But, it is very hard to "purify the art", because pragmatics teach us that locuotionary, ilocuotionary and perlocutionary sides of the speech act have to be considerer in order to understanding the meaning of the argument. Of course you are right about the problems concerning wrong or irrelevant arguments, but the problem is how to deal with pragmatics.

Dialectic is the art of dialogue...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic

We see it represented in the ***Dialogues of Plato,*** for example. Today we find it practiced, more or less, in discussion groups, such as this, Philosophy group.

The term as it is frequently used includes Aristotelian logic. In medieval universities, dialectic (including logic) was part of the the 'trivium,' the first three subjects taught, along with grammar and rhetoric.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivium_(education)

How about this take on rhetoric:

0118 – MYTH/FABLE

Fantasy - Individualism

Personal Authority

0128 – RHETORIC

Fantasy - Pragmatism

Personal Follower

0138 – LEGEND

Fantasy - Personalism

Group Authority

0148 – PROPAGANDA

Fantasy - Utilitarianism

Group Representative

0158 – PARABLE

Fantasy - Romanticism

Spiritual Authority

0168 – PROPHESY

Fantasy - Ecclesiasticism

Spiritual Disciple

0178 – ALLEGORY

Fantasy - Ecumenism

Humanitarian Authority

0188 – UTOPIANISM

Fantasy - Eclecticism

Humanitarian Follower

The Themes for the Virtuous Fantasy Dialogues

Sincerely

John E. LaMuth - MSc

P.O. Box 105

Lucerne Valley, CA - USA - 92356

http://www.global-solutions.org

JEL: "The Themes for the Virtuous Fantasy Dialogues"

Thanks, John!! It's not really clear what all of this means. Perhaps you could exercise your rhetorical skill to fill us in on the secret?

Bill

We appear to be converging along the same ideational lines...I have something parallel in my book concerning my original class of virtuous themes

118 - INDIVIDUALISM

Ego States

Personal Authority

128 - PRAGMATISM

Alter Ego States

Personal Follower

138 - PERSONALISM

Personal Ideals

Group Authority

148 - UTILITARIANISM

Cardinal Virtues

Group Representative

158 - ROMANTICISM

Civil Liberties

Spiritual Authority

168 ECCLESIASTICISM

Theological Virtues

Spiritual Disciple

178 - ECUMENISM

Ecumenical Ideals

Humanitarian Authority

188 ECLECTICISM

Classical Values

Humanitarian Follower

198 - HUMANISM

Humanistic Values

Transcendental Authority

108 - MYSTICISM

Mystical Values

Transcendental Follower

I further expand this to a literary sense in Chapter 35 with respect to THE PHANTOM AND FANTASY DIALOGUES

The current ethical system (at this juncture) has encompassed only the domain of active human dialogue. Other formats prove equally feasible, however; namely, those referred to as the phantom and fantasy dialogues. The phantom dialogue is defined as communication directed to an absent individual (the phantom). It includes letter writing (in a printed mode), or the monologue/soliloquy (in the spoken form). The fantasy dialogue, in turn, takes this trend to the limit. Both parties are relegated to the phantom role, as in the literary genre of fiction (where all parties are fictitious).

THE PHANTOM DIALOGUE: A MONOLOGUE IN WORDS

In terms of our modern mobile society, one often enters into relationships separated by barriers to direct communication. Communication doesn't cease, but rather switches from verbal to written form, as in letter writing to a friend. Here, I record my internal dialogue in order to communicate with you in a written format. In terms of this phantom form of dialogue, I carefully record my feelings intended for your reaction, in turn, filling in the counter-perspectives you might employ if you were present. This reading of insights into the motives of another is a traditional literary device intended to simulate the continuity characterizing a more direct style of dialogue. These fixed roles are reversed for the reader of the letter, in that the role for which the letter is intended is already anticipated. The letter reader takes on the formal role of the phantom, wherein feelings expressed during the writing of the letter are transferred in terms of the time-displaced dialogue.

In this two-stage fashion, the phantom dialogue simulates a direct dialogue, although in a disjointed fashion clearly lacking in the flexible of a direct dialogue. A similar pattern applies to the soliloquy upon a stage, with the audience taking over the active role of the phantom. Letter-writing actually represents a special case of the mental dialogues that fill-up our introspective moments, although now recorded in written form. Also known as the self-dialogue, the mind is generally flexible enough to take on (in imagination) a role that is not present in this time of solitude/introspection. It is chiefly through this cross style of dialogue that I am able to plan a future course of action by imagining how friends view me in various circumstances, wherein preparing accordingly (an aspect somewhat akin to diary writing). Indeed, whether one relies upon a diary, a letter, or a soliloquy: the basic impact of the phantom dialogue remains true to its focus.

