Please read the basics of the scientific method. Induction and deduction are both absolutely necessary. Induction in the formation of hypotheses that explain empirical data. Deduction in refutation attempts of the hypotheses. This is all well known. Your question is a question of ignorance.

Michael Sidiropoulos, true. My question is due to ignorance. I have only taught philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and the various epochs of the history of philosophy.

In fact, I have published a few books; but on logic only one article: a new manner of looking at logic, namely, systemic logic.

I said here that I want to learn ways of connecting induction and deduction. Not in order to do them separately or together. In order to find whether their theoretical foundations could have something in common. Moreover, I did not do a doctorate in logic. Mine were on causation in QM and causation in cosmology. Hence, I really lack enough formation in the common foundations, if any, of induction and deduction.

I know absolutely nothing about engineering logic. Please don't feel bad about it.

I am happy that Stephan C. Mann recommended your reply. Really nice of him, too!

Michael Sidiropoulos and Stephan C. Mann, good morning!

If you get time, kindly take a look at this too:

Which principles of logic are universal? And why?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Which_principles_of_logic_are_universal_And_why

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy already has a vast amount of material on inductive, deductive ( and abductive ) reasoning, and also Argument Theory from historical ( thousands of years ) and current perspectives ( "Argument and Argumentation" at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/argument/ ).

Michael John Patrick, thanks. I am aware of it. What I intend is a discussion on possible ways of structurally connecting with each other induction, deduction, and possibly also abduction.

Raphael Neelamkavil My point may have been, on a subject so intensively covered in the literature, what existing deficiency(s) / limitations in those perspectives would prompt further interrogation of the topic.

Induction, deduction, and abduction are very generic labels at a high level of abstraction for information transformations, along a spectrum from informal cognitive heuristics to formal mathematical algorithms. Any knowledge production in the real world will use some recursive sequence of one, some, or all of them to get to a some desired goal. Simplistically, 'analysis' and 'synthesis', but various domains will have their own lexicons for the transformations but the concepts are the same. They are 'connected' the same way '+-*/' are 'connected' for arithmetic, or Boolean operations in formal logic, or set operations in category theory.

If there be a 'general framework' that crossed disciplines, that would be the tools and methods used for constructing ontologies and then operating across them, such as the the Cyc inference engine.

Well, there is a clear connection between induction and deduction (I leave apart abduction in order to avoid unnecessary complications in this context). Both are different sorts of inferences. Inference: premisses + conclusion. The essential feature of deductive inferences is truth preservation (from true premisses we arrive to a true conclusion). Inductive inferences do not fulfil this requirement. They are non-monotonic, in logicians jargon. Unfortunately, deductive inferences are “empty”, that is, the conclusion of a valid deductive inference does not add any content to that information contained in the premisses. Let my simplify a bit: on one side, deductive inferences (security plus vacuity); on the side, inductive inferences (risk and informativeness).

Both sort of inferences are involved in scientific reasoning/methodology, of course (here I am thinking about natural and social sciences, not about pure mathematics). And both are necessary.

Let’s take for granted that we’ve got a hypothesis that may formulated as a universal generalization. We may arrive to such a hypothesis through a more or less complicated inductive strategies (from a “more of the same” (all crows are black) basic induction to analogical reasoning or more sophisticated options (think of statistical reasoning). In order to test this hypothesis by means of an experiment, we should DEDUCE (particular) observational consequences from it (not only from it, actually, since it is necessary to count with data about (particular) initial conditions, and further background knowledge). I admit that this is a bit simplistic, since it seems as if induction is related exclusively to the discovery stage and deduction just to the testing/justification stage. Actually, both types of inference are intertwined. Anyway, it shows how induction and deduction work jointly.

The question you suggested, Raphael, is interesting, sure. But having said all this, maybe you should think a bit more about what sort of deeper connection between deduction & induction are you looking for. Is it a about a merged notion of inference which encompass both? In principle, I do not feel sympathetic to that approach, since their respective definitional features are opposing as I said before. Maybe, the connection is on the practical side: to put them jointly in work. That’s what scientific reasoning/research does, precisely, in contrast to that philosophy or pure mathematics, for instance, do.

Valeriano Iranzo,

You understood it correctly. I seek a merged notion of deduction and induction at the sources of these two methods. The sources are not merely the application, but instead, the metaphysics and epistemology of the two.

I have been trying to formulate this. But there are many problems!

I think it may not be totally correct to say that deductive conclusions are devoid of inormational content. At least they can update the agent's epistemic state or belief state.

