"L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers" -Rousseau

In a treatise devoted to freedom of both a social and political nature, Rousseau's Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique/The Social Contract is remarkably free of any treatment of "free will", and likewise despite detailed concern with and discussion of various possible constraints upon one's will in Aristotle we find not merely absent a discussion of free will but a concept of will that could be free. These and similar works testify as to the extent to which one's will can be and necessarily is hampered in any number of diverse ways, making an already troublesome philosophical issue virtually unapproachable if we do not define "free will" to constraints of a more specific sort.

And, indeed, when surveying literature in not only philosophy but neuroscience, physics, theology, etc., we do find a far more narrow definition (and, additionally, often enough the possible consequences of an omnipotent deity or similar constraints relegated to the issue of fatalism, which, as in Aristotle and in no small way because of this, is often treated as a separate matter). From Plato to the Stoics to Origen, much of the discussion of "free will" or close analogues wasn't just different from how "free will" came to be conceived of and discussed but different somewhat in fundamental ways. Theologians and philosophers still debate over the potential problems divine foreknowledge poses, yet pagan and early Christian writings on God's omniscience draw from (and in the later especially seek to refute) the unknowable nature of the Creator, viewing this intellect as made in God's image. Rather than pose a problem to free will, at that time omniscience seen in part as a consequence of it.

Regardless, the development from natural philosophy to the sciences from Galileo and Newton to Laplace and onward fundamentally changed the debate. The successes of physics in predicting the behavior of systems opened the door for Laplace's Intellect which, given sufficient knowledge of initial conditions and the complete laws of physics, could completely predict the configuration of the universe arbitrarily far into the future. Although the study and models of deterministic system were not intended to (and did not initially suggest) a deterministic cosmos, it didn't take much for this to develop. Once it did, the main "opponent" of free will and central issue in most debate on the subject concerned determinism.

In recent years, an fair number of philosophers have contributed a great deal to the cognitive sciences (Daniel C. Dennett, John Searle, Tim Crane, David Chalmers, Paul Churchland, etc.). Moreover, numerous cognitive scientists refer to various philosophers from Descartes and Kant onward, testifying the extent to which agency & free will have moved from metaphysics and philosophy to the sciences of the "mind". Even physicists like Penrose and Stapp not only contribute to this literature, but the basis for their views on the quantum nature of consciousness is motivated by its (supposed) capacity to explain how we experience the capacity to make choices (to exert will). Finally, in almost a sort of reversal from the fatalistic Christiainties or theological issues with an omniscient God back to Origen and other early Christians, we find theologians and theological literature using consciousness as an argument for God.

Personally, being a scientist I happen to prefer debates about the existence and possible nature of free will in an arena that, even when it is not strictly speaking scientific, is approached largely through how mental causation allows for free will given what we understand (and do not) of physics. So too are the various positions: compatibilism, libertarianism, dualism, non-reductive physicalism, and numerous versions of these.

To me, questions about the nature of our ability to exercise free will without constraint are (at least as a whole) rather pointless. We cannot choose to live forever, as social animals we will always be thwarted or thwart others (in whole or part) with respect to will, and so many of the possible constraints humans deal with are better left to separate areas of inquiry (political theory or theology, for example). Additionally, it is somewhat meaningless to speak of agency in terms of socio-political theory if in fact all our would-be "free" choices are determined by neurophysiology and our sense of "free will" an illusion. I see as far more productive the interdisciplinary scholarship as found in e.g., Is Science Compatible with Free Will: Exploring Free Will and Consciousness in the Light of Quantum Physics and Neuroscience, Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will, The Emerging Physics of Consciousness, Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will, Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work, the series Advances in Consciousness, the three volumes Towards a Science of Consciousness published in the Complex Adaptive Systems series, and the numerous monographs, volumes, etc., on complex systems as they are relevant to consciousness and free will.

Probably we have a limited edition of free will, since we are free to

• dream, but inside our family's constraints
• desire, but inside our social provided "menu of options"
• decide, but among a specific set of alternatives.

The key question to ask is, what does "certain prevailing factors" mean? Very different answers can be given to the question depending on what factors we are talking about. Simply because it then becomes different questions we are asking. It is a huge family of questions of the form "is our will free from X" or "does X cause our will", where will is understood as our ability to choose between alternatives (whatever they might be). Using the examples You gave we can ask:

• Are our choices free from metaphysical constraints? e.g. does will work outside physical causation (the answer to that is in all likelihood a clear no)
• Are our choices free from threats of punishment?
• Are our choices free from our phobias.
• Are our choices free from our genetic dispositions?

There is therefore no general answer to the question "do we have free will", as it is entirely a matter of defining what free will refers to.

"L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers" -Rousseau

In a treatise devoted to freedom of both a social and political nature, Rousseau's Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique/The Social Contract is remarkably free of any treatment of "free will", and likewise despite detailed concern with and discussion of various possible constraints upon one's will in Aristotle we find not merely absent a discussion of free will but a concept of will that could be free. These and similar works testify as to the extent to which one's will can be and necessarily is hampered in any number of diverse ways, making an already troublesome philosophical issue virtually unapproachable if we do not define "free will" to constraints of a more specific sort.

