There is also the possibility that more intelligent adults do sports because they are aware of the benefits for them. Doing sport has also a money cost ... (Sorry not to answer about your question on embodied cognition but I was a bit surprised by the first interpretation you gave)

(adults with high academic performance probably eat better too)

There is no "non-embodied cognition". Such a term can only arise due to conceptual misunderstandings!

The embodied cognitive perspective came about partly in response to the "brain as a computer" metaphor. One way to think of the distinction concerns what mental representations represent. The brain as a computer thinks of mental representations as abstract symbols, much like how a computer operates on binary representations that can, if complex enough, encode virtually anything. These abstract symbols are completely divorced from what it is that they represent, in the same way that there is nothing tying together words, like "DOG" from what it is that they represent (i.e., actual dogs) -- there is nothing about the visual symbols that constitute the English word for dog that suggests what it represents, and consequently, other languages have their own, equally valid word for 'dog'.

The embodied perspective, on the other hand, argues (depending how far you want to take it) that our mental representations are tied to what it is that they represent by virtue of how these representations entered the mind (i.e., through whatever apparatus our bodies provide). Thus, a mental representation of 'dog', at whatever level of abstraction, is rooted in the fact that we see, hear and touch dogs. Thus an embodied representation of 'dog' is tied to how we have experienced dogs via our bodies.

See early debates between Pylyshyn (non-embodied) and Paivio (embodied: dual-coding) and more recent work by Markman (non-embodied) and Barsalou (embodied: perceptual symbol system). I also have a recent paper (McNorgan, 2012) that discusses the plausibility of assumptions underlying the embodied perspective.

Well, right! I stated an extrem position view.

But I´m not sure whether a momentary (bottom up) construction of a semantic content can sufficiently explain the subjective "meaning" of a content in a given context.

I think "meaning" itself is an entity of representation. But does this representation fully derive out of a given context? If no, the question then is: Where else has the "meaning" got its meaning from if not from the bottom? Hence there must be something from the Top, i.e. a representation. So why should a representation not be embodied? What about permanently-embodied-representations? Should you be aware?

the debate is indeed about difference with abstract symbolic mental representations ; but the question is whether both types of mental representation might coexist in the cognitive system, or in other are these two perspectives exclusive?

@Chris I am surprised that you consider Paivio's dual coding theory as embodied. I understand that in dual coding verbal coding is abstract. Or is this an example of such mixed perspective?

I believe Chris refers to the separation into perception/motor based codes and those that stem from language. Abstract concepts are more often coded in language, while concrete concepts are coded in an embodied way. As Paivio accepts an emobdied coding in his theory, classifying him as part of embodied cognition isnt wrong. The discussion on whether the "brain as a box similar to a PC processor" theories and embodied cognition can coexist are a completely separate matter.

On an off note, a good book for understanding embodied concepts, though not aimed specifically at a scientific audience, is "Embodied Cognition" by Lawrence Shapiro. I can recommend it especially when newly occupying once self with the topic.

I would agree that representations of concepts that are sufficiently abstract can exist as non-embodied representations, especially when they are vague (e.g., jargon). However, in a perceptual symbol systems framework, even abstract concepts can become embodied by virtue of being associated with concrete concepts (e.g., 'time' associated with things like clocks, as well as episodic recollection of instances where time may have seemed to pass especially slowly or quickly, etc.).

With regards to dual coding, Malte's interpretation was correct: the duality of the representation includes an abstract or lexical representation for a concept, living along-side its sensory-based representation.

Thanks all for your replies.

My understanding is that embodied cognition arises out the processing of sensorimotor representations. In terms of developmental psychology notions it would relate to Bruner's notion of 'enactive' thinking, or Piaget's sensorimotor stage of cognitive development. In more contemporary language it may relate to some definitions of simulation.

Some writer would argue that the cerebellum serves as a neurological substrate for sensorimotor representation and processing, and for embodied cognition

I am not attempting to answer the original question - but some of you might want to follow the question Robert Moss (on RG) posted today. It also gives information about a new neuroscience journal which it seems will fill a gap in this area.

"Robert Moss

What is the role of the cerebellum in emotional processing and behavior?

