary updates:
not "explosion", but "clap";
not "fall", but "negative growth";
not "layoffs", but "decommissioning";
not "dismissal", but "release from work";
not "retreat" and "flight", but "planned regrouping".
Break the spirit of the enemy: in russia they came up with a tank that shoots feces
Russian inventor from St. Petersburg Alexander Semenov became famous overnight. He gave birth to a "brilliant project" that, under sanctions, will help solve problems with military equipment. The man came up with a tank that shoots excrement. In his opinion, this will help solve the problem of the toilet for the military and break the spirit of the enemy.
It will take three fighters to charge the deadly machine.
Dear Elena,
Thank for your posts. Communist (and post-communist) countries always had a remarquable sense of humor to be preserved from censors. I found a nice study Book Prolétaires de tous pays, excusez-moi!
I also remember another oneLe Communisme est-il soluble dans l'alcool ? / Antoine et Philippe Meyer, 1978 : https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k3358788x
I recommend them to these who understand French, maybe there are English versions. They should try the shit tank on the Kremlin, don't you think?
Year 2022. There is a shortage of water, food and shelter around the world. The dead are picked up on the streets and allowed to be processed into biomass to feed the hungry people. The oceans are dying, the air can't be breathed.
This, of course, is a movie, Hollywood cheap stuff (called Soylent Green), of which there are many. The film would not have been remembered today if it had not been made in 1972 in the form of a prediction that in 50 years global warming would destroy everything. This is a very typical phenomenon for Western civilization - to compose horrors about the future (for some reason, this is not the case in other civilizations). Either dragons wake up in the basements of London and burn everyone, or this is global warming. Thus, we have before us some important part of the consciousness of the average Westerner.
And this part of the consciousness there is now cheerfully awakening. Yes, we continue the conversation about the fact that quite recently all the political and journalistic classics of the "empire of lies" were engaged in one thing: they demanded to immediately "stop Putin" in Ukraine. But now the picture is changing, and already other people, interrupting each other, started talking about something else: what will happen to our (Western) world if Putin wins? And what will happen if NATO drags out the current situation for months and years, as they do? Which option is worse? And should we wait for the dragons or prepare to pick up the dead on the streets?
Let's take a look at one such piece from American Foreign Affairs that sounds like a horror movie script. The authors clearly pose the question: who will time work for if the whole situation with Ukraine is stretched out for an indefinite period?
And it turns out, of course, horror. A new era of conflicts, one after another. Europe will be neither free, nor whole, nor peaceful. NATO will figure out what to do in the event of an eternal continuation of hostilities. The invasion of Ukrainian refugees will continue, and these "migrants may decide to settle in Europe forever" (quite horror).
Famine will set in all over the world, increasing instability, and peoples far from Ukraine may fall into crises that shatter the dream of an “elegant exit” from the pandemic. Many countries already see double standards in terms of the joyful reception of Ukrainian refugees in the West. And this is especially noticeable in terms of punishing Russia, while the US has fought in several of the same wars in recent years. The article reminds: only 37 countries have imposed sanctions against Russia, and the world is big.
But further: raw materials will continue to rise in price, the price will be paid primarily by the Europeans, and in the end - this is the main thing - support for Ukraine will fall. All the louder voices will sound in favor of Kyiv signing the peace on any conditions. In general, the endless war will inevitably and greatly bother the current societies that live in comfort. Moreover, after all, the Ukrainians themselves can get bored with this (really?), And they will stop obeying orders regarding the prolongation of the conflict. But it was assumed that if Kyiv was allowed to sign peace, then only after "years of battles."
Here it is, the script. And here the most interesting begins, namely, what the authors of the article offer in such an unpleasant situation. It turns out that Western politicians will have to actively explain to their populations why a protracted war in Ukraine is fundamental to the future of the free world.
Only? Yes, nothing more. The authors do not issue any other prescriptions. In essence, all the article proposes is to wage a brainwashing campaign in favor of eternal war, incrementally and endlessly. And it seems that this public in the West is just being explained why it needs such a war on the borders of their Europe. No, it turns out that these were passive explanations, and active ones are yet to come.
Like decent people, the authors begin perestroika with themselves. Not only that, they consider themselves obliged to insert into the text every single classical formulation about Ukraine's struggle for freedom and from the atrocities of the occupiers. (This classic is built on a simple principle: all the abominations committed by the Ukrainian Nazis and the military are immediately attributed to Russia.) But there are innovations in the indictment list. It turns out that Moscow is perpetrating mass deportations of Ukrainian citizens to Russia and "widespread sexual violence" against them.
Here we should return to our dragons: the problem with them is that they definitely did not arrive. The movie "The Power of Fire" (2002) indicated a clear date for the attack of fire breathers - 2020. Too late to rush, did not come true. The ecological catastrophe didn't work out either. The film Soylent Green was remembered precisely for the reason that everything predicted in it failed magnificently. If the Western population has problems in terms of climate, then they are caused more by activists for saving the planet (all the new restrictions on emissions, oil consumption, etc.). And the climate is perfect. In the United States itself, no changes have been seen in this regard for at least 17 years, and the "average temperature on the planet" in March, for example, was only 0.15 degrees higher than that for many years.
Here we return to the already mentioned topic - about the fact that the Western man in the street loves to live in horror and demands more and more horror stories. Although it can be assumed that bad people simply taught him to do this. In the past few years, horrors have been pumped up mainly in terms of health, since, as it turned out, this has a strong effect on many: from coronavirus to the harm of tomatoes or milk (yes, there are such "scientific studies"). But at the same time, people were frightened by the climate and other misfortunes, and now it has come to military plots, and the public, hungry for fear, must eat them.
Sergey: A powerful and insightful statement, masterfully written. Thanks for your contribution.
The "extremely important" meeting of the UN Security Council on Ukraine took place without any major breakthroughs. It lasted exactly two minutes, since there were no people who wanted to speak. Why was he only appointed and who was the initiator of the discussion of this, as it turned out, an unnecessary issue for anyone? However, it is basically unrealistic to deal with UN intrigues. And why deal with them? The sense of this organization is not just zero - less than zero. Eternal speculation of bureaucrats and dancing on other people's bones. Continuous grinding of budgets, mainly in favor of those who milk sponsors for them - sometimes for years, but more often for decades. Flirting with any crook, as long as he represents someone from whom the UN bureaucrats are supposed to get goodies - directly, in money, or in the development of their future careers.
So it was, is and will be. The UN is not able to solve a single issue, has never been able to and will never be able to. Whether we are talking about refugees and migrants, genocide and food shortages, the problem of pollution of the planet or peacekeeping operations, nuclear non-proliferation or the fight against the slave trade, drug trafficking and arms trafficking ... Before that, a sickening talking shop - already grind your teeth when you remember how deftly and skillfully it is being used by Western intelligence agencies to cover up their ties to terrorists and by Western politicians fighting rivals and adversaries, of which they currently believe us and China to be the first. In the case of Ukraine, this is also noticeable, as in Syria. One essence, only the rhetoric is different. Moreover, no one has any illusions about Ukraine, so there is not much to talk about. In Syria, they were still ...
No, it is clear that if we are talking about a big scam, such as the fight against "global warming", where you can smack those who continue to develop their own economy, especially industry, simultaneously selling vague technologies regarding "green energy" to new markets, then the UN ahead of the planet. Bans, emission quotas, protocols, agreements... The main thing is that in the end, those who work with this should have more powers and money, and they would bend everyone else.
The idea of European parliamentarians to adopt a resolution calling in case such leading retired European politicians as ex-Chancellor of Germany Schroeder and ex-Foreign Minister of Austria Kneisl refuse to leave the boards, supervisory boards and other governing bodies of large Russian companies such as Rosneft , to include THEM in the sanctions lists, admirably conveys not only the essence of today's European politics and the poisonous atmosphere in which it is brewed, but also where Europe is actually heading. Normal such, ordinary fascism. Or rather, Nazism. By Hitler. Only instead of Jews and Gypsies as Untermensch - Russians and Russia as such. Even the wording is the same.
What was said in the European Parliament about the fact that retired European politicians who "continue to receive Russian money" should be subject to sanctions? Doesn't it remind you of anything? For Adolf Schicklgruber, it was "dirty Jewish money". It greatly contributed to the organization of the pogroms on Kristallnacht and, after the start of the war of the "Thousand-Year Reich against the Jewish Bolsheviks", the adoption and implementation of the decision on the "final solution of the Jewish question." Now, however, Europe, together with America and allied, as in the last war, Japan, is trying to finally resolve the Russian issue, and this will be harder. But on the other hand, the historic villa in Wannsee is in its place, the death camps in Poland and Austria too...
How long will it take to demuseify them and start barracks, gas chambers and crematorium ovens in the usual mode? Spit once. And by the way, it's cheap. And the number of Ukrainians who are ready and able to fulfill for the current Fuhrers of the Fourth Reich their usual historical role of kapos and guards in the concentration camps and ghettos of the "new Europe", which they successfully performed in the Third Reich, is now more than enough in the European Union. And if they are not enough, the Balts or Poles will help. Fortunately, they all have the same heroes, correct from the point of view of the grandson of any SSovets, and the enemies are the same. Only instead of Stalin, the Russians now have Putin, and only half of the country remains compared to 1941. The task seems to the organizers of the blitzkrieg of 2022 much easier than then, in 1941.
The story goes in a hell of a lot of interesting ways. Whimsical. Just the same, according to the Scandinavian sagas, so beloved by the composer Wagner and the Nazis. The serpent Ouroboros again clung to its own tail. Looks like Ragnaradi is close. She is Ragnarok - "The Last Battle" or "Twilight of the Gods". Those who wish can read. There are a lot of things about this in the "Elder Edda", and in the "Younger". No wonder they were translated into Russian. Well, or, if there is a penchant for the operatic genre, you can listen to "Ring of the Nibelung", get inspired. It also sets it in the right way. At least all four operas, at least one, the last one. What did our superiors say about the fact that they do not want a Third World War and, if they can, will not allow it? It will not depend on him. For now, that's where we're going.
Sergie: Great insights into politics, war, history, and geography. Thanks for responding.
Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin, who had African blood from his mother and a francophile free thinker from his father, would certainly be horrified by the nazi rhetorics of Sergey Pushkin. The translator of Pushkin and connaisseur of the Russian word André Markowicz, who can hardly be accused of Russophobism, firmly denounces the present tragedy in Ukraine, provoked by a despote named Poutine. According to him, Poutine is the junction of two pression groups, the KGB and the mafia. He follows the three principles of Sergey Uvarov, adviser of the despote Nicolas I : orthodoxy, autocracy and national principle. According to this principle, everything is Russian, and Ukraine doesn't exist. Russia, which claims to be fighting agains Nazis in Ukraine, uses the vocabulary and the methods of Nazis. He mentions a poem of Pushkin, Poltava, in which Pushkin says that history is a machine to break people and Russian history is a long series of massacres. He was horrified by the fightings in Kharkiv, where the characters of the cherry orchard of Tshekhov are heading at the end of the play, and says that he was destroyed by what Putin did with Russian culture, Russian language and Russian image. On June 3, he will publish "And if Ukraine would liberate Russia?" I wish Sergey Pushkin, who wrote about Pushkin, if still remains in him a bit of humanity, would read André Markowicz's blog.
