Collecting data from internet users without their consent (or in the event of its leakage) can be considered unethical, as this activity violates the sense of personal autonomy due to the myriad of abusive purposes it serves: unwanted marketing and manipulative advertising (spam); breaching confidentiality, which can cause significant psychological harm (for instance, disclosure of health information or sexual orientation); discriminating against individuals by exposing compromising information; various forms of fraud (blackmail, extortion, etc.); (cyber)crimes (such as social engineering and direct hacking); intentional persecution of individuals, and so on.
All of this suppresses individuals' sense of personal freedom, making them feel unprotected even in the online sphere, fearing to express their genuine opinions or explore various topics. This seriously compromises the fulfillment of the basic need for safety as per Maslow's hierarchy.
Hence, it's extremely important to establish strict boundaries regarding the collection and utilization of online data to maximize the protection of people from potential harm
Evgeniy A. Bryzgalin Thank you for your answer. I appreciate it.
I agree that collecting data from internet users without their consent (leakage) may be considered unethical. Moreover, it is most often contrary to law. Two systems are engaged then, namely law system and morality system.
My question was more focused on morality system only, namely let’s assume that there is a consent given to an internet platform for collecting personal data. Is it possible that in such situation ethics can be breached? An activity of an internet platform is compatible with law but against ethics? What kind of situation would it be?
I believe that the question of ethics in this case may arise due to several aspects:
- Insufficient transparency (obscure nature) of the privacy policy: users might consent to data collection without fully understanding how their personal data will be used. This can lead to a situation where data might be used for purposes not entirely agreed upon by users within specific boundaries.
- If the platform fails to ensure an adequate level of data security, it could lead to a breach of user privacy due to potential unauthorized access.
It seems to me that if the platform adheres to all the aforementioned rules and collects data from users who have given their consent, there should be no need to complicate this moral question. In any case, it wouldn't be considered amoral, as users, in this scenario, have assumed all the risks and responsibility by using one or another online platform
The reason why I asked this question is because I read in one of books on morality in cyberspace that it may be immoral when a platform, based on the collected data (upon our consent), judges us, namely creates our profile for commercial purposes (mainly) without a context, without knowing us better.
However, after having thought about it, I realize that we are judged without a context in various situations on a daily basis.
Therefore, I am inclined to say that morality in cyberspace is in fact a broader topic concerning “interpersonal relations”.
A solution to the above mentioned “immoral situation“ would be perhaps not giving our consent before collecting data on us, but to give our consent after having been profiled for further commercial purpose, namely whether we accept or not the profile of ourselves created in cyberspace by a platform for further commercial purposes.
In short, if our data is collected to achieve certain purposes, we should consent not to the collection of data, but to the purpose that was achieved thanks to it. Or we should consent twice: 1. to the collection of data; 2. to the purpose that was achieved thanks to it by a platform.
In answering this question, I would like to adopt a decidedly critical perspective.
Together with Jean-François Lyotard, we should consider that the post-industrial society is characterised by two essential features, namely: the "rise of techniques and technologies" and the "re-development of liberal capitalism". Ulrich Beck pointed this out from a risk-sociological perspective: Media not only bring about "individualism", but also "standardisation". The individual situations associated with this are characterised by market dependency.
These developments are converging in the form of curated digital platforms, linked to the value creation stages of the digital economy. Byung-Chul Han draws the provisional conclusion of the technicist-economist development calculus: "The neoliberal imperative of self-optimisation serves solely to achieve perfect functioning within the system. [...] No concern for the good life drives self-optimisation. Its necessity arises solely from systemic constraints, from the logic of quantifiable market success."
In terms of practical philosophy or ethics, the individual no longer decides for himself, free will and human freedom are deconstructed. In the classic critique of power, the millions of mapping and Machting of personal data ultimately serves some political, economic or military particular interests. Perhaps the time has long since passed when civil society can put a stop to this threat.
Christian Filk Thank you very much for your interesting input into our disccussion (in fact).
A lot of issues have been raised in your opinion. I agree that political, military and economic interests are a driving force of changes that are currently taking place in society and in law.
On the one hand it is understandable to some extend. On the other hand, we observe a critical crisis of international law and international standards.
To me, a foundation based on which the world law order (international law) was built up became obsolete - also due to an increasing development of new technologies and states’ strategies so to speak.
Thank you for your classification from the perspective of a global legal system.
In an argumentative extension of your position, one can, I think, bring the complex, convoluted circumstance to a more abstract point. The currently rampant international, escalating and interacting crises and conflicts reproduce more than ever the status of a polyvalent, heterogeneous world order, as a side effect the so-called world community degenerates in a certain way into a farce.
International humanitarian law and an international legal framework based on values and norms is only normative and standardizing in a positive sense to the extent that it can be enforced. The situation here is not the best, which underlines not least the regrettable role of the United Nations.
I do agree with you professor Christian Filk that we live in a polyvalent and heterogeneous world and to me this is why the legal order established in the United Nations Charter doesn’t work out.
Do you think that it is possible to recreate or to create anew values and interests that could reconnect the international community?
You wrote another interesting thing, namely that „the international community degenerates in a certain way into a farce”.
Do you think that it also might be an interest of some states or other entities to do so?
Thanks for your approving comment and your important question.
Unfortunately, I am currently not very positive in principle:
On the one hand, there is undoubtedly a whole range of philosophical, social and legal theory concepts that are worth considering, intelligent and worth supporting, which postulate and legitimise important imperatives and maxims, values and norms, especially when an international order based on public humanitarian law is addressed. The focus here could be on legal interests that have not yet really been canonised in international law (e.g. ecology, future generations, legacy of humanity, etc.).
On the other hand, we could indeed run the risk that the international community, if it is to be founded on a rules-based order, could degenerate into a farce. After all, there is no lack of convincing approaches. In order to successfully implement such or similar initiatives on a global scale, large, influential coalitions are needed that are prepared to subject themselves to corresponding norms and values. Unfortunately, this is diametrically opposed by more or less diverse power-political, geostrategic and particular interests.
It looks like we should make a choice between common or particular interests.
Therefore, I am inclined to say that there is a challenge for Public International Law scholars to determine all circumstances in which particular interests and common interests matter. They will probably correspond with the situations: 1) when we have tensions and competition in international relations (particular interests matter); 2) when we have relative peace in international relations (common interests matter).
I agree with you. Even though I am not an international law expert, I think your suggestion is useful in the field of humanitarian international law. Your conditions could show an operationalisable way to give more weight to a value-based international order.
Nevertheless, the problem of implementation remains: How are these legal rights ultimately enforced and realised through supranational or international institutions? This is where I am confronted with fundamental scepticism.
Let me answer to your question with a critical and realistic approach.
I think that we face one fundamental difficulty which is of two aspects: 1) the real situation nowadays shows that international community members do not share the same values in fact; 2) the world legal order that has been built up after the II WW is based on values that were desirable at that particular time.
Thank you for your answer. Indeed, the coconstellation of facts that you state can explain our systemic and structural problems and deficits of an international legal order of values quite well.