9118 - The PLEDGE

Phantom - Individualism

Personal Authority

9128 - The GRANT

Phantom - Pragmatism

Personal Follower

9138 - PROCLAMATION

Phantom - Personalism

Group Authority

9148 - The CHARTER

Phantom - Utilitarianism

Group Representative

9158 - The EDICT

Phantom - Romanticism

Spiritual Authority

9168 - The SANCTION

Phantom - Ecclesiasticism

Spiritual Disciple

9178 - The CHRONICLE

Phantom - Ecumenism

Humanitarian Authority

9188 - The TESTAMENT

Phantom - Eclecticism

Humanitarian Follower

Perhaps more relevant is THE FANTASY DIALOGUE: THE REALM OF FICTIONAL IMAGINATION

In a brief review of the phantom dialogue, the written word bridges the gap not only for space, but for time as well. This proves a crucial advantage in that the written word is essentially permanent, as opposed to the ephemeral quality of the spoken word. The written tradition allows one to communicate to future generations long after one's death. Indeed, most libraries are crammed with dialogues from the past, made meaningful to consecutive generations of readers. The phantom dialogue, however, is still a fairly restrictive writing style. The roles are rigidly fixed for both the reader and writer alike. Over time, the audience may change to such a degree as to make the material outdated, scarcely more than a quaint curiosity. The time-honored tradition for circumventing this shortcoming entails the use of an alternate form of recorded dialogue termed the fantasy dialogue. Also commonly known as fiction, the writer is divorced from any direct personal involvement within the work, wherein freeing creativity conducive to a truly imaginative narrative. The reader, likewise, is not trapped into any particular role, rather free to identify with any of the fictional characters. This vaunted sense of imagination is not limited simply to gazing inward or manipulating a range of images. The truly unfettered imagination further extends to a suspension of conventional presupposition or belief: an entertaining simulation of make-believe, as in creatively pretending or anticipating. According to Gaston Bachelard: "Imagination is not the faculty of forming images of reality, it is the faculty of forming images which go beyond reality, which turn reality into song. It is a superhuman quality." Consequently, good fiction it broadly appealing in that it generally has some meaning for everyone, whether child or adult. By restricting the content to a fantasy level, the message is generalized to all ages and cultures, as witnessed in the great popularity of mythology and lore from ancient times.

0118 - MYTH/FABLE

Fantasy - Individualism

Personal Authority

0128 - RHETORIC

Fantasy - Pragmatism

Personal Follower

0138 - LEGEND

Fantasy - Personalism

Group Authority

0148 - PROPAGANDA

Fantasy - Utilitarianism

Group Representative

0158 - PARABLE

Fantasy - Romanticism

Spiritual Authority

0168 - PROPHESY

Fantasy - Ecclesiasticism

Spiritual Disciple

0178 - ALLEGORY

Fantasy - Ecumenism

Humanitarian Authority

0188 UTOPIANISM

Fantasy - Eclecticism

Humanitarian Follower

I offer these tables/diagrams as perhaps relevant for use in the media presentation...

Sincerely

John L

[Note to members: When pasting text, please take care in its presentation. I've taken the time to edit the above excerpts. I'm afraid I will not always have that time or patience again ;). Thank you.]

JEL: "In terms of our modern mobile society, one often enters into relationships separated by barriers to direct communication. Communication doesn't cease, but rather switches from verbal to written form, as in letter writing to a friend. Here, I record my internal dialogue in order to communicate with you in a written format. In terms of this phantom form of dialogue, I carefully record my feelings intended for your reaction, in turn, filling in the counter-perspectives you might employ if you were present..."

Sounds like a discussion group on the internet for sure...

Thank you Natasha -- for your editting skills

I was wondering what you (and Bill) think of the overall coherence of the master system ??

John L

http://www.world-peace.org

As it seems to me, rhetoric is largely ignored in schools today. I think the closest I came to rhetoric in my college days was when as a graduate student in Industrial Engineering, I was required to take an undergraduate course in Experimental Design. It wasn't rhetoric, of course, but it did stress the need to build complex arguments from probable evidence.

Where does one learn such things these days?

JEL: "I was wondering what you (and Bill) think of the overall coherence of the master system ??"

You seem to have spent a good bit of thought on the subject. I am not sure what to think of it all. I am a mathematician and (computer) disk jockey. I am afraid I am not able to judge such a work as it is far outside my limited competence.

"Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

"Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states -- especially in well-governed states -- were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

It should be noted that Aristotle assumes a division of powers between the judge and the law-giver. We are not talking about an autocrat, but of a judge who must, himself, follow laws laid down by another.