Good point. If you give a definition of informational content indexed to a particular agent, it's true that the conclusion may be "informative" to the agent, insofar as it is unexpected to her (that would be a way of "updating" her belief state). Just a trivial example: I didn't notice that (p&q), even though I actually take for granted p and q. Then, when I "discover" that p&q my belief state has changed, sure. I agree. However, this is a different notion of information than that at stake in my previous comments, which is non-epistemic, namely, the sort of semantic notion of information commonly invoked to distinguish between monotonic or non-monotonic (non-ampliative vs. ampliative) inferences. It should be stressed that this distinction -between those inferences where addition of information does not undermine the inferential link from those where it does- is not relative to any particular agent's state of belief.

Ruurik Holm, Valeriano Iranzo, this is one aspect of what I have been suggesting. Let me term it epistemological synthesis. Now, if the objects being represented by terms at use in deductive and inductive efforts, we need to take up the question of the metaphysical foundations of reference. This will facilitate another kind of synthesis. I have treated of this in an article that I published about 18 years ago. I termed it Systemic Logic. But now I find it impossible to find the text.

Dear Raphael, if I may, I would like to warn you against the "dangerous" conclusion that your question about the relationship between induction and deduction stems from your ignorance of the research topic. It would be too simple to be true.

We must then classify both Hume and Kant as people who are not very versed in this matter. However, this would not be surprising, since their doubts about the solution of the problem of induction have a very solid historical period (many may say that modern science has gone far since then, and it is difficult to argue with this). But there is also Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper. They had completely different points of view on the inductive method as a method of scientific knowledge.

In my opinion, the problem of the relationship between induction and deduction is a worldview problem. When we talk about the scientific method of cognition, we are talking about the scientific worldview of the researcher. There are no two people with the same worldview.

Popper says bluntly: "Induction, as a scientific method, is a myth."

And this position is clear to me, since I am interested in purely practical questions of epistemology.

There is no living organism, and even more so a scientist, who would not have initially formed a general theoretical picture of the world. This applies even to the simplest organism such as a virus. His "worldview" is his genetic code formed by billions of years of evolution and trillions of generations of his ancestors. And this worldview - the hypothesis is constantly tested by the virus in an attempt to penetrate the cell of the "victim" and produce offspring. And what to say about a scientist who studies, even if it is a new object of research for him?

That is, Popper's idea is that we always and about everything have some initial hypothesis about the origin or behavior of the object of study. This applies to research in formal logic, research in physics, engineering development, as well as our daily behavior. The initial hypothesis is formed both by the genetic code and the knowledge we received from birth. Therefore, a purely deductive method is a purely theoretical method that does not exist in real practice. (This does not exclude the possibility of some speculative reasoning about induction).

If you study and accept the position stated in the philosophical dictionary, then you will simply accept the ideological position of the author of this article on this issue. This of course also applies to accepting or not accepting the opinion expressed by me.

I apologize if it's a bit long and "unscientific".

Good luck to you. With a sincere desire to help sort out your problem. Best regards, Konstantin

Konstantin Shmarko, I am confused as to what you want to say. Do you say that my attempt is futile, or that it is useful? I get this confusion because first you see to have said that Hume, Kant, Russell, Popper etc. have kept the difference between induction and deduction, and then you say that Popper said bluntly: "Induction, as a scientific method, is a myth."

Kindly tell me what your position about an attempt to do an epistemological and metaphysical synthesis of induction and deduction is.

Dear Raphael, I'm sorry, I'll try to formulate my thought more specifically.

It seems to me that the separation of induction as an independent method of cognition from the general process of scientific research is an artificial device.

This gives rise to the following error - an attempt to contrast or search for common features between induction and deduction as equivalent methodological techniques.

What we usually call induction, I would consider as an intermediate stage of verification of "trial theory 1". If the observed single "phenomena" fit into the original trial theory 1, we are talking about its verification. If they do not fit, we talk about the falsification of “trial theory 1” and put forward “trial theory 2” (using the terminology of Karl Popper). In any case, we start with theory and end with theory. And between these theoretical constructions there are "induction single samples".

Is it possible to carry out the synthesis of induction and deduction with this approach, investigating them as independent methods? I'm not sure. Is it possible to study the features of induction as a stage of the general deductive procedure? Apparently it is possible.

But this is just my understanding of the problem. An understanding largely based on my feeling of Karl Popper's position regarding the place and significance of induction as a scientific method in its own right. His position seems to me the most convincing. Perhaps I am less familiar with Russell's position on this issue.

I don't know if I managed to get my point across.

