All of the answers bring up important points from moral philosophy and psychology but they barely touch on the approaches that derive from evolutionary theory.  I could recommend a review that I wrote a few years ago (Sunar, D.,  2009. Suggestions for a new integration in the psychology of morality.  Personality and Social Psychology Compass, 3/4, 447–474, doi 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00191.x) which includes many relevant references.  Since moral psychology is a very active field of research these days, there are of course many newer references as well. 

However, your question about the conditions under which you have a "right" to do something assumes that there are "rights" independent of "morality".  Isn't this self- contradictory?  Or is it just an updated version of the argument that "if God is dead, then all things are possible"? 

In another version of what Orlando M Lourenço says, morality is what allows people to live together.  As a group-living species, humans always generate rules that facilitate group life.  These may vary to some degree according to ecology, economy, history, culture, etc. but people everywhere are motivated to follow rules and to punish others who break them. They are equipped with a whole suite of moral emotions, both self-blaming (such as shame and guilt) and other-blaming (such as anger, disgust, contempt), not to speak of capacities for reconciliation and forgiveness.  Of course this does not mean that individuals do not have any selfish motivations to break rules themselves, nor does it mean that violations are always punished.  People sometimes "get away with" selfish or destructive behavior. But  "rights" derive from what benefits the group (society) in the long run.

Best wishes,

Diane

Even if morality were merely a convention, through the accident of birth you grow up in a given culture, with a given moral system, and members of that culture will take care of not allowing you to get away with the local moral norms violation. See Tetlock's discussion of moral enforcement through "intuitive theologians" and "intuitive prosecutors": 

Tetlock, P.E., 2002. Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors. Psychological review, 109(3), p.451.

Thank you, but I asked whether we have a moral right to do anything we wish if morality were just a convention. Sometimes we can get away with grossly immoral acts if they are not discovered. If nobody knows that we violated conventions, we have "gotten away" with it. But have we done any moral wrong in that case? It seems to me that we haven`t if morality is merely a convention, i.e. a social construct.

At ABC Elementary School there is a school rule that jackets are not to be in classrooms but should hang on the hooks outside .  One day, kindergarten teacher Mrs. Jones tells her class that it is okay today to hang jackets over your chairs.  Her student Jen hangs her jacket on her chair.  Was it okay of Jen to do that?

At XYZ Elementary School there is a school rule that children are not to bite one another, but should talk to one another when mad.  One day, kindergarten teacher Mrs. Smith tells her class that it is okay today to bite other children.  Her student Mary bites another classmate.  Was it okay of Mary to do that?

Just curious, Vojin, if you see a difference between those two vignettes?  Developmental Psychology research suggests young children recognize differences like this - between conventions and morals.  Some interesting studies are in the articles I attached below.

Hope this helps your pondering!

Kevin

Article Children's Understanding of Uniformity in the Environment

Article Young Children's Understanding of Beliefs About Moral and Co...

 Very good, Kevin. You have gotten my point. Morality is more than a convention.  It is more than a social construct. Now we arrive at the second step: - what is it that gives morality its value? Not convention, not social construction. What then? 

Hi Vogin

If, as you say, morality were a mere social convention, then we have a moral right to do anything we wish as long as we can get away with it.

Would this be moral from an ideal point of view? I don’t think so. This means that morality and convention are two distinct domains and realities. In other words, morality has to do with the way things ought to be, whereas social convention has to do with the way things are.

