Philadelphia, PA, November 11, 2014

Dear Risser, 

This strikes me as an interesting question, and you certainly show some facility in elaborating it. I would say, in the first place that there is an important difference between whether political actors will, as a matter of fact, engage in "dirty hands" activities, and whether they ought to do so. In all likelihood, there will always be some amount or degree of this sort of thing--at least from time to time-- and the only very interesting question is how much and how often? Regarding the moral question of the responsibility of political actors, it seems clear that "dirty hands" activities are morally culpable. This implies, along with much else, that such activities should not be accepted as moral and/or legal precedent. The question resembles the old puzzles about the ethics of life-boats. But I do not believe for a moment that any reasonable ethics can be formulated for every variation of emergency situations. The best answer regarding the ethics of life-boats is simply to keep out of life-boats. I think one must be blinded by the ideal of universalism to fail to see the appeal of that answer. 

The chief question, then, as I view the matter, is how far the "dirty hands" activities permeate a given society.  Many and varied persons, in many and varied positions, may come to think of themselves as primarily or partly political actors, and in the extreme the prevalence of underhanded activities will likely culminate in a generalized lack of trust and pervasive corruption--on the theory that what's good for the goose in good for the gander. The corruption would plausibly spread by association with centers of political power --as more narrowly understood. That is the chief reason that "dirty hands" activities cannot be allowed to set a precedent for more of the same. 

You mention the American Civil War in passing, and I think it worth adding a point of history. The founders of the American republic tended to be very skeptical of the idea of maintaining a standing army, and though millions were under arms during the Civil War, after the war, the U.S. Army was cut back to 30,000 men and kept at that level for about 30 years --until the time of the Spanish American War. This fact belonged to the meaning of "Reconstruction," and the belief was that the country needed to be reconstructed for civil purposes, after the war. As with the founders, the prevalent belief in the middle to late 19th-century was that if the army was there, on a large scale, then it would be used in one situation or another. The point belongs to the heights of the politics of those times. I see an echo here of the idea of keeping the country "out of life-boats," and not allowing war and the preparation for war to enter into the social and political constitution of the country.  I think we might learn much from the historical example.

It is not that I think we only need 30,000 soldiers, but some greater movement in this direction, after the long ordeal of the Cold War, would likely be beneficial. 

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA, November 11, 2014

Dear Risser, 

This strikes me as an interesting question, and you certainly show some facility in elaborating it. I would say, in the first place that there is an important difference between whether political actors will, as a matter of fact, engage in "dirty hands" activities, and whether they ought to do so. In all likelihood, there will always be some amount or degree of this sort of thing--at least from time to time-- and the only very interesting question is how much and how often? Regarding the moral question of the responsibility of political actors, it seems clear that "dirty hands" activities are morally culpable. This implies, along with much else, that such activities should not be accepted as moral and/or legal precedent. The question resembles the old puzzles about the ethics of life-boats. But I do not believe for a moment that any reasonable ethics can be formulated for every variation of emergency situations. The best answer regarding the ethics of life-boats is simply to keep out of life-boats. I think one must be blinded by the ideal of universalism to fail to see the appeal of that answer. 

The chief question, then, as I view the matter, is how far the "dirty hands" activities permeate a given society.  Many and varied persons, in many and varied positions, may come to think of themselves as primarily or partly political actors, and in the extreme the prevalence of underhanded activities will likely culminate in a generalized lack of trust and pervasive corruption--on the theory that what's good for the goose in good for the gander. The corruption would plausibly spread by association with centers of political power --as more narrowly understood. That is the chief reason that "dirty hands" activities cannot be allowed to set a precedent for more of the same. 