Aims Neuroscience is requesting paper submissions for our April issue. Manuscripts will need to be received by February 28, 2014, and decisions on acceptance will be completed by March 28. Some research has suggested that damage/disease of the cerebellum results in affective/emotional problems. Is there sufficient evidence to support a direct anatomical link? What are the mechanisms by which this can occur? Please add your comments and opinions here as to your views.

Dec 20, 2013

http://aimspress.com/home.jsp?journalID=39

AIMS Press"

Regarding abstract symbolic representations and their meaning, some AI writers argue that abstract representations derive their 'meaning' referentially, through a process of symbol grounding, which entails a 'linking' to non-abstract representations, for example, sensorimotor representations, or in AI terms, connectionist-type representations (analog representations, in 'old currency'). Pavio's dual coding notion would then relate to hybrid AI systems.

On a different note, regarding the last comment about the cerebellum and emotion, by coincidence, this very morning I posted a paper "Emotion: a neuropsychological perspective" which to some extent addresses the role the cerebellum in emotion !

I have been enthusiastic about embodied cognition for about 15 years (since I first read Glenberg's "What memory is for: Creating meaning in the service of action") and I have recently discovered that I had understood so little about what embodiment was or was not when I read Anthony Chemero's book "Radical Embodied Cognitive Science". I now think that in order to grasp what embodied vs non-embodied cognition is, the best thing one can do is to read the first chapters of this book. It is extremely clear and it will blow your mind !

Apologies for won't try to summarize it here because I won't be able to do as well as he does, and also because the key chapter dealing with these notions is about 10 pages long. So go read it! :)

Cheers!

I am not sure this is relevant to your question, but if you were distinguishing embodied and disembodied knowledge, you may not want to overlook mystic experience.

Saint Teresa of Avila in various works, but especially her "Moradas del alma"(Dwellings of the Soul), speaks of disembodied knowledge of God In bodily terms after having left her body to know Him. So here you have what I would call "virtually" embodied knowledge.

I suggest reading:

Wilson, A. D., y Golonka, S. (2013). Embodied Cognition is Not What you Think it Is. Frontiers in psychology, 4(February), 58-58. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00058

It's a great source to understand how the mainstream embodied cognition theory branched into different interpretations. You will find this paper very useful.

Better than attempt here an adequate but still (or forever) preliminary statement of my own views on the matter, I provide the following short list (not in any particular order) of somewhat disparate readings which present views I find richly relevant and provocative:

Ignorance of Language by Michael Devitt

i of the vortex (sic!), Rodolfo R. Llinás

Language and Human Behavior OR Adam's Tongue, Derek Bickerton

Human Language (and Our Reptilian Brain), Philip Lieberman

The Continuity of Mind, Michael Spivey

The Body in the Mind, Mark Johnson

Redefining Linguistics, Hayley G. Davis & Talbot J Taylor

+ (already mentioned by another contributor or two): Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Anthony Chemero

Of the above, if selection be needed, I'd start with Llinás, thence to Lieberman, capping off with Spivey.

Maybe you can find useful to read also the paper by Jirak et al. "Grasping language – A short story on embodiment", or some articles from 2012 Frontiers' Special Topic "Embodied and Grounded Cognition"

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810010001388

http://books.google.it/books?hl=it&lr=&id=u_bSV7fFWQ8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=10.3389/978-2-88919-013-3&ots=NQx03UUhm0&sig=gk0InGAveNF6anuApokrAXR245g#v=onepage&q=10.3389%2F978-2-88919-013-3&f=false

Kelly

it seems that no-one really came out and answered your question, but addressed details of it. I agree that the Chemero book and Wilson and Golonka paper are good, I hope you read them and they helped. The fundamental issue here is the remarkably pernicious and widespread (neo-Cartesian) fiction that we have an mind and a body - and they are separate or separable. There is no scientific evidence for this position, as axiomatic as it is.

Cognitivism or computationalism (Old school cog sci) says cognition occurs via symbol manipulation inside the skull. Everything else is peripheral. Embodied cognition says that is not the whole story. Note that you do not have to be a radical externalist to not be an internalist. You just have to say - there is more to the story. Various schools of embodied cognitive science - situated, distributed, embodied, extended, enactive...emphasise different aspect of this.

I hope that is useful

Simon Penny