Dear Max:

First, here is an early study that heavily influenced the field of embodiment:

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice

1945 Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, Éditions Gallimard (http://www.fichier-pdf.fr/2012/12/12/merleau-ponty-phenomenologie-de-la-perception/merleau-ponty-phenomenologie-de-la-perception.pdf, access: 30 January 2015).

1962 Phenomenology of perception, Colin Smith, translator, London/Henley/New Jersey, Routledge & Kegan Paul/The Humanities Press (https://archive.org/details/phenomenologyofp00merl, access: 30 January 2015).

1993 Fenomenología de la percepción, Jem Cabanes, translator, Barcelona, Planeta-De Agostini (http://filosinsentido.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/merleau-ponty-maurice-fenomenologia-de-la-percepcion.pdf, access: 30 January 2015).

2012 Phenomenology of perception, Donald A. Landes, translator, London/New York, Routledge.

Here are two fundamental works from the 1990s, with web links where available:

Varela, Francisco J.; Thompson, Evan; Rosch, Eleanor

1993a The embodied mind, cognitive science and human experience, Cambridge/London, The MIT Press.

1993b The embodied mind, cognitive science and human experience, digital copy, Cambridge/London, The MIT Press (http://monoskop.org/images/b/b2/Varela_Thompson_Rosch_-_The_Embodied_Mind_Cognitive_Science_and_Human_Experience.pdf, access: 3 April 2016).

Lakoff, George; Johnson, Mark

1999a Philosophy in the flesh, the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought, New York, Basic Books.

1999b "The embodied mind," chapter three of the book Philosophy in the flesh, the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought (http://www.ics.uci.edu/~redmiles/ics203b-SQ05/papers/Lakoff1999Chapter3.pdf, access: 21 January 2016).

undated "Chapter one, Philosophy in the flesh, the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought," in The New York Times on the Web (http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/l/lakoff-philosophy.html, access: 30 January 2015).

A more recent overview can be found here:

Shapiro, Lawrence

2011 Embodied cognition, London/New York, Routledge.

For further reading, please see the bibliography I have been assembling over the last two years, for a graduate seminar called "Art in the embodied mind":

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303374480_Art_in_the_embodied_mind_a_bibliography_updated_20_May_2016

Best regards,

David

Data Art in the embodied mind: a bibliography (updated: 20 May 2016)

Hello Max,

Tom Simke and Margaret Wilson wrote some very nice papers on different notions of embodiment.

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.529.2280&rep=rep1&type=pdf

http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/BF03196322

Perhaps Barsalou's "Grounded Cognition" is also a nice read if you want to get a general idea of the concept and find out about some of the influential findings.

http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639

Finally, my own work is in embodied language processing and you may find my review article called "From demonstration to theory in embodied language processing: A review" useful.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259160039_From_demonstration_to_theory_in_embodied_language_comprehension_A_review

Article From demonstration to theory in embodied language comprehens...

Hi Max,

I do not know about a philosophical perspective, but based on my background in social psychology I can recommend the following, which is rather recent but probably cites some good basic literature:

Meier, B. P., Schnall, S., Schwarz, N., & Bargh, J. A. (2012). Embodiment in social psychology. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(4), 705–716. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01212.x

Marsh, K. L., Johnston, L., Richardson, M. J., & Schmidt, R. (2009). Toward a radically embodied, embedded social psychology. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(7), 1217–1225.

Wilson, A. D., & Golonka, S. (2013). Embodied cognition is not what you think it is. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1–13. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00058

Dear Max:

First, here is an early study that heavily influenced the field of embodiment:

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice

1945 Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, Éditions Gallimard (http://www.fichier-pdf.fr/2012/12/12/merleau-ponty-phenomenologie-de-la-perception/merleau-ponty-phenomenologie-de-la-perception.pdf, access: 30 January 2015).

1962 Phenomenology of perception, Colin Smith, translator, London/Henley/New Jersey, Routledge & Kegan Paul/The Humanities Press (https://archive.org/details/phenomenologyofp00merl, access: 30 January 2015).

1993 Fenomenología de la percepción, Jem Cabanes, translator, Barcelona, Planeta-De Agostini (http://filosinsentido.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/merleau-ponty-maurice-fenomenologia-de-la-percepcion.pdf, access: 30 January 2015).

2012 Phenomenology of perception, Donald A. Landes, translator, London/New York, Routledge.

Here are two fundamental works from the 1990s, with web links where available:

Varela, Francisco J.; Thompson, Evan; Rosch, Eleanor

1993a The embodied mind, cognitive science and human experience, Cambridge/London, The MIT Press.

