Philadelphia, PA

Dear Eagleson,

Good question.

I agree with the presumption against state paternalism, or, as it is sometime put, against the "nanny state." The evident danger is state-enforced moral conformity and the support of puritanical attitudes and policies. Since we live in one of the very few countries ever to attempt to prohibit the production and consumption of alcoholic beverages, and there is a recurrent puritanical theme in American society and culture, we should be wary of what we may allow to get going and generalize. I think it goes without too much emphasis that there is a somewhat puritanical element is just about any religious tradition we might care to discuss. If given license it will tend to come to the fore.  In general, I hold, moralism yes, puritanism, no! Your theme of the preservation of autonomy is an important one in any democratic society.

Your paternalistic paradigm of the legal prohibition of addictive drugs is an interesting one. We have recently seen state action here in PA against the epidemic of opiate, prescription pain killers. Many people have been caught up in that epidemic, unaware of the dangers, and the drugs have been over promoted and over prescribed by the industry and by medical people. Since the prescription drugs are very expensive, those caught on them have often subsequently turned to illegal drugs. Many have died in consequence. Sate action to restrict the use of these prescription drugs is a positive development, long needed.  

On the other hand, our decades-long national "war on drugs," has been somewhat more doubtful. It seemed to turn into a program of mass incarceration of people on minor charges of possession. I think it is well known that this has not been exactly color blind. Possession of crack cocaine was treated as much more serious than similar possession of (more expensive, sometimes trendy) cocaine. It may be doubted that many people have had their autonomy restored by the war on drugs. It seems to be a matter of an excessive, puritanically driven policy, which eventually came to be focused against poor people and people of color. It perhaps illustrates the dangers implicit in paternalistic policies.

The policies that work best are those which address mass issues of public health. A old paradigm of this sort was the stamping out of malaria during the construction of the Panama Canal, or the wide-spread chlorination of publicly supplied drinking water. As you may know, Philadelphia was an earlier leader of this sort of thing with the construction of a public system of water distribution in the early 19th century. See the old water works behind the Art Museum near Center City. Prior to that there was a long history of seasonal outbreaks of infectious disease, and people of means would literally head for the hills during Summer.

To properly answer your question, I suspect that a full range of "paternalistic" policies and their excesses will need to be considered. Such policies need to be subject to more intensive scrutiny--especially in times of generalized conformity and conformism. They may easily serve someone's political agenda in a lopsided way. We have to do with a new, globalizing Gilded Age, and recall the "Victorian morality" of the last one.

H.G. Callaway

I think the general HAS to be, in a democracy, any "nanny state" laws have to be laws that the people demand. Not laws that are handed down by edict, from any type or form of elite, but laws that bubble upwards, from public demand for them.

And also in general, laws are needed to protect people's rights. It's obvious enough that freedom for one person can conflict with the freedom of another person. So laws are needed to disambiguate this inevitable state of affairs.

So for example, people should be free to drink themselves into oblivion, and wreck their health, as long as they do so without putting others in danger (such as, drive a car).

But that pretty much has to be it. So, as long as people do not directly harm other people, they should be free to do what they please, including being stupid.

First, this much has to be established. Then you have to address the gray areas. In short, state paternalism is never justified, IMO. What are justified are laws demanded by the people, or in principle, by their duly elected representatives.

There is a nicer name for it now in pilitcal philosophy but it is always a threat to persons integrity.i will post a paper on the subject

Best

Mylene

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Manfredi,

Though I object to the excesses of the nanny state and see a threat to personal integrity in it, it appears that I am not so libertarian as thou.

Part of the constitutional purpose of the state is to promote "the general welfare." PA, in fact calls itself, not, "the State of Pennsylvania," but instead "the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." This conception is centuries old.

I think you may not be aware of what is happening here regarding the epidemic of opiate addiction. See the following webpage:

http://www.pa.gov/collections/naloxone/

Many otherwise young and healthy people get addicted, because of legal but unwise prescriptions, and end up dead of heroin overdose. If the state government can act to prevent some of this, then it is certainly in order. There is a crying need for someone to do something. Even minimal intervention or public education can save many a life otherwise tragically destroyed.

H.G. Callaway

Callaway, sure, most people can agree that laws are not always a bad thing. I don't think one can call it "nanny state" if such common sense laws as traffic laws are written and enforced.

As to drugs, that's a tough call. My wife had back surgery very recently, and it was not trivial to get off the more powerful pain meds. You have to want to get off them. Otherwise, even after just a couple of weeks, the easiest path is to stay on them. So exactly how that "want" can be legislated is a difficult matter.

