Philadelphia, PA

Dear Tabata & readers,

What exactly does "physically speaking" mean in your note, quoted below? Apparently it just means that consciousness functions like an "information collection system." ? See my objections to Kralj above.

You go on to say that "Furthermore, the system should be able to wonder about itself. Namely, the system automatically should begin to collect information on its working." But this seems to run together consciousness and self-consciousness. I have no doubt, for instance, that the domestic cat is conscious of its environment, but the house cat seems little involved in "wonder about itself." There seems to be little self-reflection going on.

A house cat may change patterns or habits of behavior due to sensory feedback, but shifts in habits, insofar as they occur, don't seem to require self-reflection or cats "collecting information" on their own doings. Changes in habits of behavior take place by some unreflective process. For the most part, moreover, their inbuilt patterns of behavior seem to suffice.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Physically speaking, consciousness is the information collection system. Furthermore, the system should be able to wonder about itself. Namely, the system automatically should begin to collect information on its working.

Good discussion.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Kralj & readers,

The concept of "information" is sometimes found in physics. But it seems that you give, at most, a partial definition of consciousness in physical terms? Perhaps that is what is wanted here?

But surely, there could be an "information influx on oneself (or surroundings)" which is not conscious. While asleep, say, someone could be subject to vibrations from passing traffic, which may carry all sorts of information --fully unnoticed by "oneself (or surroundings)." --No conscious experience.

What you apparently mean to claim is just that consciousness involves some "influx" of information? Plausible. But consider again our sleeping, dreaming subject, or perhaps an hallucinating subject. Would this not involve conscious experience without the "influx"? It seems that the relationship between consciousness and "influx of information" is less direct than you take it to be?

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

IMO, consciousness physically represents information influx on oneself (or surroundings). So, the unfolding physical process of sensing, carrying information (through physical carriers), evaluation, and storage of information onto physical storage device (e.g., brain) constitutes descriptive definition of what consciousness would physically look like.

Human consciousness may be five basic senses along with sixth sense of Intuition reinforce by Nature for efficient protection from unforeseen panic.

1. Human

2. Biodiversity

3. Nature

4. Universe

All abovementioned have consciousness inherently for stability of mater/materials/lives

Well, I think Bob was asking what are the physical manifestations of "consciousness," which perhaps can be expanded to non-lifeforms. The physical manifestation is that a sensory input is processed, likely stored, much as Ales described, which may well result in some physical reaction. Even while asleep, if we sense noises or other environmental events, we may wake up. Indicating that the sensed signals are being processed all along, and the body is merely watching and waiting, in case the signals sensed pass a certain threshold level.

While a super vivid dream might also wake us up, I think the brain is almost always aware of the difference between a dream and something real, while we're asleep.

On the other hand, if we completely deprive the senses, we won't wake up from a deep sleep for any environmental change, and won't be conscious of our environment.

You can apply this to an automated control system. The elevator is aware of its direction, speed, and its vertical location. It reacts accordingly. It knows when to begin slowing down, and exactly where to stop, when it has reached a floor. It is aware even of a possible cable break, to take appropriate action, rather than let the cab drop. Instead of an elevator, if we think of a humanoid robot, I can see where people will attribute "consciousness" to that robot, after a certain level of algorithmic sophistication has been reached.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Manfredi & readers,

Well, I thought that the question was:

What is consciousness ... physically?

Please note my question does not ask "what is human consciousness!"

---End quotation

Plausibly, the physical "manifestations of consciousness" include the fact that being conscious (or not makes) a difference in the world. Otherwise, it is difficult to imagine how it could ever have arisen in biologically or via evolution. Consciousness definitely has various relations to physical phenomena (notice that biological or chemical phenomena also have their relations to the physical), but properly the concept belongs to psychology. If you look in the physics books, you will find little on what consciousness is --excepting perhaps that it has its effects and causes.

You say, "Even while asleep, if we sense noises or other environmental events, we may wake up." But notice the "may" --meaning sometimes, I take it. On the other hand, the point argued in disputing Kralj, was that there may be an "influx of information," without consciousness of it. You don't address that point, but surely vibrations from the street may go completely unnoticed--no consciousness, no conscious experience. In consequence, consciousness cannot be identified with an "influx of information." Right?

You make a a pretty poor reply, I'd say--in that you don't really target the objection made. What you do say is clearly beside the point.

Notice also that we have no evidence whatsoever that "an automated control system" as in an elevator, is conscious at all. Either this is an extremely doubtful conjecture or a very vague analogy.

If the question was "what things are like consciousness in performing 'control' functions, then you would have an interesting answer. Perhaps you think an "interesting" answer to a different question is just as good? But, in fact, its not.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Well, I think Bob was asking what are the physical manifestations of "consciousness,"

Physically speaking, consciousness is the information collection system. Furthermore, the system should be able to wonder about itself. Namely, the system automatically should begin to collect information on its working.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Tabata & readers,

What exactly does "physically speaking" mean in your note, quoted below? Apparently it just means that consciousness functions like an "information collection system." ? See my objections to Kralj above.

You go on to say that "Furthermore, the system should be able to wonder about itself. Namely, the system automatically should begin to collect information on its working." But this seems to run together consciousness and self-consciousness. I have no doubt, for instance, that the domestic cat is conscious of its environment, but the house cat seems little involved in "wonder about itself." There seems to be little self-reflection going on.

A house cat may change patterns or habits of behavior due to sensory feedback, but shifts in habits, insofar as they occur, don't seem to require self-reflection or cats "collecting information" on their own doings. Changes in habits of behavior take place by some unreflective process. For the most part, moreover, their inbuilt patterns of behavior seem to suffice.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Physically speaking, consciousness is the information collection system. Furthermore, the system should be able to wonder about itself. Namely, the system automatically should begin to collect information on its working.

The physicality of human consciouness is located in the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neocortex clinical significance points neurologically clearly to the memory-consciousness-interplay, in terms of higher brain functions.

Dear Callaway and readers,

I'm thankful for Callaway's comment on my answer. Surely, I mentioned self-awareness as the necessary condition of consciousness. There is a lack of any agreed upon theory of consciousness, but we find "reflexive theories" among main types of theories on consciousness. Reflexive theories imply a strong link between consciousness and self-awareness (see for example section 9.2 of "Consciousness" in "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy," https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#RefThe), supporting my supposition.

Regards,

Tatsuo Tabata

It is our consciousness which remain our guideline for our life phase .Consciousness is within every of us related to HEAD,MIND,BRAIN & INNER URGE with the DIVINITY WITHIN US & this remains a guiding force of our life .

This is my personal opinion

Consciousness means to be aware that every thing you did may have bad/good consequences. One ceases conscious by negligence, ignorance or disease. ¶

It is the reaction of a living object due to any kind of change in its inside or outside surrounding.

Interesting! Following asnwers.

In my opinion consciousness is a program (that is, a function) over stable physical patterns that monitors itself and all other functions that the object performs. There is no reason why consciousness is soecific to humans. I would argue that animsls are conscious, and machines could be too. Put very crudely conscious is like an operating system running in debug mode. I would add that the ability to make decisions that affect the entity (yourself) is also inportant.

HG Callaway,

You say, "Even while asleep, if we sense noises or other environmental events, we may wake up." But notice the "may" --meaning sometimes, I take it.

You should have continued reading the next sentence, where I explained this:

"Indicating that the sensed signals are being processed all along, and the body is merely watching and waiting, in case the signals sensed pass a certain threshold level."

I've certainly experienced this many times. It depends on one's situation at the time, whether and when certain sensory stimuli will wake you up from a deep sleep.

You don't address that point, but surely vibrations from the street may go completely unnoticed--no consciousness, no conscious experience.

That's most likely a false assumption, on your part. When I was on active duty in the USN, in a previous lifetime, hearing a volley of 7 rounds from the 5" guns would not wake me up, as loud as they were. But 15 rounds would (because it was unusual, hence a cause for concern). Or, the noise of the ventilation system varying at all, also would wake me up (because machinery was my responsibility, and such changes indicated a definite problem). Other people would have been affected differently, most likely. Today, without question, if I heard anything resembling the sound and vibes of a single 5" gun round, let alone two more, I'd wake up right away. Different circumstance, different threshold levels.

