Yes and no, dear David. We are the offspring of tradition and education, while we have to make our own room for maneuver. We are, in Foucault's words, in need of "taking care of the self" and of assuming responsibility for our own betterment, while we are indebted to society for many ancestral reasons we might not be aware of, though as time evolves, we take stock of our debts, and try to pay. We decide to learn by ourselves, or decide not to. Every time we acknowledge that we have room for maneuver, we must admit that decision-making makes us responsible for the outcome of our decisions, whether or not we are fully aware of all the implications of that. There is an evident ambiguity implied in our assuming responsibility for oneself. Our lives are so preconditioned that it might be possible to renounce outright all responsibility for our acts and thoughts but, on the other hand, it might be wiser to asume responsibility just for the sake of being alive and being a self. This is not necessarily a matter of "morals", but a matter of being in the world because, in the end, it is the world we are (or are not) responsible to.

Heavy stuff!

Lilliana

Dear David:

I would have to carefully examine the context of the passage you cite from A Theory of Justice to draw a a better conclusion on Rawls view on the subject.

Anyway, we know that social culture, family, unique early individual experiences and even genetics, are a fundamental part in shaping the moral character of a person .They, of course, are not under the control of the individual. 

All this, however, does not mean that our decisions and lives are a product of mechanical causes .So your question leads us to the question of whether or not there is free will .

My view is that if uncertainty is an irreducible fact in the physical world, there are even more reasons to believe that it is also present in the human world. 

I think freedom exists, in the sense that we as individuals are not completely driven by external causes, so a person can shape --within certain limits- his or her own moral character. 

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Risser,

You pose an interesting question, and I can well imagine that it could develop into an engaging discussion. As Jorge suggests above, it could turn into a quite philosophical question. It seems quite reasonable, even a matter of common sense to acknowledge environmental, limiting constraints upon the development of character; and various "ought implies can" arguments are lurking in that direction.  Imaah seems to take a reasonable stance, saying that "a person cannot be solely held responsible for his or her own character."

It strikes me that one might better ask whether a person is responsible for the development of their own character--whatever the constraints may be in particular cases. Others may help (by parenting, or in the role of teacher, say) and some may also hinder --by exclusion or denial of opportunity for example. But it seems to make sense to hold people responsible for the developmental process within the limits of what is factually possible. There is no way to get at the responsibility except by reference to the factual limitations and the facilitating factors. It seems clear, though, that no one else can be exclusively responsible for the character of another person --unless perhaps by inhibiting its development.  Whatever the positive conditions may be, on the other hand, the person must actually make use of them; and no one can do that for us. So assuming some positive development of character, it seems to follow that the person in question is responsible for it in significant degree. Where there is little or no development in spite of positive facilitating conditions, then the person is responsible there, too.

Compare the following analogous question: Is a person responsible for what they learn? --and consider, in relation to this "Is moral character something that is learned?"

H.G. Callaway

Yes and no, dear David. We are the offspring of tradition and education, while we have to make our own room for maneuver. We are, in Foucault's words, in need of "taking care of the self" and of assuming responsibility for our own betterment, while we are indebted to society for many ancestral reasons we might not be aware of, though as time evolves, we take stock of our debts, and try to pay. We decide to learn by ourselves, or decide not to. Every time we acknowledge that we have room for maneuver, we must admit that decision-making makes us responsible for the outcome of our decisions, whether or not we are fully aware of all the implications of that. There is an evident ambiguity implied in our assuming responsibility for oneself. Our lives are so preconditioned that it might be possible to renounce outright all responsibility for our acts and thoughts but, on the other hand, it might be wiser to asume responsibility just for the sake of being alive and being a self. This is not necessarily a matter of "morals", but a matter of being in the world because, in the end, it is the world we are (or are not) responsible to.

Heavy stuff!

Lilliana

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Ramos-Collado,

You emphasize "room to maneuver" and Foucault's "taking care of the self," in the matter of taking responsibility for self-development; and there seems to be some contrast or tension between this and thinking in terms of conditions for development including facilitating or inhibiting conditions. It is, perhaps, less than clear that it is always possible to create "room to maneuver," in the absence of facilitating conditions of self-development.

