Re: It seems a major sort of addition needs to be made to cognitive-developmental ontogeny theory (Ethogram Theory)
I have been out just to describe the developing very early processing and all the later hierarchical developments and processing, yielding the development and the progressing of the [grand/always-important] "outer container" (cognition). These are the levels of/stages of cognitive abilities being most of, and what's central to, guiding behavior: cognition, representation, abstract concepts and thinking, and actions. I NOW do believe something more is involved than I have yet ever indicated (something I avoided). For years and for decades:
I almost perhaps incredulously spoke nothing of emotions. Now I do; BUT, reservedly: I want to "add-in" and speak of just basic, early-on emotions that may be central to ALL cognitive development, per se: in particular it is those that are likely necessary to transfer a level of representation and thinking abilities from one domain (once established in an early domain) to another domain (this is sometimes known as transfer, sometimes as generalization -- neither which captures all that goes on with true hierarchical development with ontogeny).
I have long sought to make emotions (relatively simple response PATTERNS) something that can simply be added-in ("tacked on"), AFTER cognitive ontogenies are under way (which seemed esp. good for AL /AGI). But, the problem of humans (as well for AI / AGI) going from using a level of skills somewhere at first and THEN going from one domain to other domains for a new same sort of transformation THERE, i.e. to a essentially new similar level/stage of which he/she is capable THERE, has remained unclear. This matter is now, in much of mainstream psychology, explained hypothetically (or supposedly) based on obvious/common-sense contingencies of guidance (from others and language) _OR_ as using analogies or metaphor to find the similar structures (alignments) in the new domain. This does not often seem plausible and is not sufficient for the broad and quite precise applications for a new level of thinking. (It is too crude and contains irrelevancies.)
FINALLY NOW, I thought of my likely neglect in not providing sufficient impetus or motivation OR direction (or "self"-reward) for ontogenic shifts (at inception: BASIC perceptual shifts), then changes. Early on, and then later, given the representational context of past key developments:
Maybe SOME key emotions help direct the organism to take a closer look at things, actions, and events and with the simple general sorts of motivations GIVEN BY SOME truly basic emotions; if there is more "dwell time" and the organism will take a closer look, THEN he/she will find more, and develop a similar system of structure and understanding THERE (as well as in contexts where such a system was applied earlier).
For, after all, a number of notable emotions have been with us sentient beings since mammals and birds (evolutionarily speaking). Not using any, even for the development of the grand "outer" container no longer seems possible. They (some emotions) are there, and, if they give direction and impetus, why wouldn't the be used in cognitive stages key unfoldings (and making them more precise and reliable). These few particularly important emotions are THERE basically from birth. For me, now, NOT making use of a small set of basic emotions aiding cognitive development does not seem adaptationally likely OR even plausible (from the point of view of logic and soundness, as well as evolutionarily). The set of such basic emotions for cognition and cognitive ontogeny (throughout), i.e. for all major cognitive developments, can be likely understood as interest-excitement-anticipation and surprise and joy. (The combination, in the first 'hyphenated term' are in part(s) present in all modern theories of the basic emotions, while the last two are IN ALL such systems of understanding.) In short such emotions ARE THERE to provide major motivations to dwell on aspects of things, circumstances, and situations -- even situations, in later ontogeny, very much spanning instances (situations/circumstances) across times and space -- AND also facilitating the basic associative learnings -- so things "carry on".
Some present proposals which put forth that for "generalization" or "transfer" metaphors and/or analogies doing the bridging just do not work for me. This brings in irrelevant distraction elements and does not give you the needed precision or focus on new things or things seen-anew. Analogies and metaphors WITHIN a single stage may be helpful to the degree workable and appropriate in more minor learning regards.
For descriptive details of the Theory (Ethogram Theory) itself see: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Isnt_it_obvious_that_Cognitive_Science_in_Psychology_refers_to_structure_not_understood , in particular, the Answers .
- Badges
- Science topic
- Similar topics
- Psychology
- Emotion