Let us restrict to symbolic thinking. IMO the difference between

a reaction and thinking is that in the latter case new combinations

of symbols are created as intermediate results of processing steps.

Of course these intermediate results must be stored, at least

temporarily.

The place where such new combinations of symbols are stored is

the (one and only) working memory. There is a chance that the

content of the working memory makes it up to the long term memory

(AFAIK over the hippocampus).

Regards,

Joachim

>But, we are to assume that he will not think about the event as I would, being as the >frog possesses no language and cannot run through, analysis, and draw >conclusions from his memories.

How can you assume such a thing?

1) why would language be required in order analyse and draw conclusions?

2) how can you make assumption on what is going on in the mind of a frog? we are barely able to do that correctly for our human counterpart...

If your main point is that frogs do not attribute a theory of mind to others then you maybe be right, although I'm quite sure that theym like a lot of other animals, are able to discriminate between a human having an agressive behavior and a human trying to feed them for example.

Moreover I find the distinction between the reflexes and the "thinking process" a bit arbitrary. Although it is clear that the two processes are handled by different brain regions, there is over time a migration of the "thinking" process toward some more automatic area. You can take for example when one learns how to drive: initially you think about all your actions, understand them, sequence them. But at some point you just think about the nice frog legs you had for lunch and you are not even conscious that you are driving...

You can take a look at the (quite old) paper I attached from Doya. It describes pretty well the main brain structures and the type of learning they are associated with. Somehow your distinction between reflex and thinking is lying in the information exchange of those 3 structures. ;)

Article What are the computations of the cerebellum, the basal gangl...

The thing is that "thinking" should not be that much related to the behavior of a being. When looking at someone with a locked-in syndroma, they are barely able to blink with one eye. From an external perspective those individual could be classified in the same category as stones... Although some of them were actually able to write books...

Thanks for all of your input. Your comments made me reflect on my question and how I chose to word it (I worded it very poorly). Really, the frog is superfluous. I just picked the first animal that came to mind with the assumption, for the sake of the argument, that they did not possess language, and only used the example of an animal as a contrast to the human thought process I was attempting to explain (but this was a mistake and the question is not concerned with frog/human comparisons). Stephane I understand your frustration with my poor wording and apologize. I was assuming but I was assuming for the sake of the argument. Or really, for the sake of the question, which upon further reflection I realized was a question of whether or not we have freewill.

The point I was trying to get to is whether or not what we "chose" to "think" about at any given time is truly our choice, or just a very complex "reflex" of sorts. The way we do not "chose" to jump in pain when something hot or sharp pokes us, we simply "react" to the pain. When I use the word "think" in this sense, I am referring to what I suppose could be summed up as "word thought". So "thinking about something with words" or "thinking through a problem and using words to do so". Another way to put it would be "internal dialog".

*** Some people may refer to this as "conscious thought" but I prefer not to use that term here as my focus is on freewill and not consciousness. I don't want the debate to get hung up on the word consciousness the way we became hung up on the frog.***

When explained like this I hope it is clearer that Stephane's driving analogy does not apply here. I am not asking about the process of learning something, the question is referring to freewill, particularly in what I attempted to describe as "word thought". Hope this gives you a better understanding of what I mean and I look forward to any replies.

Let me take a slightly different angle of approach. The "thinking" you refer to, whether mediated by language or otherwise, is a kind of reflection on past experience, which depends on episodic memory. Now, episodic memory (visiting our own past when we aren't absorbed in the present) may be uniquely human. (Note the "may" there.) Endel Tulving (if I understand him correctly) has hypothesized that it is a kind of by-product of our capacity for thinking about the future: moving outside the present time is the basic faculty, and its chief value is for anticipatory planning.

But this kind of thinking, like linguistic thinking, is only one form of thinking. There is little doubt that cognitive activity deserving the name "thinking" takes place in other animals, even if certain forms may be unique to our species. So your question can be re-construed as: "How much of what we call thinking can be explained as an heroic elaboration upon reflex." This query goes back as far as Descartes, who first described the reflex arc and hypothesized that most life functions are mechanical. Clark Hull wrote some very interesting papers (published in the Psychological Review in the 1930s) in which he tried to develop a stimulus-response model for thinking. He made some progress, but I think the extent to which human cerebral activity is recursive ultimately defeats any S-R or S-O-R model. Maybe (and I'm thinking as I write here) as the incoming ideas link up with pre-existing ideas in memory, there comes a point beyond which we would say that the process is dominated by the internalized ideas. And maybe a point beyond which, after some number of imperfect synaptic connections, enough uncertainty is accumulated that no mechanistic model could predict the outcome except in terms of statistical probability estimates. But I suspect that this is not a sharp border, with instinct on one side and thinking on the other - rather, a continuum along which we must choose to name a boundary zone. With the choice being influenced by our own species' position on said continuum.