Again, it strikes me that "tradition and education" may not always be fully facilitating conditions, but may instead sometimes fall under the category of inhibiting conditions. Development of character and virtue seems to involve a degree of exploratory and even experimental behavior. We do not know, beforehand, what it may become possible for us to do, which virtues we may become capable of exercising and in which degree. So, if the son of a shoemaker is generally assumed to be only capable of becoming a shoemaker, and the daughter of a housewife is generally assumed of only being capable of becoming a mother and housekeeper, then such general, traditional social conditions may inhibit or even prevent fuller development or self-development. It matters, too, to what degree such conditions may be imposed.  Does a given society or social configuration provide room for consideration of individual differences, talents and capabilities, or does it instead more strongly tend to force each person into a pre-assigned  general class and category?

"Assuming responsibility" you say "is not necessarily a matter of 'morals',"  though, the development of character, is often thought of precisely as a matter of "moral education;" and in the Aristotelian conception, development of character is a matter of the development of the virtues. Basic in this is self-restraint. There is no virtue without self-restraint, since it requires that we attain to a "golden mean" (and virtue is a mean between two extremes) by resisting the extreme to which we may be more attracted by native inclination. So, for instance "courage" is a mean between impulsiveness (or foolhardiness) and cowardly inclinations to always run for safety. 

I find some tension between emphasizing the need of self-restraint in the development of character and the talk of creating "room to maneuver." It may be that the facility to create "room to maneuver," is an attainment of accumulated virtues and practice, but self-restraint seems to be basic in the practice involved in acquiring or developing the virtues and character. In consequence undue emphasis on creating "room to maneuver" may inhibit attainment of the virtues in the young, for instance, if it de-emphasizes the need of self-restraint. 

I agree with your sentiment, of course, when you say "it might be wiser to assume responsibility just for the sake of being alive and being a self," while I am more skeptical of holding generally that "Our lives are so preconditioned that it might be possible to renounce outright all responsibility for our acts and thoughts." What I would say is that people in particular situations may be "so pre-conditioned" as to inhibit or prevent fuller development; but in the general case, given supporting human decency, self-development within some limits (to be explored) is possible. I would stress that there is no knowing of the limits, or limits of the self, without some considerable exploration; this point is a humanizing precaution against puritanical strictures and presumptions. 

H.G. Callaway

Dear H.G., of course tradition and education are inhibiting factors. "Room for maneuver" is essential if you are to take responsibility: if you cannot move, you cannot "do", nor be "virtuous" or "not virtuous". Words like "morals", "virtue", "decency", coming straight from Aristotle and Cicero's De oficci, are probably not applicable to our concept of the self and of our being in the world at this point of history. We can read —if we have been taught to read—, we can make decisions —whose appropriateness depends on our actual knowledge about what is "right"—, we can even make mistakes unknowingly, we may have no idea of what "betterment" means. It may be fair to say that a huge part of the world population fight every day just to have a sufficient meal and thus stay alive and, thus, have no real room for maneuver. To have aspirations for the betterment of the self, it is almost a requisite to be "civilized", to have the possibility to decide things, to have a basic education. These ideas are, evidently, Western, and, as you know, the West, with its savage exploitation of the rest of the world, with its oppression of the rest, with its indifference for the rest, urges Westerners to stay course and thrive on that oppression, silencing and abuse of the rest. Our betterment right now depends of that savagery and oppression because it is arguable that our creature comforts come from the bad seed of cruelty and indifference for the rest. I am right now part of the rest. My country is being broken apart by savage Wall Street. Even if I want to be better and know how to be better, it will be very hard to actually act on that wish. Sadly, your comments may be philosophically correct but I wonder if you can sustain them in the real, inhumanizing world, where "the self" of so many selfs is so limited and frustrated.

Lilliana

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

You wrote:

Don't you have to choose between believing in causality and believing in responsibility (or free will)?

---End quotation

Yes, this is one very large question of substantial connection in the present context. In recent discussions of "freedom of the will" and "responsibility," there has been much emphasis on the idea that one is responsible only if "one could have done otherwise." So, discussion of that idea is also welcome, I believe.

Causality is definitely of interest. But on the other hand, I've always found it a fascinating point that we also speak of "political causes," and say, "working for a cause," liberation, freedom, abolitionism, enlightenment, etc. Is there a significant relationship here?

Inhibiting conditions of self-development seem more relevant to "cause" as in "cause and effect." Part of the point is that it is much easier to destroy than it is to create; and in consequence, the worst sorts of human competitions tend to focus on the means of destruction. Its easier to inhibit someone's self-development (say of competitive potentiality) than it is to facilitate someone's self-development. But notice that we can imagine a teacher, say, as devoted to the cause of the self-development of the students. But your teacher can't alone cause someone's self-development. A teacher might contribute to your self-development. On the other hand, a teacher might, unfortunately inhibit the student's self-development more easily than facilitating it.

