Wouldn't it depend on the extant material conditions (e.g. available raw materials, population size, technologies) as well as cultural factors (e.g. religious beliefs, aesthetic preferences, social relations and expectations)? In principle, with the right admixture of such conditions, each of the three systems could deliver the same hedonic output (cf. Deng Xiaoping's famous quip that it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice).

Preprint JEREMY BENTHAM'S UTILITARIANISM PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL DEMOCRAC...

Bentham might argue that the system producing the greatest happiness would depend on how well each system can be implemented to maximize overall well-being and minimize suffering. The effectiveness of policies, sociologic conditions, and the degree to which they can ensure happiness for the greatest number would ultimately be the deciding factor, rather than a clear preference for one system over another.

Karl Pfeifer

"cultural factors (e.g. religious beliefs, aesthetic preferences, social relations and expectations)"

So we're supposed to brainstorm something maxing out social cohesion, social connections and general impression of having meaning in life, right?

Based on this criteria... uhm... ethnically homogeneous theocracy with strong clan like structure (to remain in close contact with no more people than Dunbar's number)...

While technically speaking it could indeed keep quite high share of population happy, I somehow think that this philosopher of enlightenment may not like pushing his idea to such ultimate conclusion. :D

Marcin Piotr Walkowiak

1-Social Democracy, 2-Capitalism, 3-Socialism ??

I don't recall Bentham specifically addressing those either. What he would've liked can be at odds with unforeseen implications of the hedonic calculus. Why not regard such results as a reductio of it?

Here is a quotation from Bentham (Rationale of Reward, 1830) that is at least suggestive of cultural factors being relevant: "The utility of all these arts and sciences,—I speak both of those of amusement and curiosity,—the value which they possess, is exactly in proportion to the pleasure they yield. Every other species of preeminence which may be attempted to be established among them is altogether fanciful. Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either."

Damian Wayne Williams

I don't know how to respond to that, since Bentham himself created the hedonic (aka felicific) calculus as a methodology for Utilitarians to determine what is morally required of them:

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/An_Introduction_to_the_Principles_of_Morals_and_Legislation/Chapter_IV

Damian Wayne Williams

The calculus is replete with subjective notions: happiness, pleasure, pain, intensity.... Benthan recognized that frivolous things might give pleasure (e.g. push-pin) and unlike Mill didn't make a special case for higher pleasures. You said "I also don't think the hedonic calculus would have been much interest to Bentham" which is a very strange thing to say, given that it is his detailed explanation of how his principle of utilitarianism is to be understood.

Yes, the principle is supposed to be a moral truth and is objective in that sense. Maybe Bentham didn't foresee the possibility that his principle might sanction, as Marcin Piotr Walkowiak suggests, "ethnically homogeneous theocracy with strong clan like structure." Or maybe he would just accept the verdict, if such a state of affairs satisfied his principle. Why do you regard such subjectivity (foresee, accept) as being at odds with the objectivity of the principle? Even theories in physics can have unforeseen consequences that turn out to undermine their generality.

Karl Pfeifer

"Why do you regard such subjectivity (foresee, accept) as being at odds with the objectivity of the principle?"

I thought that in some simplification part of the job of being thinker of the Enlightenment was finding some logical, elegant, rational explanation affirming ideology of the enlightenment. Effectively having already the answer, just being busy thinking through the pathway there. (Nothing that unique, Scholasticism did the same except having to direct thought process towards confirming divine order and Church teaching)

"1-Social Democracy, 2-Capitalism, 3-Socialism ??"

Depends on definition. I mean Marxists loved to call tribal societies as "primitive communism", while if one rather measures state imposed redistribution then tribal society with some limited central government would count as heavily capitalist.

I also wonder to what extend society which ultimate goal is maxing happiness, could tinker with the numbers by relying on high level of availability of antidepressants and using them in edge cases. (the studies are a bit murky on showing that they really improve situation in cases that are below threshold of fulfilling clinical definition of depression) Regardless of exact institutional arrangement (could be well available mental health, or could be aggressive marketing campaigns and selling OTC), this may technically speaking reduce number of people feeling slightly unhappy.

Marcin Piotr Walkowiak

You wrote: “I thought that in some simplification part of the job of being thinker of the Enlightenment was finding some logical, elegant, rational explanation affirming ideology of the enlightenment. Effectively having already the answer, just being busy thinking through the pathway there. (Nothing that unique, Scholasticism did the same except having to direct thought process towards confirming divine order and Church teaching)"

The history of ideas may invoke sociology and biography as part of the explanation for why a certain principle or theory was held or proposed. Einstein’s upbringing and experiences in the patent office may be part of the story behind the development of the Theory of General Relativity but they are not part of the Theory of General Relativity. From the theory, physicists were able to make predictions, but those predictions were entailed by General Relativity together with other theories and tenets of physics. Not everyone could foresee certain entailments, including Einstein. When Quantum Mechanics entered the picture, there were entailments that Einstein had not expected and that he was not comfortable with (“God does not play dice with the universe”). But again, Einstein’s psychology is not part of any theory in physics, although in a loose sense one might say it was against the spirit of, or at odds with, continuing developments in physics.