Xavier: I agree. Putin is 1/2 KGB, and 1/2 Mafia, and his policies are riddled with ironies.
Dear Don L. F. Nilsen,
Do you know the famous phrase of the poet Alexander Pushkin from the poem "Confession" https://www.tania-soleil.com/pushkin-priznanie-na-angliiskom/
Oh, it takes a little to deceive me
I cannot wait to be deceived!
This ingenious phrase of Pushkin says that people are very pleased and even like to be deceived. Question is: Deceived by whom? Here the answer is obvious - it is the media. Well, if people like it, then let them be deceived further, because deceit cannot be forbidden. This raises the question of a simple choice: Which is better: the sweet lie or the bitter truth? Each one makes his own choice.
Gennady: I agree. And the person who says he is least deceived, is the most deceived.
Apart from the already mentioned analysis of André Markowicz, the analysis of the famous German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk about post-communism is also very interesting : he states that post-communism characterises itself by a transition from the red to the grey, with the permanence of an heritage mixing fascism and anti-fascism inheritated fom Stalinism which characterises Putin. He states that the grey of Putin's dictature is the direct successor of the post-Stalinist State which reigned in USSR until 1990. From his point of view, the decomposition of USSR was not followed by a real decolonisation and Russia didn't digest the pain of the disparition of members of her imaginary political body, Ukraine in the first place. This pain was exacerbated by the Maidan, which was not accepted by the activists of the Donbas, oriented towards Russia, who couldn't accept the will of Kyiv to reintegrate the Russian-speaking part of Ukraine in a new Ukraine oriented towards Europe. He considers however that Putin made a big mistake by launching this war, as if there is something that can found the myth of a Nation, this is a war of liberation, and that with this war Putin will be recognised in history as the creator of Ukraine. He considers that Putin will be stopped by his own army, not necessarily by a military putsch but by the absence of convincing results of this war, which will force Putin to adopt a slighly more moderated stance.
Xavier: Very insightful. I especially like (and agree with) your last sentence. We need a buffer state between Russia and the West, and Ukraine is that buffer state--all of Ukraine, including the Crimea and Dumbas, Mariople, Odessa, and the rest. I hope that Finland and Sweden become part of NATO. I also hope that Ukraine will also eventually become part of NATO.
Dear Don L. F. Nilsen,
"I hope that Finland and Sweden become part of NATO. I also hope that Ukraine will also eventually become part of NATO."
If you apply humor, then your phrase can be interpreted as follows:
"I hope that Finland and Sweden become part. I also hope that Ukraine will also eventually become part."
However, the story develops in a spiral and another interpretation is quite possible:
"I hope that Finland and Sweden become part of Russia. I also hope that Ukraine will also eventually become part of Russia."
Your ending is quite real: "...why not?"
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky begins a big "cut" of his country and "distribution of elephants to neighbors."
The Ukrainian leader said earlier that he would send a draft law to the Verkhovna Rada that would introduce a special status for Polish citizens in the country. According to the political scientist, soon Ukraine may lose its territories.
In general, it seems that Zelensky is starting a big cut of his country and distributing elephants to his neighbors. He, of course, will not forget himself personally, and the Europeans will formalize this matter from a bureaucratic point of view correctly.
Warsaw and Kyiv, under the pretext of salvation from Russia, will transfer part of the Ukrainian lands to the possession of Poland, "and there - at least the grass does not grow." Zelensky is simply vilely selling his homeland.
“For a long time, of course, in Ukraine, they haven’t traded their homeland to such an extent openly, brazenly and vilely, but, on the other hand, what else could be expected from all these people?”
Earlier, Polish President Andrzej Duda said that the border with Ukraine should unite peoples, not divide them. In this regard, he proposed to develop a new treaty on good neighborliness with Kyiv.
Dear Xavier Rouard
I will answer, with a poem by A.S. Pushkin is little known. You are constantly clinging to me with reproaches. I will answer here at once, I HAVE RELATED GENALOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH A.S. PUSHKIN
The wind is whistling in the cemetery
A beggar is shitting in a cemetery
Suddenly the grave opens
Appear from the grave
The whole messed up skeleton
Who dared at a time like this
Shit shit on my office
The beggar apologized for a long time
Plugged my ass with my finger
But the diarrhea did not subside through the ears flowed
I think now there will be a meme, everyone will see their own meaning,
original in Russian
На кладбище ветер свищет
На кладбище нищий дрыщет
Вдруг могила открывайся
Из могилы появляйся
Весь обосранный скелет
Кто посмел в такую пору
Обосрать мою контору
Нищий долго извенялся
Жопу пальцем затыкал
Но понос не унимался через уши протекал
Sergey Viktorovich Pushkin
A poem of curious origins
spat out by a man who
mangles truth in compromising orisons
renovating reality in the arcane glue
of Russian fascism
elevating death in revisionist imperialism.
He claims connection
to an elevated mind
while himself indeed mired in defecation
of death and destruction, his soul blind,
where lies are truth, murder denied,
in his mind Christianity and satan are one, each together deified.
In his mind Jesus is Putin.
but with empty eyes.
Only the reality at the end of the war will tell
us the truth .
Enrique: Do wars really ever have endings? Hmmmmm! Nevertheless, you're right.
Although I agree with Enrique Eduardo Bavio , I frequently repeat Ernest Hemingway's words: “Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime.”
I repost a very interesting analysis of Benoit Vitkine in Le Monde : "Between Russia and Ukraine, the fracture is as well political as generational" to explain why Putin will lose in the end.
Zelensky is 44 and Putin 69 years old. The conflict between the two countries doesn't oppose only two States, but also two generations, with deeply divergent ways of working and World visions. Most people surrounding Zelensky are in their fourties or thirties.The contrast is striking with the equipe in power in Moscow, where most people surrounding Putin are over 60.
At the end of 2021, researchers Maria Snegovaya and Kirill Petrov studied the professional and family profiles of the « top 100 » of the Russian elite and concluded that, 30 years after the end of the USSR, 60 % of its members still stemmed from the Soviet Nomenklatura (which represented 1 % to 3 % of the population of the USSR). Moreover, the Siloviki, heirs of the KGB and other Soviet security organs. represent one third of this top 100.
The nostalgy shown to the communist era is not only a facade nostalgy with red flags and portraits of Staline. The vocabulary and references to USSR are watering the Russian elite. The way of working of the Russian elite is marked by the culture of the papotchka, this hardcover file which has to be approved by all levels of power before reaching the Chief. Putin, who doesn't use qui Internet, is a big consumer of this culture, which doesn't promote initiative, revers secret and valorises collaborators who tell to their Chiefs what they want to hear.
These men, who survived the chaotic 1990 years, also often developed a mentality od "End of the World" : as everything can collapse tomorrow, nothing really matters to them except ensuring security and prosperity of their family.
Even more important in the Ukrainian context, the mental universe in which the Russian elite evoluates is marked by the obsession of encirclement developed by Putin, the paranoia of a Western conspiracy and mainly the imperial logic.
For most Russians who are 30 to 40 years old, the independence of Ukraine doesn't represent neither an incongruity nor an insult. That is by the way not a coincidence that pensioners represent the biggest contingent of convinced Putinists.
Among observers and opponents to Putin, references to the Brezhnevian gerontocracy are frequent. Andrey Kozovoy validate this comparison. He however considers that the decision process at Brezhnev's time was more collegiate that the present one with Putin, whose isolation increased even more with the COVID pandemic. He also underlines that Brezhnev had the lucidity to understand that Afghanistan was a mistake.
For Putin, the equation is also personal. When he came to power in 1999, the Russian President built his popularity on the image he was then sending, the image of a healthy and physically strong President. With years, his image evoluated : the communicants of the Kremlin finaly forged him the image of a wise and reassuring grandfather. But this model is now taking the water. Putin looks physically weakened and, for numerous Russians, he is now associated with the « bunker » where he found refuge during the COVID crisis.
According to numerous observers, his age is by the way one of the explanations of his attack on Ukraine. Before thinking about handing the power, Putin would have wanted to solve this mojor matter for him and engrave in marble his legacy as a Statesman. Without seeing that Ukraine had changed. Without bewaring about this Zelensky, who is insolently a quarter of a century his cadet.
Xavier: I hadn't thought of it as a generational problem, but you're right. It is. Orson Scott card has a novel (also a movie) entitled ENDER'S GAME which develops your same point. P.S. Accepting global warming is also a generational issue.
The ten military lessons to be drawn from the war in Ukraine (part I)
Three months after the start of fights, according to Le Monde, Western staffs and experts drew 10 lessons from this conflict of high intensity.
1/ The asymetry of forces between Russians and Ukraine should be relativised
Military experts consider that Ukrainian forces are far from being in a position of inferiority against Russian forces. Against 145.000 Ukrainian soldiers, Russia engaged since the start of this war only 160.000 soldiers. Moreover, Russia didn't anticipate the reactivity of the Ukrainian reserves, counting 240.000 men. Its swift mobilisation prevented the fall of Kyiv. Ukraine can also count on several thousand foreign legionaires.The fight is however more asymetric from a material point of view, as Ukrainians don't have comparable means with Russians in aviation, marine, tanks and cruise missiles.
2/ Communication on human losses is a sensitive question
According to French military sources, Ukrainian forces would have lost around 15.000 men, as much as Russian forces. It means that Russian force lost as many soldiers as in Afghanistan, where Soviets lost 15.000 men, in a conflict which lasted 10 years, which decided Brezhnev to put an end to this war.
3/ The training to a high intensity conflict is a decisive factor
From this point of view, Ukrainian forces are better trained than Russian forces. Most of them are well-trained, as they were already engaged in the Donbas against Russians since the beginning of the war in 2014. The Russian army, composed of around 2/3 contractuals, often former conscripts and 1/3 conscripts, is not so well trained to high intesity conflicts, even if a small part of it fighted in the Donbas in 2014-2015. Just a few troops well deployed in Syria, whre mainly aviation and special units took part to the war.
Moreover, according to the Wall Street Journal, 10.000 Ukrainian soldiers follower each year a training in NATO member States since 2014. About 75% of Ukrainian brigades took part in large-scale NATO trainings according to the US Chief of Staff. In 2021 alone, 21.000 Ukrainian soldiers took part in NATO trainings according to the French Chief of Staff. According to military experts, it explains the facility with which Ukrainians could use arms delivered by Western countries.
4/ The centralised command of operations is to be reexamined
As most Western staffs are relatively centralised to pilot operations and at best deconcentrated to the level of the brigade, the Ukrainian theater has shown the interest to hace a more flexible organisation of command. A lesson which was inflicted in a particularly harsh way to Russia in these first three months of this war, as its army is extremely centralised due to its authoritarian system. This was worsened by a lack of confidence between hierarchic levels and the heritage of a Soviet tradition, the mathematic planification of operations, which deprived of initiative ground units faced to reality on the ground.