I suspect that various (honorable or less honorable) political and social causes may be more relevant to inhibition of general self-development--as they are relevant to facilitation of self-development. Of interest here are those "causes" closely connect with political favoritism and and insider trading of privileges, advantages and opportunities.  As I say, the worst sorts of human competitions tend to focus on means of physical destruction of competitors. This is truly a matter of "cause and effect." But there are more finely tuned means for getting the competition out of the way, which tend to have a political or social and quasi-political character. What comes to mind at first, is simple gossip or defamation against potential competitors circulated among the favored insiders with the aim of maintaining or enhancing their own position. This can be done in the name of a "cause," of course, to attempt to disguise the less reputable motives.  This is a subtle means of exploitation of outsiders and destructive of their fuller opportunities of self-development. Many unknowingly or passively go along with such things, as one may say, "in order to get along."

We learn to be suspicious of great concentrations of institutional and social or political power just because they tend to be used by insiders against outsiders. They may facilitate growth and self-development, virtue and character --but also inhibit it selectively. I see the point as important in understanding the general social and political conditions of self-development. Of course, these things are generally open to change themselves. But, as with the avoidance of war, the avoidance or prevention of oppression is historically a very difficult matter. "In tyranny" says Aristotle, "there is little or no friendship." But notice that this "friendship" or "philia," includes what goes from parent to child and from teacher to student. If a "teacher," say, is set on exploitation, then to what degree might the student "have done otherwise" in the course of prospective self-development? 

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Ramos-Collado,

You wrote:

of course tradition and education are inhibiting factors. "Room for maneuver" is essential if you are to take responsibility: if you cannot move, you cannot "do", nor be "virtuous" or "not virtuous".

---End quotation

You wrote a very stimulating reply, but just at the start of it, we see what seems to be a faulty generalization. Surely, "tradition and education" sometimes facilitate self-development and the development of character. Don't you mean that education and tradition are sometimes inhibiting factors? 

Your point about "room to maneuver" here is well taken. But it sounds a bit too political to me in some of your usage. Note my distancing from puritanical rigidities in matters of morals. Morality is often more appropriately adaptive than it is strictly prescriptive and imperative.  But what counts as "maneuver" for the mature actor might also count as evasion of needed self-discipline for others. Morality, virtue and character by no means reduce to political or quasi-political adroitness. We don't want to encourage the young and impressionable to simply adapt themselves to the powers-that-be --especially not where political dysfunction is much in the air. Virtue and character are elsewhere.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

If, as you say, "There is only one thing one can do: the thing one actually does," this reduces all possibility or potentiality to what actually happens. That is a strict linear determinism.

Consider the following argument. It is now about 9:30 AM EST, and by 12 noon, I could be, say in New York City--which is only 90 miles away. I need only jump on the train and off I go. But if I wait until 11:30 AM, it will no longer be possible for me to be in NYC by 12:00 noon. The possibility persist for a time, and then expires. But equally, now at 9:30 AM EST, I could be in, say, Atlantic City by 12:00 noon. This again is a possibility which persists for a time and will later expire. Obviously, by 12:00 noon, I can't be both in NYC and in Atlantic City.  Still, I have no doubt that I could make either trip. Neither is especially difficult or complicated and I have made them many times. I know how to do it and the infrastructure is all in place. It makes sense to say I could make one trip or the other. In consequence, it seems obviously false to maintain that I can only do whatever I will eventually do in fact. Your strict linear determinism seems false on the face of it.

Right?

p.s. I'm open to your demonstration that one of these two alternatives was not in fact possible at the time. What would it take to show this? What kind of argument would that be? What kind of evidence might be offered? What established fact could be appealed to as the basis of the argument?

H.G. Callaway

David,

While upbringing and environment has a lot to do with one's character, they are not the end-all determining factors. There is such a thing a personal responsibility and choice. I see underprivileged children in single parent welfare recipient families that, through hard work and perseverance, get accepted into well respected universities on scholarships. This proves that one can be more than one's environment and social rearing dictates. My hat is tipped to those individuals who strive to achieve what they are constantly told is beyond them. They steer their own course in a rock-strewn sea.

One's character can be changed through determination and perseverance.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Ramos-Collado,

You wrote:

Words like "morals", "virtue", "decency", coming straight from Aristotle and Cicero's De oficci, are probably not applicable to our concept of the self and of our being in the world at this point of history.

