[ This post is actually another negative critique of current embodied development 'theories' (also sometimes referred to as 'embedded' or enactive 'theories'). ]
There are new 'theories' which posit (actually: imagine/presume) the centrality and key role of many rather strange and supposed social learning processes -- to somehow come out of Piaget's Sensorimotor Period (0 - 2 y.o) and keep having "sensorimotor contingencies" (SMC) central and key to our progressive conceptual understandings/abilities. (This is likely a presumption in large part due to refusing to believe that any innate guidance for learning and concept development occur after infancy -- in spite of their being NO evidence against such further emerging innate-guidance factors and that we have seen some such things in ethological studies of other mammals).
One very notable problem with this SMC-type theory (other than failing to have a link with biology and being impossible to prove or disprove) is that it seems to fail to be able to account for several similar conceptual abilities in other apes. For other apes just to understand the social structures of their social life (not to mention, creative forward-looking development of tools) would seem to certainly require SEVERAL of the levels of our developed conceptualization abilities.
THEN, the key question becomes: Do these 'theorists' see the same special key social learnings happening in these other apes? I bet these SMC 'theorists' would not say such occurs. But, if not, these apes get to their levels of conceptualization in some other ways! IF these other apes have their conceptual abilities develop other ways, we still need to know how. And, of course: if 'them', why not US too? (Readers of my "Human Ethology and Development" Project know my answer -- for ALL apes.)
Article A Human Ethogram: Its Scientific Acceptability and Importanc...
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