Physics is a lower science (Apara Vidya) and Metaphysics is a higher science (Para Vidya). In physics experiments are conducted outside of human mind and observed by five senses, particularly by physical eye. In Metaphysics, experiments are conducted within or behind human mind and observed by a non-physical eye which does not become functional till certain spiritual disciplines are observed like continance. When experiences of more than one person agree, it becomes a theory. This applies to both, physics as well as metaphysics. Metaphysical experiences are quale, therefore cannot be easily communicated to others.

Dear Vikram, it came to my mind as an immediate reaction to your contribution that what is important is to understand the fact that a metaphysical proposition receiving confirming instances does not make it falsifiable, i.e.empirical.

By the way, the reflection of Popper on metaphysics and its relations with science baffled the neo-positivists for whom the metaphysical theories were nothing but fruits of no-reason!

Mainz, Germany

Dear Tucci,

In answer to your question, I'd say that metaphysics is not science, but you are also concerned with specifying the relationship between metaphysics and sciences, which is an interesting topic. I agree, of course, as against the positivist accounts of old that metaphysics is not "non-sense." However, I am inclined to remark that scientists often see reason to avoid metaphysics even if admitting that it is not non-sense. Why is metaphysics, then a traditional sub-discipline of philosophy? Well, one basic reason is to keep up to date a historical record of metaphysical systems past and present, and if nothing else, this can facilitate distinguishing science from metaphysics.

I also think to remark on the positivist polemic against metaphysics. If metaphysics were literally non-sense, according to positivism, then why would they bothered with an extensive critique of it? I think that part of the answer is that though metaphysical systems have no testable observational consequences, they can still have social effects, since they are often capable of evoking widespread belief and organizing expectations. The positivists saw such organized belief and expectation as dangerous and often anti-scientific in character. Theses philosophers engaged in an extensive polemic against metaphysics, one might say, to counter the social effects of metaphysics, much as contemporary psychologists might organize a critique of alleged psychic demonstrations or claims. It is worth noticing, perhaps, that the positivist critique of metaphysics took place against the background of Europe's late 19th-century and early 20th-century infatuations with political and cultural nationalisms.

However, given this much sympathy for your question and opening statement, I also wonder about your distinction between "pseudo-science" on the one hand and "scientific program" on the other, as this relates to your discussion of metaphysics. You wrote:

Thus, as a way of a summary, I’d conclude by saying that metaphysics, not wanting to be a set of tautologies, is necessarily a pseudo-scientific theory. A metaphysical theory can be seen as a research program. The difference between a metaphysical theory and a pseudo-scientific one is that the former is fruitful of predictive theories that foresee facts and exclude others, while a pseudo-science gives birth only (or almost only) to ‘ad hoc’ hypotheses that can not exclude any fact. The pseudo science grows ‘ as a cancer’ on itself. The dividing line between metaphysics and pseudoscience is their fertility or infertility against refutable theories they generate.

---end quotation

In this passage you seem not entirely of one mind regarding the relationship between metaphysics and "pseudo-scientific theory." If metaphysics is not trivial or tautological, you say, it must be a pseudo-scientific theory.  But then you turn around and say that "A metaphysical theory can be seen as a research program." But I doubt that many scientists would take kindly to the notion that their research program is either a variety of metaphysics or a pseudo-science --especially in light of your following characterization of pseudo-science. Perhaps you would like to clarify a bit here. 

The recognized danger in theoretical science, I think, is that theory runs off into excesses of speculation in the attempt at "new science," and in consequence, even the most speculative research program (in physics, say) will aim to find observational predictions or consequences of theory. The theoretician is held accountable to this goal by the experimentalists, and all of this takes place within a recognized scientific discipline and domain. Metaphysics may indeed be a background influence on theory, I think, and philosophers of science familiar with the history of metaphysics are capable of detecting the resemblances that may arise. Still both theoretician and experimentalists, in their differing ways, aid in finding the ways in which speculative science may grade off into metaphysics or pseudo-science. Richly suggestive results in mathematical physics for example, will be gladly accepted, but in the end, there have to be testable observational consequences at some point.

