It must be systematic, rational and based on observation with reasonable ideas and thoughts.

The most important criteria for science is a correspondence model of truth - a statement is true or false if it matches reality or not. So the minimum criteria for a scientific theory would be clear operational definitions (i.e., w/ precision & accuracy, reliability & validity) and falsifiability (i.e., it's possible, at least in principle, evidence could be found demonstrating the theory is wrong). Beyond the minimum, a good scientific theory has parsimony - explaining the largest possible range of phenomena from the fewest and most simple constructs. An ideal scientific theory is built upon a body of evidence, weaving it together with coherence, and suggesting novel avenues for future research (whose new evidence either continues to fit the theory, or helps refine or replace it). Not sure if this is what you had in mind, Orlando. I'm distilling an answer from decades of early to mid 20th century Philosophy of Science. I recommend the Philosopher of Science Bertrand Russell, a prolific author who wrote clearly about math and science. Best wishes, Kevin

Following on from Kevin, but in a more pragmatic manner, a core charateristic of a scientific theory is that it is testable. The parameters of testing will be variable - but consistent.

Dear Kevin Grobman,

You get quite week what I have in mind with my question and make very good points regarding the criteria of a scientific theory, which I much appreciated. Per my understanding, a scientific theory should also have an explanatory power and a predictive power. If the former lacks, then the focal theory risks describing phenomena, but not explaining their occurrence. If the latter lacks, the focal theory would be, say, a set of guesses, however educated they might be, but no theory in the end. I also recommend other philosophers of science, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, for example. I have more to elaborate on the criteria of a scientific theory. I will do in subsequent posts, may be after getting other answers to my question.

Dear Dean Whitehead,

Thanks for participating effectively in this thread. You are completely right when you state that a core characteristic of a scientific theory is that it is testable. I see this characteristic as the most important criterion of a scientific theory. As a matter of fact, if a scientific theory could not be tested and falsified it would be like a dogma ann no scientific theory in the end. There are other criteria for a theory to be scientific, as you can see in Kevin Grobman's post and my reaction to

it.

More on the criteria of a scientific theory,

Dear Kevin Grobman & Dean Whitehead

As I see it, most theorists and scientists would agree on the following six criteria for a set of propositions, hypotheses or theses may constitute a (good) scientific theory, be it in the social sciences, or the natural sciences

First of all, a scientific theory has to make falsifiable and testable predictions with consistent accuracy across a broad area of scientific inquiry, such as mechanics, for example. If a proposition, thesis, hypothesis, or theory is not subject to falsification it is a metaphysical statement, not a testable scientific affirmation and theory. A theory composed of untestable propositions is a dogma, not a scientific theory. If, for example, we say that tomorrow it can rain, we are setting out a metaphysical statement, not a scientific hypothesis. If we say that, we are right either it rains or it does not rain tomorrow. Unfortunately, the field of developmental psychology, which is my field of expertise, let alone psychology in general, is full of examples of untestable hypotheses. I know of a student who wanted to run an experiment to show that Piaget’s formal operational thinking appears only after Piaget’s concrete operational thinking. If formal operations are operations upon concrete operations, then it is true by definition then the former has to appear only after the latter. It would then be a pure waste of time to run such an experimental because the hypothesis at hand could not be falsified. In a nutshell, that student did not have in mind that while performing a scientific research we have to be first, say,” students of logic” and only after that “students of nature”. As Wittgenstein astutely remarked in his famous Philosophical Investigations, in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion.

Second, a scientific theory has to be well-supported by many independent strands of evidence, rather than a single foundation. This ensures that it is probably a good approximation, if not completely correct. Note that in psychology there are many theories that persist even when negative results are found. This partly explains what Paul Meehl (1978) called the slow progress of soft psychology in his seminal article titled Tabular asterisk and theoretical risks: Sir Ronald, Sir Ronald and the slow progress of soft psychology, published in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. This sad reality was anticipated by Wittgenstein’s astute remark that in psychology – and probably in other sciences – there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion.

Third, a scientific theory should be consistent with pre-existing experimental results and, at least, as accurate in its predictions as are any pre-existing theories. If this is not the case, then it should be replaced by a more progressive research program, if I can borrow from J. Laudan’ idea of progressive research programs. This also means that a theory has to have a predictive and explanatory power. If this were not the case, then it would be, say, a set of (educated) guesses, and no scientific theory at all.

Fourth, A scientific theory has to be subject to minor adaptations to account for new data that do not fit it perfectly as they are discovered, thus increasing its predictive capability over time. This idea reminds us of Laudan’s idea of core assumptions and protective belts. It is the latter, not the former that is subject to minor adaptations. When its core assumptions are falsified, the theory has to be replaced by a more progressive theory, that is, a theory whose predictive and explanatory power is greater than that of the theory at hand.