Safe to say that an elevator is not sensing and processing information in a way that is even remotely like the way that I am when I am riding in it.

I'm not at all sure how "safe" that is. The truth is, I have no idea how or whether other people are conscious of anything. I suppose one could do a brain scan and measure the sensed signal, then see what else varies in the brain as a result of that or those sensed signals. These are all electrical signals, ultimately, no matter the mumbo jumbo "subjectivity" people might talk about. And you can do the same sort of thing in the elevator controls. The more sophisticated the machine and its algorithms, the more people will call that "consciousness."

Larry,

Indeed, modern neuroscience tends to agree with Freud's notion that the Self is just a rider with imaginary reins, and who suffers from the delusion that (s)he is in control of where the horse goes. In large part, the sense of self is needed by the more social animals with complex nervous systems. But again, such a sense is not essential to consciousness.

Okay, that's quite interesting. I'd say that what the other guy's "sense of self" might be is mostly a mystery, to any of us. This must involve any number of internal stimuli, just to sense that we exist at all, plus also stimuli we receive from mirrors and from other people.

Some of what we might call "sense of self," the more primitive aspects, could potentially apply to machines too. Every time you boot up a PC or smartphone, or really any sophisticated control system, it goes through many system checks, to establish how operational it is. Or brains do this sort of thing too. So at this primitive primeval level, even smart machines can be said to have a "sense of self."

So the question posed by Bob is: What is consciousness ... physically ?, followed by a clarification: Please note my question does not ask "what is human consciousness!"

The clarification to the question seems to exclude, as a preventive measure, every possible anthropocentric digression on the subject, while the question is, perhaps, a little misleading, yet it is not clear if it is formulated starting from the assumption that consciousness can be treated as "physical object" in the strict sense, as "substance" or as an unidentified physical "phenomenon" (UPP). I’ll choose the latter.

From the answers I read, it seems to me that: a) the clarification failed to exclude or limit the digressions, b) the answers provided show a certain degree of "sympathy" for the concept of "information", considered as a necessary ingredient (also) in the physical definition of consciousness. Well, to the vast array of scholars who put information everywhere I ask: what is information ... physically? In this regard, I would like to mention that the physical concept of "information" it has absolutely nothing to do with that of "data transmission", and even less with that of "transmission of messages containing a (semantic) meaning". The former (physical concept) consider "information" as a measure of coherence or structural “complexity” of surrounding system related to various entropic processes in physical world, that is the measure of in-formation amount, related to a certain object, may be a complexity of its internal structure (negentropy), while the latter (IT concept) consider "amount of information" as frequency characteristic of code letters-signals, that is improving of messages coding and decoding methods and solving of other questions related to optimization of technical communication systems operation.

That said, I come to the question with another question: What is loneliness ... physically? Loneliness is a way of feeling, a complex psycho-somatic and multi-systemic state, linked to many variables, unpredictable, non-linear, subjective. Loneliness cannot be formed (in-formed) in the laboratory, it can be formed (in-forming) only in a subject that experiences it as such. Where is loneliness when there is no subject that is experiencing it?

If loneliness were a physical object of a material (fermionic) type, we could assume that it changes position in time (retrograde/anterograde) and/or in space (bi- or n-dimensional). It could be a kind of material substance (non-ordinary) that today impregnates this subject here, and tomorrow it impregnates that subject there. In a metaphorical sense, it could be compared to a "condensed fish that swims in the sea until it falls on the fisherman's hook”.

If instead it were an energetic object (bosonic), we could compare it to a system of energy relations (radiative) that transform into spacetime, going and coming from the quantum vacuum. An (unknown?) form of energetic substance (exotic) able to interact with several subjects simultaneously in different places/times. A "diffused" fish that can coagulate at the same time around more lines hanging from the hook of more fishermen.

If it were a physical phenomenon (as it actually is), what would its physicality consist of?

What is it and where is a sensation before it is sensed?

Is it dissolved in the sea of energy?

Is it present in spurious form in the zero point quantum field?

None of these options?

The Moon existed before someone or something sensed its presence and it will continue to exist even after the disappearance of the last someone or something able to sense its presence. The existence of the Moon does not depend on the existence of someone or something capable of sensing its presence.

There are quantum phenomena whose "manifestation" (not: whose "existence") "is affected", at least to some extent, by the "observation" action performed by a human observer.

The existence of the Moon does not depend on the existence of someone or something capable of sensing its presence, and is not "affected" (at least until proven otherwise) by the "observation" action performed by a human observer. We can say that the "condensed/material dimension" of the Moon enjoys a "physicality" independent of someone or something that can sense its presence or observe it. Among other things, we can land on the Moon with a spaceship and its crew. Try to do that on someone loneliness.

The "manifestation" of quantum phenomena, on the other hand, simce to be "affected" by the "observation" action carried out by a human observer (at least). In this case, the "observation" action recalls the line/hook around which "coagulates" a quanta of energy, dissolved in the sea of energy or present in a spurious form in the zero point quantum field. The "quantum dimension" of a "quanta of energy" gives then the impression (to anthropic mental categories) of not enjoying a "physicality" independent of someone or something capable of sensing its presence or observing it.

Where is it then, and what happens to a quanta of energy in the absence of someone or something able to sense its presence or observe it?

By the way: what is energy ... physically? The nineteenth-century definition (so dear to the man-machine integration process) reads more or less like this: the capacity of a physical system to do work. The contemporary definition (so dear to the human-computer integration process) could become: the capacity of a physical system to perform work through information. The Taoist definition could be: the substratum of changes. The biblical definition (creationist) could sound like this: the divine Force that creates all things between Earth and Sky.

I would say that Energy is the “manifestation” of a supra-liminal, reducible, state assumed by a non-uniform, irreducible, distribution of tension gradients, agitated "within" by an impulse of motion. Its way of being is vibrational. Its way of becoming is the self-organization on an interferential basis. Its property is the ability to generate interference (in-form domains of oscillatory coherence vs domains of oscillatory incoherence).

Physical reality is dual: tension (irreducible dimension) and energy (reducible dimension).

The "loneliness" is a physical phenomenon belonging to the tension dimension that can not be treated with the criteria and laws of the energy dimension.

So, finally: What is consciousness .... Physically?

It is a physical phenomenon belonging to the tension dimension that can not be treated with the criteria and laws of the energy dimension.

Dear Claudio,

Thank you for your stalwart response in actually answering the question (as asked) rather than engaging in irrelevant anthropocentric digressions. You seem to be the only respondent (besides Aleš Kralj ), so far, to have actually read the question (and the prophylactic clarification), correctly.

I perceive so much of value to contemplate in your answer, it will probably take my {comparatively} dim-wit some time to properly consider and integrate it all.

I am grateful, as always, that you will expend your valuable time in trying to educate a world of mundane thinkers {such as me} who must seem to {a genius of neuroscience such as} you (often) to be ineducable.

Reading your mini-essays is always a joy. Please do us the favor of expounding upon your ideas more often!

Best regards,

Bob Skiles

Consciousness is a self-experience that cannot be accurately described with words and therefore cannot be defined?

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Kralj & readers,

Thanks for your further note. I think we are ruling out your "influx" of information notion of consciousness.

More recently we see Messori pointing out the doubtful application of some contemporary conceptions of information. Messori wrote:

The former (physical concept) consider "information" as a measure of coherence or structural “complexity” of surrounding system related to various entropic processes in physical world, that is the measure of in-formation amount, related to a certain object, may be a complexity of its internal structure (negentropy), while the latter (IT concept) consider "amount of information" as frequency characteristic of code letters-signals, that is improving of messages coding and decoding methods and solving of other questions related to optimization of technical communication systems operation.

---End quotation

What this tends to show, I think, is that concepts of information in physics and in computer science are not well suited to discussions of consciousness. It may be, though, that some other, more sophisticated concept would prove to be more useful. As I recall, the concept of information in contemporary physics has much to do with the reversibility of physical laws and processes and is thereby linked to determinism of physical laws --thus, in turn, to debates in the interpretation of QM, say, the tension between thinking in terms of the wave function and thinking in terms of "collapse of the wave function," in measurement. I doubt, though, that debates in QM will cast much light on the present topic. Equally, the IT concept seems ill-adapted to discussions of consciousness --though perhaps of interest.