But on the question of "promote the general welfare," I have to suggest that the word "promote" is key. The word is not "provide," and the distinction, I believe, was completely intentional.

I would say that the commonwealth of the people should not be seen as implying "provided by the government." The common wealth should be promoted by laws written to help stimulate commerce, generally providing a business-friendly climate.

Perhaps some clarifications are in order. To focus on paternalistic policy is to focus relatively narrowly. These would be laws or policies that interfere with the actions of an individual solely for the reason of protecting that individual from him/herself or otherwise promoting his/her good for his/her own sake. 

Laws that prohibit harm to others interfere for an entirely different reason. 

Albert Manfredi says, "But that pretty much has to be it. So, as long as people do not directly harm other people, they should be free to do what they please, including being stupid."  This is a rough statement of libertarianism.  We could certainly have robust state involvement beyond the libertarian's minimal state, yet disavow and in fact have no paternalist laws. There is no conceptual link between anti-paternalism and libertarianism. 

But Albert Manfredi continues, presuming the moral grounding of the minimal state, "Then you have to address the gray areas. In short, state paternalism is never justified, IMO. What are justified are laws demanded by the people, or in principle, by their duly elected representatives."  The problem here is certainly not the idea of building upon the minimal state by means of sanctioned legislative action, but rather the idea that paternalistic laws could never be enacted in this way. If such a law were "demanded by the people," where would its justification fall short?

There is a general presumption against paternalism in liberal thought. Kant saw it as the “greatest despotism imaginable.” Isaiah Berlin provides an excellent critical review of attempts by philosophers to justify paternalism in his essay “Two Kinds of Liberty.”  Nonetheless, throughout history, some liberals including John Stuart Mill in “On Liberty.” have sought to offer justification for limited forms of paternalism.   The most recent of these is Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s popular and influential book “Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness.” 

Is the obligation to secure yourself in a car with a seat belt a good example of what you're pondering about?

Steven Verbanck, In so far as this obligation is justified in terms of the state looking out for my well being, then yes, I think it is. The argument would be that while a legal requirement to wear a seat belt would have a marginal impact on my autonomy, the potential consequences of not wearing one could allow catastrophic outcomes regarding my autonomy. (There are arguments against any such justification. E.g. since I am, as a statistical matter, unlikely to be the victim of such catastrophic outcomes, I am made to pay the price of this paternalistic policy when the benefit only goes to a relatively small minority of the group to which it applies. That's unjust since it violates my right to personal autonomy. Given these facts, I should be the one who decides whether I wear a seat belt or not.)

In so far as the obligation is justified in other terms, then the problem of paternalism is not relevant. E.g. the state may say that it costs others too much in increased car insurance premiums if wearing seat belts is optional. That's a harm to others justification, not a paternalist justification.

Perhaps paternalism is embedded in the concept of representation:  as you know, a conscientious representative is supposed to follow his best judgement concerning what's good for his constituents - not what they themselves believe is best.

Yes, procedurally speaking, the constituents get to hold the representative responsible for his choices.   But this retrospective evaluation (a) has no real bearing on the representative's relation to those whose votes don't succeed in calling him to account, (b) don't make the relationship less paternalistic.  I can come to reproach you for having acted paternalistically towards me; that doesn't change the character or your action.

None of this is too surprising given the original opposition of liberalism to democracy.  Even Mill's emphasis on education in his theory of representation suggests a hope that qualified voters will be the sort that appreciate higher pleasures and generally lead society towards the mentality of a cultured adult.

Michael Neumann, Very helpful entry. It seems right that in Mill (unlike Bentham) there are good (much better) and more worthy pleasures. And these in particular require some cultivation. Education of minors is paternalistic but presumably the justification here is on morally safe ground. Is voter education inherently paternalistic? Not if the voter seeks to learn, it would seem. I suppose if a culture continues to treat its citizens, to some extent, as it does its minors, with a kind of "healthy indoctrination," then the idea of paternalism, and Mill's at least implicit support of it, gains footing. (Of course Mill's explicit view is anti-paternalistic.)

The idea that the concept of representation includes the concept of paternalism is very intriguing. A representative who, against the self-interest of reelection, makes policy in the interest of, but against the wishes of, her constituency does seem to act paternalistically, and with legal justification. As you point out, her constituency may respond by feeling disrespected and subsequently vote her out. Now in theory a voter expresses his autonomy when casting his vote, and in theory he has consented to "the rules of the game" of representation. Do these considerations undermine the claim that the representative acts, under the described circumstances, paternalistically in our standard moral sense?

Honestly I'm not sure.