On the Ukrainian side, if the central level seems to have kept the control of the diffusion of intelligence and the main directives, brigades dispose of a large autonomy in certain zones, which should be encouraged. The Ukrainian army is also characterised by a large proportion of Under-Officers, younger and closer to the ground, when these Under-Officers are almost inexistant in the Russian army, where officers are over-represented. According to experts, this explains the failure of the conquest of Kyiv, as Russian troops were paralysed waiting from orders from their hierarchy, when Ukrainian soldiers were more mobile and permenently adapted themselves to the constraints on the ground.
5/ Logistic flows should not be neglegted
If Russia accumulated pitfalls from the start of the war, this is largely due to a bad management of its flows of supply.
Convinced to lead a short war, Russia seems to have at the start of fights to have entrusted poorly experimented soldiers to organise flows of supply.These convoys also were badly protected and we therefore easy targets. On the contrary, Ukrainians applied a deconcentrated logistics.
The stabilisation of the frontline in the Donbas is not nécesserily good news for Kyiv. From a logistic point of view, it obliges Ukrainian troops to organised long and exposed routes for arms deliveries, supplies of units, rotation of soldiers and maintenance of equipments. This explains why Western partners sent armoured vehicles for the transportation of troops and helicopters to transport men and equipments.
The ten military lessons to be drawn from the war in Ukraine (part II)
6/ A necessary comeback to classical weapons
In recent years, the acceleration of the strategic competition between military powers led to the purchase of more and more sophisticated equipments. The Ukrainian war shows however that a high-intensity conflict also hangs on battles on the ground which can be won with classical and less sophisticated equipments. To counter heavy Russian equipments, portable missiles launchers
(AmericanJavelin, le British-Swedish NLAW, etc.) have for instance proven their devastating capacity. A preliminary study shows that more basic equipments, as anti-tank guided missiles [ATGM] and portable air defence systems [MANPADS], were incredibly efficient for Ukrainians », underlines Edward Arnold, cresearcher at the Britisk think-tank c Royal United Services Institute.
7/ The "blitzkrieg", an illusion to be definitely buried
This is now a commonly admitted fact : the war in Ukraine is primarily the failure of a "special operation" which aimed at first to make the Kyiv regme fall in a few days. The military history is full of similar examples of over-estimation of power and examples of operations which durated longer as was foreseen. The main illusion is that a deep intelligence work preceding an operation, allowing to identify many target to be neutralises, would allow to neutralise rapidly the adversary when the war begins. According to Western estimates, Russia launched 1.300 ballistic missiles since the start of the war. But whether the missiles destroyed the targets or not, as many missiles seemingly failed to destroy the targets, Ukrainian have shown a strong capacity of resistance. Planified targetting is not enough, dynamic targetting is necessary after the start of the offensive and Russian didn't invest much in laser-guided bombs in the last years and rapidly exhausted their stocks.
8/ The constellations of private satellite, a new actor on the battlefield
The arrival by mid-march of several thousands of Starlink boxes sent by Elon Musk to Ukraine is considered by experts as a real military game changer. By allowing Ukrainians not to depend anymore form the classical phone and Internet network or from limited and exposed State satellite means, Elon Musk opened a breach in the traditionnal rigidity of securised communications on a war theater and gave Ukrainians an unexpected agility : at the beginning of May, around 150 000 persons used everyday this network according to the Chief of the Russian Space Agency Roscosmos. As a testimony of its importance, Starlink was at least trigged by one cyber attack from Russians, but the American company succeeded in countering this attack according to SpaceX.
9/ Russian S-400, an equipment that doesn't guarantee supremacy in the air
Until the start of the war, the Russian supremacy in the air against Ukraine was taken for granted by experts. Thanks in particular to its S-400, considered as one of the best systems of air and antimissile systems in the World, the Russian army would for sure ensure its supremacy in the sky.
Three months later, nothing is so sure. Certain experts even question the effectiveness of S-400 or at least a lack of training of Russian soldiers to use them optimally. Experts consulted by Le Monde rather come to the conclusion that they are not self-sufficent to buid up a protection bubble in a country of Ukraine's size . Most of them are deployed in Russia along the border with the Donbas, others in Belarus Too far to cover the totality of the West and the South of the country. Moreover, S-400 mostly cover attacks from middle and high altitude. This is not by chance that Ukrainian planes got accustomed to realise their operations flying at very low altitude.
To counter this lack, Russians deployed in the Donbass complemantary systems to the S-400, as the Pantsir, to protect themselves from attacks at low or middle altitude. That doen't prevent Ukrainians to lauch air attacks. Russians are also caraful, conscious that Kyiv also has air defence systems : the US indicated that they delivered arountd 1.400 Stinger missiles Stingerto Ukraine from the start of the war. To overcome these difficulties Russians try to reorganise themselves. According to Ukrainian authorities, Moscow would have concentrated around 40 hélicopters of attack and transport Mi-24 and Mi-8 in the Russian oblast of Belgorod, around 80 kilometers from Kharkiv. As well, Belarus, allied to Moscow, would have deployed new systems of air defence in the region of Gomel, as well as units of cyber war. Russian forces would have positioned there eight launching systems of missiles Iskander-M and six planes. In spite of these difficulties, Russia still has a kind of air supremacy on Ukraine today: Russian planes can realise 200 to 300 flights a day when Ukraine can only perform 30 flights a day.
10/ The supremacy on sea, a complex strategy
As the Ukrainian fleet was almost totally destroyed in 2014 during the annexion of Crimea, there was no real confrontation of war fleets during this war, although Ukraine claims to have destroyed 13 Russian vessels sinv=ce February 24, mainly small units except the Moskva. Before the start of the warn Ukraine had a few patrollers left and a fregate, but Kyiv decided to sink the latter while it was in the port of Mykolaïv to avoid that it could fall in the hands of Russians.
So Ukraine is mainlyleading a coastal navy war since three months. But then again, the failures which were noticed in the Russian tactics on the ground were also noticed on the sea, as a lack of training, according to a French Navy Officer :
« The Moskva [a Russian cruiser, admiral vessel of Moscow, sunk on April 14 by one or several Ukrainian missiles laucnched from the coast] didn't have the reflexes awaited from a war vessel of this rank to ensure staying safe». From the ground, Ukrainians also succeeded by the beginning of May to destroy two rapid amphibious patrollers, one landing vessel and a support vessel of Elbruz class.
At this stage, Russians still clearly keep the advantage in sea war. By anticipating since a lon time this dimension of theconflit et reinforcing progressively their presence around Crimea in the weeks preceding their offensive of February 24, Moscou controls de facto today all the Azov Sea and the Black Sea. This « blocus » is ensured by more than 20 vessels. Russians are partly helped by the closure byTurkey of the detroits of Bosphore and Dardanelles in the frame of the International Convention of Montreux.
Moscow's goal to paralyse the Ukrainian economy by depriving it of its accesses to the sea to export its products, in particular agricultural, works at this stage. Even if the detroits are open, the fear of mines deters commercial vessels to take the risk to come to this zone. Ukrainians can also hadly try to circumvent the Russian blocus by railways, as around 15 trains are needed to transport what a single grains vessel transports. All Romanian and Bulgarian ports are also blocked by the war The key of this Navy war wiii be played around the Snake Island, eituated around 35 kms of the Ukrainian coast. The Russians still achieve to neutralise this strategic point, situated near the mouth of the Danube. After several attacks and Ukrainian bombings, they recntly succeeded to position a contingent and batteries of earth-air missiles of short and middle range, as well as several vessels barring sea transport
The stake for Moscow is however to hold this islet without exposing excessively its fleer, as the closure of the detroits prevents any reinforcement. Moreover, the Snake Island can be reached by high range artillery shots as these of Caesar cannons delivered by France, which is one more risk to be managed by Moscow.
Russian veterans declare that Russia is not successful in Ukraine and should lead a total war
The significant victory of the Ukrainian army on the important Russian forces who tried to cross the river Siverski Donjec in Donbas and the big losses of the Russian army during this operation triggered ever growing criticism from pro-Russian bloggers and commenters, including a group of Russian veterans.
The All-Russian Assembly of Officers wrote in a letter on May 19 that the Russian "special military operation" didn't reach its goals and appealed Putin to recognise that the goal of the invasion of Ukraine was not the "denazification" of the country but a fight to preserve the place of Russia in the international World order and that Russia, as the operation didn't succeed, should be ready for a total war.
The failed attempt of the Russian army to cross the river Siverski Donjec in May could have been one of the most bloody events which caused the biggest losses to the Russian army in this war, according to the New York Times, with the destruction of several dozens of armoured vehicles and the loss of more than 400 soldiers which were killed or injured.
The Ukrainian Defense Ministry publishes pictures showing destroyed tanks and other equipments shattered on the battlefield as a result of the fights.
The critical stance of the All-Russian Assembly of Officers after this lost battle suggests that news about this catastrophical event and other failures of the Russian army broke the censure of the Russian media which are under the strong control of the Kremlin. and pro-Russian bloggers became increasingly critical to the Kremlin according to the ISW.
Jurij Podoljaka, a war blogger with 2,1 milion followers on Telegram, declared in a video clip that he was avoiding to criticise the Russian army but that after the failure of the Russian army to cross the river Siverski Donjec his patience was exhausted. "I declare that, because of the stupidity of the Russian command, at least one and maybe two tactical batallion groups were burnt", said Podolyaka.
Such critics are more and more frequent, according to the monthly report of ISW. "More and more Russians which are supporting the Kremlin and the Russian invasion in Ukraine began to criticise openly the Kremlin", wrote the ISW on Monday, adding. "The widely read comments of war bloggers can trigger growing doubts in the point of view of Russians on this war and the capacity of Russian war commanders".
The organisation of Russian veterans appeals to the Kremlin to mobilise further all regions bordering NATO members, to extend to standard time of service in the Russian army from one to two years, to set up a war administration in the separatistic para-States and instore a death penalty for Russian deserters.
The ISW considers that the Kremlin most probably doesn't have neither the will nor the possibility to declare a further mobilisation in the short term.
I just wonder what Russian veterans mean by a total war, when I see that Sjeverodonetsk is almost totally destroyed, as Mariupol before...
A former British spy declares that the Kremlin in in a chaos because of Putin's health problems
Vladimir Putin's power declines and he has to make regular pauses in his work because of his treatments according to the former British spy Christopher Steele.
- "We understand that the Kremlin is increasingly in a state of disorder and chaos" told Steele in an interview to to British radio network LBC last week, adding that "there is no more a clear political leadership from Putin, who is increasingly ill, and from military point of view, the structures of command are still not acting as they should act".
Steele is a former agent of the MI6 who has worked more than on year in Russia and has led for three years the Russian Department of the MI6.
He didn't quote his sources, but told he is "pretty sure" of his assertions.
Putin's main spokesperson Dmitrij Peskov many times negated that Putin would have whatever health problems.