You mention the American Civil War in passing, and I think it worth adding a point of history. The founders of the American republic tended to be very skeptical of the idea of maintaining a standing army, and though millions were under arms during the Civil War, after the war, the U.S. Army was cut back to 30,000 men and kept at that level for about 30 years --until the time of the Spanish American War. This fact belonged to the meaning of "Reconstruction," and the belief was that the country needed to be reconstructed for civil purposes, after the war. As with the founders, the prevalent belief in the middle to late 19th-century was that if the army was there, on a large scale, then it would be used in one situation or another. The point belongs to the heights of the politics of those times. I see an echo here of the idea of keeping the country "out of life-boats," and not allowing war and the preparation for war to enter into the social and political constitution of the country.  I think we might learn much from the historical example.

It is not that I think we only need 30,000 soldiers, but some greater movement in this direction, after the long ordeal of the Cold War, would likely be beneficial. 

H.G. Callaway

There is a separate morality applicable to politics in the sense of there being a particular set of rules that override all others. It is the requirement to respect the fundamental rights of all persons, such observance constituting rules of behaviour and of government operation. These rules are objective and universal (if properly defined), not being based on anyone's choice of morality, values, religious beliefs and so on. At the same time every person, owning himself/herself, may choose his/her morality. If their choice is consistent with the aforementioned rules then he or she may perform a useful political role. If not then they may waste people's time.

Dear Robert,

In fact you are disagreeing with the claim of a separate political morality. Respect for a set of fundamental human rights is a principle of conventional morality, which you argue ought to also be an overriding principle of political action.  The objectivity of moral rules is a meta-ethical issue, and it is beyond the scope of the question posed here.  Thank you for your response to my question.

David

Dear Robert,

I have an additional point.  The respect by governments for some set of fundamental human rights as an overriding principle of political action must start with and be supported by the people as a part of their personal/private moralities.

One who does support the claim that there is a separate and conflicting morality applicable to political action, would also claim that there may well be situations in which rights ought to be violated in order to achieve some higher and pressing political goal, such as protecting the very existence of a state.  

For example, despite withering criticism from US Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney, President Lincoln temporarily suspended the constitutional and common law right of habeas corpus to protect the Union from infiltration by spies for the Confederacy.

Thank you,

David

Dear Dr. Callaway,

Among those scholars who agree that there is a separate political morality, some characterize the conflict with conventional morality as a paradox.  If a political actor ought to respond to a political situation in a manner which is wrong in private/personal circumstances, he/she is right in terms of political morality, but wrong in the context of conventional morality.  Since the same action cannot be both right and wrong, an apparent paradox arises.

At a more theoretical level, political morality is consequentialist , while conventional morality is deontological, but often accompanied by some consequentialist feature. These divergent natures of the two moralities also help to explain why they conflict.

An interesting question for me is under what kinds or categories of circumstances is the use of political morality appropriate   Also, though I agree that dirty-handed political actors bear moral responsibility, it is not clear to me what sort of response to an ascription of moral responsibility in such cases is fitting.

Max Weber argues that in such cases, the political actor must live with the moral taint of a compromised conscience.

David

Philadelphia, PA, November 12, 2014

Dear Risser, 

Many thanks for your thoughtful comments and elaboration. Let me see if I can pin down more finely exactly what you want to get at with this question. 

While I can imagine, without too much difficulty, that the special situations arising in political practice and political office might call for special elaborations of moral thought, I am not much inclined to place political morality in contrast to conventional morality. I'm disinclined to erect a dichotomy or moral dualism. If you are thinking of political ethics, as akin to say, medical ethics or engineering ethics, that seems more plausible. 

A former judge here in Philadelphia recently plead guilty to the charge of "conflict of interest" for accepting a gift from someone looking for a contract from the courts. A more serious charge was dropped, I believe. Conflicts of interest are generally problematic, though not always criminal. I take it though that special restrictions are appropriate for public officials.  I can imagine a political morality along these lines.