You can, I suppose, autonomously decide to submit to paternalism.   It's a bit like Sartre's monk who can make, if I remember right, an authentic decision to renounce his freedom of choice.   But that the decision to accept a paternalistic representative or institution does not, on the face of it, even diminish the paternalism.   It seems relevant here that when I vote, I can only chose among those who, perhaps, represent me in paternalistic fashion.   I cannot choose not to be represented.

Perhaps someone might want to speak of different depths of paternalism.  Paternalism resulting from autonomous choices might be considered less deep than paternalism to which one autonomously submits.   But I'm not sure that being locked into a representative system involves autonomous submission.

 So I get a bit into the woods here. "Paternalism resulting from autonomous choices might be considered less deep than paternalism to which one autonomously submits."

Isn't part of the presumptive problem with paternalism that it interferes with a person's autonomy? It forces or coerces him to do what he would not do? Can we really square this seemingly straightforward feature of paternalism with the characterizations of certain forms of paternalism expressed in the sentence I've quoted? (P resulting from autonomous choices; P to which one autonomously submits. Each seems to invoke (prior?) consent. If I say, yes, I agree and accept that policy X is for my good, so so I accept policy X, am I being treated paternalistically by the policy maker/implementer? In this case I guess I'm accepting the procedure first, which commits me to accepting the policy outcome.)

The whole discussion started as a question, but I've so much enjoyed the debate between Michael Neumann  and Ian Eagleson. I might be allowed to be a referee, I think, while of you are right....Michael seems closer to the truth as evident in our own experiences in Africa with regards to various governmental policies which they deem fit as promoting common good.......uhmmm...I've so much to read!

`Hi, I'm not deeply invested in autonomously chosen paternalism because I suspect representation isn't autonomously chosen.   I have no choice whether or not some person or other is to represent me.  I only have a choice, maybe, sometimes, which person is going to do that.  (Usually I don't have a real choice, only some laughably small probability that my vote may actually determine that outcome.)   So in my opinion I have no choice whatever but to submit to a system of representation, and that system seems paternalistic in a pretty narrow sense of the term.

However I'm not sure there is a problem with the notion of autonomously chosen paternalism.   I can autonomously surrender my autonomy, in which case I am of course no longer autonomous.   One of the ways I can do this is by submitting to paternalism.  If this is just one way of autonomously surrendering my autonomy, I'm then cease to be autonomous when I submit to paternalism.   That I autonomously choose this alternative may or may not legitimate it, but it doesn't make me any more autonomous after the choice.

To give one of those silly philosophical examples:  suppose I autonomously chose, by surgery or drugs, literally and irreversibly to acquire the mentality of a five year old child, and was taken into the care of an adult.   Certainly I would be under a paternalistic regimen whether or not my initial choice was autonomous.

Michael,

Having been trained more or less in the Anglo-american tradition, I am disposed (perhaps unfortunately) to take these kinds of examples pretty seriously as tests of principles in question. And I think your example does that rather well. (And it seems to raise questions similar to those raised by traditional discussions of whether it is possible for one to genuinely offer oneself into or sell oneself into slavery.)

There is a difference of course between being treated as a slave (or a five year old) in fact, and someone's having the right to do so. Surely we can imagine situations in which someone agrees to be treated as a slave (or a five year old). And these cases may include this someone taking on some of the trappings of a slave (or a five year old). But I don't take this to be the relevant question. 

Is autonomy an inalienable right? That is to say, given that someone possesses certain capacities (presumably capacities of reason), does this right simply belong to her/him as an aspect of her/his identity conditions? If so, part of being this person is having this right. No one can override this right and acquire rights to "replace" this person's will with their own not merely because it's morally wrong, but because, in a rather profound way, this proposition doesn't make sense (as a point of ontology). Persons are incapable of not being autonomous in their fundamental make up, and so the right to autonomy is cannot be transferred. This is why I cannot acquire the right to replace your will with my own. (I take it this is the sort of view we find in several Enlightenment thinkers, including Locke, Kant and Mill.)

(So we may make all the arrangements you mention in your example, but does this really amount to a transfer of rights? I think these philosophers I mention would say no. In your example would we have a case in which de facto parental caretaking would be required? I would have to grant that we would. But this person/human of course would not be a five year old. And it may be that the differences in the cases would have moral relevance. Specifically, we may have rights as parents that we do not have in this case in your example, and for the very reasons I've been mentioning.)