"It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it" Thus Aristotle would have the litigants in court avoid any appeal to emotion. This fact does not imply that such an appeal might be appropriate outside the courtroom when considering political issues in general.

"Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and [1354b] capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the "introduction" or the "narration" or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator's proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

The practice of the United States Congress shows the wisdom of Aristotle's admonition. For the Congress typically leave laws half written, expecting various commissions to write regulations and the courts to write decisions to determine the meaning of what the Congress left to the imagination of lawyers, administrators and judges.

Aristotle goes on to say "If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters..." switching the subject from the laws to the teaching of rhetoric. He objects to the way the Sophists divided speeches into parts such as the introduction and narration, saying that such divisions aren't essential to the art of rhetoric. What is essential is the enthymeme, without which the orator is lost.

Going back to the previous analogy... just as the lawgiver should specify the general character of the law and not leave it to the judge to determine; while the judge in turn decides on the particular questions of a given case --- so too the teacher of rhetoric should specify the "proper modes of persuasion" which the orator must employ; while leaving it to the orator, himself, to work out the details in a specific case.

"Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people's affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. [1355a] Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

Q: How do you know if a politician is lying?

A: If his lips are moving.

I don't quite understand Aristotle's idea that political speech is less given to unscrupulous practices than legal pleadings. Perhaps the type of unscrupulous practices found in political speech differ from what is found in courts of law, but can we really say that political discourse is "less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues?" The issues are wider, but as a consequence the opportunity for personal advantage is wider, as well.

"It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

"It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non-essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

"Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. [1355b] Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

"It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a "sophist" is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term "rhetorician" may describe either the speaker's knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a "sophist" because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a "dialectician" in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

Dialectic is the skill of arguing a point, of engaging in dialog --- just as Socrates did in Plato's dialogues. Rhetoric is the skill of arguing a point in a monologue --- what John E. LaMuth calls a 'phantom dialogue.'

"Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself -- of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 1

"Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset -- witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

I guess I should read "Rhetoric"...we skipped over that part in our Rhetorical Theory class...8 )

KK: "I guess I should read "Rhetoric"...we skipped over that part in our Rhetorical Theory class...8 )"

People actually study Rhetorical Theory these days?

BO: Well, it was the only "required course" in the graduate-level professional writing program at UMass Dartmouth (that's where I am). It's even possible to get a PhD in Rhetoric & Composition from University of RI, Rhode Island, Carnegie Mellon University, UC Berkeley, etc. It crossed my mind...for a brief moment...

KK: "Well, it was the only "required course" in the graduate-level professional writing program at UMass Dartmouth (that's where I am). It's even possible to get a PhD in Rhetoric & Composition from University of RI, Rhode Island, Carnegie Mellon University, UC Berkeley, etc. It crossed my mind...for a brief moment..."

Did they place any emphasis on Rhetoric's sister-science, Dialectic?

Nope, they left that out. Guess they thought we'd figure it out on our own...Rhetoric is usually coupled with "Composition." How would you structure the curriculum?

I don't claim to know how to do such things. I do know that in the classical curriculum, (Latin) Grammar, Dialectic (including Logic) and Rhetoric were the first subjects taught...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivium_(education)

Drat!! (Excuse my French) I see that Researchgate botches up the URL. As a result it goes to a disambiguation page on which one can select Trivium_(education)

Oh, well...

"[1356a] Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts-sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or [1356b] apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics ), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate. [1357a] The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms; or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that are not generally admitted or believed."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

oh god, we^ve now moved onto another of aristotle^s books? bill, why don^t you just give us the address for aristotle^s works on the internet so that we read them ourselves?

HS: "oh god, we^ve now moved onto another of aristotle^s books? bill, why don^t you just give us the address for aristotle^s works on the internet so that we read them ourselves?"

Sure, read them. I've no problem with that.

"The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say "For he has been victor in the Olympic games," without adding "And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown," a fact which everybody knows."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"There are few facts of the "necessary" type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the same, just as 'necessary' conclusions must be drawn from "necessary" premisses; this too is clear to us from the Analytics . It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be "necessary," will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the "contingent" or "variable." It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular. [1357b] Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a "complete proof" (tekmerhiou); the fallible kind has no specific name. By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called "complete proof": when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a "complete proof," meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed (peperhasmeuou ); for the word perhas has the same meaning (of "end" or "boundary") as the word tekmarh in the ancient tongue. Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, "The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just." Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, "The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill," or, "The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child." Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of Sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, "The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever." This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a Probability, of a Sign, and of a complete proof, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics a more explicit description has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings can be put into syllogisms and some cannot."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"The 'example' has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject-matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the proposition it supports is not that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an 'example.' The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. [1358a] We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

The example is the first 'definition' a child will learn. Ask a child what is a dog and he may answer "It is something like Fido."