A funny story, I do not know if Taoist or Zen, speaks of a frog and a scorpion.

The scorpion comes on the shore of a pond and has to go through, but does not know how to do. Sees a frog and decides to ask her a ride to the other side.

"Frog", says the scorpion, "I can not swim, can you take me on your back to the other side?

"Of course not," replied the frog, "You are a scorpion and certainly you'll kill me with your sting"

"No, no," replied the scorpion, "I promise on my honor that I will not hurt you!"

"All right," answered the frog with little enthusiasm, "I'll take you to the other side of the pond. Get on my back."

The scorpion gets on the back of the frog and the frog began to swim, but when they arrive halfway the scorpion stings the frog.

"Why did you sting me?", asks the frog, "Now I will die and you'll drown"

"Because this is my nature," replied the scorpion.

For their survival and reproduction, all biological systems with a receptor system (sense organs), make use of specific behavioral strategies, genetically prescribed and applied ontogenetically.

Individuals who are part of a given species, strictly adhere to behavioral strategies genetically prescribed for that species, so uniquely and repetitive (stereotyped behavioral). In terms of "character", however, each individual can present characteristics different from those of another individual. In any case, these differences are always closely subordinated to the phylogenetic constraint.

This is what happens when the animal, vertebrate or invertebrate, lives in its natural environment. Any behavioral theory born from the observation / experimentation on animals kept in captivity, it is a theory that says nothing of natural behavioral attitudes of that animal. Zero. It just says how much this animal can be trained, domesticated, subdued, how much can be useful for anthropic purposes.

For their survival and reproduction, humans (Homo Sapiens onwards) make use of behavioral strategies significantly released from the phylogenetic diktat, ambiguous and redundant. This has nothing to do with free will. Free will is an invention motivated by a clear will to power. For centuries, it has been discussed about free will because speak of free will is like talking about the sex of angels, you will never put an end to the discussion. And for what?

We are clearly influenced by having a body of flesh and bones, from having six senses, from living in a certain environment at a given moment in history, from having certain possibilities, capabilities, tendencies, from having a past, from our emotional and/or sentimental state, , from what we eat, our beliefs, and a number of other objective and subjective conditions.

Free will is a mask.

This applies even more so for the anatomical features. In the words of a friend of mine anthropologist: The mechanism that underlies the appearance of anatomical features particularly "useful" to the animal, does not depend on its efforts. If you are living in the forest, you will never, ever make you grow a prehensile tail, as may become necessary.

You can also teach a lion to play with the ball, but if you leave him free in the bush and hope that lion will organize a football team ....

A short answer: thinking is a spontaneous or willed reaction of the brain to an internal event, whilst a reflex in the generally accepted sense of the word is a spontaneous reaction of brain or the spinal chord to an external event.

In an attempt to explore this with undergraduate students, we use the reaction of male Siamese fighting fish to images of themselves in a mirror. They consistently make impressive displays of warning to their image. It's more like a fixed action pattern in that it is elicited every time the mirror is presented. The fish can't choose to stop making the display. This can be seen as a reaction. If it got sick of the constant display behaviour, it can't think "nope, not this time, that other fish never gets any nearer and I'm too tired" (probably just as well for its survival!). . I'd say that the difference between thinking and reaction is more than semantic.

The example you give is an interesting one.  The reaction to being poked with hot coals is definitely a reflex.  However, remembering the event and thinking about it even for an extended period of time, but will still not change the reflex reaction to being poked with hot coals. This is innate and it helps go keep us safe.  So, these type of reflex reaction may not be the right example to prove or disprove free will.  We have other more complex behavioral patterns that require thought and choice.  

The example you give is an interesting one.  The reaction to being poked with hot coals is definitely a reflex.  However, remembering the event and thinking about it even for an extended period of time, but will still not change the reflex reaction to being poked with hot coals. This is innate and it helps go keep us safe.  So, these type of reflex reaction may not be the right example to prove or disprove free will.  We have other more complex behavioral patterns that require thought and choice.  

The example you give is an interesting one.  The reaction to being poked with hot coals is definitely a reflex.  However, remembering the event and thinking about it even for an extended period of time, but will still not change the reflex reaction to being poked with hot coals. This is innate and it helps go keep us safe.  So, these type of reflex reaction may not be the right example to prove or disprove free will.  We have other more complex behavioral patterns that require thought and choice.