Of course, morality, such as convention, is a social construct.  However, there are social constructs of several types. Morality, social convention, and issues that are a matter of individual choice and preference are three cases in point. Suffice it to say that it has been found (see, for example, Turiel, 1983, 1998) that, from very early in development, children distinguish different types of judgments and justifications regarding social domains, and this distinction is universal as it is grounded on rational criteria. Thus, for example, it has been found that children as young as 3 years judge (1) the norms linked to human welfare, justice, and rights, the moral domain (see Kohlberg, 1984), to be prescriptive, generalized, and non-contingent on social rules or authority figures; (2) the norms pertaining to social conventions and rules, the conventional domain (see Turiel, 1983), to be relative, alterable, and contingent on aspects of social organization; and (3) the issues related to decisions that are outside of the area of justifiable social regulation, the personal domain (see Nucci, 1996)  to be a matter of individual choice, and falling beyond social regulation or authority jurisdiction. It has been also found that moral, conventional, and personal judgments are justified differently. Moral judgments are justified in terms of justice, others’ rights and welfare; conventional judgments are justified in terms of custom, authority and social coordination; and justifications in the personal domain concern individual preferences for one’s right to make decisions that affect the self. It has still been found that such distinction generally improves with one’s development and exists everywhere. This means that although what is considered to be moral, conventional, or personal preference varies across cultures – a content-oriented distinction -- all cultures make a distinction among moral principles and rules (e.g., the golden rule), social conventions (e.g., to eat or not to eat with our fingers), and personal issues (e.g., one’s right to choose as friends those who we want them to be our friends) – a structure-oriented distinction. As philosopher David Hume put it a long time ago, the idea of wrong/right, duties/rights, and the like exists everywhere, but people and cultures often disagree on what is considered to be moral/immoral, right/wrong, good/bad, correct/incorrect, just/unjust.  

 What actions are considered to be moral or immoral, just or unjust? If we look, for example, at the psychology and philosophy of morality, then we find four main answers to this question, each based on a different basic moral principle.  

More precisely, according to deontological theories of morality, such as Habermas’ (1981), Kohlberg’s, (1984) or Rawls’ (1971) theories, the more an action accords with the principle of justice, the more an action is likely to be moral and just. As you certainly know, the main injunction of the principle of justice is that, regardless of their socioeconomic status, ethnicity, gender, political, religious or sexual orientation, all people deserve to be treated with justice and respect. More precisely, when a conflict of interests is at issue (“Should/should we not steal a drug belonging to its legitimate owner to save a human life?”), an action is considered to be just and moral (e.g, “We should steal the drug because human life transcends one’s right to property”) if it passes, so to say, the Kohlbergian “tests” of reversibility (“Would I advocate, in a conflict of interests, the same conclusion/solution if positions were reversed?”), and of universalizability (“Did  I reach a conclusion/solution that would be acceptable for all at all times and places?”). This Kohlbergian idea echoes Kant’s (1785) famous categorical imperative, whose main formulation is the following: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal [and universalizable] law.” (p. 30). As I see it, although there is no universal moral law in factual terms, that is, a moral law that is followed by all people at all places and times (i.e., the “is” domain), it makes sense to argue for universalizable moral norms from an ideal view point, that is, moral laws or principles that should be followed by all people at all times and places (i.e., the “ought to” domain). The Kohlbergian “tests” of reversibility and universalizability remind me of Rawls's (1971) idea of original position or veil of ignorance. In other words, in a conflict of interests and moral choice, the choice should be made from behind a veil of ignorance, which would deprive participants of information about their particular characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender, social status, and the like. Such “tests” are also consonant with Habermas’ (1981) discourse ethics, namely his idea of better argument, or the argument in which the force of reason, not the reason of force or power is the basic moral principle. As I see it, deontological theories are, so to say, strong moral theories mainly because its main moral injunction is that we should not treat others unfairly. They have, however, some shortcomings. For example, in deontological moralities, a person right to his/her life should be always respected. But a problem arises: Should we respect a person’s right to live when such right puts in danger the life of some or even many other persons? 

According to consequentialist, teleological or  utilitarian approaches to morality, such as is the case of Bentham’s (1983) theory, the basic moral principle is not justice, but social utility. In other words, according to consequentialist or teleological theories of morality, the more an action brings about the greatest good for the greatest number of people, the more moral that action is. To think in terms of the welfare of the majority of people is a noble and noteworthy idea. But a question arises: Who determines what is it the greatest good for the greatest number of people?

For care and responsibility-oriented moralities, such as is the case of Gilligan’s (1982) theory of morality, the basic moral principle is not the Kohlbergian principle of deontic justice nor is it the consequentialist principle of social utility advocated by teleological or consequentialist approaches to morality, but rather the principle of benevolence.  According to caring and responsibility-oriented moralities, the main injunction underlying the principle of benevolence is that we should not turn away from someone in need [see Gilligan, C., & Wiggins, G. (1987)]. If we lived in a world of, say, saints and perfect altruistic individuals, the principle of benevolence would be a good enough principle for dealing with our everyday social interactions. As this is not the case, we are often confronted with situations of moral choice and dilemmas, that is, with hypothetical or real situations wherein there is a conflict of interests or welfare. When this is case, Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984) cogently argued that benevolence cannot solve conflicts of welfare, and that for that purpose we have to appeal to the principle of justice.

