This RG open question is linked to the previous about the dramatic evolution (partly unexplainable) of COVID19 in Northern Italy during wave 1.
The previous RG open question is reported below🔴 and resulted in a completely alternative model for the evolution🟨 of SARS-CoV/2 from pre-pandemic phase to pandemic phase.
In this specific RG question, the intention is to create an open discussion on the possible emergence of a violent outbreak of avian flu or similar in central Europe.
This concern arises from a qualitative model that links three events which in the past have always characterized the violent explosion of a bird flu or similar.
The model involves three steps.. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367046404
---Coronavirus Epidemic/Pandemic;
---Conflict/War partly out of control;
---Pandemic avian flu or similar.
The ABSTRACT of the model can be consulted directly here.. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/46_fig2_367046404
This RG open question will serve to accumulate data both for and against this dire possibility.
Thanks to all the participants.
|--sv--|
🔴The novel Coronavirus in N. Italy, Lombardia 【 COVID19 / 2019nCoV / SARSCoV2 】 shows a fatality rate compatible with SARS-MERS. Why?? MAR.2020. -- https://www.researchgate.net/post/The-novel-Coronavirus-in-N-Italy-Lombardia-COVID19-2019nCoV-SARSCoV2-shows-a-fatality-rate-compatible-with-SARS-MERS-Why
🟨Link between the start of pandemic SARS-CoV/2 (COVID19) and the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan (Hubei: China): the furin cleavage site of spike protein. FEB.2022. -- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358443761
The pattern of three steps..
---Coronavirus Epidemic/Pandemic;
---Conflict/War partly out of control;
---Pandemic avian flu or similar.
Technical Report Will COVID19 and Russia Ukraine War favor new pandemic influ...
ANALYZING REPLICATION, TRANSMISSION, AND PATHOGENESIS OF SARS-COV-2 AND ITS RELATION TO AVIAN INFECTIOUS BRONCHITIS VIRUS (IBV)
Dhama et al. (2020) point out that “further research should be directed toward the study of SARS-CoV-2 in suitable animal models for analyzing replication, transmission, and pathogenesis.” In this way, they undertake highly focused research on the following key aspects:
Immuno-informatics approach can be used for the identification of epitopes for inclusion in COVID-19 vaccine candidates. Recently, immuno-informatics was used to identify significant cytotoxic T lymphocyte (CTL) and B-cell epitopes in SARS-CoV-2 S protein. The interactions between these epitopes and their corresponding MHC class I molecules were studied further by using molecular dynamics simulations and found that the CTL epitopes bind with MHC class I peptide-binding grooves via multiple contacts, thus indicating their potential for generating immune responses. Such epitopes may possess the ideal characteristics to become part of COVID-19 vaccine candidates. The nucleocapsid (N) protein as well as the potential B cell epitopes of the E protein of MERS-CoV has been suggested as probable immuno-protective targets that induce both T-cell and neutralizing antibody responses. Reverse genetic strategies have been successfully used in live-attenuated vaccines to inactivate the exonuclease effects of non-structural protein 14 (nsp14) or to delete the envelope protein in SARS. Avian infectious bronchitis virus (IBV) is a chicken CoV. It was suggested that avian live virus IBV vaccine (strain H) might be useful for SARS given that protection provided by strain H is based on neutralizing antibody production as well as other immune responses. Hence, avian IBV vaccine may be considered another option for COVID-19 after evaluating its safety in monkeys.
Bibliographical reference
- Dhama, K., Sharun, K., Tiwari, R., Dadar, M., Malik, Y. S., Singh, K. P., & Chaicumpa, W. (2020). COVID-19, an emerging coronavirus infection: advances and prospects in designing and developing vaccines, immunotherapeutics, and therapeutics. Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics, 1-7. Retrieved from: (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7103671/). [Accessed May 25, 2020].
ABSTRACT of model-pattern >> https://www.researchgate.net/figure/46_fig2_367046404
Europe as a key cluster???
💥 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/46_fig3_367046404
💥 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/46_fig4_367046404
Contagion in European farmers >>> 💥https://www.researchgate.net/figure/46_fig7_367046404
Why this document also for Italian schools ?? >>> https://www.researchgate.net/figure/46_fig8_367046404
☣☣GERMANY: first COVID19 report for Dec.2019!!
SARS-CoV/2 in Europe in Autumn/2019 ??