1993b The embodied mind, cognitive science and human experience, digital copy, Cambridge/London, The MIT Press (http://monoskop.org/images/b/b2/Varela_Thompson_Rosch_-_The_Embodied_Mind_Cognitive_Science_and_Human_Experience.pdf, access: 3 April 2016).

Lakoff, George; Johnson, Mark

1999a Philosophy in the flesh, the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought, New York, Basic Books.

1999b "The embodied mind," chapter three of the book Philosophy in the flesh, the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought (http://www.ics.uci.edu/~redmiles/ics203b-SQ05/papers/Lakoff1999Chapter3.pdf, access: 21 January 2016).

undated "Chapter one, Philosophy in the flesh, the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought," in The New York Times on the Web (http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/l/lakoff-philosophy.html, access: 30 January 2015).

A more recent overview can be found here:

Shapiro, Lawrence

2011 Embodied cognition, London/New York, Routledge.

For further reading, please see the bibliography I have been assembling over the last two years, for a graduate seminar called "Art in the embodied mind":

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303374480_Art_in_the_embodied_mind_a_bibliography_updated_20_May_2016

Best regards,

David

Data Art in the embodied mind: a bibliography (updated: 20 May 2016)

Depending how far you want to go back for "first attempt", you may want to look up works from BCE India. The interdependence of mind and body are core to yoga and Buddhist philosophy and psychology.

It's also worth reading Descartes' famous "Discours de la Méthode" Parts IV & V. Often cited as the key text influencing the separation of mind from body in Enlightenment philosophy and medicine. The deep influence of this book is perhaps why it took such a long time for embodied cognition to gain acceptance in Western scientific circles.

Also look at Schopenhauer's 1818 "The World as Will and Representation" for early Enlightenment writing on the influence of physiology on the reasoning mind. It influenced Freud and is an early instance of Indian/Buddhist embodied mind philosophy  coming back into Western Europe. Its core differences from Kant's work ("Critique of Pure Reason" 1781) makes it perhaps a good candidate for your "first attempt" at bringing embodiment back to Western philosophy.

The Ancient Greeks probably had a lot to say on embodiment, but I don't know enough about them to comment on that.

As others have mentioned, Lakoff and Varela are interesting recent additions and may give you an overview of prior work.

Another lineage for embodied psychology from late 1800's to present day is Charles Sherrington (Noble Laureate, neurophysiologist) - FM Alexander (founder of the Alexander Technique) - Mabel Todd (ideokinesis - "The Thinking Body") - Eric Franklin (Franklin Method). Very influential in the world of performance technique, in dance, sports, acting etc.

Michael L Anderson's (2003) overview paper "Embodied cognition: A field guide" gives a really nice overview of a variety of approaches in philosophy and cognitive science

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370203000547

Hi Max,

Above are all excellent suggestions. I just wanted to add that I have written a paper on embodiment in social cognition, and that the introduction of this paper provides a very short overview of embodiment in general (attached).

Best,

Sebo

Article The role of the body in social cognition. WIREs Cogn Sci 201...

One should not overlook Erwin Straus's “The Upright Posture.”

Thanks alot. All of your suggestions have been very helpful. 

I can recommend "Evan Thompson - Mind in Life".

An overview: 

Shapiro, L. (2014). The Routledge handbook of embodied cognition. New York: Routledge.

Dear Max,

If you are not sure how embodiment is defined, are you sure it is something you want to study? Personally I do not think there is any useful meaning to the term. Certainly within neuroscience the theories that claim that 'embodiment' explains something that theories without the concept do not, are demonstrably wrong. They don't work. Embodiment tends to ignore the requirement for causal locality in physical science. It often attributes experience non-locally. If you do that you cannot make any useful predictions that are not contingent on an infinite number of unknowns. That is fine if you want to waffle and not do any testing of your theory, but not much use for increasing understanding.

Dear Jonathan:

You may well be right about embodiment within neuroscience; I would be interested in reading criticism along these lines. The only way to advance in research is to actively seek out the flaws in what one imagines one understands. (I'm not asking you to do this here, as it is surely a complicated matter; a few references would do nicely.)

I see embodiment theory more as an overarching transdisciplinary framework that can be used in an ongoing attempt to build a coherent worldview, drawing on more precise evidence provided by more focused research. The basic tenets are fairly simple, so much so that in erudite academic discussion we sometimes lose sight of them. We are part of a biological species, symbolically oriented primates, interacting with our natural and collectively constructed environments, and human consciousness results from this situation. Neuroscience, cognitive science, perceptual studies, and related areas are giving us an incredible view of specific aspects of the puzzle of our nature, but it seems to me that it is important to back up from time to time and look at the entire body, then back up a bit further and consider the body in its context, to transcend a more limited, cerebral/mental conception of our phenomenal experience. My present goals require this broad framework, as I am trying to find new ways of understanding aesthetic experience that don't clash with knowledge emerging from other fields.