According to virtue ethics-oriented moralities, such as is the case of M. Nussbaum (2006) theory of morality, the main moral principle is the principle of eudaimonia or personal-fulfillment. As you certainly know, virtue ethics dates back to Aristotle’s thinking on morality, justice, and virtues. For eudaimonia-oriented moralities [see, for this respect, g., Den Wyl (1991)], the more an action brings about one’s personal-fulfillment or self-actualization a la Abraham Maslow, the more the action is judged to be moral and just. Of course, a self-fulfilled individual is generally more morally advanced than his/her non-fulfilled counterparts. But, again, a problem arises. What to do when one’s personal-fulfilment collides with another’s self- fulfilment or self-actualization?     

I turn again to your question:” If morality is merelysocial convention, do we have a moral right to do anything we wish as long as we can get away with it?”

As I said before, it has been found that even young individuals distinguish between morality and convention.  The idea that we do have a moral right to do anything we wish as long as we can get away with it, for example, not to be punished, caught up, or put in jail reminds me of a response that would be coded as a Stage 1-oriented response in Kohlberg’s [1984; Colby, A., Kohlberg, L. (1987)] moral theory. Because of this I think that a brief reference to Kohlberg’s three levels and six stages of moral reasoning and developing is now in order:[preconventional (Stage 1and Stage 2) conventional (Stage 3 and Stage 4) and postconventional  [Stage 5 and Stage 6). In others words, what follows intends to show what would be a stage 1-oriented response, a stage 2-oriented response, a stage 3- oriented response, a stage 4-oriented response, a satge-5-oriented response, and a stage 6-oriented response, all responses having to do with the following idea: I have/have not the moral right to do this, that, and so forth, in a case of moral conflict and choice, for example, cheating /not cheating in a situation of a doing a written exam.

Consider the case of a student who says then s/he has a moral right to cheat in that situation because, by doing so, s/he will get good or even excellent marks and will become a famous person in the future. This would be a preconventional and stage 1-oriented response.

Think now of a student who says that s/he has a moral right to cheat because this is what s/he wants and needs to do. Such a response would be, say, an oriented- hedonistically and individualistically response, and hence a preconventional stage 2-oriented response.

Consider the case of a student who says that s/he has a moral right to cheat because s/he wants to show his/her parents that s/he is a nice /guy and a decent student for s/he is capable of getting good marks in an exam situation. This hypothetical response would be a social approval-oriented answer, and hence, a conventional stage 3-orienetd response. 

Consider now the case of a student whose response is the following: “I have a moral right to cheat because I am the only student in the class whose parents are unemployed, cannot afford money to buy my books, and the like. If this were not the case, I should not/would not cheat. So, when I cheat, instead of doing a wrong action, I intend to compensate, for instance, for my economic situation, and hence, to introduce some impartiality into the school system. Even so, I am prepared to accept the legal consequences that may occur because of my cheating” This response, if sincere, would be a conventional stage 4-oriented response.  

Consider the following sincere response. “I have the moral right to cheat because of my particular economic situation. I even will tell others, professors inclusive, that I cheated, and am prepared to accept all the consequences due to my (apparently) immoral act. By cheating, I wanted to show that the school system, namely the exams system, should have to take into account and even be modified such that some justified and even justifiable circumstances were considered and taken into account. Note that this answer intends to transform rather than maintain schools such that they became a just environment, which does not happen when justifiable differences among students are not taken into account. This hypothetical action would be a postconventional stage-5 oriented action.  

As the late Kohlberg [see Colby & Kohlberg (1987). The measurement of moral judgment, Vols.1 and 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press] gave up his initial Stage 6, the example mentioned above could substantiate also a postconventional Stage 6-oriented response.

Given that Kohlberg’s theory is a structure-oriented theory, responses stating that “I have not a moral to cheat in an exam situation” could be also justified in terms of deontic reasons of stage 1, stage 2, stage 3, stage 4, stage 5 or stage 6.

“I have not a right to cheat because I will be caught up and expelled from my school or university.” This response would be a stage 1-oriented response.   