🟥 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig240_339781431 🔷
🔷PMID:36964561
🔷PMCID:PMC10038364
🔷DOI:10.1186/s13256-023-03809-0
🔷RG:369505460
☣☣CALIFORNIA (US): first case of SARS-CoV/2: Dec.2019.
SARS-CoV/2 in East Coast US in Autumn/2019??
🟥 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig241_339781431 🔷
🔷DOI:10.1016/j.sste.2022.100517
🔷PMCID:PMC9087146
🔷PMID:35934325
🔷RG:360510036
【☢☣】Why this slide??【☣☢】
Because the matter is very urgent from March 2023 onwards.
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/46_fig9_367046404
Why March??
March is the month of almost unified arrival of all migratory birds arriving in Europe from winter destinations (Africa; Asia;..).
All bird migratory routes and populations are part of a single Euro-Afro-Asian global network.
Therefore, the microbial and viral load is also widely shared, at least over a five-year period.
Why 2023??
More than a year has now passed since the beginning of the conflict in central Europe between Russia and Ukraine on Ukrainian territory.
The extent of territory in Ukraine subject to conflict is enormous.
Human and livestock sanitary surveillance is absolutely insufficient and in many key areas, it is almost absent.
Monitoring of wetland bird populations has been completely non-existent for at least 13 months.
The 50 recognized Ramsar sites in Ukraine account for about 3.3% of the wetlands of continental interest in Europe.
However, while in all countries there is a certain surveillance on the presence of Avian HPAI viruses (eg: H1N1; H5N1; ..) in Ramsar sites, in Ukraine, there has been none of this for at least 13 months!!
This creates the conditions for a real triggered time bomb, with gravity off the scale for each month of conflict. Exactly as happened during the First World War.
The war in central Europe must be stopped immediately, otherwise the risks of an avian flu virus pandemic are very severe.
The model on which the triggered time bomb is based is IN>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367046404
.
.
EUROPE: 1125 Ramsar Sites on 28,289,091 ha.
France: 52 Ramsar Sites, on 3,760,591 ha
(13.3% of Europe).
Denmark: 43 Ramsar Sites, on 2,335,939 ha
(8.3% of Europe).
UK: 175 Ramsar Sites, on 1,283,040 ha
(4.5% of Europe).
Ukraine: 50 Ramsar Sites, on 930,559 ha
(3.3% of Europe).
The Netherlands: 54 Ramsar Sites, on 914,175 ha
(3.2% of Europe).
Norway: 63 Ramsar Sites, on 909,134 ha
(3.2% of Europe).
https://ramsar.org/country-profiles
https://rsis.ramsar.org/ris-search/?f%5B0%5D=regionCountry_en_ss%3AEurope
Late professor Robert Shope a famous and frank epidemiologist of past century in 1992 said;
“The medical community and society at large have tended to view acute infectious diseases as a problem of the past. But that assumption is wrong. We claimed victory too soon.” (10.1016/S0140-6736(04)15866-2)
Then different warnings after warnings by epidemiologists and virologists of past and present century came that sooner or later viruses certainly strike. One of the last urgent warnings came just months before covid19 pandemic.
In 2020, I started a research on this topic from the viewpoint of Scientometrics. In 2021 first part finished. If anyone is interested in,
Presentation Bill Gates source of information on Epidemics and Viruses in...
Many thanks professor Rahim Alijani for your contribute.
--sv--
IN January of this year it was indicated that 2023 had all the end characteristics of the COVID19 pandemic.
💥 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig10_367046404
This could be inferred from the comparison with past pandemics, but also more simply from the global trend of associated SARS-CoV/2 deaths.
Does this mean that the first step of the hypothesized model 🔹 for the new Central European pandemic has occurred perfectly and on time??
🔹 Technical Report Will COVID19 and Russia Ukraine War favor new pandemic influ...
🔹
If this is what was found for Ireland, Technical Report Will COVID19 and Russia Ukraine War favor new pandemic influ...
what do the wet lands of Ukraine hold??.
.
.
Estimated mortality of the highly pathogenic avian influenza pandemic on northern gannets ( Morus bassanus) in southwest Ireland.
🟥PMID:37311549
🟥PMCID:PMC10264098
🟥DOI:10.1098/rsbl.2023.0090
🟥RG:371542084
🟥We are getting ever closer to a new
massive mammalian-human spillover
for Avian Influenza HPAI viruses..
Occult epicenter:
conflict area in central Europe🟥
.. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig12_367046404 ..
