How popular are Hegel's ideas in the USA? Can we say that his influence on Communism indicates his being marginalized in American philosophical circles?
Leading thinkers as Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Freud, Braudel, or some (few) others are classic authors. Their books and theories have a lasting intrinsic value regardless of ideologies, politics, manipulations, and "popularity". It doesn't simply matter if they are or not "popular" since their ideas, theories, and erudite interpretations will last.
Muthana, if Hegel is unpopular in the USA, is it not more likely to do with his connection with Marx and thereby a real or imagined connection with communism?
Michael Uebel , thank for your reply. Forgive my ignorance and curious intrusion into a field that is not mine, but do I understand that the American Democracy did not find Hegel's demeaning ideas about the authority of the people in choosing their government threatening? I wonder when the rediscovery trend started.
I'd say that Hegel's ideas are a marginal influence, chiefly on the extreme left.
Over the course of much the 20th century Hegel was in disfavor and associated with authoritarian and totalitarian political thought of both the right and the left
--and the domination of political thought over everything else. In its origins, say in Russell and Moore, analytic philosophy has been chiefly anti-Hegelian; and likewise American pragmatism, particularly in the wake of the influence of William James has also been chiefly anti-Hegelian. Much of James' philosophical work is devoted to critique of the British idealists and their influence at the time of the American Gilded Age. The beginning of the 20th century saw a large-scale "revolt against (objective) idealism."
Americans, as is often said, are "instinctively" federalists and pluralists. I would say that the American concept of nationality, based on a common political creed argues against forced assimilation and totalizing social and political ideas and programs. I would also tend to understand the social-political content of Hegelian idealism as flourishing in 19th-century Germany in connection with its efforts toward unification --under the stress of the warring and contending European powers of the time. Later, similar ideas were imported into the British empire.
In my judgment, the mini-resurgence of Hegel since the 1990s and associated with globalization, will not last. Notice in particular the refusal of the E.U. to more fully unify politically or subsume the sovereignty of the nation-states.
Dear H.G. Callaway , Thank you very much. This does make sense. Though American mainstream philosophical literature does not openly reveal disfavour of Hegelianism, as Michael Uebel has suggested, I find it logical that a political system would resist (at least softly) any ideas that oppose its bases of existence. Being a democratic country, the United States's intellectual-political authority is compelled to show tolerance about Hegelianism and any other unfavourable thought, a thing which is in accord with the democratic mode of the country, yet, the gate-keepers know how to filter it out. The politics of philosophy!
Reform and even "progressive ideas" in the traditions of Anglo-American thought are generally neither Hegelian nor Marxist in inspiration. Outstanding problems are instead treated by legislation as they arise, piece by piece.
It's like the ship of theseus, rebuilding planck by planck while still at sea. You don't try to get outside the ship and start over from scratch by totalizing revolutionary practice, but instead seek to preserve what is best, depending on it, while changing what proves problematic.
I think you have it about right in the following passage:
I find it logical that a political system would resist (at least softly) any ideas that oppose its bases of existence. Being a democratic country, the United States's intellectual-political authority is compelled to show tolerance about Hegelianism and any other unfavourable thought, a thing which is in accord with the democratic mode of the country, yet, the gate-keepers know how to filter it out. The politics of philosophy!
---End quotation
However, your comment suggests the topic of the wisdom (or lack thereof) of our tolerating intolerant practices. Hegelians, and especially right-Hegelians tend to be institutionalist and yet play trade-off and "tag" team with the often less institutionalist left-Hegelians. Both varieties often unite in intolerance of liberal reform. Totalizing systems and historical, totalizing systems tend to be intolerant of opposition, since they profess to know how things will turn out. Add to this the intolerance often found among institutional insiders and a great deal of intolerance will be generated.
I often have my doubts on whether our supposed "gate-keepers" have much of a clear idea of what they are doing --other than protecting insiders against outsiders. I'd certainly be wary of right-Hegelian gate-keepers. Overall, liberal tolerance has its just limits.
It depends on who you ask. “Popular” is a function of consensus. If you were to ask the average US Citizen, most may reply; who is Hegel? On the other hand, ask them about Thomas Jefferson’s philosophy of “unalienable Rights”, there’s a good chance their response will be, “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”; the foundation of the US Constitution, the DNA of Americanism.
I coined Jefferson’s simple philosophy as “Constructalism”; perhaps, an example of “Analytic philosophy”:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvD4DHMq1Y4
As for “American philosophical circles”, I often wonder if “communism” is being “marginalized.”
You can be sure that "communism" was and remains pretty much beyond the pale in the U.S. As I say, our "right-Hegelians" are typically institutionalists which means that they attempt to blend into protective institutions in more conservative fashion, observant of all the on-going institutional strictures and fashions --political correctness included. The left-Hegelians, on the other hand tend more to "insurgent" styles--though with luck and connections they may later turn into right-Hegelians --where careerist themes are more dominant.
I have been describing the academic phenomenon. The right-Hegelians you might think of as imitating an old-style European elite, which the left-Hegelians love to hate. But for them as the saying goes, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend;" and both are more intolerant of liberal reform.
Of course every country has its own distinctive philosophy, art and culture --including the U.S. Though philosophy strives to be universal, it is frequently caught up in national particularities.
We need to know just enough about Hegel to recall why our ancestors left the old continent. But if you do not understand or sympathize with that statement, then maybe you need to read the historical literature of American criticism and rejection?
It is by no means easy for people from one country or culture to understand another country, its history and culture. I expect you are right that "this kind of debate would be difficult to run." But notice that this is just the problem of any universal history. How could any universal history be justified unless all the details have been identified without exception for historical and cultural differences? Because of this, one may well suspect that universal histories get "validated" only within particular cultural contexts and against a background of comparative unanimity and particularistic perspectives. (That is not to say, however, that it is not possible to advance mutual understanding on occasion.)