“I have not a right to cheat because if I cheat I will have problems with the staff of my school/university”. This answer would be a stage 2- oriented answer or response.

“I have not a right to cheat because if I cheat my colleagues are going to say that I am a dishonest and bad guy”. This response would be a stage 3-oriented response,

“I have not a right to cheat because if I cheat a precedent for disregarding a legitimate law (“It is forbidden to cheat at schools/universities) is set. Pupils/students cannot decide individually when to obey and when to disobey the law”. This response would be a stage 4-oriented response.

“I have not a right to cheat because if individuals are to live together in their schools/universities, there must be some common agreement, for example, that pupils/students are never allowed to cheat. Legitimate laws represent a necessary structure of social agreement”. This response would be a Stage 5 or Stage 6-orienetd response (see above).

Fortunately, social convention and morality are two distinct domains. Even so, we could analyze the individual’s responses to social conventions (e.g., traffic rules) in terms of Kohlberg’s levels and stages of moral reasoning. Note the following example: “I can violate traffic rules as long as  I can get away with it”. This would be a stage 1-oriented response.

Note that the true, the good, and the beautiful are universal categories, regardless of how they are seen at different places and times. Deprived of the true, our world would be an illogical and incoherent place. Deprived of the good, our world would an immoral and unjust place; and deprived of the beautiful, our world would an ugly, even horrible place.

It is not a mere coincidence that philosopher Immanuel Kant has devoted his Critique of Pure Reason to the true, his Critique of Practical Reason to the good, and his Critique of Judgment to the beautiful.      

I hope I have got your question and that this helps.

Best regards,

The question contains a contradiction.

 Dear Orlando,

Thank you for your very thoughtful analysis. In actual fact, you have shown that if morality being a convention would imply that we can do whatever we wish if we can get away with it, we would end up at the lowest, pre-conventional Kohlbergian stages of development. This might mean that morality being a convention does NOT imply that we are allowed to do whatever we wish if we can get away with it. Everything being allowed as long as we can get away with would then only pertain to pre-conventional stages. 

Btw: the intention of my question was not to invoke Kohlberg`s theory, but my use of terminology (convention) apparently did invoke his theory.

Vojin

@ Orlando.

Another point. You say that morality is a social construct. Not everybody would agree. Some think that morality has its foundation in biology (e.g., Persson and Savulescu 2008), others that it is inspired by God (e.g., CS Lewis - see the appendix in his "Abolition of Man" for the argument that various moral rules have transcultural and transhistorical validity).

Morality is not a social convention but a profound human need.--we need something to guide our choices and actions because we are not born with knowledge. But where ethical theorists have gone wrong by not starting in the right place. The first question is not: what is the good but rather why do we need a moral code at all? The answer is to live successfully on earth. The next question is: what is the ultimate, objective standard of morality? Ayn Rand has answered it: life is the standard (meaning long range survival and happiness). The virtues needed for survival include: rationality, honesty, integrity, independent thinking ,productiveness, justice and pride. She also showed why practicing these virtues is in one's self interest. For an introduction to her ideas see L. Peikoff;s: Objectivism The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. There are also two books on her ethics by Tara Smith.

Hi Vogin!

Even if morality were a social convention we could not do whatever we wish if we can get away with it. If this were the case, our consciousness would bother us. Even so this would be a stage 2-oriented reasoning a la Kohlberg. Even though morality has its foundation in biology, it still is a social construct. Can you imagine a morality whatever in a world deprived of any individual? We need morality just because we are not alone in the world. If, in a thought experiment, I were the only human being in the world, then there were no moral rule or principle, or even social convention. 

Of course, all of our behaviors have a biological root. It is because of our biological heritage that we cannot fly or give a jump from Lisbon to Belgrade or the other way around. Note, however, that biological maturation only opens up a series of possibilities without bringing about  necessarily their actualization. Biologically, almost all people could be a genius. As this is not the case, other things than biology are also responsible for our feelings, actions, and thoughts.

I also think that morality is what allows us to live in harmony with ourselves, the others, and the nature. Do you agree on this?

You say that not everybody would agree on the idea that morality is a social construct. Note that before Copernicus and Galileo, nobody agree on the idea of  the

heliocentric theory. However, all of these people were scientifically incorrect.