More to the point, I suspect is the question from Lambrechts as to whether consciousness can be described. I suppose that it can be. As I have argued, before, on similar threads, the question of appropriate descriptions brings up the relationship of consciousness to the contents of consciousness. Separate the two, as I have argued, and you end up with consciousness as a mystery --that "eye" which sees but is "never seen" or something along similar lines.

Regarding conscious experience, one important philosophical approach is to think in terms of "contents" and "objects" of consciousness. If one is aware, then how, or in what way is one aware? That's the specific content. If one is aware, of what is one aware? That is the object of consciousness. These questions are not specific to human consciousness. They take us in the direction of psychology as contrasted with physics. As I say, it may be that physics has little to tell us on the topic.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Howard, correctly identified another form of consciousness: experimentation of the information that already is in the brain on oneself (imagination). Yes. Even in absence of the influx from the outside one can experiment on oneself (imagination). This is from of evolutionary exploitation search where previously stored information is manipulated (experimented with). Synonyms: daydreaming, imagination, gadanken experiment, thought experimentation...

And probably dreaming.

Ahmad Yousef states:

"Energy transformations may cause a system to lose some of its energy content, and thus, according to Einstein's formula, that system will lose some corresponding mass, releasing it as radiant electromagnetic energy, such as light or heat. Now, imagine two identical systems that are continuously losing their mass by radiating photons. With engineering, radiant photons from the first system might achieve complete destructive interferences with radiant photons from the other system. Such interferences cause amounts of the two systems’ mass/energy to disappear from our observable universe, and physicists think these amounts are transported to extra physical dimensions.

How and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences and how sensations acquire characteristics, is the hardest scientific question until this moment, (Chalmers, 1995). A few scientists think that photons themselves carry the consciousness, (Romijn, 2002).

Others think that consciousness in the universe is scale invariant and implies human brain’s ‘event horizon’ , (Meijer, and Geesink, 2017).

Neurophysiologically speaking, C. Koch, and his colleagues had been trying to localize the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) neurons. Noticeably, it remains debatable whether the frontal lobe is contributing in the creation of consciousness, it is important for intelligent behavior and cognitive control though, (Koch et al., 2016a).

I, however, am concerned about finding the precise location of the consciousness first. Speculatively, I think that any disappearance of the impact of matter/energy (photons) from our observable universe should refer to extra physical dimensions that might include consciousness ... " (emphases added by Skiles; continued at link below)

Consciousness Might Be Localized in Extra Physical Dimensions, Ahmad Yousef , April, 2019, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28721.02400 :

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332738644_Consciousness_Might_Be_Localized_in_Extra_Physical_Dimensions [accessed May 04 2019].

Marcel M. Lambrechts asks: "Consciousness is a self-experience that cannot be accurately described with words and therefore cannot be defined?

Dear Marcel,

The more I search for a definition of consciousness, the more I become convinced that current sciences (mathematics, physics, psychology, neuroscience, biology, thermodynamics, cybernetics ... and all related disciplines) do not possess vocabularies adequate to define (or explain) consciousness.

Gratifyingly, there are a great number of highly-qualified researchers currently working on the topic of consciousness (using interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches), that seem to offer some promise of producing a concilience for a tentative definition of physical manifestation(s) of consciousness (or at least some worthwhile suggestions toward formulating experiments that might test some postulated physical components of the consciousness phenomenon or 'process').

So, we wait (but not patiently ... for I am old and sick and haven't much patience or time to waste idly waiting) ;)

Best regards,

Bob

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Skiles & readers,

I see that you are interested, at least, by some rather speculative physical approaches. I suspect that they will be founding wanting in one way or another--particularly regrading clarity and evidence. That consciousness exists in a nexus of causes and effects seems to be about as far as physics will take us. I think that is to be reasonably expected. Physics and psychology are pretty remote from each other.

Whether one can reasonably expect a definition of consciousness in psychology is perhaps a more interesting and more tractable question. That is certainly where I would be inclined to look first. We expect some relationship of physical and psychological phenomena--given that consciousness has any effects in the world; but this is no guarantee that anyone knows exactly what the relationship may be.

Its reasonable to (eventually) expect some account of the relationship between psychology and physics--psychology and biology, psychology and neurology and physiology, etc. Yet this is very far from saying that details of the relationships are a condition of adequacy of any theory in psychology. By analogy, we don't have to be able to express evolutionary theory in purely physical terms in order to accept the theory of evolution. Or again, if someone claims to know, say, the causes of WWI, we won't count it against the claim that it can't be expressed in the term of textbook physics.

The best place to look for an account of consciousness, I would think, is in empirical psychology itself.

Webster's says:

Definition of consciousness

1a: the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself b: the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact c: AWARENESS especially : concern for some social or political cause.The organization aims to raise the political consciousness of teenagers.

---End quotation

Any problem with this definition?

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

The more I search for a definition of consciousness, the more I become convinced that current sciences mathematics, physics, psychology and all related- and sub-disciplines) does not possess a vocabulary adequate to define consciousness.

David Longinotti avers:

"Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency, mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which does not motivate as a force, but as a control signal. From brain research and the locality principle of physics, I surmise that qualia are a fundamental, biological form of energy generated in specialized neurons. Subjectivity is explained as thermodynamically necessary on the supposition that, by converting action potentials to feelings, the neural cells avert damage from the electrochemical pulses. In exchange for this entropic benefit, phenomenal energy is spent as and where it is produced - which precludes the objective observation of qualia."

source of quote:Chapter Agency, Qualia and Life: Connecting Mind and Body Biologically

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

Approaching "consciousness" via language. Might we find something of its general character in a special case?

Perhaps there is a version of the "origins" questions reflected in the experience of learning a foreign language. Surely, comprehension in the new language develops gradually, and in the meantime, there is much that is missed or imperfectly understood. One might say its a somewhat "flickering" awareness at first. This is a matter that is at least partly evident in testing for comprehension; and testing is something that language teachers frequently do, for there own specific purposes in instruction.

Also of similar interest, I suspect, is the ways in which people infer the meaning of an unfamiliar word from its usage and the context of usage. We might think of this as a process of becoming aware of the meaning of a word; and the process of becoming aware seems to be reflected in the formulation of dictionary entries on the basis of empirical studies of usage--the work of the lexicographer.

I think the general point is that we might do well in this fashion without need of wondering about the absolute origins of consciousness. Since, as is plausible, consciousness continually grows, and in consequence, its new forms must be available just about any time and place. Surely, if someone learns a new word, or infers its meaning from usage, then that person becomes able to do something that he or she could not do before: at the least, begin to use the word correctly. Isn't this also a difference in the world? Doesn't it imply other practical abilities? A key to this approach is that it makes little sense to consider linguistic meaning apart from empirical evidence of usage, which in turn, has all manner of relations to practices. We speak in certain ways, partly because it facilitates our participation in related practices and doings. The efficacy of consciousness seems to be evident in the relationship between understanding language and success in related practices.

Maybe the question of the absolute origin of consciousness is somewhat like the question of the absolute origin of life? Evolutionary theory gets along in understanding living things even in ignorance of absolute origins.

H.G. Callaway

---A correspondent wrote---

An even more basic question that requires more consistency in how we define and ultimately understand consciousness might be "when does consciousness begin", even considering as far back and primitive as fetal development in the womb. Consciousness itself cannot be just a single, all or nothing attribute, but a gradually developed, complex mechanism, continually updated and modified by daily exposure to internally varying brain plasticity, and exteriorly applied social pressures and human culture at large. Language would be just one example of a component to modern day consciousness that typically evolves within each person and between each person, from day to day.

Consciousness of an object seems to explain consciousness but doesn't as the object itself might be involved in the state resulting from interaction between both. Any consciousness of an object involves an awareness of the objects position within the environment containing it, what it is called and if this is necessarily accepted by others. Consciousness might thereby be confirmation of the environment not of ourselves.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Wilkin & readers,

Thanks for your note on this thread.