We often overlook the importance of example. Yet there are things which we know only through example... and everything we do know does, in fact, depend on things known through example.

Political rhetoric is not infrequently lacking examples. People will talk endlessly about 'glittering generalities' without ever naming names. They talk about the evil forces ruining society. Even when pressed they may be unable to give any credible example of what they are discussing.

Such talk runs the risk of being empty speech.

A good rule to remember is that when we say that something is true of all X it must be true of some X.

"There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody -- one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic. This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully. I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with 'the more or less'. On this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects -- right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. But there are also those special Lines of Argument which are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which nothing can be based about natural science. The same principle applies throughout. The general Lines of Argument have no special subject-matter, and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one's science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong. Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument; comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in the Topics , therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be founded. By special Lines of Argument I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by general those common to all classes alike. We may begin with the special Lines of Argument. But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 2

"Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making -- speaker, subject, and person addressed -- it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. [1358b] The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 3

Aristotle says that he is dividing rhetoric to correspond to a threefold division of the "person addressed." Yet it seems that he has more truly divided them by the subject matter. The subject may be in the past, forensic; the future, political; or the present, ceremonial.

This division seems to agree with C. S. Peirce's 'categories.' Ceremonial rhetoric seeks to entertain the observer in the present. Thus it would seem to be a 'First.' Forensic rhetoric relates past events. Thus it would seem to be a 'Second.' Political rhetoric is directed toward possible future events. Thus it would seem to be a 'Third.'

"Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 3

As it seems to me, scientific rhetoric generally ought to follow the forensic model. In other words, it deals mostly with establishing what has occurred. Predictions about the future are made in the hope that they will confirm judgments regarding the past.

"Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 3

"That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial. So too, political orators often make any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all. In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider [1359a] whether his acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die: yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 3

"It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 3

"Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur. Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser -- propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 3

"Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them. We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 3

"First, then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place. Concerning things which exist or will exist inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take place, no counsel can be given. Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things which may or may not take place; for this class includes some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident; and about these it is useless to offer counsel. Clearly counsel can only be given on matters about which people deliberate; matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. [1359b] For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

"Now to enumerate and classify accurately the usual subjects of public business, and further to frame, as far as possible, true definitions of them is a task which we must not attempt on the present occasion. For it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to a more instructive art and a more real branch of knowledge; and as it is, rhetoric has been given a far wider subject-matter than strictly belongs to it. The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. Even here, however, we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment falling naturally to political science."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

"The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

Much has changed since Aristotle wrote. Certainly, ways and means: the economy, taxes, etc. is an important topic about which men deliberate.

War and peace, and in general foreign affairs, embassies, etc. are equally important today.

National defense provides the ways and means for engaging in foreign affairs. A strong nation will be respected.

Imports and exports are important economic factors.

What does Aristotle mean by 'legislation?' I suspect he means criminal law and laws regulating merchants and craftsmen.

Societies, today are more complex than in Aristotle's day. We now might want to include a host of other factors, such as social welfare, the environment, corporate law, higher education, space exploration and science, etc.

Rhetoric, as Aristotle noted is the practical art of how to argue about such subjects.

"As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to know the number and extent of the country's sources of revenue, so that, if any is being overlooked, it may be added, and, if any is defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenditure of the country, in order that, if any part of it is superfluous, it may be abolished, or, if any is too large, it may be reduced. For men become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure. A comprehensive view of these questions cannot be gained solely from experience in home affairs; in order to advise on such matters a man must be keenly interested in the methods worked out in other lands."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

Some of the economic principles are far from obvious, such as the Laffer Curve.

"As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the nature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, [1360a] and that his own may have power to make war or not against those that are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that may affect their relative strength. With the same end in view he must, besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

"With regard to National Defence: he ought to know all about the methods of defence in actual use, such as the strength and character of the defensive force and the positions of the forts -- this last means that he must be well acquainted with the lie of the country -- in order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed if it is not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with special care."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

"With regard to the Food Supply: he must know what outlay will meet the needs of his country; what kinds of food are produced at home and what imported; and what articles must be exported or imported. This last he must know in order that agreements and commercial treaties may be made with the countries concerned. There are, indeed, two sorts of state to which he must see that his countrymen give no cause for offence, states stronger than his own, and states with which it is advantageous to trade."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