The model is in progress ... Technical Report Will COVID19 and Russia Ukraine War favor new pandemic influ...
..... Disease Outbreak News. Influenza A(H5N1) in cats – Poland. 16 July 2023. WHO.💥 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig13_367046404 🟥
On 27 June 2023, the IHR National Focal Point of Poland notified WHO of unusual deaths in cats across the country. As of 11 July, 47 samples have been tested from 46 cats and one captive caracal, of which 29 were found to be positive for influenza A (H5N1). Fourteen cats are reported to have been euthanized, and a further 11 died, with the last death reported on 30 June. The source of the exposure of cats to the virus is currently unknown and epizootic investigations are ongoing.
Sporadic infection of cats with A(H5N1) has previously been reported, but this is the first report of a high numbers of infected cats over a wide geographical area within a country.
As of 12 July, no human contacts of A(H5N1) positive cats have reported symptoms, and the surveillance period for all contacts is now complete.
The risk of human infections following exposure to infected cats at the national level is assessed as low for the general population, and low to moderate for cat owners and those occupationally exposed to H5N1-infected cats (such as veterinarians) without the use of appropriate personal protective equipment.
WHO continues to monitor the situation and work in close collaboration with the animal and public health sectors, regional agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), and other partner agencies in Poland.
Description of situation
On 27 June 2023, the IHR National Focal Point of Poland notified WHO of unusual deaths in cats across the country. As of 11 July 2023, a total of 47 samples have been tested from 46 cats and one caracal (Caracal caracal). Of these 47 samples, 29 (62%) were positive for influenza A(H5N1). Positive samples were reported from 13 geographical areas within the country.
Some cats developed severe symptoms including difficulty in breathing, bloody diarrhoea, and neurological signs, with rapid deterioration and death in some cases. In total, 20 cats had neurological signs, 19 had respiratory signs, and 17 had both neurological and respiratory signs.
Fourteen cats are reported to have been euthanized, and a further 11 died. Post-mortem exams on a small number of cats are suggestive of pneumonia. According to the information available, the last known death among cats was reported on 30 June .
Genomic analysis of 19 viruses sequenced from this outbreak showed that they all belonged to the H5 clade 2.3.4.4b and were highly related to each other. Also, the viruses are similar to influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses which have been circulating in wild birds and which caused outbreaks in poultry recently in Poland.
The source of exposure of cats to the virus is currently unknown and epizootic investigations are ongoing. There are several possibilities for the source of infection, among which the cats could have had direct or indirect contact with infected birds or their environments, ate infected birds, or ate food contaminated with the virus. Authorities are investigating all potential sources and to date have not ruled out any. Of the 25 cats for which the information is available, two were outdoor cats, 18 were indoor with access to a balcony, terrace, or backyard, and five were indoor cats with no access to the outside environment. Seven cats are reported to have had the opportunity for contact with wild birds.
This is the first report of high numbers of cats infected with avian influenza A(H5N1) spread over a wide geographical area within any country. Sporadic infections in domestic cats with A(H5N1) viruses, including A(H5N1) H5 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, have been reported previously, following close contact of the cats with infected birds or from ingesting meat of infected birds.
Epidemiology of H5N1
Since the end of 2021, an unprecedented number of H5N1 outbreaks among poultry and wild birds has been reported worldwide. As of June 2023, the clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have become dominant in Asia, Europe, the Americas and Africa. Alongside wild bird and domestic poultry infections, there have been increased detections in non-avian species, including wild terrestrial (often scavenging) and marine mammals and occasionally in farmed or captive mammalian species, likely through contact with infected live or dead birds or their environments.
Since 2020, 12 human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections have been reported to WHO, four of which were severe cases and eight were mild or asymptomatic. It is unclear if the detection of the virus in these mild or asymptomatic cases resulted from infection or temporary contamination of the nasal passages. Most humans infected with A(H5N1) viruses have resulted from direct or indirect contact with infected live or dead poultry. Human infection with influenza A(H5N1) viruses can cause severe disease and is fatal in some cases.
Public health response
Response measures have been implemented by the national authorities in Poland. These include:
Under the guidance of the public health authorities in Poland, all owners of infected cats are provided with a health self-assessment questionnaire and requested to self-monitor for symptoms of influenza-like illness (ILI) or acute respiratory illness (ARI) for 10 days since last contact with infected cat. As of 12 July, 70 individuals who had been in contact with confirmed cats have completed self-monitoring and none reported symptoms.