You say, "Consciousness of an object seems to explain consciousness," but it is somewhat unclear to me what this might mean. How would it be proposed that "Consciousness of an object explains consciousness"? It would seem to be somewhat tautological on the face of it, "That you are conscious of an apple" is explained by the fact that an apple is the object of your consciousness? That doesn't seem even a prima facie explanation. Something is missing here.

But on the other hand, I do not see that saying that "the object itself might be involved in the state resulting from interaction between both," should count as an objection?

You also write, "Any consciousness of an object involves an awareness of the objects position within the environment containing it, ..." but here you seem to be thinking of visual perception of an object? But, what, say of the awareness of an odor? I think this might be pervasive and unlocated, e.g., the smell of gas?

Again, if a domestic cat e.g., is aware of a mouse--perhaps its behind the refrigerator--, it may have an idea of location, but I don't think the cat knows "what it [the mouse] is called," and I doubt that it matters if the mouse's perception is "accepted by others." The cat may well keep up the hunt, though it and the prey are unperceived by "others." Right?

Are you reading in something specific to human conceptual consciousness? Even in human cases, it seems that an infant may see and reach for its feeding bottle, though having no knowledge of "what it is called."

H.G. Callaway

Consciousness is intangible and none manifest physical existence

HG Callaway, only addressing this one detail:

but I don't think the cat knows "what it [the mouse] is called,"

I'm far from being a naturalist, but I do catch the occasional PBS episode on nature. Turns out, as a defense mechanism, some animals do call out threats from different predators, using different sounds. Animals may be more conscious of such things than we give them credit for.

Conciousness is simply the ability to absorb information, or

to react to stimuli, the simplest from a medical or science view. ( as a term applied only to living organisms)

You can certainly tell if a person is unconscious, would have to check if dead or not. The question is if you looses all senses are you still conscious?

I dont believe in the rather philosophical aspects this topic may aquire.

Is a robot conscious? Use the same criteria as above.

@Larry Carlson

My understanding about consciousness is five basic senses along with sixth sense of Intuition may be consciousness and intangible.

Humans under belief has:

(1) human body (Physical or tangible)

(2) Soul (Intangible)

Consciousness in human is secured by soul and none physical manifestation.

Following!

Let's use a simple mechanistic approach:

Science is based on visible-based observation, e.g. an observation/perception transformed into Something visible (e.g. a number, a picture, a table, a diagram)….. Thus, 'invisble' consciousness/feeling/emotion/energy per se cannot be defined without this transformation into Something 'visible'? Given that this transformation can only be an human interpretation, science does not have access to consciousness/feeling/emotion/Energy per se?

Larry, I have recently read in detail the belief (a word I tend to use as in many cases it fixes the thoughts and aspirations embedded in an idea) that consciousness does not really exist but is simply a symptom of unconscious mechanisms, but being aware of unconsciousness mechanisms seems to me to lay the authors open to accusations of tautology. As, and I am producing my own, does the old and repeated belief here that intentionality towards objects produces consciousness suggesting primacy of objects not subject.

Surely selecting such a position produces the idea and rational behind this kind of notion of consciousness based upon the discrete subject-a clear product perhaps of Victorian individualism?

In ancient days, people neither needed nor claimed consciousness (except for perhaps kings-and maybe not them either) as consciousness (sic) was represented by gods and the world understood through them in one form or another. Over the past 2 centuries (give or take) numbers of people began to separate from the group or entered much smaller groups thereby creating the position of subject and object rather than subject and subject, object and object.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Wilkin & readers,

I have never, myself, encountered the claim that "intentionality towards objects produces consciousness." So, who might you be disputing? (or, the notion that the object of consciousness explains consciousness).

One traditional claim (arising indirectly out of Aristotle, by the way) is that "intentionality" or "direction toward an object," is the mark (distinguishing characteristic, one might say) of the mental (the 19th-century philosopher, Franz Brentano). But this is a bit different from claiming that direction toward an object "produces consciousness." Also, presumably, the category of "the mental" is wider than that of "consciousness." ?

Nonetheless (and with or without adopting Brentano's thesis), it certainly makes sense to think that conscious acts can be described in terms of content and object.

If someone is thinking about the Evening Star, for example, they may be gazing on it and thinking "The Evening star is dazzling tonight." The content of the though makes it an Evening Star thought--this is its subjective character we might say. The object, in contrast, we might designate as the planet Venus. Notice that though Venus = the Evening Star = the Morning Star, still, thinking about the Evening Star, by way of content, does not amount to thinking about the Morning Star. It took some early (likely Babylonian) astronomy to establish the identity of the Evening Star and the Morning Star, on the basis of empirical observations --and projections of orbital position.

Would you care to clarify your claim? Are you just fishing?

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

does the old and repeated belief here that intentionality towards objects produces consciousness suggesting primacy of objects not subject.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Manfredi & readers,

You put forward the notion that some animals may categorize "different predators, using different sounds." Well, fine, perhaps so. Chimps seem to do something similar.

Notice, however, that I only need one case, and my suggestions was not that no animals ever use sounds to categorize different things.

My point was simply that a domestic cat though hunting a mouse and aware of its presence does not "know what it is called." I only need one such case. The infant reaching for and seeing its feeding bottle would do just as well, so long as the infant in young enough not to know "what it is called."

My claim is quite modest, while you run the risk, it seems, of thorough reading in of human conceptualizations into animal consciousness?

A cat must be able to perceptually distinguish, say, a mouse (likely by smell?) or other prey from things not of interest in hunting, But this does not plausibly amount to "knowing what it is called."

The more general point is the existence of non-reflective, non-conceptual consciousness.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

I'm far from being a naturalist, but I do catch the occasional PBS episode on nature. Turns out, as a defense mechanism, some animals do call out threats from different predators, using different sounds. Animals may be more conscious of such things than we give them credit for.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

Interesting stipulation, that "mental activity (aka, consciousness, sensations, etc.) is entirely physical," and I have no objection to the stipulation.

However, I have serious questions about the meaning and evidence of the claim. The problem is that none of the more or less standard vocabulary of psychology, such as "mental activity," "consciousness," "sensation," etc. properly belong to physics. The science of physics is simply not concerned with these matters --except perhaps occasionally and incidentally. I think we can all agree that if consciousness is a phenomenon of scientific interest, say in psychology, then it must exist in a causal nexus. It must have causes and effects. But this is a quite minimal claim and nothing particularly to do with physics --which concerns itself with forces and particles, motion, space and time, etc. The more immediate causes and effects may be biological. You will not find the physicists saying much about consciousness.

The problem of the stipulation naturally leads on to the question of the relationship of psychology (which is concerned with mental activity, consciousness etc.) and other sciences. But, it certainly does not follow that we require purely physical explanations in order that any theory in psychology (say, a psychological study of consciousness) will have its own evidence or validity--and claim upon our belief.

Insofar as conscious states exist in a causal nexus, of some sort or other, physical causes and effects may come in. But, as I argued above, this is very far from saying that theories of consciousness must be physical theories. Prima facie, they are theories in psychology.

Right?

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

I presume you [Tomar] are stating that "consciousness" is not physical. If so, I would not [say] that there are a few sites in which people 'argue' as to whether consciousness (sensations, awareness) is physical or not. It is therefore my understanding that we are starting in this thread with the mutual understanding that mental activity (aka, consciousness, sensations, etc.) is entirely physical

Yes, H. C. clearly that is not what I meant, but like many others here I can be slack. It is not essay writing after all.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Wilkin & readers,

Thanks for your reply.

I think the idea here is to do research related to the question. I would not recommend that our efforts at academic research be "slack." On the contrary, we should be as rigorous as is plausible in the context of an on-line discussion.

As usual in an academic setting, we have to do with teaching and learning--serious business!

H.G. Callaway

Let me go back to my point. (Yes, I was thinking of Brentano). One/why connect thinking and consciousness? Two?you make no attempt to separate lets say cause and effect. Is the evening star originating the process or you? Is the evening star initiating a conscious process of which you are a part?