"But while he must, for security's sake, be able to take all this into account, he must before all things understand the subject of legislation; for it is on a country's laws that its whole welfare depends. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are; under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what internal developments or external attacks each of them tends to be destroyed. When I speak of destruction through internal developments I refer to the fact that all constitutions, except the best one of all, are destroyed both by not being pushed far enough and by being pushed too far. Thus, democracy loses its vigour, and finally passes into oligarchy, not only when it is not pushed far enough, but also when it is pushed a great deal too far; just as the aquiline and the snub nose not only turn into normal noses by not being aquiline or snub enough, but also by being too violently aquiline or snub arrive at a condition in which they no longer look like noses at all."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

"It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one's own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited. From this we can see that books of travel are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn the laws and customs of different races. The political speaker will also find the researches of historians useful. But all this is the business of political science and not of rhetoric."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

What is that old quote... "He who is ignorant of history is bound to repeat it?"

"These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the political speaker must possess. [1360b] Let us now go back and state the premisses from which he will have to argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding these and other matters."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 4

SK: "Show enthusiasm for everything you do in order to gain the maximum benefits from every situation you encounter & every challenge you face."

What is the purpose of enthusiasm in rhetoric?

Certainly enthusiasm adds to the affective impact of a speech. At the same time, it may blind one (and one's potential audience) to the important probable consequences of what one is trying to project. Thus it is a mixed blessing.

15. BO : I have completed reading the full thread Rhetoric. One formulation that immediately struck me was your equating the wordeas [word+idea] forensic and past.

SN: "I have completed reading the full thread Rhetoric. One formulation that immediately struck me was your equating the wordeas [word+idea] forensic and past. "

It is not I, but Aristotle who equates the two. I am impressed by his division of rhetoric into three categories based on time.

"It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

"We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

VS: "seems pretty much one persons view."

Well, give us an alternative view.

"From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: -- good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue. A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have. (Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external.) Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure. As we have already ascertained what happiness in general is, so now let us try to ascertain what of these parts of it is."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

As I recall, David Hirst believes that "Happiness Is a Warm Gun."

http://www.researchgate.net/group/Philosophy/board/thread/11141_happiness?page1=3

I suspect he was just quoting from The Beatles song...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happiness_Is_a_Warm_Gun

"Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous or ancient: that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

In our age it would seem that mentioning such things poses the danger of offending against 'Political Correctness.'

"The good birth of an individual, which may come either from the male or the female side, implies that both parents are free citizens, and that, as in the case of the state, the founders of the line have been notable for virtue or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women, young and old."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

#24. BO 092420102144 : social context of birth : in our age, i deem, it should scarcely matter - any associated pride, is a waste of pride - any feeling of loss, is a waste of effort - you do draw the economic benefits [may be plus socioeconomic benefits], nothing more it should mean to.

@Senthil

Hi!

You're one kind of a individual, aren't you? "Any feeling of loss is a waste of effort"?? You should probably see someone for that, because numbness leads to depression and depression can lead to other unhealthy complications...

#H1-26. PB 092520100556 : "aren't you?" . Certainly with your background, you are adding perspective.

How i would not know, and how i have had (having?) depression/s. Why a sense of loss, and what avalanches of thought it cascaded with, and why whatever i am familiar with today is the consequence it gave foundation/bedrock to, and why now when i return to writing after 25 years, i am able to source every idea only from it. Did i not live the intervening years [may be that's, including the present outside-of-here, another life?].

I may even say it could be even injustice if you do not care enough to feel the sense of loss, in such sanctified circumstances.

Probably i gave myself to use disproportionate phrases. Actually, i meant only a very narrow context; the socioeconomic context of one's' birth - however productive a sense of deprivation is [depression is], let's not the derive the depression from unworthy causes. Regardless of the high results that may be achieved, it's not worth deriving from unworthy propellers. To feel a sense of loss at the social contexts of any one's birth--aren't there hundreds of crores of hearts and minds and brains (and to start from, even bodies) less provided than you are, and you would be blaming loss? It is a waste of effort, diverted from other useful contributions that may be made to the "collective loss". Sin?

I always retain surprise if somebody did notice my words; my thanks to you.

SN: "social context of birth : in our age, i deem, it should scarcely matter - any associated pride, is a waste of pride - any feeling of loss, is a waste of effort - you do draw the economic benefits [may be plus socioeconomic benefits], nothing more it should mean to."

I don't know... one can certainly be proud of one's family. Speakers frequently refer to the deeds of their parents. Barack Obama is one who has successfully used his ancestry to his political advantage.