My basic argument, in any case, is that the future course of human history is not predictable. I have given this argument on several occasions. What human beings will do in the future depends on what they will be able to do. But what people are able to do changes with the advance of the sciences; and the future results of the sciences cannot be predicted. We can only practice the sciences and scholarly disciplines and wait to see how the results turn out. If it were possible to simply predict the results of future research, then it would not be necessary to actually do the detailed research of the sciences--which is absurd. In consequence since we cannot predict what we will come to know, it is not possible to predict the future course of human history. Claims to the contrary always depend on particularities (special assumptions) of a given supporting culture or society.
I don't agree. People who interact, travel or get education in other culture and country as well, still can understand the simple definition of philosophy.
What I wanted to say, young generations but not just them don't like, read and talk about those topics.
Academia going down fast.
And it's pretty visible via Researchgate as well.
Future of the world?
People who don't think. Just consumers of so called knowledge picked up online.
Gerard van Reekum , Thank you for asking! Actually, my interest is geared towards Benedetto Croche, the Italian idealist philosopher, and his influence on American aesthetics rather than Hegel himself.
While I believe that Croche is marginalized in American philosophical circles, it attracted my attention that his British colleague, Robin George Collingwood, received more recognition for carrying on Croche's work on the theory of art.
So I wondered why.
I saw that Croche (who was in some way related to Fascism) is branded as Hegelian in America. My understanding is that Croche is more of a transcendentalist whose aesthetics can be traced in the thought of many American writers. So I proposed that the reason for marginalizing Croche in America was because of his connections.
Gonna do nothing about it. It will only prove how biased academia gate-keepers can be even though they pretend to be otherwise. Should a man's ideas on art be silenced because of his political background or where he comes from? Can academics do anything about it? Well, politicians can. People who do things.
I saw that Croce (who was in some way related to Fascism) is branded as Hegelian in America. My understanding is that Croce is more of a transcendentalist whose aesthetics can be traced in the thought of many American writers. So I proposed that the reason for marginalizing Croce in America was because of his connections.
---End quotation
I take it you are concerned with the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866-1952). But notice that this is a pretty esoteric interest. He was important in aesthetics, but one may doubt just how important aesthetics may be in the general scheme of philosophical topics and interests.
My point is that it is quite natural and to be expected that people in any given society should be more centrally engaged by their own literature --and their own philosophical thinkers. American experts in aesthetics are certainly conversant with Croce as is the case with writers on aesthetics elsewhere. But one would expect that in any society expressing a developed interest in aesthetics, primary interest and emphasis would be placed on what is more familiar from their own writers and thinkers. If Croce was "marginalized" in America (or in England, say) I would think of this in the first place as more a matter of the comparative lack of (domestic) connections.
One naturally comes to understand alternative intellectual traditions by reference and comparison to one's own. Everyone starts from where he or she stands --to turn a Hegelian phrase. Or, one might say that if a philosophy is to prevail, it must rest upon something already prevalent.
There is perhaps a background, historical controversy involved in the specifics of Croce's influence in the U.S. This has to do with Croce's possible influence on Dewey's Art as Experience (1934).
See:
Article Dewey’s Aesthetics
I don't know if this article covers the controversy, but it may be helpful for those wanting to pursue the relation of Croce's work to aesthetics in the U.S.
I know only a bit about this due to the fact that the aesthetician, Monroe Beardsley was my dissertation adviser. As I recall, he subsequently edited a book titled From an Aesthetic Point of View.
If I may go off topic for a bit: Can you name any grammatical rule for your use of a comma in your sentence „I know only a bit about this due to the fact that the aesthetician, Monroe Beardsley was my dissertation adviser“? It‘s a serious question - I have seen this use more and more lately, but am oblivious of any rule justifying it (and I do not mean a purely descriptive rule such as „when using a combination of noun-which-acts-as-attribute-of-X and name-of-X, place a comma before name-of-X“). As far as I am aware, until fairly recently, no comma had been used in grammatical constructs such as these. Personally, I am not a native English speaker, but rather familiar with its grammar and practical use.
Leading thinkers as Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Freud, Braudel, or some (few) others are classic authors. Their books and theories have a lasting intrinsic value regardless of ideologies, politics, manipulations, and "popularity". It doesn't simply matter if they are or not "popular" since their ideas, theories, and erudite interpretations will last.
Ivo Carneiro de Sousa , I agree. I do recognize that a true intellectual's mission is to seek truth and communicate it regardless of any other considerations, but today's academic journals are usually more interested in the writer's investigating the ignored and marginalized and shedding light on them than the more recognized mainstream thinkers. Regardless of whether journals are right in this, this is the way academic publishing is at least for the time being and unfortunately we have to play by the gate-keepers' rules. Don't we?
Dear Muthana, I completely agree with you and you raised key questions: how many important academic journal papers do you remember, for example, in the last decade? In contrast, how many times social scientists continue to recall Hegel, Marx, Weber, or Durkheim. I use them very often and they continue to suggest important conceptualization theories even when they are widely criticized (normally by people that never read them, but only a summary of summary of their theories). I can be wrong, but I am afraid that we lost their erudition and theoretical perspectives to reward the most bizarre "specializations" (some are mere political or ideological opinions) and to approve with "summa cum laude" the most futile Ph.D. dissertations. My Ph.D. students continue to read and to discover the immense novelty of Hegel or Weber's theories. Surprisingly, they appreciate their help to understand that researching always is researching what we don't know.