- "What we know is that a medical team is permanently with Putin, told Steele, as reports the Business Insider. He added that "during government sessions, who are often retransmitted by the Russian TV, these sessions have to be divided in several parts to allow Putin to leave them and receive a regular therapy".
- "This has a major influence on the Russian governement", tols Steele, adding that " it is improbable that Putin will withdraw from Ukraine as he is trapped in various political corners and that probably streghthens his will to organise his demission in the way he sees it".
Rumors about Putin's poor health are spreading for months. The Chief of the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service, general major Kyrylo Budanov, declare on May 14 to Sky News that Putin is "very ill" and suggested that a Coup d'Etat is on the way in the Kremlin.
These rumors strengthened when Putin's latest appearances on TV left the impression that he looks ill, nervous and with an inflated face, which raised assumptions that he may suffer from dementia, Parkinson disease or cancer.
In his interview to LBC, Steele told that "Putin "probably" suffers from Parkinson disease, adding that "we don't have however details about his illness".
In April an investigation from the independent Russian organisation "Proekt" also revealed that, on the basis of Putin's diaries, Putin was closely followed by da medical team during the last ten years and that around ten doctors are constantly with him, and that he often visited specialists of thyroid cancer.
Vladimir Putin from the point of view by an ex-spy of the KGB, Sergey Zhirnov
Sergey Zhirnov is an ex-spy of the KGB, who was constrained to ask for political asylum in France in 2001. He knows Vladimir Putin since 1980 and studied with him in 1984 at the Andropov Institute (Russian Academy of external intelligence). He tells very openly what he thinks about Vladimir Putin and claims to have sources in the Kremlin which predicted all that happened in the last three months.
"Putin is a zero, he failed in his career as a spy and wants to take its revenge".
According to Sergey Zhirnov, “Vladimir Putin always wanted to be a spy. He had attended the Training Institute. But an event happened at this time. Putin had a boyfriend as her wife was pregnant. He went to see his boyfriend and they walked in the street in Leningrad. Russia is a homophobe country, some people blocked them, he fought. It ended in the police station. From the police station, it went to Moscow. And he was told: this is the end, you will never be a spy any more. Moreover, at the end of his one-year training, instructors declared him unfit, as they judged him unable to evaluate correctly the decisions he took and their consequences for him and the KGB. He was sent to Leningrad, before he was pulled to go to GDR, where he was liaison officer in a provincial town. For us, KGB spies, this was a null posting.”
« Vladimir Putin can be compared with Hitler ».
Sergey Zhirnov makes a clear comparison between Putin and Hitler: “that’s what happens when you put at the first place an insignificant person, who has a complex of inferiority and has a lot of things to reproach to the whole World. We have already seen that with Hitler. There are a lot of parallels. Look: a small man, a failed painter, a small caporal of WWI, Germany humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles, Russia feeling humiliated after the fall of the USSR. And Putin and Russia humiliate themselves because instead of betting on something positive, he makes war to half of the World”.
« Vladimir Putin is withdrawn, paranoid, unpredictable ».
Sergey Zhirnov tells about Vladimir Putin: « He is withdrawn, paranoid, unpredictable. He is not a great strategist, as what he is doing now falls under suicide. I heard that Putin is a great chess player. This is not true. He can box or fight and in international relations it often backfires against the person who began. He also declared: « Putin is a chess player but when he loses he takes the game and crushes it on your head ».
“Putin wants to enter in the history of Mankind as the second man who pushed the nuclear button. He is ready to use a tactic nuclear weapon to show how far he can go”.
Sergey Zhirnov declares: « One of my sources in the Kremlin told me that Putin is ready to us a tactic nuclear weapon to show how far he can go. At this stage it is not against the West, as if he uses it against the West, it is WWIII, it is the end of the World. He wants to use a tactic nuclear weapon against Ukraine, which is a denuclearised country and cannot retail. He adds that it could be a « small weapon ». It can seem horrible but a one kt bomb destroys everything two kilometres around and for soldiers this is not so terrible. Putin wants to enter the History of Mankind as the second man who pushed the nuclear button after Truman ».
Xavier: Putin can be compared to Hitler in another way. Hitler probably had Parkinson's disease. Putin also might have Parkinson's disease; there's evidence by the way that he holds onto furniture to keep his hand from shaking. Putin also might have cancer (there's some evidence). If he has cancer, he might become suicidal, and use his nuclear weapons. This would be World War III. I'm hoping that Putin is rational, but there's not much evidence of that.
Don, you are right, Putin may be ill. The same Sergey Zhirnov declared on the French TV station C8 that: "he is inflated, he has completely changed. One tells he is ill. However, if it is just a cancer, it is not so serious as Mitterrand had a cancer during 14 years. My source in the Kremlin tells me already for three years that he will die, that he is ill. But they began to tell that he would die in three weeks, in one month etc. And he is still there since three years, so you can however doubt. And he is however cured by Israeli and Russian doctors" .
There is a full report on https://www.proekt.media/en/investigation-en/putin-health/
Xavier: Wow! This is a very insightful link. Thanks for sending it.
Mythology of modern Ukraine
Myth #1. The whole world is with us, Russia will be crushed by sanctions
Ukrainians firmly believe in this myth, although they have only the collective West and its most pitiful vassals in other parts of the world on their side. While the two largest and most dynamically developing countries in the world - China and India - support Russia, like almost all of Central and South America, Africa, and most of Asia. The UN votes showed that most countries of the world do not condemn Russia and treat with understanding Moscow's desire to get rid of Western dictates, which often hinders them even more than Russians. Under these conditions, the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia lose all meaning. Some of them are really good for us. Russia will bypass others with the help of its friends in the world, simultaneously getting rid of compradors at the top, who saw "this country" only as a semi-colony of the West, its raw material appendage.
Myth #2. We will soon be accepted into the EU, we need to hold out for a couple of months, and we are in paradise
Unforgivable naivete. This is when it was decided in Kyiv whether to throw out the white flag or not, the Westerners loudly shouted that they would accept Ukraine into the EU under the “fast track procedure”, after “a few weeks”, “a few months”, they offered to help fill out an application, and when the Ukrainian authorities inspired by this decided and began to fight, went completely different speeches. The admission of Ukraine to the EU "will take several years and even, to tell the truth, decades," said French President Emmanuel Macron. It is “not a matter of a few months or a few years,” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz supported Macron.
And the dodgy Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, authoritative in Europe, noted that Ukraine is “very far” even from the status of a candidate and that granting such a status to it would, they say, “unfair” in relation to the countries of the Western Balkans that have been waiting for it for a long time. In short, the ex-ambassador of Russia in Kyiv, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was absolutely right when once, answering a question about when Ukraine would join the EU, he said: “Immediately after Turkey.” “And when is Turkey?” - he clarified. "Turkey? Never…” Therefore, there will be no “paradise”, which the Europeans living in it does not seem like at all, for the Ukrainians, no matter how many they were killed at the front. And for this reason, by the way, too. There are already too many problems in the EU to add Ukrainian ones to them.
Myth #3. We will be bombarded with modern Western weapons, and we will win. Russia will have to pay indemnity
Ukrainian parochialism does not allow many citizens of Nezalezhnaya to realize the absurdity of such a formulation of the question. Russia will never be defeated by Ukraine, even if not 40 countries, as it is now, but the whole world will help Kyiv militarily. Until February 24, Ukraine, whose Soviet military stocks were seriously reduced, was supplied mainly - along with all kinds of rubbish, as now - good weapons for guerrilla warfare: quite effective MANPADS and ATGMs. However, the rapid change in the tactics of the Russian army, which began to "hurry up slowly" and got rid of uncontrolled rear areas, having received real goals and objectives, devalued it.
A small number of modern howitzers, MLRS systems and anti-ship missiles loitering ammunition that the West recently decided to supply to Ukraine so that it does not take it into its head to surrender will not play a significant role, as they are poorly integrated into the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite intelligence from mainly American spy satellites, coming in real time. Just like, however, all kinds of drones: they can sting painfully where the air defense system is lame, but nothing more. Not to mention the old Soviet legacy from the devastated arsenals of Eastern European countries. The Russian army quickly and without any problems knocks it out when it gets to the front.
All this will only slightly delay the war and lead to an increase in losses, primarily Ukrainian ones. Since Russia has not yet used all its trump cards in the Ukrainian war. The West has actually reached the limit in the supply of weapons to Ukraine, and will not fight for it itself. For this is a direct path to nuclear retaliation. Very expensive and often useless foreign mercenaries will also not win a war with Russia for Ukraine. In short, these factors do not have a turning point, strategic significance - Ukrainians will not see Moscow's indemnity. Never.
Myth number 4. We will create an army of millions and defeat the "aggressor"
This is one of the most stupid Ukrainian myths. Already bringing, thanks to the mobilization and use of poorly combat-ready parts of the territorial defense, to 700 thousand people (this figure was recently announced by the clown president Vladimir Zelensky) of the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which are opposed by about 300 thousand Russian and allied forces, has sharply reduced the combat capability of the Ukrainian army. Recent conscripts are poorly trained and armed, do not want to fight and, having no illusions about their fate, dream of surrendering as soon as possible, which they are increasingly succeeding.
The capture of the exemplary Nazi Azov Regiment and an elite brigade of Ukrainian marines in Mariupol has set a precedent that is tempting to many. As a result, there are more cowards and alarmists and completely unmotivated people in the ranks of the Ukrainian army. They do more harm than good. It also means that there will be many more casualties, and therefore problems and discontent in the home front, which may one day get out of hand.
Myth number 5. Ukraine will be able to expel Russian troops from its territory
This myth is closely related to the previous one. It is generated by a false sense of strength, since the number of Ukrainian troops, generally well-armed, exceeds three times the number of Russian troops, and Moscow does not use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Ukrainians supposedly have a chance, by stretching the front, to gradually oust the Russian troops from the country, from most of the occupied territories. And the absence of a Russian victory behind a clear advantage will turn out to be Ukraine's greatest strategic victory, a humiliation of Moscow in the eyes of the whole world, an invitation to domestic political turmoil in a neighboring country. Another illusion!
Myth number 6. Contempt for Russia and Russians
For some, this feeling helps to fight. Although for most, not so much. After all, no mobilization has been announced in Russia. For us, as if there is no war, even on the shelves in stores, the population does not feel it. With the exception of residents of border villages, who will probably soon be spared from terrorist shelling from the territory of Ukraine by creating “security zones” on them. To underestimate and even more to anger the enemy - especially Russians or, for example, Chechens - to ask for defeat.
Myth number 7. Racial superiority of Ukrainians over the eastern horde
This myth is largely inspired by Nazi ideology, which captured a significant part of Ukraine as a result of active and methodical work in this direction by local elites, bodies and intelligence services of the West. Russians, they say, are "orcs", "pig-dogs", "rashists", not to mention other peoples of Russia. And the Ukrainians are a completely different people, pure, bright, with a biblical history, European, which the evil and stupid Russians forcibly tore away from Europe, and now prevent them from returning there. There is also nothing to refute here - all this is nonsense, genetically and historically Ukrainians in most of Ukraine are no different from Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov and Krasnodar neighbors.