Looking back over Aristotle's list of the components of happiness, I see none corresponding to one's national origin. I suppose that in Ancient Greece that was seen as a good birth. Most of his readers would have been Greek. Thus it was unnecessary to specify nationality in his list.

Today, of course, national origin is much more complex than in Aristotle's day. An American, for example, can be proud of men who trace themselves back to many different nations. Thus when an Amreican speaks of the glory of his birth he might include in that, men from many different nations.

Aristotle noted "The good birth of an individual, which may come either from the male or the female side, implies that both parents are free citizens..."

That one's parents were free citizens is an interesting qualification. Today we have many who descended from slave parents who boast of their ancestry.

And of course citizenship is always important. One might be embarrassed if one's ancestors were immigrants, legal or otherwise... or criminals deprived of the rights of citizenship.

"The phrases "possession of good children" and "of many children" bear a quite clear meaning. [1361a] Applied to a community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good a quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic powers; and also in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good qualities we have described. Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the latter are, in body, beauty and stature; in soul, self-command and an industry that is not sordid. Communities as well as individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians, the state of women is bad, almost half of human life is spoilt."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

#H1-27. BO 092620102344 : It is possible i am over-reducing/ do condense the practice/ideal, but when in philosophy, i tend to abstract the idea towards denser states (statements), and i think practice and ideal/theory don't [shouldnot] differ. [i called such a life that lives the theory as "theorological", and since i lived as such, i used to expect my statements be taken for 100% of face value, sice they indeed were so, and being the stated theory indeed was the practiced life].

Such a life ofcourse is not exactly what is commonly learnt. People do make use of practices that may not be 'philosophically'best, and ofcourse they use such practices without violation of any right/wrong commonsense. It is certainily acceptable that we do use of common-tendency worldly behavior. That you overcome any sense of pride is philosophy; a pride within the limits of harm, nothing can be wrong in it. In fact, it may even aid other virtues like thanking your family/society.

A further clarification into my ways of thinking (and therefore what i get written here).

1. when i have said pride, i have meant harm-enough-pride, not harmless prides. 2. i am usually unable to say philosophical aims and commonsense aims are coincide in the usual levels of analysis. 3. i usually have no difficulty to say logic and creativity overlap in some levels of analysis. 4. i think i scarcely use any concept in it's pure state, usually treat as contaminated with atleast one more concept. eg harmless pride, partial dispassion.

Suppose that I were to write a speech praising Barack Obama... [believe me, that supposition is not likely to hold] would it be legitimate for me to refer to his family? Suppose, on the other hand, I were to write a speech condemning Barack Obama... would it be legitimate for me to refer to his family?

Aristotle's comments about the Lacedaemonians seem bewildering. In the ***Nicomachean Ethics*** he complements them...

"In the Spartan state alone, or almost alone, the legislator seems to have paid attention to questions of nurture and occupations; in most states such matters have been neglected, and each man lives as he pleases, Cyclops-fashion, 'to his own wife and children dealing law.'"

~Aristotle; ***Nicomachean Ethics;*** Book X; #9

But here he criticizes them, at least in regard to the state of women.

"The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of numerous and beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By "productive" I mean those from which we get our income; by "enjoyable," those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion of "security" is the ownership of property in such places and under such Conditions that the use of it is in our power; and it is "our own" if it is in our own power to dispose of it or keep it. By "disposing of it" I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity -- that is, the use -- of property that constitutes wealth."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

"Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

"Honour is the token of a man's being famous for doing good. it is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good; but also to the man who can do good in future. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time -- for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour. For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour; which explains why honour-loving as well as money-loving persons desire it. [1361b] The present brings to both what they want; it is a piece of property, which is what the lovers of money desire; and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

"The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are "healthy" as we are told Herodicus was; and these no one can congratulate on their "health," for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do.-- Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip him; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one's movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an "all-round" athlete."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

#H1-34: BO 1002102204 :

use/care/attention to our body/our good/our social non-inury; these continue to torment me - we are not supposed to take care of ourselves [unless we are alone,and unless the most unavoidable essentials].

How to migrate from the "most unavoidable essentials" to "all practically desirables". It is no way true i desire social injury; it is not safe to solely rely on lenience-based escape mechanisms, but if there is an escape mechanism, i seem to finally make benefit of it; for example, in commitments to home and office, i am growing to limit my efforts only to the most easy paths, and no more, claiming difficulty, and wanting to escape.

I know this is neither good nor safe [see, here i have confirmed my desire for not disappointing others, or landing into injury myself; but the co-existing refraining from/ refusal to take the more-than-12-hours per day efforts only which enable me to put in the difficult efforts required; this seems over-attention to self's social interests; social interests mean safety from social injuries, after all if you dont do your job, naturally you may land in punishment; then, after the 12 hours, i come to say researchgate!].