Providing regular updates on the situation and sharing information and updates with partners, including international organizations.
Epizootic investigations are underway to understand the epidemiological situation in cats and the likely source of exposure of cats to the virus.
Preventive measures have been taken to prevent the occurrence of disease in humans by issuing publicly available general precautions for cat owners and individuals who have contact with sick animals suspected of avian influenza infection.
WHO continues to monitor the situation and work in close collaboration with the animal and public health sectors, regional agencies, FAO, WOAH, and other partner agencies in Poland and globally.
WHO is evaluating the existing candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) of A(H5N1) through the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) to ensure valid CVVs are developed and available for pandemic preparedness purposes.
WHO risk assessment
To date, human A(H5N1) infections following contact with an infected cat have not been documented. Avian Influenza A(H5N1) virus detections in humans remain unusual, and sustained human-to-human transmission has not been documented.
To date, no symptomatic human contact of infected cats has been reported in Poland despite potentially close contact between cats and owners, and the capacity to detect a human case in contact with an infected cat is adequate in the country.
Therefore, based on current information, the risk of human infections following exposure to infected cats at the national level is assessed as low for the general population, and low to moderate for cat owners and those occupationally exposed to A(H5N1)-infected cats (such as veterinarians) without the use of appropriate personal protective equipment.
Based on the current information, the risk for humans at the regional level is assessed as low, due to: i) avian influenza surveillance activities in animals in Europe being strengthened since September 2022, when the unprecedented geographical extent (37 European countries affected) resulted in 50 million poultry being culled in affected establishments; and (ii) Currently, there are no reported instances of human infection with the A(H5N1) virus acquired from cats, although A(H5N1) infection in domestic cats has been confirmed in Poland.
Due to the uncertainties related to this event, including the source of infection, the risk assessment may change.
WHO advice
The reports of these events do not change the current WHO recommendations on public health measures and surveillance of influenza.
Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global surveillance to detect and monitor virological, epidemiological and clinical changes associated with emerging or circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health and timely virus-sharing for risk assessment.
All individuals exposed to animal influenza viruses, and all contacts of confirmed human cases, should monitor their health for the duration of the known exposure period with additional seven days at a minimum.
All those exposed to known infected poultry, wild birds or other animals, or to farms under suspicion, should be registered and placed under close monitoring by local health authorities. This will facilitate the early detection of illness and timely clinical case management. If a person is suspected of having zoonotic influenza, the health authorities must be notified, and appropriate clinical case management should be provided.
Public health and animal health authorities should collaborate closely in the areas of information sharing, joint risk assessment, and response to outbreaks of zoonotic influenza at the human-animal interface, adhering to the One Health approach.
FAO, WHO and WOAH have issued a joint situation analysis and advice to countries in relation to ongoing avian influenza outbreaks in animals and the risk posed to human health. FAO, WHO and WOAH continue to review the situation, monitoring the rapidly evolving nature of the virus, and updating recommendations for curbing its spread, in addition to working with countries in preparedness and response, and facilitating collaboration across countries and sectors. The spread of the virus to five continents speaks to the need for global cooperation and alertness to protect animals, people, and economies.
WHO does not recommend any restrictions on travel and/or trade with Poland based on available information on this event.
.