---End quotation

This strikes me as a quite astounding claim! I am not quite sure how this could be established. How would you propose to argue for it? What exactly do you see as making such concepts "probably" inapplicable? What alternative conception of self do you propose? What exactly is wrong with what you want to criticize?

On the contrary, "morals,""virtue," "decency," and Aristotle's ethics seem to me to make perfectly good sense. In fact there is something of a revival of Aristotle going on at present.

What sort of "being in the world" does "this point in history" suggest to you?

Aren't you going a bit off the deep end here?

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

I do not see that my argument above had anything to do with "feelings" or with "feeling free." My argument was that there were these two possibilities of trips, to NYC or Atlantic City. I gave evidence regarding each. Each destination is relatively close by, there is good infrastructure for travel, the time limitations were within reason, I'm familiar with the routes, and I have made both such trips many times in the past. The evidence is, surely, and our common-sense conviction, that I could have been in either place by 12:00 noon--if I had left at 9:30. But if I could have taken the one trip and I could have taken the other, then, although I stayed home, I could have done otherwise. 

You fail to give any argument why one trip was possible and the other not; or for that matter, any reason to believe that neither was possible. But clearly, I could have been in NYC by 12:00 noon, though now its too late for that. It seems obvious to me that I could have done something else than what I did do. This is no "feeling" its a matter of travel experience, frequencies of the trains and availability of other means of transport, my familiarity with the routes, etc.  I gave arguments and evidence. In contrast, you seem to suggest that I don't know what my conclusion is and that I was really just expressing a "feeling." But my conclusion has nothing to do with feelings. 

H.G. Callaway

The person is responsible for his own character, but not entirely. Social environment and life circumstances make an impact. 

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

It is not that I thought "feeling" had some negative connotation. It is instead that, contrary to your claim, my conclusion had nothing to do with "feelings." I said that two things were possible, and I gave my arguments. I said nothing about feelings or feelings of freedom; and I simply restated my conclusion to make that clear.

To recapitulate a bit, recall that I was responding, with my argument about the two possible trips and destinations to a statement of yours, viz.,

You wrote:

The idea, related to free will, that one is responsible only if "one could have done otherwise" sounds very twisted to me. There is only one thing one can do: the thing one actually does.

---End quotation

I was simply defending, with a concrete example, the ordinary sense in which we believe that alternatives are sometimes open to us and we therefore, "could do otherwise." I was criticizing, or arguing against  your claim that "There is only one thing one can do: the thing one actually does." (I am yet to say anything about "free will.")

Although I in fact stayed home, at 9:30AM it was still possible for me to go to NYC or to go to Atlantic City by 12:00 noon. You haven't shown otherwise. But you continue to suppose that if I did one thing instead of another (which, in fact, I equally could have done), then the alternative was not a genuine possibility. But this seems false. We know the possibilities from past experience.

H.G. Callaway 

Renzo,

''a feeling of freedom has not much to do with an actual free (i.e., unconstrained, undetermined) will.''

I feell that it has a lot to do with it.  You think it has not a lot to do.  My feeling seem to be natural and why should I doubt it?  Doubting it seems to lead to paralysis of my freedom.  No doubting it seems to be a first requirement for it to act.  I think that we naturally applies this principle.  What parent would say to his 4 year old child that:  ''you think you are free but you are not, all you do is compelled by your desires anchored in your body.  You are not really responsible of anything.'.  Nobody would dare raising a child that way.    

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

You oppose freedom to causality, but many others connect the two. Let me sketch a short argument to that effect.

I assume that we are sometimes able to do what we want. Obviously, no one of us is omnipotent, and sometimes we are not able to do what we want. But the fact that we are sometimes able to do what we want belongs to our conception of freedom.

But further, sometimes it is possible for people to changes their wants and desires. This point is closely connected with the concepts of virtue, the attainment of virtue, and the concept of acquired self-control. A simple example is changing one's eating habits, or even something as simple as giving up on sugar in your coffee or tea. People are able to cultivate tastes, for example tastes in music or varieties or styles of arts generally, and come by such means to have wants they didn't have before.  Changing habits, desires and wants can be difficult and frustrating, of course, but the point here is that it is sometimes possible for people to do such things. That this is possible, and we needn't be "slaves to the passions," say, or always captured in unwanted habits, belongs to our conception of freedom. If we can sometimes do what we want and sometimes even change what we want, then ... what more could anyone want from freedom? (Notice I have said nothing to deny causality.)