H.C. if you bother to look at one or two of my papers you will see I have done the research on this subject. Have you?

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Wilkin & readers,

Are we not conscious in thinking? I find your contrary suggestion quite puzzling. When we are thinking, we are conscious in a distinctive way, but still conscious by thinking. Notice, too, that processes of thought, say, mental arithmetic at the check-out counter, may enable you to do, what you could not otherwise do, e.g., confirm or check the correctness of the amounts to be paid. Some people are quite good at this, others never bother. We can sometimes tell the difference. Is a thoughtful person not often more broadly aware of what is going on?

It seems to me that your expectations about distinguishing cause and effect are somewhat problematic. It simply was not to the point in my argument for the distinction between contents and objects of thought. Quickly turning to proposed causal analysis is often too hasty. First things first; and I had in mind the preliminary objective of setting up some descriptive vocabulary. If we don't know how to talk about conscious experiences, then we are very unlikely to arrive at any reasonable account of causes and effects.

Notice that thinking in terms of contents and objects of conscious experience generalizes well. Consider e.g., perceptual illusions. They are interesting and problematic just because the characterization of the subjective content contrasts with the characterization of the object. The experimental psychologist may set up an illusion, knowing what is there to be seen, say, and then ask what someone sees or seems to see. "Content" contrasts with "object" basically because we can be mislead or subject to illusion, etc. and even at the best our awareness may be limited, one sided, or generally perspectival. So it may be with thinking about the Evening Star.

Brentano is only a sort of background here, and one problem in Brentano is that the distinction between content and object is not very clear in his writings --or so I tend to think.

H.G. Callaway

Brentano was effectively distinquishing between consciousness and unconsciousness as part of his effecting an independent academic discipline. Im not convinced that his concerns went further than that.

HC you suggest the preliminary is discussing the conscious experience in the first place so go ahead/ but how can describing the phenomena aid any further understanding? I cannot see how by your descriptions above anything is further obtained. You seem to be discussing or on the verge of discussing Naming.

Please, continue. What does discussing content do other than dissect the phenomenon? I am interested but as yet I cannot see what is being achieved.

For me it is an state of a distributed charged gel that receives many names such as glycocalix, extracellular matrix etc.

To see the arguments and experimental data suporrting this assertion look at these papers:

• DOI:
• 10.3233/JIN-170012

• DOI:
• 10.1155/2016/7192427
• The consequence of this concept for perception and learning is that it can be anywhere and at several apatial dimensions simultaneously.

Vera, I certainly think it can be veriable. I do not believe it is this known commodity that HG, for example, seems to be implying. Any thing describable is surely known.

The experience of consciousness need not tell us anything about its nature but about how we perceive a phenomenon. If that is consciousness, then fine.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Wilkin & readers,

Well, I think you have to appreciate that your reply is pretty disappointing from the standpoint of a scientific interest in psychology. You don't dispute, or argue against the distinction between content and object, you seem to simply find it uninteresting? But my argument was either a good one, or there must be some flaw in it which you perhaps neglect to mention?

Consider the distinction between cognitive psychology and say, behaviorism. The cogency of the concept of content, as representation, counts against behaviorist psychology --in its various varieties. Since you show an interest in social and political context, I think to mention that behaviorist psychology had its recent heyday during the Cold War --when there was great emphasis on top-down social control. One way to understand the autonomy, or independence of judgment, of the subject is in terms of distinctive psychological descriptions.

More generally, as I say, if we cannot cogently describe conscious experience, then there is little hope of every understanding its relationship to the physical --or to anything else. Ignoring the prospect of psychological description one simply surrenders to the vague notion of consciousness as a mystery; and that would leave the present question without much purchase.

Note again, the present question:

What is consciousness ... physically?

If we cannot even describe conscious experience, then how could we possibly relate it, in a convincing way, to anything else? Having some way of describing conscious experience, and distinguishing one conscious experience from another, is required for any cogent discussion of the present topic. Without something quite similar, our very grasp of the subject-matter under discussion wavers.

Part of the point of distinguishing content from object of consciousness, in the fashion I sketched, is to avoid confusions which arise from identifying the two or conflating their descriptions. So, in particular, though the Morning Star = the Evening Star, thinking about the Morning Star is not to be identified on that ground with thinking about the Evening Star. (The thinker may be unaware of, or even reject, the identity.) This has little to do with naming.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

HC you suggest the preliminary is discussing the conscious experience in the first place so go ahead/ but how can describing the phenomena aid any further understanding? I cannot see how by your descriptions above anything is further obtained. You seem to be discussing or on the verge of discussing Naming.

Please, continue. What does discussing content do other than dissect the phenomenon? I am interested but as yet I cannot see what is being achieved.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

I take it that what is emphasized in the passage quoted below is primarily an explanation on offer of the "private" or privileged character of conscious experience. I have my conscious experience and you have yours, but I cannot have yours, nor can you have mine. Moreover, looking somehow inside your brain, I would not expect to catch sight of your conscious experience, though I might detect all sorts of electrical activities, etc.

Longinotti says:

"Subjectivity is explained as thermodynamically necessary on the supposition that, by converting action potentials to feelings, the neural cells avert damage from the electrochemical pulses."

Perhaps so. I think, in any case, that we may need some explanation of "privileged access." The talk of "feelings" here, I take it, is intended to take in the "felt quality" (or "qualia" qualitative character) of conscious experience. For example, if you are left with an after-image of the flash, after someone has taken your picture, then the "mental" image (which presumably involves a physical effect on the eyes and the retina) would count as a "felt quality" of consciousness. I think to ask why the cells could not "avert damage" by instead immediately discharging their "action potential"?

Also of interest in the passage below is the claim that "By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which does not motivate as a force, but as a control signal." Here we have a claim about mental causation. Since the claim is that "a feeling - which does not motivate as a force, but as a control signal," we seem to have something like a distinction between "cause" ("motivating like a force") and "causal condition," [motivating] "as a control signal." Presumable, if a "control signal" is involved in something you do, "a successful action," then it is a necessary condition (required for?) what you do, but not alone sufficient.

To get more concrete, imagine that you stop at a red light. The perception of the red light might count as a causal condition of what you do, but obviously, a good deal of prior training (you learned how to drive) is involved in your reaction to the red light. Someone not trained in a similar way might not have the same reaction to the signal. Generally, it seems useful to think in this way--distinguishing between a cause and a causal condition.

H.G. Callaway

---Longinotti wrote---

The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which does not motivate as a force, but as a control signal. From brain research and the locality principle of physics, I surmise that qualia are a fundamental, biological form of energy generated in specialized neurons. Subjectivity is explained as thermodynamically necessary on the supposition that, by converting action potentials to feelings, the neural cells avert damage from the electrochemical pulses. In exchange for this entropic benefit, phenomenal energy is spent as and where it is produced - which precludes the objective observation of qualia."

HG I constantly deal with the problems you lay out and which you find my answers to such a disappointment/but who made you the arbiter? You do seem to be deciding what is good and what is not good simply on the basis of whether someone answers according to your wishes.

All the items you seem on insisting on talking about I have talked about at length. You seem blithely unaware that I do this and have done it at length while insisting that my interests lie elsewhere. While I know you want to discuss this/fair enough/ but a new stance would be welcome. Been there, seen it, done it I think are the necessary qualifying phrases. I cannot get over in effect your stubborness in insisting on your views as against other views. I have a paper on here that I think expresses in part the views your are extrapolating on, but they represent a dead end in many ways.

I have a lot of time for your comments but here you are digging in sand and devouring mud while expressing the belief that your labour is producing castles. I know you like to discuss things your way and discuss what you wish but here is something to be going on with......

If I rise from a chair much of the action will be automatic and not express consciousness or of the phenomenal type/one that provides experience sufficient to render it memorable in any degree. I look out of the window and see the fabled evening star flickering intensely. The phenomena becames more intense because of the many sensations and experiences the star produces. It is at once a metaphor. The heightened experience heightens consciousness. Fine, but what then? Does the consciousness merely lie in me, or is it activated by what is around me (I know you dont like this notion)and therefore the phenomena produces a sense of consciousness. If I do not rise (of course I might be dead) there is no recordable consciousness. Now this is both description and perhaps causality. Who knows?