I see that you do not accept the idea of 'implicit consent' when it comes to contemporary US representative government. I sympathize. Nonetheless, the idea and the theory of implicit consent should not, I think, be ignored. As Socrates says in the Crito, if we've decided to stay and enjoy whatever benefits the democratic state offers (and presumably decided to put up with the rest, perhaps making whatever meager efforts we can to legally change what we don't like), then we've implicitly accepted the rules of the game. The state of course does not keep us here against our will (at least in your case and mine). So the state may presume we implicitly consent to its procedures, that we may use legal procedures to change what we don't like, or that if not satisfied with that that we may reject its procedures and leave to find others more to our liking. (Note that this is not 'love it or leave it.' since paths for criticisms and possible change are meant to be available. You may say that the state is not doing what I want, but that's not really the idea. The democratic state should be responsive to what WE want.)

Implicit consent, by means of the idea of consent, is how the idea of autonomy plays its role in the idea of a representative government. And that's how it gets its moral justification. 

If any of this is right, then, at least as a matter of theory, representative government, if not too corrupt, is not paternalistic. Also, it follows from what I've mentioned above that paternalism and autonomy are, at least on the surface, at odds. (That's why my original question was concerning possible cases in which paternalistic policy might be seen to enhance autonomy. In such cases the argument for paternalism would appeal to the very grounds typically used to argue against it.)

"There is a difference of course between being treated as a slave (or a five year old) "

I do not think this is correct analogy. Five year olds, are autonomous beings with legal and moral rights. Their preferences and developing capacities should and would (in developed - morally and legally - countries) be taken into account, and the decision making standard used by the proxy decision makers (usually parents) is usually said to be best interests standard. That is the interests of the developing and future autonomy will have to be protected by the decisions taken by the decision maker. In various jurisdiction it will be variously codified into law, but in all of them in extremis the state's legal apparatus will step in to protect the child's rights. 

Slaves on the other hand, even if they had some legal protections as in later Roman empire, would not typically be treated as autonomous beings who's interests per se are worthy of protection. 

Short version: children are not slaves. 

Few would disagree that children are not slaves. I'm not sure I see the relevance of this observation in this context. We were thinking of cases in which the will of one agent is replaced with the will of another (specifically for paternalistic reasons). In fact five years olds are standardly not regarded as (fully) autonomous, and this fact gives moral justification for their guardian treating them paternalistically. Children are typically protected by law, and this confers upon them certain rights.  But their rights are not co-extensive with adults' rights. The relevant comparison concerns whether, and to what extent, the will of an adult may be replaced by the will of another, whether that adult is being treated as a slave or being treated as a five year old. 

I completely disagree. The children have full moral and legal rights as citizens and persons, however they can only exercise them to a limited degree due to their limited (developing) capacity. For some matters the parents or other legal guardians will typically be making decisions and exercising those rights on their behalf - e.g. medical decision-making, in some others the state expects them to be capable enough themselves before they can exercise those rights - e.g. age of consent, or voting rights. But even if they are represented by someone else then in the international law and many national legal systems there are provisions securing such rights as "right be heard", "right to assent and dissent" and "respect for the developing capacities" in accord with their level of development. And proxies will be limited to various degrees in their decision making - their job being, among other things, making sure they maximise the future autonomy of the child.

Why this is relevant for the discussion here? Well, adults suffer various and multiple limitations to their autonomy - cognitive, perspective, SES, situational. In some cases things are not possible to judge from a single person's perspective - that is why consumer rights exist, that is why licencing boards for the medical professions exist, that is why nearly all countries in the world will have some sort of pharmaceutical authority, and public health authority. These public health, public policy and other measures are not to limit the autonomy or to make those adults slaves but to protect their autonomy in example by letting them take informed choices, or in some cases from such harm that is dangerous to the survival of the autonomy on public scale - as with toxic substances in building materials, or epidemics of infectious diseases and such. 

The state taking measures on issues that individual citizens cannot possibly avoid on individual levels may be using similar principles to those being used for protection of children, but it has nothing to do with slavery - even if some person will feel like it if they are put into those circumstances. 

By the way - implicit consent argument might have held for Socrates, but it would require quite a strong evidence to say that current US citizen, especially one of low SES, has the same ability to move somewhere else as freeborn and educated Athenian of 5th century BC.All those refugees trying to get to Europe want to move somewhere else and reject the government of e.g. Syria, but apparently it isn't so easy.

Unless this is supposed to be some sort of "radical freedom" in Sartresque spirit. But in that case taking the suicide option for most people with dependent families and attachments that Socrates that we know from Plato and Xenophon did not have, is probably not a morally neutral option for the reason of harm to others. 