Warm regards,

David

Dear David,

The problem with embodied theories in neuroscience is when it is claimed that bodily interactions with the world constitute, rather than act as antecedent causes for, conscious experience. This is clearly wrong because for A to constitute B the presence of A has to be both necessary and sufficient for the presence of B. (You can argue over types and tokens but it does not change the conclusion.) We have innumerable pieces of evidence for bodily interactions not being necessary or sufficient for experience but we have every reason to think that certain neural events ARE necessary and sufficient. So these 'enactive' theories are just plain wrong. Ken Aizawa and Fred Adams have written a number of erudite and entertaining pieces on this - plenty on the net.

I appreciate that you can talk of embodiment without implying this enactive model. You can call it an overarching framework. But I see no advantage in it and I worry from what you have aid that, like others, you are using it to suggest some explanatory or heuristic power that is not there. 

I am very doubtful about the idea that human consciousness 'results' from our being a species interacting with an environment and using symbols etc. That is a bit like saying we are here because we exist at this place - just a change of words. To be of any use a theoretical framework needs to invoke some causes or dispositions that can be used as levers to make predictions that we could test or at least contemplate testing. Human consciousness is the result of a very complex chain of events that involves climate, random chemical combination and mutation, natural selection etc etc. What we are conscious of may result from our current circumstances, but that does not explain the fact that we are conscious of it.

I am uncertain that being a species is important. If a DNA formatting shift occurred in Australia 35,000 years ago that prevented cross fertility of two populations we could be two species. I doubt that would affect our consciousness one bit - except in having a literature about the tragedy of being an infertile human mule perhaps. 

We certainly use symbols, and the reason for that is brain structure. Christy Brown showed that humans can use symbols as well as any other with a good brain and not much else. Those with perfect bodies but seriously damaged brains do not. As indicated above the evidence points clearly to phenomenal experience being constituted purely by neural events, with everything else merely antecedent cause.

And I am not sure what the argument to focus on body rather than neutron is. As Mary Midgley pointed out there is no magic membrane around a human body. There is no mysterious 'person' that stops at the skin. My consciousness is fed by vision but much of that is reading, so my information gathering depends on tens of thousands of other bodies as well as mine, living and dead, from 'Homer' to David Lodge. My own brain collates and selects input, but much of the day I deal with input already collated and selected by others. So I think there may be an argument for 'extended mind' if mind is the information gathering apparatus, but not body. What worries me about talking of embodiment is that it lulls so many people into thinking it somehow solves the mystery of phenomenality, when it does nothing of the sort. Phenomenality must be constituted by neural events. Aesthetic experience probably involves neurons in the amygdala and thereabouts, although maybe indirectly.

But even extended mind seems to me to be a confusion, because the word 'mind' has always meant those presumed internal events in our heads that we cannot access through our senses but learn to track and collate as we mature in childhood through some other internal route.

The key problem I see with all this is the insistence that phenomenal consciousness has to belong to 'persons' or 'individuals' - the ghosts that Ryle would have on the outside of the machine rather than the inside. Everything tells us that human subjects are internal and multiple in each head. There are bodies with complex aggregate dynamic behaviour but no 'persons' in the sense people tend to believe. The rub is that William James may have been right when he said that an idea that is unpalatable to almost everyone may not prevail, even if true. 

Thank you for investing time and thought to reply to my petition, Jonathan. In broad terms, I don't see much contradiction between what you are saying and the essence of what is being said in the basic embodiment literature that I posted here 13 days ago; we're looking at the same reality from different perspectives, focusing on distinct parts of the problem. The main contradiction is that you tend to downplay the corporeal context of the brain while others actively explore its relevance. Of course there will never be a last word on this; what is fascinating is to watch the story unfold and listen to the arguments. Hopefully we can make some modest contributions to the discussion, each from his or her particular areas of interest and action.

I don't think I am downplaying or up-playing anything to be honest, David, just making sure explanations are not being sought were there are none!

Thanks for your clarification, Jonathan. You do seem to be focusing almost exclusively on the brain, though, while embodiment theory is looking at context. The brain is evidently a huge part of the picture, and neuroscience is providing vital data, but it is obvious that there is more that needs to be considered to see the big picture. How to consider this context is another matter and this needs to be discussed.

