There are a number of papers related to this question in Value-Free Science. Ideals and Illusions? Eds. Harold Kincaid, John Dupre, and Alison Wylie, Oxford University Press, 2007.

John Dupre

Mainz, Germany

Dear Cañas, 

I looked around a bit and found the following article on line, which may be of interest. Its definitely an interesting question you pose.

See:  

Evolutionary Psychology human-nature.com/ep – 2006. 4: 33-48 ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ Original Article

The Anti-naturalistic Fallacy: Evolutionary Moral Psychology and the Insistence of Brute Facts

Alex Walter

Abstract: The naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s ‘law’ are frequently appealed to for the purpose of drawing limits around the scope of scientific inquiry into ethics and morality. These two objections are shown to be without force. Thus two highly influential obstacles are removed from naturalizing ethics. The relative merits of moral skepticism and moral realism are compared. Moral skepticism and some forms of moral realism are shown to make similar recommendations for developing a science of moral psychology. Keywords: Naturalistic fallacy, Hume’s law, moral psychology, ethics, moral skepticism, moral realism, ethical naturalism, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology.

http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/ep043348.pdf

This is not exactly your question, but perhaps its close enough to get started, and you might want to have a look at the references. 

My sense of the matter is that epistemology is no doubt normative; yet without some basis in actual, successful practices this normative status is going to look pretty empty. New inquiries, as in the sciences, may also bring new methods and standards of judgment. So, it looks like the norms of inquiry follow the factual development, though, of course, this is not perhaps the full story.

I recall that there was some attention to the lack of norms in Quine's naturalized epistemology some years back. 

H.G. Callaway 

Mainz, Germany

Dear Cañas, 

Another on-line paper might prove of interest:

https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoBrad.htm

Normalizing Naturalized Epistemology

Michael Bradie

Bowling Green State University

ABSTRACT: The most trenchant criticism of naturalistic approaches to epistemology is that they are unable to successfully deal with norms and questions of justification. Epistemology without norms, it is alleged, is epistemology in name only, an endeavor not worth doing (Stroud, Kim, Almeder, Rorty). What one makes of this depends on whether one takes epistemology to be worth doing in the first place (cf. e.g., Kim and Rorty). However, I shall argue, it is possible to account for justification within a naturalistic framework broadly construed along Quinean lines. Along the way I shall offer a corrective to Quine’s celebrated dictum that the Humean condition is the human condition.

----end quotation

H.G. Callaway

There are a number of papers related to this question in Value-Free Science. Ideals and Illusions? Eds. Harold Kincaid, John Dupre, and Alison Wylie, Oxford University Press, 2007.

John Dupre

Hi Canas

This paper may help you.

Is Naturalism Normative?

The Function of Epistemic Norms

Within Naturalized Epistemology∗

Barbara Trybulec

Lublin University

The definitive paper is:

Bredo Johnsen (2005). “How to Read ‘Epistemology Naturalized’”. Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):78=93

I discuss the naturalistic fallacy as it applies to ethics, but not to epistemology, in my book Grounded Ethics:  The Empirical Bases of Normative Judgments (Transaction, 2000) and more recently and briefly in my essay "A Behavioral Analysis of Morality and Value," The Behavior Analyst, 2013, 36-239-249.

Hi!

Perhaps you may find useful several entries at:

http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=naturalism+epistemology, as well as the chapter written by Pidgen, Charles. “Naturalism.”, in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 421-431. -

Added before.  Doubled by mistake.

Hi Canas,

I have recently wrote a chapter in an upcoming volume that specifically addresses your question. The volume will be out this summer, I have however uploaded a preliminary version of the chapter to research gate. 

Best,

P

About this topic, you could also find interesting the following works:

GIERE, R. N. 2006: “Modest Evolutionary Naturalism”, Biological Theory, 1 (1): 52-60.

KORNBLITH, H. 1993: “Epistemic Normativity”, Synthese, 94: 357-376.

—— 1994: “Introduction: What Is Naturalistic Epistemology”, en H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 1-14.

LAUDAN, L. 1987: “Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 24: 19-31.

—— 1998: “Naturalismo normativo y el progreso de la filosofía”, en W. González (ed.), El pensamiento de L. Laudan, La Coruña: Universidade da Coruña, 1998: 105-116.

MAFFIE, J. 1995: “Naturalism, Scientism and the Independence of Epistemology”, Erkenntnis, 43: 1-27.

A classic paper that responds to Moore's arguments and its descendants specifically is by Anthony Prior: The Naturalistic Fallacy: The Logic Of Its Refutation, first published as chapter 1 of "Logic And The Basis Of Ethics" (ISBN 0 19 824157 7) by Oxford University Press, 1949. Prior argues that there is a problem in some cases, but not all cases. Worse, the anti-naturalist has a corresponding problem.

There are copies in many places on the internet. A good one is at http://www.hist-analytic.com/PriorAN1949.pdf It is a facsimile of the original.

http://www.hist-analytic.com/PriorAN1949.pdf

Look at the anthology by Hudson: the Is-Ought Fallacy and Kornblith: Naturalizing Epistemology.

This is a bit different, but I recommend Knowles, Jonathan. (2002) Naturalised epistemology without norms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy. vol. II, Knowles, Jonathan. (2002) Naturalised epistemology without norms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy. vol. II and similar work by Knowles, https://www.ntnu.edu/employees/jonathan.knowles

Lawrence Kohlberg wrote a piece titled, "From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development" in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 153–235.

This paper can be also very useful:

https://www.academia.edu/12699335/Is_The_Naturalistic_Fallacy_Dead_and_if_so_ought_it_be_

I have a paper on this in case you are interested.