I know i am exhibiting a bipolarity; one way [elsewhere] i say, social demands are the oppurtunity for you to deliver needed purpose, and thereby give equal response/respect to the social components of your body/selfobject, and also be in harmony with the social-level real-time; but, since that means i am taking care of my own interests (too), i abhor.

There is an abhorrence in myself to do things for my sake. Is this some pathological behavior; i seem to think, my behavior is at one level correct philosophy, at another level pathophilosophy.

I know things may appear as of opposite nature when seen from alternating levels of interpretation, but how to make that level at ground state that which ensures our safety (and not virtue or purpose).

Worldly living, for me, can/does not do without an understanding of this [ie eg "duty" even if it is in self-interest where failure to do may lead to punishment, is notwithstanding, is for always some purpose/need of the society, and society wants from you the duty only because other society itself will be lead to injuries], at the philosophical level (actually, for such understanding, commonsense may be enough, but i want "philosophical").

What is the philosophy called that insists, "it is not wrong to take care of your personal interests lest you may be inflicted social injuries". ie what guarantees "self care is not sin at least when singly exposed to social dangers" [social dangers means, not doing duties expected when in the normal course of risky responsibilities; since however much non-risky work you do, when risky work arises, you should give preference to such; but this risky work, i often take as risky for myself, i forget the risk for the organisation, and i fall in to my pathophilosophy of "refraing from self-interests"]. I know this is not risk-aversion or fear. a numbness to self-interest [only!]. If a situation says, you have crossed the line of occupational safety, i simply get disappointed, i say my logic cannot be wrong, i simply refrain from amending the situation immediately, and i take my own time before i set right [other than in the unfortunate occasions when setting right becomes beyond my means].

In the interregnum, i have to suffer the humiliation of having done things wrong. How in the first place the alleged "wrongs" arise in my work? I always believe the spirits are the law/rules, not the words. And i work accordingly. Some reviewer declares some thing wrong, and his declaration would persist until i can show that it is possible to apply a more virtuous spirit than commonly construed. And i don't do that immediately, my self-righteousness of spirit disappointed. I abhor self-defense.

I do think i correctly understand; responsibilty fires/inspires me. But i falter to assume over-responsibilty, get rendered into some over-assumed performances, liable to be called errors, i am singly causative of the errors, therefore singly unsafe, i feel in that case i shall not let down myhigher sense of responsibilities which in fact the cause ofthe overassumptions,and because they are not wrong, i feel cannot do any thing else, and finally the worst,i refuse to self defend.

What philosophy will come to my rescue? I cannot need anything else.

How to get rid of this? i want a philosophical solution, not psychological or neurological.

SN: "use/care/attention to our body/our good/our social non-inury; these continue to torment me - we are not supposed to take care of ourselves [unless we are alone,and unless the most unavoidable essentials]."

Who supposes this?

Aristotle is writing about happiness, not asceticism. His reason for considering the components of happiness is to further the purposes of rhetoric. Can bodily health serve as a motivating factor in advancing an argument? If it does than it is reasonable for one desiring to know rhetoric to study it.

Perhaps you believe you are superior to all such matters? Then you might avoid such arguments. In doing so, you will be limiting yourself to some degree. But if such limitation fits your personality, then do so.

There is an old painting showing Plato and Aristotle. Plato is pointing upward to the sky. Aristotle is shown with his hand outspread as if to say "No, Plato, lets deal with the world about us."

http://www.safran-arts.com/42day/art/art4mar/raphael/athari.html

Perhaps Plato's idealism was right... perhaps Aristotle's realism. It is for you to judge how you will respond.

A philosopher ought in some sense to know all things, from the vulgar to the sublime. We do not live in the Garden of Eden, having tasted of the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. It is far too late for man to plead ignorance. In my humble opinion, the best we can do is to seek wisdom, wherever it be found; and then to live according to the virtues which flow from it: self-control, courage and sound judgment. If we can do that, then our philosophy shall have born the fruit it is meant to produce.

#H1-37. BO 1004100652 :

supposes? : i believe it is "natural"

beleif? : i feel it is 'inborn".