Moral habits and intuitions differ from place to place and from time to time, though I suppose that there is a "better and worse" amongst the varieties and variations. I think the point could be illustrated by reference to national cultural differences, or, say, in reference to religious or denominational or even philosophical differences among people and peoples. So, I would not agree with your (apparently empirical) claim that "conventional morality is deontological."  Nor would I agree to this as a normative stricture. In any case, I think that public mores are sometimes and in some places more deontological and sometimes and elsewhere more consequentialist.  

I, for one, do not buy the idea that political actors are somehow entitled to a "higher" morality in some sense, which stands in conflict with morality as normatively acceptable and recommended on consideration. Of course, they sometimes act otherwise. But to say that such "dirty hands" action is morally culpable is to reject special entitlements of a moral character. I take it that this is part of what is generally meant by the "rule of law (and not of men--or women)."  Nor do political officials stand above criticism and debate on their actions. It is a matter of conscience, however, to support our elected officials as best we can. 

Of course I do recognize what you are talking about in categorizing "conventional morality" as deontological and political actors as highly aim directed --in the sense that this is a fact about particular societies at particular times. But by the same token, I recall my amazement to find, some decades back, that people in the Midwest cities would stand on the street corners, waiting for the light to change, though there was no hint of traffic on the streets. It is said here in Philadelphia, in some contrast, that you can jaywalk across Market Street any time of day or night--though don't try it on Broad Street.  

Of course, these varied empirical observations of the variation of deontological and goal directed elements do not settle the normative questions.  While the laws here regarding jaywalking likely do not differ from those in the Midwest, I can tell you that the related mores do.  But what are we to make of it? Similarly, some political actors seem to think they are covered by a "higher" morality, while in fact this may also count to mere expediency--always damaging if treated as precedent. 

H.G. Callaway

Hello David,

The primary distinction is that politics is what is good and right for society as a whole while ethics is about what is good and right for a person. 

So politicians who are corrupt are both violating ethics and violating politics. So we can put corruption to one side....there is a solution here but it does not bear on your question.

The issue of human rights is also a red herring. Whatever the human right principles generally accepted in a society, they ought to be applied. But principles are not binding rules (i.e. they guide and judgement and weighing of the issue is required)--which takes us to the critical issue.

In what is good for society, politics has to mediate between powerful groups who do not see eye to eye.  Power intrinsically comes down to ends justifying means i.e. it is anti-ethical. One of ethic's key personal tasks is to help us manage power.  Politics primary task is to manage power on the societal stage. 

Given the way the world is (i.e. the current stage of human awareness -- capacity for self-mastery, rationality, compassion), this management will be difficult and often appear to violate ethical principles e.g. telling lies in your example. You cannot run a society as if it was a person. It is not.

The bottom line is that the quality of politics we have today in the West is a long long way from where it can and should be, because politicians are not incentivized or monitored to focus on the good of society. Rather than being professional, they become slaves to ideology and are overwhelmingly concerned with getting re-elected.  You might call this unethical. I would call it unprofessional and immature. But then that reflects their public.

You can read more about this way of thinking with positive solutions at my website:  thee-online.com  

Go to: Explore > Frameworks > Politics

Warren

Justice is justice and the Dharma is the Dharma. There are not ways out. We cannot hide behind one blade of grass. There are private correct and politicians correct. There are private with bad morality and politicians with bad morality too. Unfortunately, the politics is home of the most people incorrect, but is not a rule, depends on human beings.

Good and Evil are in our limited mind. Dharma is beyond the mind and the action that follows is always correct. I explain better: if you have to choose an action and your action is in tune with your SvaDharma and your SvaDharma is in tune with the universal Dharma, follow the path of Dharma makes your decision easier and right.

But there are very few human beings who follow this deep path. That's why the politics is soo dirty. 

Warren,   I have to take issue with your idea that human rights are relative. As I see it every person has certain rights that come with being a person. These are the same for all persons in the world regardless of country. Their derivation I have done in my book Human Rights, What Are They Really? which is available at my web site www.truehumanrights.com Governments acknowledge and protect these rights or not.