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Wilkin & readers,

You seem to be annoyed! But keep in mind that I just call them as I see them. You may see me as attempting to be an "arbiter," (a psychological description!). but I merely respond to what is said. If you have such great knock-down arguments against positions of interest here, then, by all means, roll them out, and lets have a look.

Given some of your notes, to which, you'll perhaps recall, I have devoted some critical attention, I am certainly not inclined to treat your conclusions on the basis of the authority you seem to attribute to them. You seem to be "hand waving," as the point is often put.

The passage quoted below is a bit of a mystery. Why should you think I "don't like" the question: "Does the consciousness merely lie in me, or is it activated by what is around me?" (Sometimes its the one way, sometimes the other?) Why should you even think this problematic? You seem to have some fixed ideas about academic discourse which you are yet to fully explain to the readers on this thread? I'd suggest that you may want to keep to the text--the relevant arguments and replies? What's wrong with that?

Do you really expect to be treated as an authority on the present, very speculative topic?! Let's see your arguments! Afraid of the possibility of criticism? If my points are so insubstantial as you seem to think, why not explicitly refute them?

Kind regards,

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Fine, but what then? Does the consciousness merely lie in me, or is it activated by what is around me (I know you don't like this notion)and therefore the phenomena produces a sense of consciousness. If I do not rise (of course I might be dead) there is no recordable consciousness. Now this is both description and perhaps causality. Who knows?

Following

Dear Discussants, A Clue:

As Larry has mentioned, consciousness is not a noun, but a verb ... it is not a substance, but a process ... a process of PHYSICAL (not metaphysical) interactions between living matter (most observably in brain matter) and some form(s) of energy.

David Longinotti has (IMO) propounded the most cogent (likely) theory on consciousness that I have come across, to date. I think of it as perhaps the best because he has incorporated a good concilience of relevant science along with his (perceptive) intuitions (guesses). Even in his intuitions, he has been careful to massage his theory so that it does not conflict with any known physics.

I recommend that anyone who is truly interested in continuing to discuss possible answers to my question (and avoid a lot of useless tangential and digressive discussions ... which always seem to ineluctably devolve upon human psychology) carefully read Longinotti's chapter, first! After all, it was reading his theory that caused me to pose this question, in the first place, so it seems most pertinent (almost a prerequisite ?).

Longinotti theorizes about the physical process(es) of consciousness in the same way I hoped (still hope) discussants here would do.

Best regards,

Bob

Chapter Agency, Qualia and Life: Connecting Mind and Body Biologically

Bob

Thanks - I'm grateful for your positive assessment of my theory. You've called attention to my paper, so I should let potential readers know that the paper concerns "phenomenal consciousness" (i.e., qualia), what Chalmers calls the 'hard problem' of consciousness. I don't address 'access consciousness' in the paper, the sort of consciousness that also involves cognitive attention to something (I'm working on that, particularly on what the 40 Hz brain waves are for). I make the clarification just so a potential reader won't have unmet expectations.

best,

David

Luciano, where is the evidence for synaptic involvement in cosnscioussness?

Larry

Thanks for reading the paper and for your thoughtful comments.

As you suggest, I am attempting to answer the ‘hard problem’ as I understand it, namely, the question of the nature and origin of phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia).

I do think that all qualia are a single, distinct type of energy, but that there are variants within the type. What all variants have in common is that they are experiential in some way, and they serve a defensive, homeostatic role for the neurons that generate them – a function which makes all qualia subjective. Qualia can obviously differ in the ‘mode’ of experience (visual, auditory, etc); this is due to some sort of difference in the type of living material producing the qualia, which affects the detailed way the material responds to neural pulses. I don’t think the mode of quale that is produced by a neuron depends on the location in the brain (although certain variants are correlated with certain regions). I adhere to the locality principle; a quale depends on the intrinsic entities/properties of its source, not on any relative properties (like location). This implies that if you took a pleasure-generating neuron and moved it to a different location of the brain, it would still produce pleasure when excited, rather than some other experience.

I am not a dualist. Dualism is often conflated with distinctness, which is an error; the fact that qualia are a distinct, non-reducible phenomenon does not entail that they are outside of physics. I posit that qualia are another form of energy that is directly or indirectly exchangeable for the recognized types; this is a monistic perspective. The alternative is to consider every distinct entity (like water, light, copper, etc) as fundamentally different from every other, in which case one winds up with a highly pluralistic view of the world. How one groups the entities of the world into different categories depends on one's objectives.

You’re correct that I don’t think mental causation is ‘linear’, like one billiard ball banging another. Mental causation is more like the way an infrared signal off an aircraft engine is used to guide a missile to its target. There is no direct force from the infrared signal on the steering mechanism of the missile; the missile uses the signal to adjust its 'behavior'. You are right to characterize this as a feedback mechanism; the missile constantly checks to see where it is aimed relative to the received IR signal, and makes corrections if there is an error. Marken describes the sort of nested loops that can be involved in complex feedback mechanisms involving more than one signal.

Regarding what is ‘physical’, my view is that anything that is natural is physical – and I think everything in the world is natural – so I do think of qualia as ‘physical’. Unfortunately, many use the term ‘physical’ to mean ‘non-mental’, which is very prejudicial to theorizing. In my view, the mental is a subset of the physical, not a separate category. I do think that qualia will one day be accepted into physics, when their relationship to the rest of the world can be characterized mathematically.

best, David

On a related thread, David Longinotti made a relevant comment that I thought would be of interest, here .... so I repost it (Dr. Yousef's paper, that occasioned the comment, I have posted earlier ... and will link again, below, for your convenience):

"In response to Dr. Yousef, I don't think extra physical dimensions are required to explain the apparent non-locality of thoughts.

A spatial event like thunder can be detected without the source being located, because detection can be accomplished by an energy transduction at a single point in space - an event which does not provide any information as to the spatial distribution of the detected phenomenon.

Information does not come for free - a measurement must be made. We lack the sensory means to 'measure' the direction of very low frequency sounds, for example, so they seem to be everywhere and nowhere - just like thoughts (only louder). Visual and auditory qualia from sensory inputs are psychologically 'projected' somehow (based on stereoscopic 'measurements') such that they appear to be at the locations of the objects represented. Such projection would not be possible unless sensory qualia have spatial properties (i.e., brain locations).

This is consistent with brain stimulation that produces feelings like pleasure from very small regions of neurons (e.g., the medial forebrain bundle). Qualia from thoughts are not routinely projected because to do so would be to cause hallucinations; a conscious organism needs to distinguish its thoughts from sensory information.

Descartes' famous distinction between mind and body rests on an error; Descartes mistakes an epistemological condition (no knowledge of spatial properties) for an asserted, ontological property (no spatial properties at all)."

source: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_Chalmers_so-called_hard_problem_in_consciousness_real

Dr. Yousef's paper:

Preprint Consciousness Might Be Localized in Extra Physical Dimensions

I agree with Professor Roman R Poznanski

I would urge all discussants to spend the time (if they have not already done so) to read carefully his (and his collaborators) papers, a good place to start might be to read all the material posted/linked on his project page, here:

https://www.researchgate.net/project/Panexperiential-materialism-From-self-referential-identity-theory-to-teleofunctionalism

If we are very lucky, Professor Roman R Poznanski

In a related thread Sergey Shevchenko just made relevant comments, which I repost here:

Consciousness indeed is localized in some “extra physical”, i.e. not Matter’s ones, dimensions, though not because of

“…Fusiform Face Area brain region that includes inhibitory neurons and holistically processes faces’ and a conscious experience called, face recognition. FFA inhibitory processes are therefore hypothesized to end up the impact of photons from our detectable universe…” {quote from Dr. Yousef's paper}

Photons can be absorbed without further radiating into observable universe simply at some photo-reactions, when some new chemical molecule appears; including chemical reactions proceed constantly in the brains.