When theories or principles are formulated in the realm of Geisteswissenschaft, the situation should be the same: what Bentham succeeded in doing in enunciating his principle is not the same as what he may have thought he succeeded in doing. The former is a matter of logical entailment, the latter a matter of psychology. Utilitarianism has formal consequences that are still intense subjects of debate today. Whether Bentham expected the possibility of certain entailments or would have accepted all that was entailed or would have been willing to modify the principle (as Mill did, by invoking higher vs. lower pleasures), who can say?

Marcin Piotr Walkowiak

You wrote: "1-Social Democracy, 2-Capitalism, 3-Socialism ??" "Depends on definition. I mean Marxists loved to call tribal societies as "primitive communism", while if one rather measures state imposed redistribution then tribal society with some limited central government would count as heavily capitalist."

A caution about definitions:

When I was an undergraduate, The Real World of Democracy by C. B. Macpherson was a required text for one of my courses. I thought it was a joke that he regarded African military dictatorships as a form of democracy. It reminded me of Yul Brynner's classic line in The King and I : "Democracy takes many forms. In my country it takes a form called absolute monarchy."

As Nelson Goodman warned us, “resemblances can be found anywhere, for anything resembles anything else in some respect or other."

Karl Pfeifer "When theories or principles are formulated in the realm of Geisteswissenschaft, the situation should be the same"

This otherwise valid normative statement is quite remote from reality. Firstly in case of social theories people are much more emotionally invested in them (then in let's say Newtonian mechanics, though to be fair a few centuries earlier there had been a few people overtly attached to Ptolemaic model :D). They serve as some form tribal identity and person contradicting them risk decreasing social status (as heretic, revolutionary, counterrevolutionary, bigot, etc).

Secondly building convincing argumentation is much harder. In my field (public health) I'm already on the edge. A few times I was facing reviewers who appeared somewhat unenthusiastic seeing conclusions, though nevertheless seeing the modelling behind it was quite firm so had to let it pass. Had it been a softer science, I would risk having my paper rejected. Had it been harder science or cases where I used similar classes of models in areas where my findings were what was intuitively expected or the subject was too niche for anyone to have some strong preconceived notion - the same modeling would be deemed absolutely conclusive and needing no extra contextualization.

"Whether Bentham expected the possibility of certain entailments or would have accepted all that was entailed or would have been willing to modify the principle (as Mill did, by invoking higher vs. lower pleasures), who can say?"

I personally suspect that most of enlightenment philosophers would be really uneasy if some happiness maximizing endeavor would end up quite bizarre in style of let's say Huxley's "Brave New World" or some religious fundamentalism. The typical path would be rather updating specification so something looking enlightened is being produced.

"A caution about definitions:"

Here it's more of an issue that tribal system don't really fit well on continuum capitalism vs commanded economy.

Marcin Piotr Walkowiak

There is enough emotional investment to go around, in all sciences, natural or social, and all theories or their aspects, and there is ample evidence of that on RG. So-called paradigm shifts leave a residue of naysayers and hangers-on. Moreover, in the social sciences and humanities, polemics are often considered part of the research or scholarly activity and are expressly articulated in publications.

I agree that most enlightenment philosophers would likely be uneasy and even exasperated by present-day discussions and analyses of the principle of utility that invoke unusual or merely logical possibilities (trolly problem, anyone?). You say, "The typical path would be rather updating specification so something looking enlightened is being produced." I agree with that too. I think that that's what Mill was up to with his higher/lower pleasures distinction and his semi-conciliatory remarks about Kant in Utilitarianism, although Bentham himself apparently had no qualms about Carlyle's deeming utilitarianism to be a philosophy for pigs. I guess much of this is avoided nowadays by changing the subject with a shift to talk of maximizing expected utilities as conceived by economists.

Another problem with definition is the vagueness of key terms, which give rise to terminological spectra, disputed borderline cases, stipulations unacknowledged as such, and "merely verbal" disputes. Here again, economists' mathematical approach avoids or mitigates such problems.

An afterthought. Bentham's psychology does after all enter into his utilitarianism inasmuch as considerations of his own pleasure/happiness should've been properly included in any hedonic calculation. Pooh! 🤨