When a government does the politicians are guided by these rights as rules of personal behaviour and of government operation. The antithesis of this is government operation to maximize results for the group while ignoring rights that get in the way. Unfortunately, that is the way the Western World is operating and it is spreading thru democratization efforts. Governments that work for the "good of society" are trying to achieve a society that looks good. Missing from the equation is justice for the individual person which is unethical.

Dear Warren, 

I agree with much that you say, but your characterization of politics today in the West, does not address my question.  If you like, abstract from any extant political circumstances, and address the question at that level. Thanks for your response.

Dear Ellis,

Please take a glance at the explanation which follows my question.  I agree that policy implementation follows a time line, and that intervening factors and events can change the outcome. But, first not all political action involves the public policy process, and second, although political morality is far more consequentialist  than conventional morality, even if a dirty-handed policy policy fails, judgments of blameworthiness take account of the motives from which the politician acted.  Thank you for participating.

Best to you both,

David

The abstract answer is YES.

Dear David,

your question is presumably not if there is 'really' a hierarchy of moral levels between ordinary people and politicians. If there is such thing at all, we initially have to ask who is legitimated not only to posit material moral committments within each ethical level, but also - in a metatheoretical manner - who establishes legitimately such an overarching hierarchy. In order to make things not more complicate than they are I would say, the kind of legitimacy for both of these question is the same. That means: Your question is basically - or methodologically, if you want to  - the same as to ask, who is entitled to posit a single, material moral rule.

Moral norms normally cannot be validly dictated by individuals. They are nonetheless at the core of the behavioral legacy of any society. They 'grow' and adapt over time in human communities as part of their cultural inheritance.

However, there is obviously a historical tendency in all cultures and through all times, at least as far as I know, to deny such  a hierarchy. The reason for this seems to me one of the empirical powers in play. Normally, the governed people are vastly outnumbering the governing people. This forces the rulers by and large to submit to the common good, or at least to constrain their benefits in order not be overthrown by a revolution. But that's empirical stuff and hence a different question.

Do you agree or disagree that there is a separate morality, appropriate to politics, but one which conflicts with conventional or private morality?

I disagree with a separate political morality. There should be equality for all leaders, especially for those that have the power to make rules and change outcomes. Ethical leadership goes for the power players as well and for those that try to manipulate variables to please their own agendas. There should never be private agendas in public offices, but we have seen the results of negative and conflicting leadership. The conventional and traditional have cost the US and many other countries a sense of mistrust and a lack of organizational commitment from followers. A few leaders have spoiled the ethical barrel for most political positions, compromising and conflicting the oath that was previously taken for the role in leading others. Watch dogs should be assigned to prevent such power plays.

"Max Weber argues that in such cases, the political actor must live with the moral taint of a compromised conscience." This is an old justification, that true sacrifice is the sacrifice of one's soul; anyone can lay down his/her life. I wonder if it isn't even true of politics in the home, between parents and children. We make up Santa Claus or other goofy lies for our children's enjoyment. Then we have this little drama about whether it Santa is really the parents. The kids start spying and the parents try to catch them looking for hidden presents. The policy is that it is Santa Claus, there are no hidden presents. You break important rules if you act as if you do not believe. You might not get anything for Christmas. But this policy is all to preserve what should be fun for the kids.

David,

I think that are recent social movements that try to deny such distinction between a political and a private morality. Occupy Wall Street and  Wikileaks are symptoms of this tendency of contemporary morality.  So it seems we live in a special historical moment in that  the legitimacy of politics are in question.

Ronie, didn't such an aspiration lead to the reign of terror after the French Revolution? I agree that we live on one of those moments when there is a demand from all sides to be "transparent" and honest and moral in politics. However, I am not sure if there is a separate morality or an inability to be moral once one is in office. The idea of a nation-state existing in a hostile world necessitates an abrogation of common morality (sittlichheit). To say this leads to a separate morality for those in power is an interesting contention. But doesn't it only make sense in the context of sittlichheit?