Consciousness simply is informational system, which is fundamentally different from the other informational system, “Matter”, and for anybody, who understands what are the absolutely fundamental phenomena /notions “Space” , “Time”, and so “Dimension” [that is possible only in the “The Information as Absolute” conception, where corresponding definitions are done], it is evident, that these different systems have fundamentally different spacetimes; where they exist and operate.

However at least the unique known versions of the consciousness “Consciousness on Earth” use practically material bodies as the stable residences for existence and sources of energy [Energy is the absolutely fundamental phenomena/notion also] for be, at that a dynamical system, say for be able to think. Besides the consciousnesses quite evidently interact with material bodies, when govern by the bodies. So partially Matter’s and the consciousness’s spacetimes are intercrossed.

At that that

“…we can not localize consciousness because the very concept of localization is the product of consciousness.….” {comment by Eugene F Kislyakov }

isn’t correct, every informational system, including consciousness, absolutely objectively is always localized in its/her/his spacetime. That is another thing that subjectively some consciousnesses localize some objects/systems as illusions; including that fundamentally differs consciousness from, say, any material object/system, which always localize other material objects/systems quite correctly."

source of Sergey's comments:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_Chalmers_so-called_hard_problem_in_consciousness_real#view=5cd00f4f4921ee6f8160ea6b

~~~

Editorial aside [by Skiles]: please do not discount Sergey Shevchenko 's comments because of his awkward (difficult to follow) English syntax (his English syntax may not be so great, but I assure you there is nothing wrong with his great mind and his ideas and comments are always worthy of careful consideration ... even if you have to work very hard sometimes to understand them) ...

Bob,

Thanks for the repost. However it is incomplete, since in it there is no “Cheers”, what is in the reposted SS post!

And, I made some correction in the post:

it was "..... subjectively some consciousnesses localize some objects/systems as illusions; ......"

it is ".... subjectively some consciousnesses localize some objects/systems sometimes as illusions; ......"

Cheers

"even if you have to work very hard sometimes to understand them"

Good said, Bob!

"Cheers"

Very joyfully, Sergey!

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Skiles & readers,

There is a bit of confusion in the passage I quote from you below. The word "consciousness" is, of course, a noun. That implies that the word can function as the subject term of a sentence whatever one may think of it as denoting and whatever one may go on to say in the sentence.

Consciousness "is not a substance, but a process..." you go on to say. (Readers should notice that you have changed your initial question just a bit.) "Consciousness" you also say, is a "process of physical (not metaphysical) interactions between living matter and some forms of energy."

Fine with me if we leave out the metaphysical. The more interesting aspects of the present question (I don't see your revisions as having change it much) is the prospects of the science of consciousness--or at least a scholarly treatment of the subject matter related to consciousness.

My sense of your revision of the question is that you wish to emphasize physical aspects of the subject matter of consciousness. Again, that is fine with me.

Still, there is the little matter of the identification of the subject matter of "consciousness," --what is to count, even in a preliminary way, as belonging to the phenomena of consciousness? As I say, this kind of inquiry belongs, prima facie to psychology. Nothing that you can stipulate as a matter of your interest in the question can change that fact. Again, it is important to notice that physics itself has little to say about consciousness; and moreover, psychology has its own distinctive vocabulary and terminology--which is not to be ignored.

Notice the following point from Longinotti, in his note just above:

I do think that qualia will one day be accepted into physics, when their relationship to the rest of the world can be characterized mathematically.

---End quotation

This is more a pious hope than an accomplished fact. As things stand, qualia, the "felt qualities of consciousness," do not belong to the subject matter of physics. To find the relationship of psychological phenomena to the physical, we are going to need a developed psychology and ways of describing psychological phenomena, the legitimacy of which can not be based on a prior relationship to the physical.

Like Longinotti, I advise against dualism; but in favor of the pluralism of the sciences and scholarly disciplines. A reductive physicalism or materialism which ignores the distinctions among the sciences will typically get nowhere, fast, --by leaving behind and failing to understand the subject of interest. We cannot reasonably expect to understand the relationship of psychological phenomena to physics without first understanding what psychology is about.

Do I detect some longing for quick materialist reduction?

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

As Larry has mentioned, consciousness is not a noun, but a verb ... it is not a substance, but a process ... a process of PHYSICAL (not metaphysical) interactions between living matter (most observably in brain matter) and some form(s) of energy.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Longinotti & readers,

Interesting comments on dualism, and I see that you are coming to terms with the related concepts: monism, dualism, pluralism.

Description of psychological phenomena in terms of "qualia," or the felt quality of experience is often regarded as a kind of functional description. Consider an analogy. I have in the kitchen a piece of crafted metal, known as a can opener. It is so described, because that it what it is made for. "Can opener" is a functional description; and if you look closely at the thing, examine its parts, analyze the materials, etc, --perform every sort of physical and chemical test on the thing, nowhere will you find its function in every-day use.

Is being a can opener, then a physical property at all? Notice that can openers come in many different styles and forms and shapes, some very simple, chiefly a handle and a piercing and cutting edge, while others are mechanically complex, some electrically powered, etc. There are going to also be border-line cases. I might in a difficult situation use a saw. That would work, I think, but is a saw, then, also a can opener? Examining the physical object, using any physical or chemical test available, where will we find its functions?

I mean to simply point out some distinctive aspects of functional concepts. The suggestion is, of course, that if we examine psychological phenomena, in all physical, chemical and biological detail, then we are not going to find their functions. In consequence, we have recourse to psychology. I expect that biology and physiology might be more helpful. But this is a quite traditional perspective: there is field called "physiological psychology," which is concerned with physiological structures and functions.

You argue for monism, as follows:

The alternative is to consider every distinct entity (like water, light, copper, etc) as fundamentally different from every other, in which case one winds up with a highly pluralistic view of the world. How one groups the entities of the world into different categories depends on one's objectives.

---End quotation

Here you neglect the pluralism of the sciences --and its scientific basis. We need not consider "every distinct entity (like water, light, copper, etc) as fundamentally different from every other," because they are grouped together (or apart) by their relationships in the developed sciences. This is not a matter of grouping merely "depending on one's objectives." Whether or not particular entities are reasonably grouped together, say, water and copper (chemical compound and chemical element) and treated within a single science, depends on the success of that science in showing their relationships. Your basic supposition seems to be that groupings are arbitrary, or depend merely on a purpose adopted. But this is simply not true.

In particular, the phenomena of psychology are grouped together and distinguished from the subject-matter of physics, because the phenomena of the distinct sciences cohere together in classifications and explanatory systems. This is not to forbid any relationship of psychological and physical phenomena, of course. But it is not a matter of stipulation, as in "qualia are physical," as you have it. It is instead a matter of demonstrating the usefulness of this hypothesis --in contrast to the idea that descriptions in terms of felt quality of experience are basically functional and psychological.

I hope you will find these comments helpful to your interesting project.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

I am not a dualist. Dualism is often conflated with distinctness, which is an error; the fact that qualia are a distinct, non-reducible phenomenon does not entail that they are outside of physics. I posit that qualia are another form of energy that is directly or indirectly exchangeable for the recognized types; this is a monistic perspective. The alternative is to consider every distinct entity (like water, light, copper, etc) as fundamentally different from every other, in which case one winds up with a highly pluralistic view of the world. How one groups the entities of the world into different categories depends on one's objectives.

Dear Dr Callaway

I’m a nominalist. I don’t believe that universals have independent existence in the world. For me, categories are produced by humans for their utility. The opposite view is realism about universals, the most well-known example of which is Plato’s forms. Plato asserts that for every category like “cat”, there exists the form or ‘idea’ of “cat”, and the instances of cats that we sense are merely imperfect shadows of the “cat” form. I don’t buy it. The alternative is that there are only particular ‘cats’ in the world, things that are similar enough in some ways that we apply the same label to them.

