Can we guard against intellectual impostures (in the sens of Sokal and Bricmont, 1997) in the context of evaluating and publishing research? and if so, how?
A well-constructed jargon in an area of a professional's field may not be easy to detect as a hoax as in the case of Sokal. The reason is not farfetched. Many Peer Reviews will surely base judgement on preconceived ideas about a certain phenomenon and may not be able to detect a hoax since their academic capabilities are not synonymous with being a spiritual seer who can foretell by events by divination or whatever means.
However, a professional with the right orientation may not want to be indicted in publishing a fake article or research work that has not been carried out if he knows the negative implication and associated penalties that the academic community would mete out towards the offence.
This is why I submit that even though the difficulty of identifying and curbing impostures may be gargantuan, academic communities can have good sanctions in place as deterrents that would discourage authors from attempting to be culpable.
In some areas, such as finance (and I mean both practical and academic finance), such practices are a norm. Thus, an interesting problem is what are the norms and who determines them. Different field may have different norms, and better yet, these may be evolving with time (for the "better" or for "worse"). Temptation for "faking it" often comes as a result of issues such as gaining reputation, money, etc. Guarding against this (and whether we want to guard) cannot be done before we answer the aforementioned questions and know WHAT is IT that we are talking about...