What options will the West and the US have in the face of Iran’s nuclear regime? Could they once again play politics and lure Iran into a Libya-like trap, causing the country to destroy its nuclear facilities?

What can be done? The two most common policy options - a military strike on Iran's known nuclear facilities and economic sanctions on Tehran - "Is there a simple military or sanctions solution?" Shlomo Brom, a retired Israeli general, explains why, while it is popular in Israel to carry out an Osirak-like strike on Iran's known facilities, the operational prospects for success are slim. What about the US taking on the mission? Thomas Donnelly, a staunch supporter of the invasion of Iraq, explains how a limited strike on Iran's nuclear facilities could jeopardize America's larger campaign to liberate and moderate the Middle East. Imposing economic sanctions on Iran is a possible alternative, but how realistic or effective would these sanctions be? These questions are addressed in George Perkovic and Silvia Manzanero’s analysis, “Iran Gets the Bomb—So What?” They conclude that it will be difficult to secure the support needed to enforce sanctions against Iran. So, “Next Steps” is delivered. It examines two conventional and two unconventional policy options. The first, reducing the potential vulnerability of Persian Gulf energy shipments to Iranian interference, is explored by Dagobert Brito and Amy Myers Jaffe in “Reducing the Vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz.” By modernizing existing pipelines and building new ones, the need to ship oil and gas through the strait could be significantly reduced at a relatively cost-effective level. This would, of course, require the cooperation and support of the major oil producers in the region. Their help would also be needed to strengthen existing levels of defense cooperation with the United States, without which the prospect of deterring and containing a nuclear-ready Iran would surely be slim. Michael Eisenstadt, in his book “Deterrence and Containment: Confronting a Nuclear Iran,” details what can be done with Gulf cooperation. What role can diplomacy play in preventing Iran from exploiting its ability to disrupt energy exports from the region? Douglas Stroessmann examines this question in his analysis “Diplomatic Management of the Iranian Threat to Maritime Commerce.” Using the maritime control agreements reached with Turkey and the Soviet Union as models, Stroessmann proposes several negotiation and public diplomacy plans that would deter Iran from using its military capabilities to interfere with the continued free passage of goods in and out of the Persian Gulf. The success of this effort, like so many others, will of course depend on the solidarity of the United States and its key allies, not only in the Gulf region but also beyond. How likely is this support? Therese Delpac, in “What Transatlantic Strategy on Iran?”A little over a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, a survey of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Since then, Tehran’s nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only confirmed what that analysis initially suggested: Iran is not about to give up its efforts to produce nuclear fuel and, as a result, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran’s continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing raises the question of what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might face and what we can do now to protect ourselves from these threats. The first presents the findings of the NPEC Working Group on Iran. It reflects interviews with government officials and foreign experts and the work of about 20 regional security experts that NPEC convened in Washington. Some of the report’s findings are beginning to gain official support for preventing Iran and others from openly deploying nuclear weapons or withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States government, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a growing number of allies now support the idea that countries that violate the NPT should be held accountable for their violations, even if they withdraw from the treaty. There has also been increasing internal government debate about the need to clarify what should be permitted under the NPT’s definition of “peaceful” nuclear energy. The remaining recommendations of the report, presented in congressional testimony in March 2005, remain to be acted upon. Whether they will or not, of course, depends largely on how government officials view the Iranian nuclear threat. So here we are, “Tehran’s Nuclear Efforts: What’s the Concern?” Richard Russell begins this section by explaining how Iran’s neighbors are likely to hedge their security bets as Tehran becomes more and more nuclear and ballistic, literally. For what these countries might do is to see how much nuclear capability they have themselves. This is explained by Wayne Bowen and Joanna Kidd in their chapter entitled “The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors.” In it, we learn how close Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are to acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. The special case of Turkey, a full ally of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is examined in more detail in Jan Lesser’s chapter, “Turkey, Iran, and the Nuclear Dangers.” The good news here is that if the EU and the United States provide adequate support on both the security and economic fronts, Turkey is unlikely to go its own way. However, the bigger picture of what might happen after Iran goes nuclear is sure to be grim. In his chapter entitled “The Day Iran Gets the Bomb,” Kenneth Timmerman outlines the prospect of increased war and more violent terrorism.The Iranian nuclear crisis has resulted in concerns about the potential response of some of Iran’s neighbours, in particular whether Tehran’s behavior could prompt other regional actors to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Within this context, the chapter sought to shed some light on the nuclear capabilities and ambitions of four key countries in Iran’s immediate neighbourhood: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. These countries were singled out due to their relative proximity to Iran and because there have been suspicions that they have all been interested, at one time or another, in acquiring nuclear weapons. For each country, an assessment was made of current capabilities, including the various elements of the fuel cycle that could potentially be used to support nuclear weapons development and potential nuclear delivery systems. Attention also was given to the drivers of potential nuclear and other WMD programs in the countries concerned.An analysis of available open sources revealed relatively little about national intentions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons―both in general terms and more specifically with regard to the current Iranian nuclear crisis. The lack of pertinent information in this respect appears to stem primarily from the political sensitivity of the issue and the relatively closed and nontransparent nature of the societies involved, with the exception of Turkey. In contrast, it was possible to develop a fairly detailed picture of the various elements of the fuel cycle currently in existence or being developed in the four countries, as well as their potential nuclear delivery options. It is assessed that each country currently lacks the technical capacity to build a nuclear weapon, barring significant infusions of external assistance. However, the recent exposure of Egypt’s undeclared materials and activities is a significant cause for concern―not just in its own right, but in terms of whether it is indicative of a broader trend in the region already demonstrated by the Iran and Libya cases. Indeed, given that A. Q. Khan has previously visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, it is quite possible that, in addition to Iran and Libya, these countries also may have secretly acquired sensitive nuclear technology and expertise from this clandestine proliferation network in the past.