Further information
Situation analysis and advice to countries from FAO, WHO, WOAH https://www.who.int/news/item/12-07-2023-ongoing-avian-influenza-outbreaks-in-animals-pose-risk-to-humans
WHO Fact sheets, Influenza and other zoonotic: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic)
Influenza at the human-animal interface summary and assessment, 31 May 2023. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--31-may-2023
WHO Global influenza programme, human-animal interface: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza
WHO Monthly Risk Assessment Summary: Influenza at the human-animal interface: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/monthly-risk-assessment-summary
Cumulative number of confirmed human cases for avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003-2022, 31 May 2023. https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/h5n1-human-case-cumulative-table/2023_may_tableh5n1.pdf?sfvrsn=934b4b02_3&download=true
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Bird flu in pets and other animals https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/avian-in-other-animals.htm
The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) , Investigation into the risk to human health of avian influenza (influenza A H5N1) in England: technical briefing 5 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/avian-influenza-influenza-a-h5n1-technical-briefings/investigation-into-the-risk-to-human-health-of-avian-influenza-influenza-a-h5n1-in-england-technical-briefing-5
WOAH. WAHIS report for Influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity (H5N1) in Poland. https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/4063
Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005): https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)
Government of Poland. Chief Veterinary Inspectorate communication. 26 June 2023.https://www.wetgiw.gov.pl/main/komunikaty/Komunikat-III-GLW-w-sprawie-choroby-kotow/idn:2283
Government of Poland. Chief Veterinary Inspectorate communication. 28 June 2023. Komunikat IV GLW w sprawie choroby kotów | Główny Inspektorat Weterynarii (wetgiw.gov.pl)
WOAH Statement on avian influenza and mammals: https://www.woah.org/en/statement-on-avian-influenza-and-mammals/
OFFLU. First statement on infections with Avian Influenza A(H5N1) virus in cats in Poland. 28 June 2023. https://www.offlu.org/index.php/2023/06/28/offlu-statement-on-infections-with-avian-influenza-ah5n1-virus-in-cats-in-poland/
Chief Sanitary inspectorate of Poland Announcement regarding the detection of cases of infection among domestic cats caused by the influenza A/H5N1 virus/ https://www.gov.pl/web/gis/komunikat-w-zwiazku-ze-stwierdzeniem-przypadkow-infekcji-wsrod-kotow-domowych-spowodowanych-wirusem-grypy-ah5n1
FAO - Avian Influenza A(H5N1) virus infections detected in cats in Poland https://www.fao.org/animal-health/news-and-events/news/detail/en/c/1643432/
🟥 🟥 🟥 The current WAR in Gaza (Israel / Hamas) is an "HUGE" enhancer of this worst scenario ... Technical Report Will COVID19 and Russia Ukraine War favor new pandemic influ...
෴⇝⫸MINKS alarm?? ...
...............................
Characterization of highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 mink influenza viruses.
eBioMedicine, Oct.2023,
PMID:37812908.
PMCID:PMC10579283.
DOI:10.1016/j.ebiom.2023.104827.
RG:374530461.
Highly pathogenic avian H5 influenza viruses (HPAI) have caused more than 957 human infections, but do not transmit via respiratory droplets among mammals, although genetically modified HPAI H5 viruses can acquire this ability.1,2 HPAI H5N1 viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b emerged in Europe in late 2020 and have caused major outbreaks in multiple continents. Mass mortality events of 2.3.4.4b clade viruses in mink3 and sea mammals4 suggest high infectivity and pathogenicity among mammals. A recent study evaluated the pathogenicity and transmissibility of several clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses isolated in Canada.5 One of the H5N1 viruses tested (A/Red Tailed Hawk/ON/FAV-0473-4/2022) transmitted to five of six contact ferrets in the same cage, but transmission of infectious virus via respiratory droplets was not detected. For the clade 2.3.4.4b viruses that caused an outbreak on a mink farm in Spain, pathogenicity and respiratory droplet transmission among mammals (a prerequisite for causing a pandemic) are unknown. These viruses did not acquire the mammalian-adapting PB2-E627K substitution,3 but encode PB2-271A, which enhances viral polymerase activity in mammalian cells,6 suggesting high pathogenicity in mammals. Here, we tested the pathogenicity and potential of the mink viruses to transmit via respiratory droplets among mammals.
We generated two clade 2.3.4.4b mink viruses isolated from the outbreak in Spain (A/mink/Spain/22VIR12774-13_3869-2/2022 (mink 3869-2), A/mink/Spain/22VIR12774-14_3869-3/2022 (mink 3869-3)) which differ by several amino acids (Appendix pp. 5) and intranasally inoculated mice with each virus. Both viruses were highly virulent with similar mouse lethal dose 50 values (MLD50s) of 48.1 and 30.0 plaque-forming units (PFU), respectively; however, their MLD50s were higher than that of highly virulent A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (VN1203) virus (MLD50: 2.2 PFU) (Appendix pp. 6). In mice infected with 103 PFU of the mink viruses, we detected high virus titers in the respiratory organs as well as systemic spread in the brain, spleen, liver, colon, kidney, and heart (Appendix pp. 7). However, the mink virus titers in most organs were lower than the VN1203 titers.