Best regards, Konstantin

You said: "Is it possible to study the features of induction as a stage of the general deductive procedure? Apparently it is possible."

This is what I have been doing. But mostly from the epistemological and metaphysical viewpoints.

In view of this, I have been using a system of notions, fully developed by me a decade ago. I call them denotative, connotative, and ontological universals. In many of my papers, especially in many of my discussion texts in RG, you find this.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Irrefutable_Argument_for_Universal_Causality_Any_Counter-Argument

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematics_and_Causality_A_Systemic_Reconciliation

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Logically_Most_Fundamental_Metaphysical_Categories_behind_the_Cosmos_and_the_Sciences

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Minimal_Metaphysical_Physicalism_MMP_vs_Panpsychisms_and_Monisms_Beyond_Mind-Body_Dualism

I have been revising this short discussion paper of mine in RG. It is an attempt to correct some basic attitudes in physics. Just now I have written an introduction to it. Please read it here. In a few days I shall upload the whole lead-text of this discussion for your reading and comments. Here please find only the introduction:

FOUNDATIONS OF AXIOMATIC PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

I get surprised each time when some physicists tell me that either the electromagnetic (EM) or the gravitational (G) or both the forms of energy do not exist, but are to be treated or expressed as waves or particles propagated from material objects that of course exist. Some of them put in all their energies to show that both EM and G are mere mathematical fields, and not physically existent fields of energy propagations from bodies.

This is similar in effect to Newton and his followers thinking honestly and religiously that gravitation and other energies are just miraculously non-bodily actions at a distance without any propagation particles / wavicles.

Even in the 21stcentury, we must be sharply aware that from the past more than 120 years the General Theory of Relativity and its various versions have succeeded in casting and maintaining the power of a terrifying veil of mathematical miracles on the minds of many scientists – miracles such as the mere spacetime curvature being the meaning of gravitation and all other sorts of fields.

A similar veil has been installed on the minds of many physicists by quantum physics too. We do not discuss it here. Hence, I have constructed in four published books a systemic manner of understanding these problems. I do not claim perfection in any of my attempts. Hence, I keep perfecting my efforts in the course of years. The following is a very short attempt to summarize in this effort one important point in physics and in the philosophy of physics.

The Fallacies of Space, Time, and Spacetime in Physics

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fallacies_of_Space_Time_and_Spacetime_in_Physics

Physical and Exact Sciences and Axiomatic Philosophy: Introducing Grounding (long text)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical_and_Exact_Sciences_and_Axiomatic_Philosophy_Introducing_Grounding_long_text

Causality and Statistics: Their Levels of Effect and of Explanation

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Causality_and_Statistics_Their_Levels_of_Effect_and_of_Explanation

Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Non-Locality: Is Einstein a Monist?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen_Paradox_and_Non-Locality_Is_Einstein_a_Monist

The Fate of “Source-Independence” in Electromagnetism, Gravitation, and Monopoles

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fate_of_Source-Independence_in_Electromagnetism_Gravitation_and_Monopoles

Can what are termed "mathematically consistent" natural laws necessarily be physically consistent? If they can, then mathematics becomes physics (and for that matter any other mathematical science). But if math is different from all these sciences, the adequacy and applicability of math to physics and other sciences cannot be 100%. If that is the case, it is very important that physics (and other sciences) be helped to choose the most suitable math. This help can come from the same science/s only in a partially realized manner. Nor can math take up this task fully well. Hence, a generic science beyond all these including math and logic must take charge of the remaining portions of inadequacy and inapplicability of math to physics and the sciences. Which could that science be? I hold that this most general science need not contain all that philosophy has so far understood itself to be. But something of the philosophy of these sciences combined with the philosophy of math, logic, etc. would be an ideal option.

Watch this video (streamed today, 23 July 2023) from after the 9th minute: A suggestion that the constant velocity of light, Planck’s constant, and Gravitational constant may be found to have covariance when the whole cosmos is considered.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPCoqJqSbGY

Essential Reason in Physicists’ Use of Logic: And in Other Sciences Too!

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Essential_Reason_in_Physicists_Use_of_Logic_And_in_Other_Sciences_Too

Preprint ESSENTIAL REASON IN PHYSICISTS' USE OF LOGIC: IN OTHER SCIENCES TOO

Ian Miller added a reply

26 minutes ago

Actually, logic is derived from set theory

Recommend

Share

📷

Raphael Neelamkavil added a reply

21 seconds ago

In my opinion, this is difficult to accept. Set theory began existing a few hundred years ago. Logic as a formulated method of thought existed at least from the time of Aristotle. But as argumentation theory logic existed at least from the time of Socrates. I am now speaking of logic, and not set theorz. But you may argue that even set theory existed in this manner. True. But the basic principles of logic have been used in such elementary set theory too. Not vice versa. In that case, which is more primary? Basic set theory or basic logic?