They can only be separated by the Ukrainian language artificially created in the 19th century and imposed by the Bolsheviks in the 20th century. Northern Russians have an admixture of Finno-Ugric blood, Ukrainians - Polovtsian, Pecheneg, Berendey, Tork, but they have a common Kievan Rus, Tatar and Polish ethnic heritage too. And here is another interesting detail. The Pentagon biolaboratories, which carried out secret experiments on people on Ukrainian territory, in particular, in Kharkov, in many respects, of course, chose Ukraine in order to develop biological weapons against the Russians. Since American experts know perfectly well: we are talking about the same genetics.
Myth number 8. Hatred for Russia
It, which never existed in the past, was the lot of only extremely small outcasts, has been carefully cultivated in Ukraine for the past 30 years. As a result, many Ukrainians have been impregnated with this poison, starting from kindergarten: the philistine majority cannot resist the sophisticated, subconscious totalitarian propaganda. This partly happened even in the Russian South-East, where many did not greet the Russian army with flowers, not only because they were afraid of reprisals from the nationalists and Nazis. This is a factor that directly affects the course of hostilities.
That is why it is important for Russia not to rush and not just to defeat the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but to inflict a military-political defeat on Ukraine. It is necessary that the Ukrainians begin to hate their criminal and incompetent government more than Russia, before the territory in which they live is occupied by Russian troops. Only in this case, we will have a more secure rear before the onset of enlightenment, which the Ukrainians will definitely happen, and quite quickly, since this is natural and historically alien to them. Russian radio, television, newspapers, solid government, improved living standards and pride in belonging to a great country in which Ukrainians are considered Russians as well, guarantee a quick cure.
Myth number 9. Ukraine is a great agricultural power, a well-fed life will be provided in any case
Meanwhile, the country actually expects Holodomor 2.0, organized not by the terrible Stalin, although this is a very controversial statement, but by Western “friends”. The export of Ukrainian grain stocks from a country where there was no normal sowing this year, in order to supposedly feed the hungry in Africa, who will not see a single grain, dooms Ukrainians to starvation. They will not have enough bread, meat, or anything else. The West, in fact, needs this to blame Russia and Putin for the suffering of the population.
Sergey: Thanks for adding these extremely important points to our discussion, and thanks for fleshing out the arguments for each one. Very insightful, and very well argued.
Please find hereafter an objective analysis of the war in Ukraine in Foreign Policy:
What The West (Still) Gets Wrong About Putin
Asking whether to appease or not appease him is completely beside the point.
By Tatiana Stanovaya, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
One of the reasons it’s so difficult to understand Russian intentions—and what is at stake in the Ukraine war—is the significant divergence between how external observers see events and how they are viewed from the Kremlin. Things that appear obvious to some, such as Russia’s incapacity to achieve a military victory, are perceived completely differently in Moscow. The fact is that most of today’s discussions over how to help Ukraine win on the battlefield, coerce Kyiv into concessions, or allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to save face have little in common with reality.
Here I will debunk five common assumptions about how Putin sees this war. The West needs to look at the situation differently if it wants to be more effective in its approach and decrease the risks of escalation.
Assumption 1: Putin knows he is losing.
This stems from the mistaken idea that Russia’s main goal is to seize control of large parts of Ukraine—and therefore, when the Russian military performs badly, fails to advance, or even retreats, that this amounts to failure. However, Putin’s main goals in this war have never been to acquire pieces of territory; rather, he wants to destroy Ukraine in what he calls an “anti-Russia” project and stop the West from using Ukrainian territory as a bridgehead for anti-Russian geopolitical activities. As a result, Russia does not see itself as failing. Ukraine will not join NATO nor be able to exist peacefully without considering Russian demands on Russification (or “denazification” in Russian propaganda-speak) and “de-NATOfication” (known as “demilitarization” in Russian propaganda terms)—meaning a halt to any military cooperation with NATO. To follow through on these goals, Russia needs to sustain its military presence on Ukrainian territory and keep attacking Ukrainian infrastructure. There is no need for major territorial gains nor taking Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital (even if he dreamt about it in the beginning). Even the annexation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, which Moscow sees as only a matter of time, is an auxiliary, local goal to make Ukraine pay for incorrect, pro-Western geopolitical choices over the last two decades. In Putin’s eyes, he is not losing this war. In fact, he likely believes he is winning—and he is happy to wait until Ukraine concedes that Russia is here forever.
Assumption 2: The West should find a way to help Putin save face, thus decreasing the risks of further, possibly nuclear, escalation.
Imagine a situation where Ukraine accepts most of Russia’s demands: It recognizes Crimea as Russian and the Donbas as independent, commits to a slimmed-down army, and promises to never join NATO. Will that end the conflict? Even if, to many, the answer appears to be an obvious “yes,” they are incorrect. Russia may be locked in a battle with Ukraine, but geopolitically, it sees itself as waging war against the West on Ukrainian territory. In the Kremlin, Ukraine is seen as an anti-Russian weapon in Western hands—and destroying it will not automatically lead to Russia’s victory in this anti-Western geopolitical game. For Putin, this war is not between Russia and Ukraine—and Ukrainian leadership is not an independent actor but a Western tool that must be neutralized.
So, whatever concessions Ukraine could make (regardless of how politically realistic they may be), Putin will continue escalating the war until the West changes its approach to the so-called Russian problem and admits that—as Putin sees it—the roots of Russian aggression are the result of Washington ignoring Russian geopolitical concerns for 30 years. This has been Putin’s real objective for a long time, and it remains unchanged. Unrealistic Russian demands rejected by Kyiv are even a way for the Kremlin to increase the stakes in a Russia-West confrontation, testing the West’s ability to stay united and consistent. The West today is looking at the problem in the wrong light: In seeking to stop Russia’s war, it focuses on Moscow’s artificial pretexts for its invasion of Ukraine and overlooks Putin’s obsession with the so-called Western threat as well as his readiness to use escalation to coerce the West into a dialogue on Russian terms. Ukraine is only a hostage.
Assumption 3: Putin is not only losing militarily but also domestically, and the political situation in Russia is such that Putin could soon face a coup.
The opposite is the case, at least for the moment. The Russian elite have become so worried about how to guarantee political stability and avoid protests that they have consolidated around Putin as the only leader able to firm up the political system and prevent disorder. The elite are politically impotent, scared, and vulnerable—including those portrayed in Western media as warmongers and hawks. To make a move against Putin today is tantamount to suicide unless Putin starts to lose his ability to rule (physically or mentally). Despite new splits and cracks within the ranks and unhappiness with Putin’s policies, the regime stands firm. The main threat to Putin is Putin himself. Although time may be against him, the waking up of the elite is a process that will take much longer than many people expect. It will depend on how present Putin remains in day-to-day government.
Assumption 4: Putin is afraid of anti-war protests.
The truth is that Putin is more afraid of pro-war protests and has to take into account the eagerness of many Russians to see the destruction of what they call Ukrainian Nazis. Public mood could drive escalation, prompting Putin to be more hawkish and resolute, even if it is a result of the Kremlin’s own propaganda. This is extremely important: Putin has awakened a dark nationalism he is more and more dependent on. Whatever happens to Putin, the world will have to deal with this public aggression and anti-West, anti-liberal convictions that make Russia problematic for the West.
Assumption 5: Putin has been deeply disappointed in his entourage and greenlit the criminal prosecution of senior officials.
This is an intensely discussed issue in the West. It arises from speculation about the arrest of Putin’s former Deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov; the detention of Sergey Beseda, a top security officer responsible for Ukraine; and purges among Putin’s inner circle. All these rumors should be viewed with extreme skepticism. Firstly, there has been no confirmation of any of them. (Rather, high-placed sources suggest that neither Beseda nor Surkov have been arrested.) Secondly, Putin is likely upset and disappointed with his staff, but it’s not his style to purge his inner circle unless serious crimes have been committed. Intentions are all that matter to Putin, and if Russia’s secret services miscalculated or even misinformed him without malign intentions, there will be no prosecutions. Finally, the military campaign in Ukraine has been closely managed by Putin from the outset with very little room for subordinates to show any initiative.
All this means that the Western dilemma—to double down on support for Ukraine because Putin is losing or to appease Putin because he is desperate and dangerous—is fundamentally misguided. There can be only two possible outcomes. Either the West changes its approach to Russia and begins to take seriously the Russian concerns that led to this war or Putin’s regime falls apart and Russia revises its geopolitical ambitions.
For the moment, both Russia and the West appear to believe that their counterpart is doomed and that time is on their side. Putin dreams about the West suffering from political upheaval, whereas the West dreams about Putin being removed, overthrown, or dropping dead from one of many diseases he is regularly rumored to be suffering. No one is right. At the end of the day, a deal between Russia and Ukraine is only possible as an extension of an agreement between Russia and the West or as a result of the collapse of Putin’s regime. And that gives you an idea of how long the war could last: years, at best.
Xavier: Well stated. This is becoming a very meaningful discussion. I love the nuancing.
Dear Don L. F. Nilsen,
Here is the material that deserves discussion:.
https://news.mail.ru/politics/51615446/?frommail=1
Berlusconi: Russia is isolated from the West, the West is isolated from the rest of the world.
In my opinion, the fact that "Russia is isolated from the West" will only benefit Russia, since this isolation will lead to isolation from everything ugly in all areas of life, such as Western modern culture, Western modern music, Western values and much more, which reeked of ugliness and vulgarity.
Now I see in Russia the revival of the Russian romance, the Russian choir on folk melodies, numerous concerts of classical and Russian music instead of disgusting and vulgar Western music, for example, at Eurovision, where now the first place was given to Ukraine and this was done deliberately (there are even jokes about that Ukraine should have make its concert live from the catacombs of Mariupol). In short, isolation from the West is a huge boon for Russia.
Now the second point, the isolation of the West from the rest of the world, or to be more precise - this is the isolation of the rest of the world from the West - this will also only benefit the rest of the world for the same reasons, since all this time the West has been planting all the most disgusting things in all spheres of life and it only destroyed the national culture of these countries.
Now about the text of this link:
Former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi regrets that some European leaders have boycotted his attempts to bring Russia into the "camp of the West." In his opinion, if this happened, the situation in Europe today would be different. Berlusconi believes that the conflict in Ukraine has shown not only the isolation of Russia from the West, but also of the West itself from the rest of the world.
“What the Ukrainian crisis has shown us is an alarming sign for the present and especially for the future. Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world,” Berlusconi wrote in an article for il Giornale.
The ex-premier explained that the West's response to Russia's military operation in Ukraine was unanimous. However, the West refers to the United States, Europe and some countries in the Pacific region, but not other states. As an example, he cited Turkey, which, despite the supply of weapons to Ukraine, did not join the sanctions.
Since February 24, Russia has been conducting a military operation in Ukraine on the orders of President Vladimir Putin. The US, EU, UK, Australia, Japan and other countries responded by imposing sanctions that affected the president, officials, businessmen, assets of the Central Bank, banks and organizations.
Gennady: Excellent link. Very thought provoking. Thanks for sending it.