I am grateful for the reference to the work of Aizawa and Adams. I am in the process of tracking it down and adding it to my working bibliography. I see there is a lively debate going on. It will take some time to read and assimilate this. I'll post some references here in a bit, to facilitate access by other followers of this question that may be interested in taking a look.

The critique of an article by Fred Adams, published on a graduate student's blog, is interesting, with the additional benefit that Ken Aizawa joins the discussion:

Williams, Gary

2010 “Response to Fred Adams’ latest critique of ‘Embodied Cognition’,” in Minds and Brains, musings from a naturalist (https://philosophyandpsychology.wordpress.com/2010/09/19/response-to-fred-adams-latest-critique-of-embodied-cognition/, access: 17 June 2016).

More to come...

Here is the contents page of a journal issue dedicated to the debate surrounding the embodiment perspective in the cognitive sciences, including a link to Adams' controversial article, in which he points out what he sees as limits to the embodied approach in cognitive science (unfortunately, a paid institutional connection is required for access):

http://link.springer.com/journal/11097/9/4/page/1

This is the article I am referring to:

Adams, Fred

2010 “Embodied cognition,” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (Springer), vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 619-628 (http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-010-9175-x, access: 17 June 2016).

The other articles look promising, and reading the entire issue will surely provide a good idea of the discussion regarding the possible strengths and weaknesses of the embodiment paradigm.

Apart from the journal issue I mentioned in my last post, here are some interesting contributions to the debate:

Letheby, Christopher

2012 “In defense of embodied cognition: a reply to Fred Adams,” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (Springer), vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 403-414 (http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-012-9263-1, access: 17 June 2016).

Walter, Sven; Kyselo, Miriam

2009 “Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa: the bounds of cognition” (book review), in Erkenntnis (Blackwell Publishing), vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 277-281 (http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-009-9161-2, access: 17 June 2016).

A preliminary version of the latter text is available at ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225747068_Fred_Adams_Ken_Aizawa_The_Bounds_of_Cognition

Wilson, Margaret

2015 “Six views of embodied cognition,” in Psychonomic Bulletin and Review (Psychonomic Society/Springer), vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 625-636 (http://philpapers.org/archive/ADAEC-2, access: 17 June 2016).

Article Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa: The Bounds of Cognition

David,

Gary Williams in its response to Fred Adams said that ''affordance are objectives'' which is a right interpretation of Gibson but it is wrong.  Gibson's theory is totally adrift on this.  Gibson's theory closely follow Von Uexkull but is adrift on some points such as this one. 

This is a very minor point.  I did not read Adams's paper.  Williams seems to be saying that Adams's attact is against an mis-understanding of the Embodied approaches, in order words: a straw man argument.    

Yes, Louis, that's my understanding of Williams' text as well, and I think he makes some good points. I also like Margaret Wilson's paper, as she addresses specific aspects of embodiment theory separately, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each one, avoiding broad pro or con generalizations, which can easily fall into the "straw man" category of fallacious rhetoric.

There is an interesting evaluation of Gibson's "ecological approach" in the book The embodied mind by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch. They divide Gibson's theory into two parts, the first of which is compatible with their embodied approach to "perceptually guided action", while the second is not compatible. The first part of Gibson's theory concerns affordances, or "opportunities for interaction that things in the environment possess relative to the sensorimotor capacities of the animal." The second part is that "there is sufficient information in the ambient light to specify the environment directly, [...] without the mediation of any kind of representation (symbolic or subsymbolic)," and that this includes affordances. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch don't agree that affordances exist in the environment independently of the observer. They sum it up like this:

"Gibsonians treat perception in largely optical (albeit ecological) terms and so attempt to build up the theory of perception almost entirely from the environment. Our approach, however, proceeds by specifying the sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided, and so we build up the theory of perception from the structural coupling of the animal."

Source:

Varela, Francisco J.; Thompson, Evan; Rosch, Eleanor

1993 The embodied mind, cognitive science and human experience, Cambridge/London, The MIT Press, pp. 203-204.

This is the text they are discussing:

Gibson, James J.

1979 The ecological approach to visual perception, Boston, Houghton Mifflin.

So, we have brain-centered perspectives, environment-centered perspectives, and, in the middle, body-centered perspectives. Evidently all three factors are essential to understanding what is going on; the relative weight of each seems to be the bone of contention.

David,

Thanks for the references.

A simple example shows that the affordances do not exist entirely objectively.  You are walking into a forest and you are tired and want to sit down and rest.  There are many things around you that can afford you ''sitting'' but they are no objective sitting places.  You see these as sitting places only when you want to sit otherwise you do not see them as sitting places.  