To test the respiratory droplet transmissibility of the mink viruses, we intranasally inoculated groups of three ferrets with 106 PFU of each virus. One day later, naïve ferrets were placed into neighboring cages that prevented direct contact between the inoculated and exposed animals but allowed virus respiratory droplet transmission through the air. Nasal swab samples collected after inoculation or exposure revealed robust virus titers in infected, but not exposed animals (Fig. 1). Moreover, the exposed animals did not seroconvert (Appendix pp. 8). In contrast, a human seasonal influenza virus known to transmit efficiently via respiratory droplets in ferrets (A/Isumi/UT-KK001-01/2018, H1N1pdm) transmitted in all three pairs of ferrets (Fig. 1). In addition, we found that the sera collected on Day 10 post-infection or Day 9 post-exposure (before the ferrets were euthanized) showed high hemagglutination inhibition titers against the homologous virus (Appendix pp. 8), validating our experimental setup.
All ferrets infected with mink 3869-2 virus and two of the three ferrets infected with mink 3869-3 virus experienced substantial weight loss (ranging from 17.0% to 37.9%; see Appendix pp. 9) or were unable to remain upright and had to be euthanized on Days 8–10 post-infection. Virus titrations of dissected organs of these ferrets showed systemic virus replication (Appendix pp. 9), consistent with the systemic virus spread in infected ferrets euthanized on Days 3 and 6 post-infection for virus titrations (Appendix pp. 10). Although the mink virus titers in the non-respiratory organs including brain, spleen, heart, and liver were lower than those of VN1203 in ferrets, mink 3869-3 virus showed higher virus titers in the fecal samples. In the colon, robust virus titers were detected on Day 6 post-infection for ferrets infected with VN1203 or mink viruses; no statistically significant differences were detected among the virus titers. These data suggest replication of mink viruses in the gastrointestinal tract.
Collectively, our data demonstrate that two different clade 2.3.4.4b mink viruses are highly virulent in mice and ferrets but do not transmit to exposed ferrets through respiratory droplets.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ebiom.2023.104827
Is large-scale vaccination sufficient for controlling the COVID-19 pandemic with uncertainties? A model-based study.
Nonlinear Dynamics, Nov.2023.
DOI:10.1007/s11071-023-09077-3.
RG:360582457.
Abstract
A massive vaccination programme against COVID-19 infection started at the beginning of 2021. Studies show that vaccinated people are subject to reinfection, and there is uncertainty in the rate of immunity loss, the force of infection, recovery rate and vaccine efficacy. Here we study a six-dimensional stochastic epidemic model with vaccine-induced immunity loss to demonstrate the effect of vaccination in controlling the COVID-19 epidemic. It is shown that the disease persists for a long time if the stochastic basic reproduction number
holds. We have also proved a sufficient condition for disease eradication. Our analysis shows that the disease cannot persist if
. However, this latter condition may not hold if the infectivity increases and/or the vaccine-induced immunity loss increases. Indian and Italian COVID-19 data are used to demonstrate various dynamical behaviours of the system and disease persistence. A non-trivial observation is that mass vaccination cannot eradicate the disease if the vaccine-induced immunity loss is high. Disease eradication is also challenging with the ongoing immunization process if the infectivity of the virus is also high. These results decipher that the infection will last long unless a long-lasting vaccine candidate appears or a low infectious variant replaces the highly contagious COVID-19 variant.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-023-09077-3
REPORT on HPAI or key strains on Avian Flu Pandemic -AH5- in Europe
DEC.2023
💥 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/fig14_367046404 💥
Alarming antibody evasion properties of rising SARS-CoV-2 BQ and XBB subvariants. December 2022. Cell 186(2).
DOI:10.1016/j.cell.2022.12.018.
PMID:36580913.
PMCID:PMC9747694.
RG:366251425.
Abstract.--- The BQ and XBB subvariants of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron are now rapidly expanding, possibly due to altered antibody evasion properties deriving from their additional spike mutations. Here, we report that neutralization of BQ.1, BQ.1.1, XBB, and XBB.1 by sera from vaccinees and infected persons was markedly impaired, including sera from individuals boosted with a WA1/BA.5 bivalent mRNA vaccine. Titers against BQ and XBB subvariants were lower by 13-81-fold and 66-155-fold, respectively, far beyond what had been observed to date. Monoclonal antibodies capable of neutralizing the original Omicron variant were largely inactive against these new subvariants, and the responsible individual spike mutations were identified. These subvariants were found to have similar ACE2-binding affinities as their predecessors. Together, our findings indicate that BQ and XBB subvariants present serious threats to current COVID-19 vaccines, render inactive all authorized antibodies, and may have gained dominance in the population because of their advantage in evading antibodies.
http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.15079.27041
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366251425
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.11.23.517532v1
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