Now, if you derive mathematical logic from mathematical set theory without using logical principles, I would like to know how.

How Does Physics Know? The Epistemology Presupposed by Physics and Other Sciences

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_Does_Physics_Know_The_Epistemology_Presupposed_by_Physics_and_Other_Sciences

Preprint MATHEMATICAL SOURCE OF FLAWS IN COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES: MATHE...

Preprint THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES R...

PHYSICAL-PROCESSUAL REPRESENTATION OF IRRATIONAL NUMBERS

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical-Processual_Representation_of_Irrational_Numbers

THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS

3.1. Traditional Physical Categories

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Ontology_behind_Physics

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Grounded_Physical-Ontological_Categories_behind_Physics

Grounded (New) Physical-Ontological Categories behind Physics

Preprint THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS: CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL PHYSICA...

A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS: Beyond the Two Millennia

https://www.researchgate.net/post/A_SIMPLE_GAME-CHANGER_CAUSALITY_FOR_PHYSICS_Beyond_the_Two_Millennia

https://www.researchgate.net/post/DEFINITION_OF_THE_ONTOLOGY_BEHIND_PHYSICS_5_Paragraphs

DEFINITION OF THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS (5 Paragraphs)

THE ANOMALY IN MATHEMATICAL / THEORETICAL PHYSICS (Short Text)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_ANOMALY_IN_MATHEMATICAL_THEORETICAL_PHYSICS_Short_Text

Here a serious and somewhat complex matter to discuss:

NON-FOUNDATIONS OF ‘WAVICLES’ IN EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PARADOX: Bases for Quantum Physics to Evolve (Maybe a physical-ontological Breakthrough)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/NON-FOUNDATIONS_OF_WAVICLES_IN_EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN_PARADOX_Bases_for_Quantum_Physics_to_Evolve_Maybe_a_physical-ontological_Breakthrough

AGAINST COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION, etc.: A Critique of Identity, Simultaneity, Cosmic Repetition / Recycling, etc.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/AGAINST_COSMIC_ISOTROPY_CONFORMAL_CYCLIC_COSMOS_ETERNAL_INFLATION_etc_A_Critique_of_Identity_Simultaneity_Cosmic_Repetition_Recycling_etc

Preprint A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS Beyond the Two Millennia

Preprint ESSENTIAL LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS, ...

WHAT IS THE MYSTERIOUS STUFF OF INFORMATION? A Short but Clear Definition

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_THE_MYSTERIOUS_STUFF_OF_INFORMATION_A_Short_but_Clear_Definition

Preprint COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION:...

THE PLANCK ERA / QUANTUM ERA and “DISAPPEARANCE” OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY: “OMNIPOTENCE” OF MATHEMATICS

https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_PLANCK_ERA_QUANTUM_ERA_and_DISAPPEARANCE_OF_PHYSICAL_CAUSALITY_OMNIPOTENCE_OF_MATHEMATICS

Preprint PLANCK ERA or QUANTUM ERA,and ”DISAPPEARANCE” OF CAUSALITY. ...

Preprint IS THE VELOCITY OF LIGHT SACROSANCT?

Preprint CAUSAL HORIZONAL RESEARCH: A METHODOLOGY IN PHYSICS Raphael ...

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_INFORMATION_WHAT_IS_ITS_CAUSAL_OR_NON-CAUSAL_CORE_A_Discussion

Deleted research item The research item mentioned here has been deleted

Preprint LINGUISTIC HERESY OF DENOTATIVE ABSOLUTISM: PHYSICAL-BIOLOGI...

https://www.researchgate.net/post/ONTOLOGICAL_DIFFERENCES_OF_CHARACTERISTICS_OF_ARTIFICIAL_AND_BIOLOGICAL_INTELLIGENCE_ALGORITHMS_AND_PROCEDURES_Against_Exaggerations

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHY_EXACTLY_THE_WAVE-PARTICLE_DUALITY_Phenomenal_Ontological_Commitment_POC_as_the_Solution

https://www.researchgate.net/post/UNTENABLE_REIFICATION_OF_CONCEPTS_IN_PHYSICS_With_Examples

Preprint WHY EXACTLY WAVE-PARTICLE DUALITY? Phenomenal Ontological Co...