H.G. Callaway

Thank you - Professor Callaway - for your illuminating observations. I believe I'll have to think of them quite a while. For now, I have in mind what follows.

The topic of the last chapter of the Postscript by Popper is just that of the metaphysical research programs that Lakatos later would exhibit as 'scientific' research programs. It is worth quoting a passage of this chapter: "atomism is an excellent example of a metaphysical uncontrollable theory, whose influence on science exceeds that of many controllable theories”.

Great was the program of Faraday, Maxwell, Einstein and others to conceive the world in terms of ‘continuous fields’. Each of these metaphysical theories worked very first to become controllable; it functioned as a program for science showing the direction in which it would be possible to find adequate explanatory theories of science and to enable the assessment in depth of a theory.

Now, let us say the following: if a hypothesis is valid for which some metaphysics write programs of future research, then from such a thesis descend at least two major consequences. First of all, as Popper says that one is doing research to find and check hypothesis highly controllable, "I say - Agassi points out - that very often you do research to find and check hypotheses metaphysically relevant. As a rule, the search tends to begin with hypotheses which have a low level of controllability or are not controllable at all”. Consequently, researchers often have to use great ingenuity to control hypotheses barely controllable. Secondly, adds Agassi, "a remnant of positivist prejudice can be found in the fact that Popper brings together several types of unscientific theories, including metaphysics and pseudo-science under the single label of 'metaphysics'.

I believe that we should not lump everything all together since metaphysics can be seen as “a program of research and false claims of pseudo-science as the finished product. "

Mainz, Germany

Dear Tucci,

Thanks for that reply which I will want to get back to at some point. For now, I will be mostly traveling!

Kind regards,

H.G. Callaway

 Dear Gianrocco:

There are two grades of metaphysics. The first grade originate from individuals whose inner vision has opened up. This grade is far superior to any philosophy that may exist. The second grade originate from people who believe in the first grade theories and have faith in them, but their inner vision has not yet opened up. Sometimes comments of Voltaire, Candide, (1759), do apply to these second grade theories. These second grade theories could be called the sub-class of philosophy but never the first grade theories.

One can assess the relation between science and the first grade metaphysics along following lines. The observer is central to the most modern scientific theory of relativity (special and general). This observer of relativity uses only his physical eyes. All mathematical equations must conform to what he see. But, the observer of the first grade metaphysics with his non physical eye is not accounted for, by this theory of relativity. Therefore general relativity can never lead to The theory of everything that the scientists are looking for. The way you have to put up the Hubble Telescope to look deep into outer space, in the same way you must have this inner eye functional to look deep inside the inner space. Therefore metaphysics is a superior science than the physics.

In west, most people are familiar with experiences of Swedenborg, St.Teresa of Avila, Annie Besant and others. Here I give links to similar experiences of some people in the east.

http://www.chennaimath.org/istore/product/sri-ramakrishna-the-great-master/

http://www.vedanta.org/wiv/links/centers.html

http://www.amazon.com/Play-Consciousness-A-Spiritual-Autobiography/dp/0911307818

http://www.amazon.com/Autobiography-Yogi-P-Yogananda/dp/8120725247

It falls back to the problem of demarcation from whose perspective it is "meta" and when can we drop the prefix to "physics". In a numbers-crazed world people are fascinated with results, while they downplay process. Metaphysics unveils the process and more vitally, the motivations behind the science.

Once respected investigations into reality and truth are classified today as pseudo-scientific or even metaphysical.I am sure that the alchemy and the theological interests of Newton during his time was viewed by him as part of his "classical physics" (which we now come to call it). Taking note that he was at the forefront of his science. Could it also be that what is termed metaphysical today may one day enter the mainstream, justifying the removal of the prefix "meta"?

Relevant in this regard for today and this question is the status of quantum consciousness and quantum mind hypotheses.