But there is more. Sometimes we can become able to do things that we could not do before. "Knowledge is power," as Bacon put the point; and we are able to acquire new knowledge, which can expand our human powers. If people want to get quickly across a river, then given knowledge of materials and distances, we become able to build a bridge and afterward quickly move from one side of the river to the other. Understanding human beings better, we may become better able to deal with each other; understanding diverse societies better, they may become better able to deal with each other. The possibility of expanding human powers belongs to our conception of human freedom. This possibility depends on our understanding causal connections and on being able to manipulate causes to bring about desired effects.

So are we free, and how free are we? Well, as we have seen, we can do what we want sometimes and sometimes even change what we want. No one, I hope aspires to be able to do anything they want and on every occasion. (What good would life be, if the mere wish of a child could bring down the sun?)  Beyond satisfying our desires, and sometimes changing them, we can also sometimes expand our powers. No denial of causality here, as far as I can see, but we have a pretty strong conception of human freedom. Consistent with this, it may still be that some people have more freedom than others--say greater self-control, a better conception or understanding of the world around, --or even "friends in high places." Some people may have too much freedom and others too little--for the general good. But it is still presumably freedom which they have in excess or defect.

I think you owe us an argument that this conception of human freedom is either inadequate, or that it is inconsistent with causality. You've simply been assuming that freedom is inconsistent with causality, but we are yet to see the arguments to demonstrate this.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Renzo,

Human being learned and tranform themself all their life and we call freedom this possibily to do so that is open to them.  Transformation of their knowledge, skills, even desires and feelings. Our nervous system rewire itself during our life. One key aim of psychology has to inquire why and how it is possible.  I do not see the relevance to the question of causality onto this issue.  

Freedom in the sense defined above is all about adaptation of a human being to his physical and societal circumstances.  It make sense that biological evolution which is driven by adaptation had in the long run lead to animals whose adaptation is more plastic/flexible/faster to the point where in humanity it reached a new domain where a human  ontogeny is mostly culturally driven and where evolution become culturally driven instead of being genetically driven.  

This question is a good one.  Many in Philosophy ponder this daily.  If there is no way to influence what is going to happen then why are we here? How could it be anything but random chance and there for it is not our will but the will of nature that will say what will and will not happen.  If this is true it does not matter what happens as it was going to happen any why.    We should not have jails or a justice system as it does not matter.

I can not believe that this is the case.  We are responsible for what we do and we should always strive to get better.  The future is not set and we have a say in how it goes.  The mind of a person is not limited by its size but only its ability to imagine the future and then build it.

George

Renzo,

Human being and their societies are more than a circular causality.  Don't forget to put  agency into the equation.  We are not simple sophisticate mechanisms reacting with some memories.  We are actors.  We are not all powerfull actors, but actors that constantly tries to get a greater acting power, more options open to them and not only for themself but their love ones and societies before dying. As an actor, someone who feel that it really can act but not knowing precisely how to act or knowing precisely why.  But nevertheless having a vague sense of what I am doing, have done and going to do.  I feel that the simple X affect Y may be a correct description of what is happening to my body in the sub micro second scales but really wrong description of what I am doing in the above second and years time scales.   X affect Y may be all there is about a rock falling or rolling but a rat behavior is astronomically more complicated than a cumulation of X affect Y.

 If you subscribe to the notion that I am a machine as human so far conceive them but only more complicated then I could understand why you think that all can be reduced to a lot of X affect Y and with no real agency.  But I don't subscribe to this notion.  I subscribe to the notion that what can be scientifically known in the type of science we are doing these days can only be a mechanism.  It is the nature of the scientific epistemology to be only concerned with the predictable and the mechanical.  It simply cannot be otherwise by the very nature of what this mode of knowing is.  But this mode of knowing is far from being the only form of knowing, form of engaging the world.  The universe has evolved much aboe the mechanical mode of acting and it did because it is self-learning and this selff-learning has only increased throughout evolution of the beings that exist.  At the level of humans our science is so far behind understanding what really is going.  We are good at deceifering local physiological events in the micro second scale but far from putting them together and understanding them in the time scales where our actions are taking places.  But our lack of understanding is not as simple as this.  Agency is not somthing we can even begin to grasp scientifically because of its epistemological rejection by method.   This is a much more serious problem than just piecing a very complicated scientific puzzle.  Agency which is self-evident for any human being, central to our being, is a priori excluded from our science.  It is not going to change; it cannot change.  Science is simply limited to know what is external to agency.  It should be self-evident that it is the case.  Is a science of behavior possible?  Astronomy can study black hole up to their horizon and behavior can also be studied up to their horizons.  Lets remember that science is a 3rd exterior viewpoint but we are in the other side of the horizon and it is where we are acting at the singularity; there lye all the human modes of acting and knowing, except science (in its expression, in its doing the scientist is inside) that epistemologically decided to stay out. The scientific mode of expression do not require (in fact it exclude by principle) and subjective interpretation and all our other mode of expression needs subjective interpretations.  There is no way to pass jump accross this barrier between a objective expression to a expression relying on subjective interpretation. These subjective modes of expressions all make sense by calling to the depth of our being that come from billion of years of life evolution and millenia of enculturation.  

