Periodically, I would make the attempt to get a response that proceeds from the reflections of fellow researchers in RG Questions and Answers section.
It is no longer required to take the lead where progress drives; it seems to me that what is needed, instead, is a real full capacity to see whether the future is headed more than ever towards shared cultural roots.
As stated by the mathematician and epistemologist Federigo Enriques "the progress of science is a process where the deductions partially verified and contradictions eliminating the error of implicit assumptions, arise new inductions more precise, more likely, larger “. Excessive optimism about progress, its forms and tools of domain of history caused (and still cause) significant reactions of disapproval. The idea that the changes require scientific criticism to philosophical reason is contrasted by the opposite one that progress requires a philosophical conception whereby there is the problem of limits of reason. It prevailed increasingly until the philosophical and historical criticism could concentrate on tasks, limits, methods and conditions of the scientific rationality. It brought to light the ambiguity and problematic nature of the concept of progress, in both a general sense for the human history, and specific for science and technology.
In the last century, the relationship between the progress of science and the human condition focused the question of whether science can be said to be an evolution in itself or only with respect to a general human progression. In the face of scientific knowledge more numerous, extensive and rigorous than in the past, we wondered which consisted in their development and how to evaluate it. The debate moved from a ‘generic’ progress of science, to a more concrete and specific advancement in the ‘individual’ ones.
The natural, human and social sciences become privileged partners for culture. After Popper, Kuhn and other critical epistemologists, ‘thought’ is more credible as they developed self-criticism, the awareness of their limitations, the perception of their own mistakes.
No address - epistemological and philosophical - is decisive and irreversible. The critical reassessment covers all areas: science, epistemology, philosophy. In the transition, the new ways of interpreting and implementing science are overcoming old prejudices. At stake there is also a more human science at the service of man, of culture, of a new humanism and quality of life.
What is clear from the debate of recent years is that the issue of epistemological unification can not ignore the fact that in all groups of sciences - physical, natural, human and social – there are, in greater or lesser degree, the elements and the cognitive moments that constitute the method. The fundamental tools and models that underpin the unity of knowledge, are not exclusive of any group of sciences, nor of any discipline. Ultimately, their unity is based more on those than on method, while their diversity derives from their specific end of knowledge that forms the objects.
Sciences, therefore, are related to their context that includes, on the one hand the pre-scientific knowledge of the reality that, as sensible, must be respected, on the other hand the plurality of interests and cognitive knowledge. Scientific truths are, at the same time absolute and incomplete, that is to say, in part undeniable and definitive and in part to be completed and overcome.
All this is related to the difficulties involving each science: 1) the rapid overcoming of scientific knowledge; 2) the continued fragmentation caused by increasing specialization.
The solution of these problems depends on the meaning that each discipline gives to its statements. In this regard, all the more useful are the epistemological proposals of the twentieth century (eg. Popper, Hempel, Rudner, Kuhn, Lakatos).
I notice that there are deepening the scope of some structural limits without mitigating complexity and difficulty and, in particular: 1) the scientific process and the results thereof for building a new culture and humanism based on science; 2) the logic of science, its informative and executive criteria, its method and its techniques; 3) compliance of techno-scientific activity to the most important needs of people and society.
To these decisive problems, a culture torn between modern scientist rationalism and postmodern weak thought does not offer solutions. Emerge from a large number of Questions and Answers proposals: a) to combine the authentic values of techno-scientific culture with those of the great cultural traditions; b) welding knowledge with wisdom, opening it to the universal ad supreme values of ‘good’ and ‘truth'.