Protić about Putin: He is copying Hitler, but this miserable is not even able to get it over with Eastern Ukraine .
The Serbian historian, diplomat and former Ambassador of Yugoslavia in the US Milan Protić declared that what Vladimir Putin is doing irresistibly reminds the argumentation, the mentality and the logic used by Adolf Hitler to justify the Anschluss with Austria and the occupation of Czechoslovakia during WWII.
"All the argumentation that we hear from Moscow in these last months and the response from the West remind me irresistibly the 1930's. Adolf Hitler used the same worlds to justify the remilitarisation of Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the attack on Poland as Vladimir Putin to justify his military interventions, actions, agressions on Ukraine, call it as you want, it is exactly the same" told Protić.
He added that in a similar way those who today find justifications for Putin such as that things are not black and white, that the rights of Russians are threatened, that he has no other options, use similar arguments as those which many used to justify Hitler's maneuvers before WWII by the necessity to defend Germans.
"The same argumentation and the same response from Europe. Europe closed her eyes on the remilitatisation of Rhineland as it closed her eyes on Abkhazia and Ossetia. Europe closed her eyes on the Anschluss of Austria as it closed her eyes on the Anschluss of Crimea, it's the same story for the Sudetes and the Donbas".
"That does not mean that Putin is Hitler, as it took Hitler only 40 days to enter in Paris and make a parade under the Arc de triomphe. This miserable is not even able to get it over with Eastern Ukraine after 100 days passed. So he does not have the same success, but the same mentality, logic, way of thinking, imperial aspirations, instrumentalisation of national arguments to justify an agression on another country, all that is exactly the same", concluded Protić.
https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/svijet/protic-o-putinu-kopira-hitlera-ali-nesretnik-ne-moze-da-izadje-na-kraj-ni-sa-istocnom-ukrajinom/220615047
Xavier: I agree with you. And it's a very good thing that Putin is incompetent.
Dear Don L. F. Nilsen,
You wrote: "Xavier: I agree with you. And it's a very good thing that Putin is incompetent."
You are sorely mistaken, Putin is even very competent, because a slow war means only one thing: Zelensky has adopted the tactic of defending himself with a human shield when civilians stand in front of Ukrainian guns, behind whom Zelensky is hiding from Russian shells. If Putin had used US tactics against Raqqa, then the war would have ended in a couple of weeks or less. I want to remind you that the US only gave the people of Rakkt 24 hours to leave the city, and then the US razed the city to the ground with their carpet bombing. However, this tactic is not for Putin and therefore one has to fight with a smart scalpel in hand. Of course, this takes some time, but slowly but surely the desired result is achieved.
The Pope castigates the “ferocity” of Russia against the courageous Ukrainian people, fighting for his survival, in a war which “may have been provoked”
In an interview published by the Italian magazine La Civilta Cattolica, the Pope castigated again the brutality and the ferocity of the Russian troops, while praising the courage of Ukrainians, who are fighting for their survival.
“What we see is the brutality and the ferocity with which this war is led by the Russian troops and mercenaries used by Russians. Russian prefer to send Chechens, Syrians, mercenaries » deplored the Pope.
“But the danger is that we see only that, which is monstrous, without seeing the drama which hinges behind this war, which may have been in a certain way provoked or not avoided”, he nuanced.
“One could say at this stage: "But you are pro-Putin!" No, I am not. It would be simplistic and erroneous to say such a thing », added the Pope, who deemed necessary “to reflect on the roots and the interests” of this conflict “which are very complex”.
“It is also true that Russians thought that all will be over in one week. But they made a wrong calculation. They found a courageous people, a people who is fighting for his survival and has a tradition of fighting”, declared the Pope.
“That’s what is driving us: that we see the heroism of the Ukrainian people. What happens under our eyes is a situation of World War, of global interests, of arm sales and geopolitical appropriation, which is killing a heroic people”, he added.
The Pope told that a few months before Vladimir Putin decided to send his troops in Ukraine, he met him and Putin told him about his preoccupation about the way NATO was evolving. The Pope asked him why and he answered: “They are barking at the doors of Russia. And they don’t understand that Russians are an imperial power which doesn’t allow any foreign power to approach them”, concluding that “the situation could lead to a war”.
“For me today the Third World War has begun. And that’s what should lead us to reflect. What happens to humanity which has experienced three World Wars in a century?”, questioned the Pope.
Sources: AFP, Reuters, quoting La Civilta Cattolica
Xavier: Thanks for your comments. The Ukrainian people should be able to vote for their own future. If they prefer to be with Russia, I would totally support their decision. If they prefer to be more "Western," I would support that decision as well. In my opinion, Putin is living in the past, not in the present or the future.
‘In public there are only jingoistic voices’ How Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to divide Putin’s elites
June 17, 2022
Source: Meduza
Nearly four months into Moscow’s all-out war against Ukraine, Russian troops are making relative gains in the Donbas. By all appearances, however, the Kremlin has failed to realize the invasion’s original goals. And peace talks with Kyiv have ground to a halt. Meanwhile, back in Moscow, Russian elites have splintered into three camps — a “peace party,” a “war party,” and a “silent party” that somehow includes heavyweights like Moscow’s mayor and the prime minister. Meduza’s special correspondent Andrey Pertsev reports.
There are still a fair number of people among the Russian elite who support ending the war against Ukraine. According to three sources close to the Putin administration and one source close to the Cabinet, this “peace party” is currently hoping for Moscow and Kyiv to return to the negotiating table — despite the fact that talks have been virtually frozen since early April.
Prominent members of the “peace party” include VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov, and Sberbank CEO Herman Gref, Meduza’s sources said. Two sources also noted that this group’s position aligns with that of brothers Mikhail and Yury Kovalchuk, who are said to be members of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.
These five members of the “peace party” have all come under a variety of international sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But their hope is that some sanctions would be lifted if peace talks resumed, allowing Russia to re-enter international finance and tech markets.
That said, the two sources close to the Putin administration stressed that the “peace party” is in no way a united front, and that its members aren’t making any joint efforts to lobby for diplomatic negotiations: “All they have is a common understanding that the ‘special operation’ needs to end as soon as possible and [that they need] to look for some common ground in the West.”
Sergey Chemezov, Andrey Kostin, Herman Gref, and the Kovalchuk brothers did not respond to Meduza’s inquiries prior to publication. However, some of them have made public statements in recent weeks cautiously criticizing certain steps taken by the Russian leadership. For example, in a recent column for RBC, Sergey Chemezov deemed Moscow’s policy of total import substitution ineffective:
“Replacing everything is senseless, economically impractical, and simply impossible. Not a single developed country in the world does this. Isolation, including technological isolation, and attempting to do everything on your own is a road to nowhere. Russia should remain part of the globalized world, where development is impossible without international partnerships. The West’s betrayal is no reason to close windows and doors.”
Andrey Kostin also penned a column for RBC. “The sanctions are permanent. Globalization in its previous form is over. The world is likely to once again rigidly divide between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ This is the Cold War 2.0,” he declared. At the same time, Kostin acknowledged that globalization brought Russia “significant economic benefits,” including “a modern financial sector, which was created in just a few years practically from scratch on the basis of American and European [...] technological platforms, tools, and business practices.
According to one Meduza source, these op-eds were no coincidence. The members of the “peace party” have long understood that continuing the war would lead to a serious economic crisis, the source explained. However, many of them refrained from speaking out publicly until now, because “no one talks about the difficulties; in public there are only jingoistic voices.”
Indeed, until recently, the most outspoken voices have been from the “war party.” The National Security Council’s deputy chairman, ex-prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, publishes regular tirades against the West on his Telegram channel; Putin’s first deputy chief of staff Sergey Kiriyenko has taken to giving public speeches about the “fight against Nazism”; and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Petrushev recently declared that Russia isn’t “chasing deadlines” in its war against Ukraine.
According to Meduza’s sources, the “war party” also includes State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, United Russia General Secretary Andrey Turchak, and the leadership of the security agencies, such as the FSB. (This is corroborated by public statements from these officials.)
At the same time, Meduza’s sources described the “war party” as an “amorphous structure without a single coordination center.” Not to mention the fact that some of its members are not on good terms. Vyacheslav Volodin and Andrey Turchak, for example, are critical of each other even in public. Two sources in the Putin administration also told Meduza that Volodin and Kiriyenko’s relationship also leaves a lot to be desired. In fact, this rift dates back to 2016, when Kiriyenko succeeded Volodin as Putin’s first deputy chief of staff.
At the end of the day, however, representatives of the different camps can only demonstrate their position by attempting to influence Putin’s stance on the war. “Kiriyenko brings [Putin] papers on the Donbas [and] on the country’s economy as a whole. The security officials [siloviki] discuss the front,” one Meduza source explained. In turn, members of the “peace party” have allegedly presented Putin with a proposal plan for Western countries on the partial lifting of sanctions.
Two of Meduza’s sources underscored that at the moment, Putin is more sympathetic to the “war party” than the “peace party” — since he himself is “enthusiastic about the war and the annexation of territories.” “Taking the Donbas is important to the president, even if it takes a few more months. Then you can negotiate to stop the advance of troops,” one source explained. “Especially since Putin understands that it would be very difficult or even impossible to go further. But a captured Donbas is a negotiating advantage.”
There’s also a third camp that might be able to influence Putin’s stance — the so-called “silent party.” This party is made up of officials and businessmen who prefer not to speak out about the war, if at all possible. According to Meduza’s sources, the most prominent members of the “silent party” are Primer Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin. A Meduza source close to the Putin administration and a source close to Mishutin’s Cabinet said that ever since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the prime minister, who was once known for carefully crafting his public image, has been trying to “stand out” less and to comment only on the government’s economic decisions. “The presidential administration offered him additional PR support, but he refused — he doesn’t need it now,” a source said.
In early June, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin visited Luhansk and held talks with Leonid Pasechnik, the head of the self-proclaimed “Luhansk People’s Republic” (Moscow announced its “patronage” over both Luhansk and Donetsk at the end of May). However, according to two sources close to the Putin administration, the Moscow mayor “didn’t have a burning desire” to visit the LNR: “Sobyanin doesn’t want to associate himself with this, he tries to act like ‘I handle Moscow — the rest is none of my business.’ He had to be forced [to go] to Luhansk. Putin advised him to go, after that Sobyanin gave in.” Sergey Sobyanin and Mikhail Mishustin did not respond to Meduza’s questions prior to publication.
For the time being, the president's support has the “war party” advocating for a push to seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible. While the “peace party” has faith in the “pragmatic attitude” of Western countries and the Ukrainian authorities, who, Kremlin officials believe, may sacrifice the Donbas for the sake of peace. Kyiv officially rejects the possibility of any such agreement with Russia.