... yes he/she is ... because it is the mark of the individual him / her and that differs from livestock ...

Character is a symbolic sign for every human beings in the world .Character to be viewed in totality & can not be separated from one part to another & it is in this line a person without such sealed character become a nuisance for the society & only such characterless individual society becomes the victims of such individual with the result they can live happily  & peaceful .

Individual with character imprint are know for their moral code ,quality ,honesty ,integrity ,& whatever the know they have acquired in the  respect areas works for all the time good & worthy for the right & noble cause of the society .

This is my personal opinion 

Dear Renzo:

"Explaining" behavior --as psychology does-- does not mean that behavior is "determined", because the "laws" that human sciences establish are probabilistic, not deterministic.

We can not predict the behaviors of individual or groups with absolute certainty. That is, there is an irreducible component of uncertainty in the human world.

Arguing that this uncertainty is caused by an imperfect or incomplete knowledge doesn't solve the question, which ultimately leads to the philosophical basis of the theory.

Physics faces a similar situation and it has been able to go beyond common sense and accept, for example, that an electron is not a particle nor a wave, but both things, or that the position and velocity of a particle can not be determined simultaneously.

In the same way, we have to accept --because it is consistent with empirical evidence- that human behavior depends on a number of factors that individuals or groups don't control and, at the same time, is plenty of indeterminacy. 

Renzo,

I perfectly understand the machistic mainstream point of view of cognitive science.  Understanding it is not very hard.  What is a bit harder is coming out of it in a way that is scientific, i.e. in agreement with the facts, and that is not in contradiction with our common sense and  so don't undermine our confidence in our common sense and in this way is in agreement with our cultural inheritence and do not undermine it.  This is my sense of responsible science or the type of science I find worth pursuing.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

I suspect a short quotation from William James might help things along at this point, regarding human freedom and powers:

Our philoso­phies swell the current of being, add their character to it. They are part of all that we have met, of all that makes us be. As a French philoso­pher says, ‘Nous sommes du réel dans le réel.’ Our thoughts determine our acts, and our acts re-determine the previous nature of the world.

From, William James, A Pluralistic Universe.

“We are of the real and in the real,” quoted by James in French, needs but little paraphrase to become the later refrain of twentieth-century pragma­tism that human beings are “real causes in nature.” This human­ism (which is in no sense inconsistent with theism or religion) is an inte­gral element of James’s pluralism. It tells us, more generally, that the parts and elements of the universe make a genuine difference and are not predetermined and defined from all eternity by their place in the whole; just as the minutest observation may, for the empiricist, suffice to over­turn our most general and all-encompassing theory. In a similar way, innovations, developments, or activities of any individual anywhere may bring us to reevaluations of broad theory or established structures of life and society.

In a significant sense, it is the power of thought which makes us free and confers the uniquely human powers which are cultivated throughout the liberal arts, including philosophy. Whatever forces impinge upon us, we can reflect upon them and either act in terms of pre-existing values and beliefs, thus freely, or act in terms of the results of reflection and deliberation; and the results of reflection and deliberation are neither predictable nor predetermined by what has gone before.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

You have a considerable inclination for grand statements, lacking supporting arguments. For example, you wrote:

Dear José, as put by Ilya Prigogine, determinism and probabilism do not contradict one another but are complementary. Uncertainty is not a shelter for free will.

---End quotation

Why should anyone accept this? Your favorite phrase seems to be "free will," though you seem to be the only one who has mentioned the theme in this thread.

It certainly seems that "determinism" and "probabilism" stand in some considerable tension--to say the least. You view seems to be a variety of dogmatism. You avoid addressing stronger arguments and revert to simply making contrary claims. Presumably you think that the only people who matter already agree with you--and any others don't matter?

Or might you actually risk making an argument to try to support your position?