Dear Jakub Zawiła-Niedźwiecki,

Sorry to be so long responding to your post. I find it curious your insisting that children have identical rights to adults. We do make important moral and legal distinctions based upon 'being a minor' or 'having reached 'majority.' (Freedom of association strikes me as a right minors do not have.) In any case, the examples of "limitations to autonomy" that you adduce are useful to our discussion. This is because the justification you seem to appeal to is just the sort I was considering in my original question. We, the state, decide to interfere with your actions for your own good, and our justification is that this interference will in fact enhance your autonomy. We don't do it to enhance state power, or to serve a special interest, but rather for the sake of your enhanced freedom (whether you agree or not). A strong financial consumer protection agency is a new development in the US, and it is argued for, presumably, on just those grounds. 

I am, on a case by case basis, frequently sympathetic to such arguments. But of course a strong libertarian is likely to see things differently. A libertarian is likely not to acknowledge such thoroughly "innocent" or disinterested motives to the state. And surely there are cases in which these suspicions are not unwarranted.

I still disagree about the children, but there is strong possibility that this is verbal disagreement and we would need to very carefully untangle what we mean (one thing that comes to mind that there might be some moral / legal - positive/negative rights confusion here, but probably there is much more to it). 

In any case I agree with the conclusion. On more general level you could say that the existence of a state itself is such a limitation of personal autonomy in order to enhance the freedom to pursue whatever one finds to be good life. 

The very extreme end of libertarian spectrum I find simply inconsistent and also obviously untenable empirically. Somalia the minimal state of libertarian dreams and I don't see an exodus of libertarians going there ;-)

1. Regarding addiction and seat belts as examples of  paternalism.  Actually, they are not, because they are not really aimed at protecting the imprudent.  As long as there are systems of insurance, the prudent will cross-subsidize the imprudent (addicts, those in frequent accidents, etc).  Most of what looks like paternalism is a way of protecting the prudent by limiting the choices of the imprudent.  In other words, the majority forbids the minority drug use or other self-harming actions in order to reduce injuries the majority may have to pay for.

 2. Regarding Neumann’s theory of representation, which I think was articulated first by Edmund Burke, this is a defining feature of aristocracy, which is really Burke believed in.  Aristocracy is intended to be paternalistic.

3. Chattel slavery in the southern U.S. was defended on paternalistic grounds.  That does not mean paternalism is always wrong, but this is one example that few would defend today.  It is a demonstration of self-deception on the part of the paternalists who rationalized their behavior as being for the good of the slaves.  The long reluctance of the state to intervene in institutionalized and systemic cases of pedophilia (notably, but not only the Catholic Church) was an implicit endorsement of a kind of paternalism by a non-state institution.

 4. The libertarian view holds that self-harm is purely private.  Yet, most adults have some involvements with, or even responsibilities towards others, particularly family.  For example, suicide harms various people aside from the direct victim. Thus, the premise that some actions affect only the actor may be incorrect.

 5. In most societies throughout history, the state was not called upon to intervene because there was a high degree of cultural paternalism.  State paternalism is a relatively recent phenomenon because the administrative state only replaced the cultural “police” in the last 100-150 years.  The state is not well equipped to play this function, since paternalism requires intimate knowledge of the person whose life is being guided by others.

 6. Specialized expertise leads to new forms of paternalism.  Chemical companies and operators of atomic power stations treat the public paternalistically, and we tolerate it for long periods because we think they are telling us the truth about the safety of their products, until the bodies pile up.  The public may then react, and there is a brief flurry of democratic activity, but the background activity still remains paternalistic because of the asymmetry of information. 

One can assess the decline of a democracy by the degree of paternalism. The issue today is that in a democracy where 50% of the population are in need of direction and support, they demand paternalization of government. In the past, social agencies and charities took care of those who couldn't or wouldn't take care of themselves, but liberals have taught populations to feel entitled to parenting. How long will the other 50% tolerate funding the other half of the country. To a degree any country with a high percentage of low skilled workers will need to subsidies that population, however, the social cohesion is breaking down as groups wish to help their own, and the autonomous grow resentful at the dependence of those groups. That's where we are.

Sigrid,

On the surface, I do not see a logical or empirical connection between state paternalism and the degree of democracy. In fact, certain populations or cultures may be more comfortable with a "nanny state" and thus be more apt to vote its apparatus into office. Recall that on most views paternalism is meant to be punitive. Anti-drug laws for example some may justify in terms of protecting the drug user from himself. So-called vice taxes (e.g. on alcohol and cigarettes) are justified in part on paternalistic grounds. Indeed state paternalism is typically punitive. ("This is for your own good whether you like it or not.") I think you may be confusing state paternalism with social programs.