Your example is perfectly clear, Louis, and it seems to be in agreement with Varela et al. It is good to express abstract ideas in terms of everyday experience. Sometimes we complicate what are actually rather simple concepts.

Dear David,

It seems that you continue to miss the point. I do not 'focus' on anything. Like Adams and Aizawa, who are not in the least 'controversial' as far as I can see - just plain sensible - I think it is important to distinguish what constitutes experience from what is an antecedent cause of experience. 

The whole thing falls into place without any need for controversy if one considers everything purely as dynamics - which is all we can ever know about anyway. The difficulty is that contemporary science shies away from identifying individual events - people do not even talk about it. What we do know is that in all cases we can study experience is determined entirely proximally in a causal sequence. What I experience is necessarily and sufficiently determined by events within my skull and not by antecedent events in the sun or tomatoes or damp forest floors. The question that is not addressed is what is 'proximal enough' to determine experience. The easiest and probably the right answer is that causal sequences come in dynamic steps or units - as conveniently proposed by modern physics - and that experience only ever belongs to the most causally proximal step. That does not have to be proximal in space or time in terms of very small distances or durations, it just has to be 'the final step'. Whether it is in brain or body or world is an irrelevance. But neurobiology suggests that it is well within brain.

The debate in the popular literature has become fatuous because Adams and Aizawa are accused of attacking a straw man, yet what they are attacking is routinely used to justify theories or attitudes. The opponents just neatly rephrase things or deny that it is THEM that is guilty, but Gibson, O' Reagan, Noe, Varela and Thompson are all guilty of muddying the waters. Embodiment is a duvet under which people are hiding from reality. The only comeback is that mainstream neurobiology is at least hiding under the counterpane by not acknowledging the need to define what is dynamically proximal and relate experience to input rather than 'firing'.

The 'content' of our experience in terms of what dynamic relations it refers to in the outside world is obviously derived from the outside world - as far out as you like. But those dynamic relations are antecedent.

Dear Jonathan:

I see your point about the centrality of the brain in cognition; this is evident. But I also see the necessity of trying to understand the brain's bodily and environmental contexts and the interactions between these evidently intertwined and interdependent factors. The brain is a bodily organ, and the body emerges from and is part of the physical universe. Our cultural context --including the complex symbolic patterns that we collectively weave and interweave with our immediate and distant environmental contexts-- adds layers of complexity to our phenomenal existence.

I am not doing neuroscience, rather trying to harmonize the study, teaching and production or what we call "art" with the exciting and extremely relevant knowledge emerging from fields like primatology and evolutionary aesthetics, consciousness studies and neuroscience, visual perception (including eye movements and face recognition/evaluation), embodied aesthetics and neuroaesthetics, art education, and art production. Embodiment theory is providing the structure I need to fit the pieces together, as the body is central to each of these fields; it is the axis where they (and we) converge and where their (and our) interactions may be studied. This project is still at an incipient stage, that is, I am doing more reading than writing on this at present.

At first glance, Adams and Aizawa have not given me sufficient grounds to change course, but I am doing my best to keep an open mind. The controversial nature of their contributions is evident if you follow up on the references and links I have provided. I respect your antiembodiment stance. Each researcher approaches a problem from a particular academic background, research agenda, experiences, preferences, and personality. As I see it, the debate continues and there is no clear consensus in sight. The criticism from outside should have a positive effect on embodiment theory, forcing its proponents to work out the rough spots and discard whatever doesn't stand up to rigorous confrontation with available evidence. This is already happening, for example in Margaret Wilson's piece, cited by Oleksandr 16 days ago and again in two of my recent posts.

Thank you for opening up a new (for me) window on a fascinating discussion.

Hi Max,

Here is the link to a paper in which Ezequiel Di Paolo and I are discussing what embodiment means in different approaches in modern cognitive science (enactive, extended and sensorimotor cognition), in the context of Locked-in Syndrome.

Also relevant in this regard: an elaboration of the enactive approach to embodiment by Ezequiel Di Paolo and Evan Thompson.

Best,

Miriam

https://miriamkyselo.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/lis_embodiment_kyselodipaolo-libre.pdf

https://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/di-paolo-and-thompson-enactive-approach.pdf

Botox is a drug that is being used to num some facial muscle so that facial skin is more smooth when these muscles are not active.  Some studied have shown that the impairements of these facial muscle induced impairment in feeling certain emotion and the capacity to empathize with other facial expression.  Such findings are not surprising within the emobodied paradigm.  The bodily mechanisms for the expression of emotion are also being used for the perception of emotion.  The recognition of speech makes use of the speech production mechanism of the body. 