Curious,

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Risser & contributors,

I've come across a collection of excerpts from Rawl's A Theory of Justice, on line.

The fuller context of the passage quoted in the question at the head of the present thread, reads as follows.

Rawls wrote:

Perhaps some will think that the person with greater natural endowments deserves those assets and the superior character that made their development possible. Because he is more worthy in this sense, he deserves the greater advantages that he could achieve with them. This view, however, is surely incorrect. It seems to be one of the fixed-points of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one

deserves one's initial starting place in society. The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases. Thus the more advantaged representative man cannot say that he deserves and therefore has a right to a scheme of cooperation in which he is permitted to acquire benefits in ways that do not contribute to the

welfare of others. There is no basis for his making this claim. From the standpoint of common sense, then, the difference principle appears to be acceptable both to the more advantaged and to the less advantaged individual.

---End quotation

See:

http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/fellenm/Classes/PHL107_files/Rawls.pdf

Strictly, it strikes me that saying one deserves the character one has attained to is different from the question of whether one is responsible for the character one has attained to.

We may be inclined to deny a claim to deserve superior attainment, while recognizing the contribution of the person to the character attained. Again, if someone attains to distinction of character without great native or social advantages, I think we would be more inclined to attribute both accomplishment and responsibility for the accomplishment attained.

A person is ultimately responsible for his/her character, within the natural and social limitations encountered.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

You write, in reply,

I thought my line of reasoning was explicit from the outset. I think action is determined (i.e., not free). In this framework, inferring the existence of free will (and, therefore, of genuine responsibility) would be a contradiction in terms.

---End quotation

This, however is not so much a "line of reasoning" as it is a conclusion, for which you are yet to supply a line of reasoning, The details of the argument matter here, and without them, what you say seems mere "hand waving" or sometimes "name dropping," especially since you do not take the trouble of answering contrary arguments explicitly. 

You have persistently ignored the positions arguing that actions can be causally determined and still free--that it matters how they are determined. That is one broadly accepted position in related philosophical debates. Its called "compatibilism."  Look at the terms of your own statement "I think action is determined," you say, (i.e. not free)."  But, for instance the statement  "Act A is determined," (e.g., by preexisting desires and beliefs) does not logically imply "Act A is unfree." Something is missing, and this would be your missing argument.  You beg the question against compatibilism by equating "causally determined" with "unfree." In this way you fail to make any case for your conclusion. 

Again, you write:

The production of any human behavior requires a (causal) chain of neuro-synaptic activations. Those activations do not fall from the sky. They're determined by the (functional and structural) biology of the organism and by its environment.

---End quotation

What you have here is a scientific program for the study of human behavior. I have no objection to the program as long it is recognized for what it is and not conflated with the finished product that might be most optimistically expected from it. There are many aspects of human behavior that we would like to understand better, and the approach of relating behavior to "neuro-synaptic activations" has had some results. I recall in particular the investigation of the role of dopamine in various neurological diseases. But we are very far from having explanation of all human behavior in similar terms. In consequence, you seem to confuse a  scattering of results with vindication of a universal generalization. This has the look of a simple logical error. No doubt, human behavior has its neurological basis and conditions.

Notice that I know nothing about the specifics of your "neuro-synaptic activations." I understand you, in degree, and what you are doing on this thread in other, common-sense terms and in those of the established scholarly disciplines. This is the way that people in fact relate and interact. It is a successful way, within limits. In general terms, it tells us that people do better if they take responsibility for the development of character. That of course is a normative stance, but if people act on it, it does tend to have its expected positive effects. Merely talking about "neuro-synaptic activations," you supply no alternative, except to say that responsibility and freedom are "illusion." But why should anyone follow normative advice if they think it illusory?

Suppose someone had argued, e.g., "the human race will do better, if we abolish slavery." This is a normative position. So, the laws of nations were changed to require that people cannot be compelled to work for someone and cannot be owned by another person. The world was in fact improved by enacting a normative judgment into law. We know little or nothing about the neuro-physiology involved, but in spite of that we have reason to believe that it made a difference in the world, because people acted on this conviction. I submit that this is no illusion.

If you can actually explain some human behavior by reference to "neuro-synaptic activations" in some cases, that is fine and good by me. The idea that all human behavior could be explained in this way seems to be an unsupported dogma and the real illusion of interest in the context of this discussion. Generally, we have no access to this kind of detailed data, and even if we did have access, it seems unlikely that we could conceivably follow the details of neural activations. To insist exclusively upon this kind of dream-science strikes me as irresponsible. In consistency with you other statements perhaps you'll agree.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bianchi,

Perhaps your epistemology is inadequate for present purposes?