With the exception of things that are qualitatively identical (e.g., two electrons with the same spin), putting things into categories involves abstraction: choosing certain properties and ignoring others. This process only occurs in minds; the properties selected to define a category are those thought to be of more value for some objective. One can categorize the same group of things in many different ways (size, weight, density, transparency, specific heat, etc etc etc), none of which is more objectively correct than the other. It’s only when some purpose or goal is applied that the method of categorization can be evaluated as good or bad.

I think you make my point where you write “the phenomena of the distinct sciences cohere together in classifications and explanatory systems”. The phrase “cohere together in classifications” begs the question . . . in what way do the phenomena cohere? Is there a Platonic form for each category? The example you give for scientific categorization is “explanatory systems”. I absolutely agree. We scientifically group things together because of the utility that explanation has for prediction, and that prediction has in turn for reaching our subjective goals as living creatures. This is not in contradiction with the fact that there are regularities that inhere in nature itself. It’s a matter of which regularities we choose when characterizing two things as being of the same or different type.

My monism is arbitrary in the same way. I would not characterize a world that contained only water and carbon as dualistic, even though those things are very different ontologically. I put them in the same basic ontological category because the properties of both carbon and water are scientifically explainable. Adding bees to this fictional world would still not make it dualist for me, even though living things like bees differ greatly in their ontology from water and carbon. I draw the line at a ‘super-natural’ thing which, were it to exist, could not be accounted for scientifically. Accordingly, my monism is similar to that of Heraclitus; I think that underlying all the differences and changes we see in things there is a ‘logos’, an order within the changes. I believe that everything in the world is in the ‘same’ ontological category, in that it obeys the logos.

best, David

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

It seems you have missed the point regarding the pluralism of the sciences, the need to identify and characterize what is to count to the phenomena of consciousness (in order to relate it to physical phenomena), the partial autonomy of psychology, with its distinctive vocabulary, in relation to other sciences, regarding pluralism's rejection of dualism and dogmatic monism--and also regarding the significance of functional descriptions?

Physics is one thing. You find it in physics text books and published papers. Physicalism is something else again--a philosophical (metaphysical?) doctrine of monism. But as we have seen, physics (the science) is consistent with the pluralism of the sciences. There is much that physics, in fact, does not explain.

Obviously, you can fill up many pages with the appearance of replies, but you seem to consistently miss the points at issue.

Captured in the quick (philosophical) fix of reductive materialism?

Unfortunately, it can be a very rigid, blinding position.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Longinotti & readers,

Good that you clearly see the pronounced nominalism of your philosophical view--to which I regularly oppose a moderate realism. On my view nominalism tends to war with the concept of cognitive salience and the empirical-theoretical basis of classifications and explanatory unification of phenomena.

It often leads to tragedy when rigid philosophical positions are read into science--which must go step by step.

You might like to have a look at the following paper:

Article Semantic Contextualism and Scientific Pluralism

More later.

Many thanks for your reply.

H.G. Callaway

Stanley calls attention to the automatic response of organisms, not involving brain or mind. ie reflexes say.

I guess we have to exclude these in consciousness, so activity is not the same as consciousnness.

I think there is bit ofconfusion about some issues here: brain is individual each animal has its own, minds are different, minds are emergent property of individual brains, interacting. Language and culture are two words that describe colletive minds. Also the same brain will ontologically express different minds, (there is the implicit assumption that the brain retains all of them during life). Of course the first mind is bound to family or caretakers. the first language the one with more emocional content.

In this sense perception is the mind making sense of sensory input, reflexes responses not ususally conscious, for example all the input from the gut, kidneys, lungs, heart, skin somehow give a sense of right (well being) or wrong (something is wrong). When that sense is strong pain arises.

In my view the physical chemical substract of all these prceptual experiences and responses are the same: resonances of interfacial water at different places.

PANEXPERIENTIAL MATERIALISM

Some important roots of panexperiential materialist theory first appeared (1997) in a paper by David Ray Griffin, Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):248-68 (see link below):

" Abstract

The intractable mind-body problem, which involves accounting for freedom as well as conscious experience, is created by the assumption that the brain is comprised of insentient things. Chalmers is right, accordingly, to suggest that we take experience as fundamental. Given this starting-point, the hard problem is twofold: to see sufficient reason to adopt this long-despised approach, and to develop a plausible theory based on it. We have several reasons, I suggest, to reject the notion of ‘vacuous actuality’ and to adopt, instead, the view that all true individuals have experience and spontaneity. After suggesting criteria for an acceptable theory, chief among which are ‘hard-core common-sense notions’, I point out why dualism and materialism have been unable to fulfil these criteria. The strength of dualism has been its organizational duality, the strength of materialism its rejection of ontological dualism.

I suggest that panexperientialist physicalism, by allowing for ‘compound individuals’ and thereby a ‘nondualistic interactionism’ that combines these strengths, can provide a theory that overcomes the problems of materialist physicalism."

source: https://philpapers.org/rec/GRIPPA

Bob,

Thanks for the next joke!

“…I point out why dualism and materialism have been unable to fulfil these criteria. The strength of dualism has been its organizational duality, the strength of materialism its rejection of ontological dualism.

I suggest that panexperientialist physicalism, by allowing for ‘compound individuals’ and thereby a ‘nondualistic interactionism’ that combines these strengths, can provide a theory that overcomes the problems of materialist physicalism...”

It seems the abstracted paper relates to some physicalism, i.e. methodology that is based on physics?

Then it seems as worthwhile to note, that in physics there aren’t “panexperiential materialist”, “ontological and simply dualism”, “materialism”, “dualistic and nondualistic interactionism”, etc.; physics operates with physical laws/links/constants that govern by particles, bodies, energies, momentums, fundamental Nature forces, usual and quantum probabilities, etc…; and there aren’t “physicalisms”, including “materialist” and “panexperientialist” ones also....

Cheers

Well Poznanski,

You joined the dance, face it. I do not know about Vitello´s ideas, I got to my own conclusions based on my own experiments and many experiments from other people. For me, the simplicity of it is the beauty of it. I do not have to hide behind jargon to exclude people from understanding what I mean.

I also say that it can be demonstrated or invalidated with feasible experiments. Very empirical science.

Follow

Larry:

“…Sergey: Please clarify. What did you mean when you said in the above post to Bob, "thanks for the joke"... Could you please be more specific. …..”

-?

The SS post above is quite clear: in any/every indeed science any/every indeed scientist makes any/every research principally outside some “….isms”.

including taking no attention to any mainstream philosophical "....ism" - because of in the mainstream philosophy any/every “…..ism” is only some mental construction/doctrine, which is principally based only on non-provable/non-disprovable/non-testable basic postulates; the reason of such situation is quite evident for any/every indeed scientist: in the mainstream philosophy the utmost fundamental basic phenomena/notions “Matter” and “Consciousness” are principally transcendent/uncertain/irrational.

And it is evident that basing on anything irrational it is principally impossible to derive something rational. When the main aim of any/every indeed science is constructing of the theories that are adequate to the objective reality, what is possible only if the theories/models, etc. are, first of all, rational.

That is, again, evident for any/every indeed scientist, and for such scientists it seems even ridiculous when somebody “solves”, in this case the problem of, again, fundamentally transcendent in the mainstream philosophy, “consciousness problem”, in framework of this philosophy, by inventing next and next meaningless “……isms”.

Besides, even some “…isms” appear in some science outside the mainstream philosophy, that is fundamentally wrong also: again, any “….ism” restricts possible solutions by some its postulates, when science is an indeed science only, again, if any/every studied problem is considered/solving maximally objectively. The well known example in physics is “relativism”, when till now the evidently non-adequate to the objective reality SR/GR are standard theories; and, for example, numerous physicists soon 100 years already attempt to solve principally non-solvable problem of uniting of the GR and the quantum mechanics; when they could make much more useful work, developing of the indeed scientific theory of the indeed fundamental Nature force “Gravity”.

Etc., again, the utmost fundamental phenomena/notions above, which are Meta-notions in physics and the Life-sciences, are properly defined only in the Shevchenko-Tokarevsky’s “The Information as Absolute” conception; including this thread’s problem is considered in detail enough in https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329539892_The_Information_as_Absolute_conception_the_consciousness DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26091.18720, which is based on this conception.

And any indeed rational discussions that relate to this problem are possible only in framework of this conception…

Cheers

Schevshenko,

You put down your gospel; now can you explain in few words the essence of it, for us ignoramus?