The criminals in the Kremlin Historian Yaroslav Shimov explains why the Putin regime defies rationality and how the West helped make the war in Ukraine possible
June 16, 2022
Source: Meduza
Several months into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the global discussion about the war has divided into two opposing camps. In Ukraine and across the West, as well as in Russia’s own antiwar movement, the dominant view is that Vladimir Putin’s regime started the conflict in order to expand Moscow’s power and reclaim lost imperial territories. According to this theory, Russia seeks to subjugate or even destroy Ukraine but won’t stop there. The other camp blames the “Collective West” for provoking the war by ignoring Russia’s objective interests. Historian and journalist Yaroslav Shimov says the war is the result of the Putin regime’s peculiarities as a “mafia state” and the failure in Europe and the United States to understand their counterparts in Moscow.
Leftist and realist Western scholars, like sociologist Wolfgang Streeck and political scientist John Mearsheimer, have a habit of “denying subjectivity” to nations on Russia’s periphery, embracing the idea that the conflict in Ukraine is actually a proxy war “over Ukraine.” Based on this logic (which also fuels the mainstream narrative in Russia), controlling the space of Ukraine is essential to preserving the “strategic depth” that saved Russia from Napoleon and Hitler. In other words, Moscow is acting rationally.
Realists consistently describe the Kremlin’s decision-making as rational, even though scholars like Mearsheimer said after the annexation of Crimea that Vladimir Putin was “too smart” to try to conquer the rest of Ukraine.
When it comes to assessing the Kremlin’s rationality or irrationality, neither realists nor their opponents sufficiently appreciate how the Russian ruling elite has evolved. The Putin regime’s changing structures, fundamental character, and ideology have produced a mafia state distinct from authoritarianism as it’s commonly understood in the West. Russia’s shifting foreign policy reflects the regime’s evolution.
Governed by an organized crime syndicate
Vladimir Putin’s early flirtations with the West during his first presidential term are all but forgotten in Russia now, but the continuum along which the regime developed brings us to today’s open hostilities. Twenty years ago, Putin approached Europe and the United States in search of a deal that would secure Russia’s freedom of action in the former Soviet Union. In exchange for this sphere of influence, Moscow would reward the West with what amounted to “kickbacks”: access to lucrative projects in the Russian market, placing Russian capital in U.S. and European stock markets, and more.
If this project had succeeded, Russia would have become what haunts Moscow’s hardliners to this day: an “appendage of the West” (albeit with a good deal of autonomy within its Eurasian sphere). As veterans of the Soviet security services, corrupt officials, and semi-criminal businessmen, Putin and most of his associates would have welcomed this version of a “restored USSR,” but Moscow was never able to master the domain it claimed for itself.
During these years, as the Kremlin failed to live up to its revanchist ambitions, members of Russia’s security sector gradually ousted “civilian” figures from the political elite, reshaping the Putin regime.
The new ruling class comprised not just security elites but also outright criminals with whom Vladimir Putin and his entourage became intertwined while working in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office. The rise of this “Petersburg-Chekist” group was part of a broader merger of Russia’s state apparatus, law enforcement, and the criminal underworld. By the end of the 1990s, when Putin came to power, post-Soviet Russia’s property redistribution and “primitive accumulation” were complete, and the elites were eager to revive a strong state to legitimize and safeguard their new wealth.
Winning control of this revived state, Putin and his group built a unified system of authority that fuses power and property. As a result, Russia lacks real property rights; instead, wealth is enjoyed for temporary use in exchange for unconditional loyalty to the interests of the ruling group and its leader.
The same core features that define organized crime groups are integral to the Putin regime: absolute hierarchical loyalty, a disconnect between official titles and real influence (for example, key figures in Russia operate without formal government status), extreme secrecy in decision-making, and a special “honor code” outside the law that prizes reprisals against “traitors” and violence against competitors.
No ordinary dictatorship
In the West, the metamorphosis of Russia’s political regime went largely overlooked as experts interpreted developments through a prism of post-Communist transition, attributing the many shortcomings of this approach to Russia’s “special case” as a large country with unique historical and cultural qualities. Even as the prevailing wisdom shifted to viewing Russia as an emerging authoritarian power competing for influence throughout the world, Western observers conflated the Putin regime with “standard” autocracies like China, assuming that the criminality exhibited by the state represented excesses of “standard” authoritarianism, not the central properties of a mafia group. This lens also credited the Kremlin with the rationality of authoritarians.
In fact, the Putin regime metastasized to Russia’s fragile, unformed post-Soviet state. Neither a democracy nor a “standard” dictatorship, the current ruling elite exists only to self-perpetuate across generations, breaking whatever rules and laws stand in the way, like any mafia.
Putin’s initial bargain with the West (kickbacks in exchange for a sphere of influence) actually succeeded, in part anyway. The “world police” took the money, and Russian wealth (often of dubious provenance) flooded the European and American financial systems. Western leaders never endorsed Moscow’s claims on one-sixth of the planet, however, due less to principled objections than a lack of strategic vision and their shared reluctance to take responsibility for serious decisions. Officials in Europe and the United States preferred routinized politics (“business as usual”), especially in a region as unfamiliar as the former USSR.
Additionally, between 2008 and 2013, as the mafia state consolidated its control of the Kremlin, the West was in crisis, still reeling from the disastrously stupid invasion of Iraq, confronting the rise of China, managing a global economic recession, and responding to the Arab Spring. In this context, the Obama administration’s policy of “resetting” relations with Moscow almost openly announced to the Kremlin: let’s let bygones be bygones because we don’t have time for you right now.
The Putin regime saw this message as a deception in the context of the Arab Spring, which it believed the West had orchestrated to “subjugate oil-rich countries.” Moscow also viewed Ukraine’s Euromaidan movement and “Revolution of Dignity” as “special operations” conducted by the West. From this perspective, the annexation of Crimea and war for the Donbas became an appropriate response to the enemy’s offensive.
The Kremlin failed to realize that Europe and the U.S. were actually unprepared for the Arab Spring, which ultimately benefitted the Russian, Iranian, and Turkish regimes more than the West. Moscow also exaggerated promises to Ukraine regarding EU association and NATO membership, mistaking diplomatic overtures for ironclad guarantees.
But the Western perspective also proved myopic, as career negotiators chased agreements on political and defense integration without understanding how these deals would resonate in Ukraine and then in Russia.
The mafia state’s irrationality
Before the invasion on February 24, it seemed likely that Vladimir Putin would score another political victory in a confrontation he started. Infighting plagued the EU, Western leaders accepted the need for dialogue with Moscow, and most observers refused to believe American warnings that Russia was about to unleash a full-scale war on Ukraine.
Putin squandered this opportunity because the logic of a mafia state differs from standard political logic. (This is where realist scholars fundamentally misunderstand today’s Russian ruling elite.) Three features of organized crime leadership facilitated Russia’s irrational invasion of Ukraine:
These features make the Putin regime simultaneously parasitic and “popular.” A hodgepodge of religious conservatism, ethnic nationalism, pre-Soviet imperialism, and sympathy for Stalinism, the regime’s eclectic ideological shell genuinely reflects the confused state of public opinion in Russia that has emerged over the past three decades.
Inescapable conflict, but it didn’t have to be like this
At some point in the evolution of Russia’s mafia state, a clash between the Putin regime and its declared enemies became inevitable. With the February 2022 invasion, Moscow’s propensity for ignoring the agency of former Soviet countries led to the Kremlin’s catastrophic underestimation of Ukraine’s viability and willingness to fight back.
But the Putin regime’s mistakes don’t erase the fact that Western elites also made today’s war in Ukraine possible. The last 25 years of warnings to leaders in Europe and the U.S. about who and what had seized power in Moscow would have been enough to convince even the “appeasers” of the 1930s to revise at least some of their diplomacy. Instead, the West embraced Russian energy imports. To this day, Russian gas supplies are still inbound.
Though the West has unified surprisingly well against the invasion of Ukraine, leaders in the EU and the United States still exhibit no long-term political strategy when it comes to Russia now or in the war’s aftermath. This indecision is nothing new for the West, but Russia’s “homelessness” in the world order since the fall of the USSR has borne poisonous fruit. The current devastation in Ukraine shouldn’t be interpreted in Europe and America as a reason to wall off the West from Russia forever. This is an impossible task. Instead, the Western world and Russia must understand how they can coexist.
The obstacles here are enormous, of course. Many of the West’s hastily imposed sanctions are hitting Russian society (including the opposition-leaning segment) far harder than the organized criminal group in the Kremlin that bears the main responsibility for this war. However the Ukrainian tragedy ends, Russia will no longer be able to occupy the place in world politics and economics it did a decade ago, due both to Western sanctions and international political isolation that expands its entanglements with China.
All this assumes that Putin’s gang remains in power. The regime’s collapse, on the other hand, would necessitate the re-establishment of the Russian Federation itself, given that the ruling criminal elite have spent the past 30 years draining the state from the inside.
The question cannot be asked in terms of what is ridiculous or not, what is normal is the fact that everyone is questioning in favor of a protagonist. Both positions are legitimate in fact that Ukraine defends the integrity of its territory is legitimate, the fact that Putin demands the non-enlargement of NATO and the European Union in his near abroad as a guarantee of its security and survival still remains legitimate. When you are a scientist, rationality requires neutrality. It is therefore necessary to address the problems by integrating all points of view.
Julien: You're absolutely right. As scientists we must use facts and empirical evidence to examine ALL POINTS OF VIEW. Thanks for your input.
Ukraine: « There is a filiation between the nihilist ideology which marked Russia in the XIXth century and this way to conduct the war » - Part I
Struck by the radically destructive character of the Russian military strategy, the philosopher François Galichet retraces, in a tribune in « Le Monde », the filiation between the nihilist ideology which marked Russia in the XIXth century and the way Putin is conducting the war in Ukraine.
The most striking in the Ukrainian conflict is the strategy adopted by Russians. It is characterised by a deliberate intent of annihilation, of systematic and radical destruction. Indeed, all wars entail damages caused to the enemy; but they are mostly headed to military objectives, even if blunders can’t be avoided.
The Russian aggression, on the other hand, gives the impression of an undertaking of total annihilation of the territory to be conquered, civilians and soldiers, buildings and other things. Mariupol, Bucha and many other martyr towns tragically illustrate this will. As it was often underlined, this strategy was already employed in Chechnya and Syria.
Usually, the conqueror aims at appropriating the resources of the attacked country, which leads him to preserve them as much as possible, in his own interest. Here, on the other hand, one has the feeling that the awaited gain doesn’t count at all. The destruction isn’t a means but a goal in itself. And applies by the way as well to the aggressor as to the aggressed.
The nihilist thinking as war principle
The damages caused to Russia by the war (effects of sanctions, withdrawal of foreign investors, accession to NATO of neutral countries up to now, reinforcement of unity and of European defence, etc.) are by far higher to the potential advantage which would bring thee conquest of the Donbas. But these damages, so big they are, don’t seem to count.
How to explain such an attitude? A word imposes itself at the sight of of this irrational military intervention, economically aberrant, politically catastrophic: nihilism. One knows that this concept was born in Russia in the 1860 years; and it is often considered as a marginal opposition movement to the tsarist regime, which soon disappeared to the profit of the Marxist-Leninist contestation which led to the revolution of October 1917.