That is interesting, Louis. Something similar happens when viewing paintings.

Taylor, J. Eric T.; Witt, Jessica K.; Grimaldi, Phillip J.

2012 “Uncovering the connection between artist and audience: viewing painted brushstrokes evokes corresponding action representations in the observer,” in Cognition (Elsevier), vol. 125, no. 1, pp. 26-36 (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00100277/125/1, access: 30 January 2015).

Perhaps some of the music people reading this have evidence of parallels in their field.

Miriam's work provides an excellent look at recent developments in embodiment theory. (Just so it doesn't go unnoticed, she is coauthor of the review of a book by Adams and Aizawa that I cited in one of yesterday's posts.) I also like this article, which addresses some of the problems recently discussed on this thread:

Kyselo, Miriam

2014 “The body social: an enactive approach to the self,” in Frontiers in Psychology (Frontiers Media), vol. 5, article 986 (http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986/full, access: 18 June 2016).

Concerning music,

Katie Overy and Istvan Molnar-Szakacs have proposed a model of Shared Affective Motion Experience: "Essentially, the model suggests that when we hear music, we hear the presence (or agency) of another person, whose actions we can interpret, imitate, and predict." 

Overy, K. & Molnar-Szakacs, I. (2009). Being together in time: musical experience and the mirror neuron system. Music perception, 26(5), 489‒504. Quotation from page 495.

I have contributed a brief preliminary overview of music and embodiment in a thesis chapter:

https://www.academia.edu/2514070/Consciousness_Embodiment_and_Music_Listening_An_overview_according_to_the_findings_of_Gerald_Edelman_Antonio_Damasio_and_Daniel_Stern

`Dear David,

My first degree was in Art and Architecture and I am a practicing artist. I have been interested in aesthetics all my life. I was also a cell biologist and am now a philosopher. I see things from all sides. Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa are not controversial. They might upset 20 faculty members at UCL in humanities departments but 2,000 or more faculty members in the neuroscience facilities would consider what they say too self-evident to even mention. The unusual thing about Fred and Ken is that they think it is worth trying to point out to insular philosophers just how muddle headed they are. Embodiment is of interest to a tiny community, blown up out of proportion by lightweight popular science books (I know to my cost since I am a book review editor).

Thank you, Jonathan. You have quite a way with words! You have made your position clear, and it is good to have the opportunity to hear from diferent sides of the controversy (or debate, if you prefer). ResearchGate is a wonderful forum.

Thanks for responding, Erik. I downloaded your entire thesis a couple of days ago, put a copy in my virtual library, gave it a quick lookover, and registered it in my working bibliography to help me find it in the future. I see that it presents many years of research in a coherent package, and I am looking forward to reading it. I am primarily interested in visual arts, but the musical side of embodied aesthetics is extremely relevant to human experience, and I sometimes have musicians in my graduate seminars, so I am trying to expand my thematic horizons.

For other followers of this question, here are the bibliographical data and link to Erik's thesis:

Christensen, Erik

2012 Music listening, music therapy, phenomenology and neuroscience, doctoral thesis, Aalborg, Institute of Communication and Psychology, Department of Music Therapy, Aalborg University (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235525926_MUSIC_LISTENING_MUSIC_THERAPY_PHENOMENOLOGY_AND_NEUROSCIENCE_PhD_Thesis_2012, access: 17 June 2016).

And here's a free-access link to the article by Katie Overy and Istvan Molnar-Szakacs that Erik mentioned:

http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/11822810/Being_Together_in_Time_Musical_Experience_and_the_Mirror_Neuron_System.pdf

Thesis MUSIC LISTENING, MUSIC THERAPY, PHENOMENOLOGY AND NEUROSCIEN...

Consciousness in Action

By Susan L. Hurley

‘’We tend to think of perception and action as buffer zones mediating between mind and world. We tend to think of perception as input from world to mind and action as output from mind to world. This Input-Output picture of perception and action may hold in place traditional worries about the mind’s place in the world, as well as more specific philosophical assumptions. If perception is input from the world to the mind and action is output from the mind to the world, then the mind as distinct from the world is what the input is to and what the output is from. So, despite the web of causal relations between organisms and environments, we suppose the mind must be in a separate place, within some boundary that sets it apart from the world.

In trying to understand the mind’s place in the world, we thus study the function from input to output, especially the way central nervous systems process and transform inputs to human organisms. We argue about whether central cognitive processes must have a language-like structure that explains the conceptual structure of thought. But we tend to ignore the function from output back to input, and the way environments, including linguistic environments, transform and reflect outputs from the human organism. The two functions are not only of comparable complexity, but are causally continuous. To understand the mind’s place in the world, we should study these complex dynamic processes as a system, not just the truncated internal portion of them.