I wonder whether I am saying something different from what I said before.

 Best wishes,

Orlando

I agree with Kurak.  Your question begins....

"If morality is merely convention, do we have a moral right" 

What does having a "moral right" mean in this instance if morality is just convention?  However, everyone has moved on to examining the second aspect of your question...

"Morality is more than convention. Morality is more than a social construct."

I would agree it is more than convention (like you and the others have responded)but I am not sure that it is "more than a social construct." Some would suggest that social constructivism explains many/most uniquely human behaviours, values, needs,etc. Sure  there is a biological component, and we are not the only species to demonstrate various behaviours related to morality see Frans de Waal's TED talk...

https://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals?language=en

Nevertheless, social constructivism explains the varieties found in our species.

All of the answers bring up important points from moral philosophy and psychology but they barely touch on the approaches that derive from evolutionary theory.  I could recommend a review that I wrote a few years ago (Sunar, D.,  2009. Suggestions for a new integration in the psychology of morality.  Personality and Social Psychology Compass, 3/4, 447–474, doi 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00191.x) which includes many relevant references.  Since moral psychology is a very active field of research these days, there are of course many newer references as well. 

However, your question about the conditions under which you have a "right" to do something assumes that there are "rights" independent of "morality".  Isn't this self- contradictory?  Or is it just an updated version of the argument that "if God is dead, then all things are possible"? 

In another version of what Orlando M Lourenço says, morality is what allows people to live together.  As a group-living species, humans always generate rules that facilitate group life.  These may vary to some degree according to ecology, economy, history, culture, etc. but people everywhere are motivated to follow rules and to punish others who break them. They are equipped with a whole suite of moral emotions, both self-blaming (such as shame and guilt) and other-blaming (such as anger, disgust, contempt), not to speak of capacities for reconciliation and forgiveness.  Of course this does not mean that individuals do not have any selfish motivations to break rules themselves, nor does it mean that violations are always punished.  People sometimes "get away with" selfish or destructive behavior. But  "rights" derive from what benefits the group (society) in the long run.

Best wishes,

Diane

I do not think that anyone can seriously and consistently advance the view that morality is mere convention.  Not raping a woman, or a child, would seem to be more than a concession to mere convention.  The same with murder, theft and the like.  The social construct thing won't work either because that would allow totalitarian governments to construct a morality of their own choosing and impose it on the people.  In my view it is better to look at the renewed interest in natural law and natural rights to  see that morality is hard wired into human beings such that there are some basic human values which we think ought never to be violated.  Try John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. I would also add that if morality and with it therefore human rights is a mere social construct or convention, then the universal agreement on morality in, for example, the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights and related documents would not have been possible.  And these documents are now part of international law.  When charged with an offence of human rights violations nation states do not say that they don't agree that their behavious has been wrong.  Their defence is usually that they have not engaged in such behaviour.

If morality is mere convention then we fall into the trap of cultural relativism and the humanitarian ideals developed through years on international consensus will have to surrender before the practices of "stoning till death for adultery" and the like. On the other hand, if we completely ignore conventional morality then we may be imposing the values of our own tradition on other who follow a different understanding of good and bad. 

Besides we can get away with immoral acts in both the above conceptions if we do not have structures which converts moral values to legal ones through legislative process. Accusations of our personal guilt does not hold any meaning in objective understanding of morality and that of society is already protected by the specific cultural setting. But fortunately we have now passed the stage when one can "get away with". We watch each other and feel ashamed of our acts if we fall short of universal value. 

Therefore the ever dynamic moral perception of mankind evolves along the sidelines of this tussle between culture specific value (conventional morality) and universal value. 

Yes, Mohan, I agree that we should make a clear distinction law between the protection of fundamental human rights based upon universally agreed natural moral law perception, and conventions.  Conventions may be good or bad.  Female circumcision is a very bad convention.  On the other hand, societies formed around a particular religious adherence, will protect certain conventions which are part of religious practice.  That may be conventions around prayer and worship, certain food laws, manners which are cultural conventions and the like.  These conventions ought to be respected by minorities.  Moreover, it is the hight of rudeness to trample unnnecessarily over other people's deepest convictions expressed as social conventions.  Conventions are, and always have been, the oil that greases the social machine.  I reverent bow of the head when meeting someone in Japan, even if you are just a visitor to that country, ought to be respected.  But when it comes down to fundamental human values (expressed as human rights) there are certain non-negotiables and they ought tpo be reflected both in the law and customs of any civil society.