Thanks very much for your response. i believe only for clarifications like this good threads shall not be purged. Certainly your words will help my reconciliation. Human mind may think so many thoughts, but it also depends on external support to feel belonging and worthy to make use of it's own thoughts. I don't know how is this strange, but there is a desire for our thoughts to get supported from some body else.That recognition seem to supply a miraculous justification, external ratification of the thought.

superior? : where is the word. i said torment. it is my habit i need i don't fail people. but there is not enough time to be exhaustively hospitable, and when you are not able deliver all the accepted duty,where is the deservation to self-care. I would never have enough self-time.This researchgate only because, when you are too tired at a no-minute-discussion/decision free office, unless there is a diversion of mind to something peaceful, the next day it would be even more tired and can affect productivity. The hour or hours spent reading/writing definitely offers a relaxation, and after a dropping into sleep, renders the next morning fresh as ever. i usually say i never get tired, but i practice a variety of interests, and that is why, perhaps the newer subjects help keep the mind continuously fresh.

idealism, realism : i shall consider. i am in a destructive mix may be! -- To find a better point in this equilibria oppositoria.

"It is far too late for man to plead ignorance". This is a very nice observation. I shall certainly make use of this idea. I think that as far as i am concerned, this can become a seminal statement.

'

Aristotle wrote of what he thought of the beauty of man. He said nothing of the beauty of woman. Perhaps he thought it too obvious to need comment.

Certainly in a woman, beauty would imply the bodily condition appropriate for one to give birth and care for children and the home.

So-called feminists might object to the description, but there can be little argument about the fact.

"Happiness in old age is the coming of old age slowly and painlessly; for a man has not this happiness if he grows old either quickly, or tardily but painfully. It arises both from the excellences of the body and from good luck. If a man is not free from disease, or if he is strong, he will not be free from suffering; nor can he continue to live a long and painless life unless he has good luck. There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite independent of health or strength; for many people live long who lack the excellences of the body; but for our present purpose there is no use in going into the details of this."

~ Aristotle; ***Rhetoric;*** Book I; Chapter 5

SN: "supposes? : i believe it is 'natural'"

Strange... As it seems to me there is nothing more natural than that an animal take care of itself. Yet you say "we are not supposed to take care of ourselves." Other than yourself, who says such things?

Do you not eat? Do you not drink? Do you not wear clothes? Do you not bathe? Do you not seek shelter from the elements? Do you not consult a physician if you feel sick?

Who claims that we should not do such things?

#H1-39. BO 1005100037.

that's what. you are right in the list. these things [if you/one/i cannot avoid] i do do. "the most unavoidable essentials". these i may do even if not sanctified by some other person's finding it natural that day to day i do ["when alone"]. food /bathe/change clothes/physician all at the last permissible hours but. but shelter always.

as i was saying earlier also, my words may not be precise. there may be things/situations ranging from "most unavoidable essential" self-care to "things/situations perhaps essential".

A live example, yesterday i could not attend a potentially dangerous/embarrassing thing, since from 8 am to 7 pm, i had to attend nonstop (except for lunch) stream of customers' or staff's needs for their work, no minute passed without some discussion or decision. [sometimes the mouth aches]. Subsequently no electricity and no computer network connection. i was not objecting because, if people demand decision or other work, that's because they need it, and when they are in first person before me, and if their demands are in the ordinary course of my profession, my responding after all serves their purpose, so i could not avoid, and the bi-product is thus the dense day has/had/does also ensured my purpose, and since i had not at all been free i have to attend the dangerous thing only in the next available minute, but that means i have not attended the dangerous thing; [and now to the clincher, be their further time to attend, but the time-bomb may/will/does blows on me].

Unless somebody cares enough to insist you better take care of your position, this had been my situations a number of or many times, many times the time bombs did indeed blow on me, and lead to disclosed and undisclosed [but significant economic and may be also social losses, please] losses, but i could not change enough. [since i also say i have no sense of property/ownership over anything, i should understand, my family it is which lost, and why i act/ed not at least to take care on that basis? this would be/is their question?]

But of course i have already said in my last post, Thanks for your support. "will help reconciliation."

in English you have words characteristics called hypernymy, hyponymy etc, perhaps probably i need their help in interpreting my word usage. self-cares some allowed, some allowed not! or every self-care after an appropriate "external sanction as natural need." "ie some body else also finds the natural need is also "logical"; that leads to a "philosophical reconciliation?" All words here used not in their exhaustive range, but within some applicability range [ie the "others inapplicable" will be left out.

In 1983 i said i don't like self defence [even against significant social wrongs i faced, in science]. I think i have changed since [?]. But i still like to explore [how else to further change!] the realm of the "supposition" through to it's opposite.

SN: "A live example, yesterday i could not attend a potentially dangerous/embarrassing thing..."

I edited your message, deleting several blank lines at the end. I hope you don't mind the omission.

SN: "self-cares some allowed, some allowed not!"

I have no idea how you decide which are not allowed. Perhaps an example would help?