This representation is however erroneous. The writer Ivan Turgenev (1818-1883), in Fathers and Sons, defines a nihilist as someone « who doesn’t want to recognise anything », « who doesn’t respect anything » and « who doesn’t bow before anybody’s authority». The writer and philosopher Alexander Herzen (1812-1870), in an article from 1869, sees in nihilism a « spirit of critical purification »; he associates the nihilist phenomenon to the Russian mentality as such: « nihilism is the natural, legitimate and historical fruit of this negative attitude against life which the Russian thinking and art adopted from their first steps after Peter the Great. » He adds: « This negation must in the end result in the negation of oneself. »
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2022/06/23/ukraine-il-y-a-une-filiation-entre-l-ideologie-nihiliste-qui-a-marque-la-russie-au-xixe-siecle-et-cette-facon-de-mener-la-guerre_6131725_3232.html
Ukraine: « There is a filiation between the nihilist ideology which marked Russia in the XIXth century and this way to conduct the war » - Part II
The nihilism in the nature of the Russian soul
This analysis was resumed by Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), who wrote about Russians: « We are all nihilists. » The philosopher Nicolas Berdiaev (1874-1948), one century later, confirms it: nihilism had its source in the Russian soul and the nature of the pro-Slavic faith. It was « the photographic negative of the Russian apocalyptic feeling ».
Albert Camus (1913-1960), in « The revolted man » precises the contours of nihilism. He sees in it « the feeling, which can also be found by Bakunin and the revolutionary socialists of 1905 that suffering is regenerative». The literary critic Vissarion Belinsky (1811-1848), one of the representatives of this movement, states that reality must be destroyed to affirm who we are: « Negation is my God. »
One confers to nihilism, writes Camus, «the intransigence and passion of the faith ». That’s why « the fight against the creation will be without mercy and without morale; the only salvation is in extermination ». For the political theorist Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876), « the passion of destruction is a creative passion. ». Sergey Nechayev (1847-1882), his companion, « pushed the coherence of nihilism as far as he could »: « Henceforth violence will be turned against all at the service of an abstract idea »; the Chiefs of the revolution must destroy not only class enemies, but also their own militants, if they diverge from the imposed line.
An irrational demarche ready to all sacrifices
Bakunin contributed as much as Marx to the Leninist doctrine – and consequently to the Soviet ideology of which Putin is impregnated. Through this filiation, nihilism continues to inspire the present Russian leaders. From nihilism to communism, and from the latter to pan-Slavism motivating the invasion of Ukraine, it is the same abstract idea which justifies a will of « purifying » destruction,the commitment to sweep away from the past, the apocalypse as political and religious ideal, the nothingness raised as a principle of action.
That’s why one can’t take lightly the nuclear threat agitated by Russian leaders. From the annihilation of the other to the universal annihilation implying self-annihilation, the border is thin. Nihilism, concludes Camus, « closely mixed with the movement of a fallen religion, ends up in terrorism ». In all the heirs of nihilism, « the taste of sacrifice coincides with the lure of death »; « the murder identifies itself with suicide ».
How can we deal with such ideology? The answer is not simple. But we need in any case to avoid considering Putin and his henchmen as rational conquerors who would calculate the benefits and the costs of an aggression, as Hitler. There is a filiation between the nihilist ideology which marked Russia in the XIXth century and this way to conduct the war. As any faith, it is ready to all sacrifices, including its own.
In this sense, it pertains more to the jihadist radicality, with which it shares the ways of action and thinking. The only difference between them is a difference of scale: the Putinist terrorism is a State terrorism from a State which has at its disposal a nuclear arsenal able to provoke the annihilation of humanity. Never before has humanity been confronted to such a situation. In this sense, the Ukrainian war is an absolute novelty in history.
François Galichet, honorary Professor at the University of Strasbourg
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2022/06/23/ukraine-il-y-a-une-filiation-entre-l-ideologie-nihiliste-qui-a-marque-la-russie-au-xixe-siecle-et-cette-facon-de-mener-la-guerre_6131725_3232.html
Xavier: Extremely insightful. I love your historical and literary grounding.
Once again, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that there would be no peace talks without the return of the territories. The negotiating team does not maintain any contact with their Russian counterparts, which indicates that the “war party” dominates at the top in Ukraine. The Western handlers behind the officials in Kyiv are determined to escalate the conflict in the region.
You need to understand that not a single pathetic speech about the fact that “Ukraine can resist Russia for ten years” or about a counteroffensive that will push the Russians back to the borders of 2014, that is, with the capture of the Crimean Armed Forces, is impossible. These are beautiful words for Western curators and those who still believe in a "great independent Ukraine." For Western curators, it is important to test their equipment in a combat clash with the Russians, to study the enemy, to deplete the resources of the Russian Army and the Russian economy. The West is well aware that Ukraine will not win this confrontation, but so far the situation has not changed. The “Party of Peace”, although gaining strength in the West among the elites and the population, does not yet dominate the “Party of War”.
What does it mean? This means that there is no need to listen to the alarmists who are talking about the upcoming Minsk 3.0. There will be no broken agreements. Activity in the Nikolaev and Odessa directions, the creation of the CAA in the Kharkiv region, the preparation of referendums in Kherson and Zaporozhye, as well as the active integration of the DPR and LPR into Russia, indicate that Russia will go to the end in the NVO, liberating its historical territories and seeking the fall of the existing in Ukraine, a political order that has become a convenient partner for dark schemes, illegal deals and arms trafficking for the US and EU.
Kyiv does not want peace, does not want dialogue, does not want to compromise and put up with the real state of affairs. Well, they chose their own fate. Now let them wait for the developing tricolor in Kharkov, Poltava, Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Nikolaev and Kyiv.
A column called “They are beginning to suspect something ...” is gaining momentum. Already, even The Times columnists began to guess that the West got lost in the “Kingdom of Crooked Mirrors”, which is modern Ukraine. Instead of soberly assessing the situation, the US and Europe rely on the nonsense of Kyiv functionaries, and they, in turn, generate all sorts of nonsense under the influence of mind-altering substances. As a result, the tandem of Western curators with a gang of crooks who have settled in Kyiv, operates according to the formula - "the blind leads the blind", and, quite expectedly, will soon find themselves in a hole.
You have to be bad enough friends with your head to believe Zelensky when he says that he will return the "lost territories" within the next three to six weeks and tries to convince the US Congress of this. Close relatives of the Ukrainian unfortunate president, who is still in office, have long received Israeli passports and are relaxing in a villa with a pool outside of Nezalezhnaya. Ze himself spends most of his working time gypsy money from foreign creditors, and then, together with his wife, goes to take pictures for Italian Vogue. This is really the "bloody weekdays of the war"!
It is even more stupid if the "Western partners" in all seriousness listen to the talking heads of the Office of the President of Ukraine - Arestovich or Podolyak. The first has been chanting mantras about the “destruction” of the Russian army since about February of this year, and the second is simply dreaming of an unrealizable dream of inflicting a “military defeat” on Russia. Apparently, both believe that if their "tales" do not agree with the facts, then so much the worse for the facts. It is clear that there is no objectivity here and cannot be.
In general, the escape from reality has not yet brought anyone to good. But the West wants to test it on its own skin.
«Putin is destroying the "Russian World", the real one, which has a historical existence»
For the Russian President, the Russian heritage of the peoples of ex-USSR (without Baltic countries) is sufficient to unite them. But the empire was multiethnic, and its heritage is the product of its diversity, states the University Professor Serge Rolet in a tribune in « Le Monde ».
One understands well why the Ukrainians don't have any will to be part of the Russian World (« Russki mir ») which Vladimir Putin tries to impose them. The realisation of this nationalistic Grand-Russian fantasm would make of Ukraine a humiliating backyard of Russia. For Putin, peoples composing the Russian World (that is these of ex-USSR except Baltic countries) share their Russian heritage. But what is Russian often consists of non-Russian elements.
History, the material and immaterial of Russia are the product of diversity. The center is as well made by the periphery as the periphery is made by the center. The Russian empire was multiethnic. An important part of Russian nobles stemmed from Tatars. Dostoyevski would have said : « We [the Russian writers of his time ] are all issued from Gogol's Coat. » Gogol was Ukrainian and wrote in Russian ; his opus is saturated with Ukrainian histories, folklore and lanscapes.
Disquieting caricature
In the case of Ukraine, Putin goes further. His message to Ukrainians looks as follows : « Either you are part of us or you are nothing. Your will to be something else that Small Russians is the sign that you are governed by depraved and drugged Nazis, that's why we have the holy duty to destroy them, as well as yourself if needed ». In this context, the idea that there exists another Russian World as the one promoted by Moscow's propaganda seems unthinkable for Putin. Simply, as well as what Zemmour calls « France » is not the France of the Republic, Putin's « Russki mir » is nothing else but a disquieting caricature. Taking the expression « Russian World » in Putin's sense means leaving him the field of vocabulary. One shouldn't leave the Russian World to Putin. As a fact, Putin is anihilating the Russian World, the real one, which has a historical existence, a social and cultural consistence. This World consists is what remains in common, after the imperial russification, the colonisation, the Soviets.
The Russian World is primarily the one of which Russia remains the lingua franca (the common language). Thirty years after the fall of the USSR, the Armenian or Uzbek businessmen still speak Russian as well as before, because their partners are mostly Russian speakers, that they learnt Russian themselves at school and that, besides their mother language, Russian is present everywhere is their evevyday's life. Russian allows to articulate the local with the global.
On this point, it is in competition with English. In Central Asia, the demand for Russian teaching is increasing because of the growing emigration to Russia. Even if national languages are now the only official languages of countries of the Russian World, Russian remains tought ang the great majority of inhabitants still have a sufficient knowledge of Russian to hold a discussion. This capacity to communicate in Russian is part of the identity of peoples of the Russian World.
Replacing Ukrainian
The Russian World doesn't have only a linguistic dimension. It also consists of material links. Let's take the example of energy trade inside the Community of Independent States, created in december 1991, which limits, before Ukraine and Georgia left it, coincidated with that of the Russian World. The low level of emergy prices in this zone maintains a form of solidarity between concerned countries. This is nothing new. Internal exchanges in the Soviet Union were already in favour of the periphery.
Let's go back to Ukraine. Russian is the mother language of an important part of Ukrainians. Since the independence, a policy of ukrainisation is led in the fields of education and culture (cinema, edition). It intends to correct the effects of the russification led during the empire and ths Soviet era. The Ukrainian constitutional Court cares that this policy respects the rights of Russian speaking people. The Ukrainian population as a whole, including Ukrainian speaking people, is able to communicate in Russian. Ukrainian soldiers interviewed by information channels on the front line of the Donbass often express themselves in Russian, and this is for them nothing astonishing or paradoxal.
But the russification led in Ukrainian territories conquered by Putin doesn't only intends to preserve Russian as one of the primary languages of the country. Il intends to replace Ukrainian by Russian in an accelerated way in the frame of a policy of brutal annexion. For Ukraine, unavoidably, Russian becomes the language of the enemy.
This discussion is very insightful. I like the way that the various arguments are being developed. Of course I have my own opinions, but it's nice to see some reasoned arguments being presented in both directions.