Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamentals, the assumptions and implications of science, in relation to logic and the natural sciences, such as physics or biology, both with respect to the social sciences, such as sociology, psychology or economics.

Philosophy of science is linked in general to the philosophy of knowledge and epistemology. It seeks to explain the nature of the concepts and scientific statements, the ways in which they are produced; how science explains nature, how is predicted, and as it uses for its purposes; the means for determining the validity of the information; the formulation and use of the scientific method; types of reasoning that are used to reach conclusions; the implications of scientific methods, with models of the scientific environment and human society surrounding.In the most common sense, philosophy of science is the study of how is the scientific knowledge. It has large overlap with epistemology and several themes in common with the problem of demarcation. When we need to identify what exists, whatever the object of which we speak, ontology and epistemology will also be involved. In the philosophy of science has a certain importance also logic both for its connection with the deductive methods, and for its close ties with the philosophy of mathematics.

Philosophy of science can also be in the plural, as internal reflection to a scientific community on the philosophical aspects relating to a common discipline of competence, so we get the philosophy of physics, mathematics and other philosophical sectors.

It is part of the philosophy of science also the ethics of science, which deals with its moral aspects. "Science as an institution implies a tacit social contract among scientists so that each is dependent on the reliability of the other [...] the whole cognitive system of science is rooted in the moral integrity of the whole of the individual scientists.

In the historical development of the philosophy of science, particularly important reveals the twentieth century. At its beginning it were basic the studies of historians and philosophers Ernst Mach and Pierre Duhem that inspired the philosophers gathered in the Vienna Circle, a group of scholars who met regularly in Vienna from 1922 until 1936 to discuss issues of philosophy of science. Among the members of this group most active were Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. To be mentioned in the debate on philosophy of science, especially in relation to Popper, was Paul Feyerabend. Karl Popper, an occasional visitor to the Vienna Circle, contested the issue of ‘experimental’, to which opposed the criterion of falsifiability.

Incidentally, more or less in the same years developed, thanks to the initiative of Hans Reichenbach, the Berlin Circle, who took charge of the same themes, but with an emphasis on causality, statistics and the predictive power of science.

Kuhn criticized partially Popper’s falsificationism on the point concerning the casting aside of the theory in the case of empirical refutation of one of its elements, arguing that it should have been set aside only that single element and not the theory as a whole.

Also Lakatos, while welcoming the philosophical setting of Popper, claimed that were never the single refutations of empirical facts to determine the abandonment of a theory, because the questioning of scientific truth would cover only a marginal part of it, not its core, that although weakened in its overall certainty, would continue to be accepted as true. For a general theory to be abandoned, according to Lakatos, it should rather have a new comprehensive program of scientific research being able to give an account of the events: it is not the falsification in itself to cause the progress of the science, but the spirit of research and human ingenuity-

After the dissolution of the Vienna Circle in 1936, studies in this discipline continued in various European and American universities. Among the developments of the last decades of the twentieth century are remembered the important contributions of the American philosopher Thomas Kuhn and Hungarian Imre Lakatos related to research programs and to the progressive development and evolution of scientific theories.

Professor Mauro Dorato speaks of a "significant tension that existed among the objectives of the different philosophies (" local ") of the individual sciences, more and more " technical "and specialist, and the essential need of a general philosophy of science , seen in a synergistic context with other branches of philosophy – from ontology to epistemology, from metaphysics to ethics. "

He concludes his article with these words: "The philosopher of science, unlike the scholar of the foundations of the individual sciences, does not intended to raise the knowledge within a particular science. He / she has only the goal, not less important, to understand it better, comparing it with the image of the world that was deposited both in our pre-theoretical experience and in the implicit theories in the use of natural languages. It follows that the acquisition of a technical-scientific knowledge, if it comes from the philosopher of science inclined to a "synthesis" work, has the essential object, already mentioned, to probe the consequences of certain scientific theories, considered as "given" or acquired, on issues of "border line", which, for example, are those of the relationship between time and space of the physical world (space / time) and the time and space of our conscious experience, or among the numerous and complex neural connections and phenomenology of our mental states”.

More Gianrocco Tucci's questions See All
Similar questions and discussions