I want to thank those who have added answers and engaged in the discussion of my question thus far.  The quality of your responses strike me as quite good overall, and I have been given a number of valuable points.  These have stimulated my thinking about the important issues this question touches upon.  I hope the responses and discussion continues.

Thank you,

David

Scott, sure the world of double morality - that of people and that of States - is the world of Sittlichkeit or Realpolitik. If there is a contemporary tendency to question the morality of States, I think there is a tendency to question the legitimacy of State as such. I don't know where this can lead us but surely this is a kind of pressure on contemporary representative political system. So more and more people feel unrepresented to State.

I'm very interested in reflecting on this question further. Before I do so, however, I need to take issue with the examples you've provided because they both stand to skew intuitions here. Namely, you've selected two examples that had good outcomes, and the second is an especially desirable outcome morally speaking. Knobe and Nichols (2008), however, show us that our moral evaluation of actors changes when we disapprove of the outcomes of their actions. Had Lincoln bribed politicians to insure that the 13th amendment was not proposed, for example, then surely our assessment of the morality of his actions would change. We could always go with Nagel and say that moral assessments always hang on a bit of luck, but this seems to lead to serious inconsistencies. 

Anyway, as noted, I would like to linger a bit on the question itself, but for now it's worth noting that there may be some value in bracketing out the influence of the examples on one's theorizing. 

Have you considered the Wittgensteinian project of morality what his interlocutors think and Brandom and Gilbert Ryle because they could form the building block to your answer?

One the one hand, one could argue (as many have) that the whole idea of a system of law was to safe-guard against conflicts of interest between the whole of society and the individual. But of course you have the "FIRE- in-the-theater" problem. Let's use a popular conspiracy theory: real space aliens were invading us and only the government knows of this. Should they announce it and cause chaos and panic, or withhold the truth and try to manage the situation covertly? If any individual discovers what is happening, the government discredits the person and denies the truth. It is arguable that it would do no good to admit the truth and have massive social upheaval that creates a second massive problem. It is also arguable that the government should enlist the society it governs to deal with the invasion. There are certainly parallels to covert government spying to defend against terrorism these days. In that case, the dishonesty seems to compound injustices toward individuals, whistle blowers, etc.

The issue then seems to be as Mr. Spock used to say, "The good of the many outweighs the good of the few, or the one." But if the good of the many is so different in nature from the good of the one, doesn't that call into question a Bill of Rights for the individual?

Please also check  Knowing How by John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett OUP a text that covers a lot of literature on knowing believing, acting all of which form the bedrock of action,agency and volition[while the philosophical arena is rich one must also not overlook Erving Goffmann and Harold Garfinkel and more recently Archer] and Anandi Hattiangadi's Oughts and  Thoughts. It is all very well to argue about this topic at the meta level it something which Foucault does and also Rawls but we need to go deeper and a Wittgensteinian route with Dummett et al may just do the trick.

Your question is an important one. It also extends to economics, as a close kin to politics.

The matter of "truth" in politics and economics is malleable. This is the source of many conflicts and extreme positions.

Basically, every person has the right to choose his/her morality. In a population there are probably common elements of morality that are held by virtually everybody, e.g., right to security of one's person. A politician offends this common morality at the risk of rejection in the next election. A firmer and therefore better code of conduct is respect for the rights of all people. This is firstly every person's fundamental rights as a human being. These are improperly defined at present, mostly because of the UN declaration which contains errors and omissions. I worked on this problem for several years before publishing my book Human Rights, What are They Really? It contains a complete theory of human rights resulting from objective analysis. Politicians can therefore decide their actions against a definite standard that is common for all of them. It is like a group of engineers or medical doctors who must decide what to do in relation to the science that they all believe in.