People and other animals with minds can be seen at one level as dynamic singularities: structural singularities in the field of causal flows characterized through time by a tangle of multiple feedback loops of varying orbits. Consider the circus performer who puts the handle of a dagger in her mouth, tips her head back, balances a sword by its point on the point of the dagger, and with the whole kit balanced above her head magisterially climbs a ladder, swings her legs over the top rung, and climbs back down the other side of the ladder. Each move she makes is both the source of and exquisitely dependent on multiple internal and external channels of sensory and motor-signal feedback, the complex calibrations of which have been honed by years of practice. An only slightly less intricate structure of dynamic feedback relations knits the nervous system of a normally active organism into its environment. This is what the contents of the creature’s interdependent perceptions and intentions both depend on. The whole complex dynamic feedback system includes not just functions from input to output, but also feedback functions from output to input, some internal to the organism, others passing through the environment before returning. As a result, external states can be needed to explain patterns of activity at the body surface, even if what is to be explained is not identified in terms of external states. The dynamic singularity is centred on the organism and moves through environments with the organism, but itself has no sharp boundaries.’’

I would recommend the book 'The myth of mirror neuorns' by Gregory Hickock in which the main topic is discussion of the context of mirror neurons, but a good deal of the book is involved in areas important for understanding the brain-mind interactions. A short quote regarding embodiment: '' If the whole brain is involved in understanding, isn't this just a restatement of the embodied cognition view? Well, if by ''embodied cognition' one means that the brain is a computational network at all levels, that is hierarchically organized, that knowledge comes in different degrees of granularity reflected by the neural hierarchy, and that knowledge is organized around and accessed according to the particular task an organism must perform, then sure, it's embodied. If by emodied cognition you mean that understanding is only result of low-level sensory or motor (re-)activation, without abstraction, without information porcessing, and without a deifferentiation of systems according to task goals, then no, it's not embodied. In the end, it doesn't matter what we call it. The goal here is to explain how the brain works, not to name the philosophical approach.''

Consider Kierkegaard's saying, 'Life is not a problem to be solved, but a reality to be experienced.'. Philospohical debates around embodiment won't do us much good in reaching any tangible knowledge or even useful one. Just philosophizing about the mind (the subjective aspect) without linking it to the brain (the objective aspect) is an ignorant approach. I think this dual aspect monism is a more promising path which ultimately takes both into account and is able to yield true, useful and concrete results, facts or knowledge.

I hope my contribution to the discussion is in place even though it wasn't a direct answer to the question posed, my excuses if you find this redundant. However, I can wholeheartedly recommend the book mentioned in my comment (bolded). 

Regards,

Karlo

Hickok's book is good, providing a word of caution regarding the trend to exaggerate the role of mirror neurons in cognition, beyond what can reasonably be established from the evidence.

Hickok, Gregory

2014 The myth of mirror neurons, the real neuroscience of communication and cognition, New York/London, W. W. Norton & Company.

Some people think that Hickok goes a bit too far, though, and like Fred Adams (discussed recently on this thread), he appears to be knocking down a straw man he has contrived, ignoring the evidence that mirror neurons do indeed play an important role in the perception, comprehension, and interpretation of the actions of others. It's all worth reading, to get a balanced view of the debate: the claims for the role of mirror neurons (both the reasonable and the overenthusiastic ones), Hickok's book, and the criticism of Hickok's criticism. Here are a couple of reviews:

Kemmerer, David

2014 “Does the motor system contribute to the perception and understanding of actions? Reflections on Gregory Hickok’s The myth of mirror neurons: the real neuroscience of communication and cognition,” in Language and Cognition (Cambridge Journals), FirstView, pp. 1-26 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266209473_Does_the_motor_system_contribute_to_the_perception_and_understanding_of_actions_Reflections_on_Gregory_Hickok%27s_The_myth_of_mirror_neurons_The_real_neuroscience_of_communication_and_cognition, updated: 2 December 2014, access: 12 July 2015).

Keysers, Christian

2015 “The straw man in the brain” (review of the book The myth of mirror neurons by Gregory Hickok), in Science (The American Association for the Advancement of Science), new series, vol. 347, no. 6219, 16 January 2015, p. 240 (http://www.sciencemag.org/content/347/6219/240.full.pdf?sid=9048f9d2-1232-4c36-bd5a-0be11aaa0e82, access: 12 July 2015).

