I think that the paper by Robert J. Aumann, "Rationality and Bounded Rationality," in Games of Economic Behavior 21 (1977, pp. 2-14 has an intuitive explanation. I attach a few pages on the section on Evolutionary games from that article, as it is reproduced in Aumann's Collected papers, Vol. 1. Hope it helps.

Here some books commonly used in evolutionary game theory:

1. (basic) Osborne , An Introduction to Game Theory

2. (Intermediate) Jorgen W. Weibull, Evolutionary Game TheoryAug 1, 1997, 

3. (Advanced) William H. Sandholm, Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) Hardcover – December 17, 2010

Dear Yimin,

Here are some useful references: 

Cressman, R. (2013). The stability concept of evolutionary game theory: a dynamic approach (Vol. 94). Springer Science & Business Media.

Sandholm, W. H. (2012). Evolutionary game theory. Computational Complexity: Theory, Techniques, and Applications, 1000-1029.

Vincent, T. L. (2013). An Evolutionary Game Theory. Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications, 1, 356.

thanks so much.now i am reading these works.

i have a question. the situation i face is that there are three kinds of actors, briber, bribee and monitor. how to build the game model? is there some basic models to be applied?

Barry Sinervo and I have a new textbook/monograph forthcoming this fall from Oxford University Press, entitlled Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social and Virtual Worlds.

I think it will help answer your question.

thanks for all of your recommandations.

Jimin, I think that you got plenty of books. But it may be difficult to read. For the beginning, you can grasp the main concepts, examples  and additional literature on EGT from here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_game_theory .

Note that replication dynamics is a key aspect in EGT: types randomly match, play and then those with higher payoff have more offspring and replicate at higher volume in the next generation. You can get differential equations in the limit and they study where the solutions will converge given different initial conditions.

You suggest a game with 3 types: bribers, bribee and monitor, but I think that it may be too complicated. Why not to eliminate monitor and just introduce a chance that corruption is observed with some probability p that will influence the fitness of particular types of players.

I have just one paper about evolution of trust that is elaborated like EGT; see here on my RG contribution (page 4): https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yuri_Yegorov/publications?sorting=newest&page=4

Conference Paper: "Evolution of Trust in the Society"

by Yuri Yegorov. - 4th Joint Japan-Australia Workshop on Intelligent and Evolutionary Systems, Hayama, Japan; 11/2000 

This paper could also be useful:

Friedman, D. (1998): On economic applications of evolutionary game theory. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 8(1), p. 15-43.

If I may say so myself, the perfect book for you is just out this month...

Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social and Virtual Worlds

by Dan Friedman and Barry Sinervo.

se http://www.amazon.com/Evolutionary-Natural-Social-Virtual-Worlds/dp/0199981159/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1458071228&sr=1-2&keywords=evolutionary+game+theory

My earnest request to DELETE this answer if my response is IRRELEVANT.

My publication [refer link] is about Game based approach.

The publication is about applying game based approach to situations in Information Technology and not strictly about evolutionary Game Theory. 

I thought of sharing my publications since you mentioned that you are looking for something simple ideas.

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