I said no such thing as you suggest. If you'll forgive me saying so, you fail to respond to what is actually said. Instead you argue with straw-men? My objective is to minimize the grounds required for support of freedom and responsibility, thereby making their appeal widely familiar and acceptable. I do not aim to expand the grounds of the argument beyond generally accepted premises or narrow it to particularities of opinion and belief.

The theme here concerns basic values of liberal education. A conception of natural science which makes no room for moral responsibility stands in danger of committing intellectual-moral suicide and dishonoring science.

H.G. Callaway 

Dear Renzo:

You say that "Uncertainty is not a shelter for free will.". What I said is that this problem leads us to the philosophical basis of your scientific theory. You hold a mechanical --even newtonian-- conception of the (human) universe. I don't. 

Mr. Jorge, Mr. Bianchi, Mr. Callaway,

Thank you, gentlemen. Now I have determinism (or predetermination if you will) and probability going through my mind and, unfortunately, can see the promulgation of events that could cascade down through time since the Big Bang. That also sidetracks me trying to envision what quantum string theory means to determinism: that there is only one universe because all events are predetermined by the forces that exert on each and every atom through time or that there exists a multiverse because all possibilities are possible at the same time.

Since the very definition of predetermination means that it is not provable, then even arguing for free will is a lost cause. For example, if two identical twins were born and raised exactly the same but one had a temper and the other a pleasant disposition, that would argue for free will. However, how can we know that one brain cell or one small synapse that chanced to not develop is the cause of the different behavior? If so, is this then determinism instead of free will?

I now have to flush my brain before I start writing equations on the chalkboard!

JAG

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Risser & contributors,

I've come across a collection of excerpts from Rawl's A Theory of Justice, on line.

The fuller context of the passage quoted in the question at the head of the present thread, reads as follows.

Rawls wrote:

Perhaps some will think that the person with greater natural endowments deserves those assets and the superior character that made their development possible. Because he is more worthy in this sense, he deserves the greater advantages that he could achieve with them. This view, however, is surely incorrect. It seems to be one of the fixed-points of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one

deserves one's initial starting place in society. The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases. Thus the more advantaged representative man cannot say that he deserves and therefore has a right to a scheme of cooperation in which he is permitted to acquire benefits in ways that do not contribute to the

welfare of others. There is no basis for his making this claim. From the standpoint of common sense, then, the difference principle appears to be acceptable both to the more advantaged and to the less advantaged individual.

---End quotation

See:

http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/fellenm/Classes/PHL107_files/Rawls.pdf

Strictly, it strikes me that saying one deserves the character one has attained to is different from the question of whether one is responsible for the character one has attained to.

We may be inclined to deny a claim to deserve superior attainment, while recognizing the contribution of the person to the character attained. Again, if someone attains to distinction of character without great native or social advantages, I think we would be more inclined to attribute both accomplishment and responsibility for the accomplishment attained.

A person is ultimately responsible for his/her character, within the natural and social limitations encountered.

H.G. Callaway

Flippo,

I respectfully disagree with your opinion that "This will give the appearance of an intentional/willful change, but was in fact unavoidable". We have nothing if not free will. The person has the option to change or not to change, thus to chose to change is not "unavoidable" but a conscience act of will.

Filippo,

Galileo broke new intellectual grounds when he made these experiements with rolling mass down a slope.  He did not guess that some peoples in the future would equate people with rolling stone , acting by pure causality.  Amazing simplification.

It is too early in our neuroscience studies to tell what the genesis of character is. As such we have only philosophical studies to fall back on. The problem comes with the interference between philosophy and neuroscience. At the heart of this question is the assumption of WILL a philosophically acceptable force applied consciously to guide the brain. Problem is that in some neuroscientific studies, we have reason to question the existence of such a force, Reference if you will Wegner's "The illusion of conscious will". This questioning of the existence of Will makes the concept of Free Will, only partly attainable, and mostly an illusion. If WILL-POWER is an illusion, the question becomes just how much is conscious control an illusion, and how much is real.

The idea that there is a great wealth of processing done, implicitly or unconsciously, that precedes the actual conscious decisions, is a controversy not easily overcome when attempting to determine what is done consciously. The jury is still out, as far as I know on just how long it takes for conscious reaction. But evidence seems to suggest that consciousness comes late to the feast.