Article Does the motor system contribute to the perception and under...

Max: I hope we're not overwhelming you with all these suggestions for reading about embodiment! In your question you just ask for a basic work, in the singular. Your question has given rise to a lively and very interesting discussion; thanks for posting it.

Some fascinating references here, sorry this is a bit late but I found this paper really interesting...

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20620019

Neural Netw. 2010 Oct-Nov;23(8-9):1077-90. doi: 10.1016/j.neunet.2010.06.003. Epub 2010 Jun 16.

"Artificial humans": Psychology and neuroscience perspectives on embodiment and nonverbal communication.

Vogeley K1, Bente G.

Author information

1Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne, Germany. [email protected]

Abstract

"Artificial humans", so-called "Embodied Conversational Agents" and humanoid robots, are assumed to facilitate human-technology interaction referring to the unique human capacities of interpersonal communication and social information processing. While early research and development in artificial intelligence (AI) focused on processing and production of natural language, the "new AI" has also taken into account the emotional and relational aspects of communication with an emphasis both on understanding and production of nonverbal behavior. This shift in attention in computer science and engineering is reflected in recent developments in psychology and social cognitive neuroscience. This article addresses key challenges which emerge from the goal to equip machines with socio-emotional intelligence and to enable them to interpret subtle nonverbal cues and to respond to social affordances with naturally appearing behavior from both perspectives. In particular, we propose that the creation of credible artificial humans not only defines the ultimate test for our understanding of human communication and social cognition but also provides a unique research tool to improve our knowledge about the underlying psychological processes and neural mechanisms.

Copyright © 2010. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Dear Researchers, I want to thank all of you.

I think I found an adequate definition for my purpose, which I want to share with you.

„For Merleau-Ponty, as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it encompasses both the body as a lived, experiental structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms.“ - I got this from Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience by Rosch, Valera and Thompson.

I similar definition is made by Thomas Metzinger:

„Embodiment: a position in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind thatemphasizes the relevance of sensorimotor skills for general intelligence, the situtatedness of cognition and the role that the body has in shaping the mind, plus the subjective experience of using and ‘having’ a body.“ 

In further research Metzinger also distinguishes between different levels of embodiment:

I attached both papers for you.

Article Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood

Chapter First-order embodiment, second-order embodiment, third-order...

Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa have been mentioned in this thread as critics of embodied cognition theory. I find it interesting that both scholars are mentioned in the front matter of Lawrence Shapiro's book Embodied cognition (Routledge, 2011), on the page entitled "Praise for Embodied cognition." In the acknowledgments of the same book, Shapiro thanks both authors for commenting on "chunks or entire drafts of earlier manuscripts." Shapiro's book was included in the bibliography I provided in my post of June 4, 2016 (see above). I put it in my bag on a recent trip to a congress in Warsaw, and as I read it on the long flight over the sea, I was surprised to encounter once again the words of Adams and Aizawa.

Adams writes: "Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet and Larry Shapiro has just written the first comprehensive treatment of this exciting and new research program. This book is now and for years to come will be unquestionably the best way for students and researchers alike to gain access to and learn to evaluate this exciting, new research program in cognitive science."

Aizawa has this to say: "Embodied cognition is an outstanding introduction to this increasingly important topic in cognitive science. Written in a clear and lively style, with a critical approach, it is a strong contender for the most useful introductory text on any topic in all of cognitive science, and a genuine contribution to the scientific and philosophical literature on embodied cognition."

A brief, yet concise read in regards to the last post and this topic as well.

Link below.

Regards!

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/archive/fulltexts/2255.pdf

Thanks, Karlo. The article you posted provides insight into the theoretical varieties that fall under the loose umbrella of "embodiment," highlighting the pitfalls of wholesale acceptance or rejection of embodied studies. Here are the complete references to the original publication (Gallagher 2015b) and the free access version (Gallagher 2015a), for the benefit of other followers of this thread:

Gallagher, Shaun

2015a “Invasion of the body snatchers: how embodied cognition is being disembodied,” in Constructivist E-Paper Archive (Universität Wien), no. 68, pp. 96-102 (https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=tpm&id=tpm_2015_0068_0096_0102, access: 16 July 2016).

2015b “Invasion of the body snatchers: how embodied cognition is being disembodied,” in The Philosophers’ Magazine (Philosophy Documentation Center), no. 68, pp. 96-102 (http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/archive/fulltexts/2255.pdf, access: 16 July 2016).

The Self and Its Brain, by K. Popper & J. Eccles is a title I missed in these discussions. Although hotly criticized, this book discusses some of the important corollaries to the above discussions...