And, indeed, when surveying literature in not only philosophy but neuroscience, physics, theology, etc., we do find a far more narrow definition (and, additionally, often enough the possible consequences of an omnipotent deity or similar constraints relegated to the issue of fatalism, which, as in Aristotle and in no small way because of this, is often treated as a separate matter). From Plato to the Stoics to Origen, much of the discussion of "free will" or close analogues wasn't just different from how "free will" came to be conceived of and discussed but different somewhat in fundamental ways. Theologians and philosophers still debate over the potential problems divine foreknowledge poses, yet pagan and early Christian writings on God's omniscience draw from (and in the later especially seek to refute) the unknowable nature of the Creator, viewing this intellect as made in God's image. Rather than pose a problem to free will, at that time omniscience seen in part as a consequence of it.

Regardless, the development from natural philosophy to the sciences from Galileo and Newton to Laplace and onward fundamentally changed the debate. The successes of physics in predicting the behavior of systems opened the door for Laplace's Intellect which, given sufficient knowledge of initial conditions and the complete laws of physics, could completely predict the configuration of the universe arbitrarily far into the future. Although the study and models of deterministic system were not intended to (and did not initially suggest) a deterministic cosmos, it didn't take much for this to develop. Once it did, the main "opponent" of free will and central issue in most debate on the subject concerned determinism.

In recent years, an fair number of philosophers have contributed a great deal to the cognitive sciences (Daniel C. Dennett, John Searle, Tim Crane, David Chalmers, Paul Churchland, etc.). Moreover, numerous cognitive scientists refer to various philosophers from Descartes and Kant onward, testifying the extent to which agency & free will have moved from metaphysics and philosophy to the sciences of the "mind". Even physicists like Penrose and Stapp not only contribute to this literature, but the basis for their views on the quantum nature of consciousness is motivated by its (supposed) capacity to explain how we experience the capacity to make choices (to exert will). Finally, in almost a sort of reversal from the fatalistic Christiainties or theological issues with an omniscient God back to Origen and other early Christians, we find theologians and theological literature using consciousness as an argument for God.

Personally, being a scientist I happen to prefer debates about the existence and possible nature of free will in an arena that, even when it is not strictly speaking scientific, is approached largely through how mental causation allows for free will given what we understand (and do not) of physics. So too are the various positions: compatibilism, libertarianism, dualism, non-reductive physicalism, and numerous versions of these.

To me, questions about the nature of our ability to exercise free will without constraint are (at least as a whole) rather pointless. We cannot choose to live forever, as social animals we will always be thwarted or thwart others (in whole or part) with respect to will, and so many of the possible constraints humans deal with are better left to separate areas of inquiry (political theory or theology, for example). Additionally, it is somewhat meaningless to speak of agency in terms of socio-political theory if in fact all our would-be "free" choices are determined by neurophysiology and our sense of "free will" an illusion. I see as far more productive the interdisciplinary scholarship as found in e.g., Is Science Compatible with Free Will: Exploring Free Will and Consciousness in the Light of Quantum Physics and Neuroscience, Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will, The Emerging Physics of Consciousness, Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will, Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work, the series Advances in Consciousness, the three volumes Towards a Science of Consciousness published in the Complex Adaptive Systems series, and the numerous monographs, volumes, etc., on complex systems as they are relevant to consciousness and free will.

Victor Frankl Quote on Free Will and Determinism

Man is not fully conditioned and determined but rather he determines himself whether he give in to conditions or stands up to them. In other words, man is self-determining. Man does not simply exist but always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment.

By the same token, every human being has the freedom to change at any instant. Therefore, we can predict his future only within the large framework of statistical survey referring to a whole group; the individual personality, however, remains unpredictable. The basis of any prediction would be represented by biological, psychological, or sociological conditions. Yet one of the main features of human existence is the capacity to rise above such conditions, to grow beyond them. Man is capable of changing the world for the better if possible, and of changing himself for the better if necessary.

What he becomes–within the limits of endowment and environment–he has made out of himself. In the concentration camps, for example, in this living laboratory and on this testing ground, we watched and witnessed some of our comrades behave like swine while others behaved like saints. Man has both potentialities within himself; which one is actualized depends on decisions but not on conditions.

Victor Frankl, Professor in Neurology and Psychology

Using life experience, including living in 4 concentration camps as his evidence

Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 131 to 134

Dear Marcelo: In a theoretical plan, yes, human beings have (can have) free will. Humans are social beings. In practice life in society is totally controlled by “superpowers established”. That may explain absurd procedures that still remain all over the world. See some answers of Nizar Matar and András Bozsik that may have some relation to this matter in some previous discussions of other themes.

Even if we have free will, we may have less of it than our awareness of our decisions might lead us to believe. The experiments of neuroscientist Benjamin Libet suggest that some actions may be initiated before a conscious decision to act:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet

I follow answers

best regards

'Will' is inherent & invincible affected by,

1. 'Education'

2. 'Social System'

3. 'Political System'

4. 'Genes'

5. 'Spirituality'

All 'Five' together promote individual over 'Will'