The UDHR is an excellent document, however, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an example of social constructivism being put to task deliberately. It was crafted over hundreds of hours of discussions and concessions all framed and guided by cultural, religious, social, and ideological mores and attitudes of the individuals involved. Furthermore, although labelled "Universal" certainly only those belonging to the United Nations had a say in its development, I believe (but I am very much not an expert in the UDHR, I am basing this on the limited knowledge that I have of that work). (Just to be clear, I don't believe convention = social constructivism). Everyone's ideas are very interesting!

Dear All,

Thank you for offering so many excellent, thought provoking comments on my question. Let me note that the rationale behind my question was to provoke a discussion and not to promote my own views. I hoped that the comments will bring us all a bit further in our thinking about the grounding rationale of morality. I am truly happy that my hope is in the process of being realized. At least my thinking about the basis of morality .has additionally been inspired by your comments.Thank you!

Now I will comment on some comments.

Vojin

Dear Orlando,

You try to reconcile the biological basis of morality with the social construction of morality. But I am inclined to think that it is convention rather than morality that is socially constructed.

You also assert the following:

"You say that not everybody would agree on the idea that morality is a social construct. Note that before Copernicus and Galileo, nobody agree on the idea of  the heliocentric theory. However, all of these people were scientifically incorrect."

-----------END QUOTATION----------

I gave the example of Persson and Savulescu who argue that morality has a basis in biology (this includes morality having a basis in adaptation to the environment in order to be fit for survival). They are some of the most influential contemporary bioethicists. Why would we compare them with those who didn`t believe in heliocentric theory and those who think that morality is a social construct with proponents of heliocentric theory?

Best

Vojin

@Adelheid

You see a contradiction in this part of my question: "If morality is merely convention, do we have a moral right". I don`t think there is a contradiction: if morality is a convention, that what is to be considered as a convention becomes a moral right.

@Diane

Quotation: "But "rights" derive from what benefits the group (society) in the long run"

------END QUOTATION------

Not necessarily. E.g., various social contract theories are in discord with what you say. What about the "law of nature"? Rights that are derived from it are not necessarily derived from "what benefits the group (society) in the long run".

@Adelheid

If morality is merely a social construct, can there be anything more to it than the conventional?

This thread has already been discussed at some length-

I didn't see all of those questions directed at me.  So, I will answer...

You wrote: "@Adelheid

You see a contradiction in this part of my question: "If morality is merely convention, do we have a moral right". I don`t think there is a contradiction: if morality is a convention, that what is to be considered as a convention becomes a moral right."

if morality is purely derived from convention (and by convention my understanding is that it is something that is "typically" done), I don't find using the words "moral right" together is very meaningful as one can replace "moral" with "convention" and therefore we are only referring to conventional rights.

Regarding your other question directed to me...

You wrote: "@Adelheid

If morality is merely a social construct, can there be anything more to it than the conventional?"

There are two parts to this.  Just because something is a social construct does not suggest that it is "merely a social construct" social constructs emerge from and are shaped by, as previously discussed, biological, evolutionary, interpersonal, survival, etc. needs. Furthermore, this does not mean that other factors, if you are so inclined to believe, such as those defined by religion, don't play a role.

I would agree with Orlando M Lourenço regarding the difference between convention and social construct and so he has answered the second part of your question, whether there is "more to it than the conventional?"

Dear Adelheid

You say: "If morality is purely derived from convention (and by convention my understanding is that it is something that is "typically" done), I don't find using the words "moral right" together is very meaningful as one can replace "moral" with "convention" and therefore we are only referring to conventional rights."

-------and quotation--------

As moral rights can, as you say, be replaced by conventional rights, conventional rights can be replaced by moral rights. Hence, in actual fact,  you confirm that there is no contradiction in my question, disconforming what you previously claimed about the alleged contradiction in it.

The second part of your comment: if we understand social construct as broad as you wish to, then really everything in this world has a social construct superstructure. In that case  you are always  right. In fact, if we define social construct in such an extremely broad way, you simply can't be wrong.

Vojin