Fifth, when a theory consists of several propositions – what is generally the case – they should be logically consistent with one another. When this is not the case, the theory lacks coherence, intelligibility, and even elegance. Note that elegance, that is, coherence, logical consistent, intelligibility, and the like, are part and parcel of a scientific theory. It is alleged that Einstein considered elegance a token of a good scientific theory.

Finally, a scientific theory should be parsimonious, among other things, in terms in explanatory steps, proposed entities or propositions, and so forth. See, for this criterion, the concept of Occam's razor, which says that entities in a theory, for example, are not to be unnecessarily multiplied. Since there is no generally accepted objective definition of parsimony, this is not a strict criterion, though some theories (e.g., Freud’s theory) are much less economic and parsimonious than others (e.g., Darwin’s evolution theory).

My impression is the three of us broadly agree about scientific theories, with maybe some quibbles at the margins. We probably need some post-modernists and critical theorists to tell us why we're wrong! :-) It strikes me as too kind to Freud's theory to say it lacks parsimony, when it lacks falsifiability. In defense of our shared field, I'm having trouble seeing how Psychology generally, or Developmental particularly, have many examples of unfalsifiable claims? Let's take your example of Piaget's logical theoretical linking of Concrete and Formal Operational thought (e.g., in Genetic Epistemology). An empirical implication is the stage-like progression where children successfully solve a wide array of concrete operational tasks in relatively quick succession followed by a longer time span before relatively quick success on formal operational tasks. Piaget's theory is clearly falsifiable. Wouldn't it be worthwhile for your student to put it to the test? Actually, I'd probably recommend a replication and extension given how well established these findings are. I do agree we should think through our hypotheses carefully to be aware of what we are defining versus what we are empirically testing. ~ Kevin

Dear Kevin Grobman

Thanks for your effective participation in my thread. As you know, post-modernists are against any grand theory such as is the case of Piaget's theory of cognitive development or Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Per my understanding, Freud's theory lacks both parsimony and falsifiability. As for my student, it would be a waste of time to put to test the Piagetian claim that formal operations only appear after concrete operations. Why is this so? As formal operations are operations upon concrete operations, then, by definition, formal operations cannot ever appear before the emergence of concrete operations. Don't you think so?

My understanding of Piaget is also formal operations are derived from concrete operations, like an axiomatic system unfolds in mathematics. At the same time, I see it as an empirical question whether or not Piaget's model matches the reality of children's development. Piaget and others provide nice operational definitions with tasks, so to say, "concrete operational thought precedes formal operational thought" can be put to the test suggesting only those who successfully complete a conservation task will successfully complete a pendulum task. While not the most substantial study to do today, I don't see anything intrinsically wrong with it. I'd probably nudge the student to not simply replicate, but go beyond. Do children who successfully solve the conservation task at a younger age (relative to peers) also solve the pendulum task at a younger age (relative to peers)? How do individual differences matter for the patterns we observe? How do contextual variables matter for the pattern (e.g., pedagogy)? I might go further and suggest the student help build towards a new developmental theory by, for example, trying to synthesize different models. Siegler used the balance beam formal operations task to construct his over-lapping waves information processing model. Could we bring insights from his model into Piaget's theory? Could we bring insights from Piaget into an information processing model? Robbie Case worked on these questions, but there's likely much more to do. I would say one of the things that makes Piaget's Theory so impressive is how tasks from his framework has been incorporated into other developmental accounts.

I have relatively recently tried to provide a general (overall: for all sciences) definition of science:

The definition of science :

ALL science refers to the ability to replicate KEY OVERT OBSERVABLE circumstances and KEY OVERT OBSERVABLE phenomenon * THAT, obvious to ALL (in a fully agreed-upon way), are necessary for best understanding later replicable overt observable circumstances AND corresponding later proximately-related key overt, observable phenomenon * patterns ( so both "sides of the equation" are taken care of, so to speak ) --BUT, ALSO this may well imply some more-than-believable mechanism(s) for some linkage(s) which would be of some reasonable nature, but that may not be fully or clearly discovered YET (

Dear Kevin Grobman

Piaget's theory has some major aspects that are not sufficiently grounded in overt observables -- IN PARTICULAR, as he himself knew: the basis for the "balance' between stages and what "sparks" going from one to the next. Here is an outline of some specifics:

I have a cogent and extremely helpful theory, where I outline and indicate the nature of and the way to the discovery of the "maturation" involved in (or that IS) Equilibration Type 2 (that is the equilibration (homeostatic balance) between the stages (and thus putting the organism in the position to move on to the higher hierarchical stage)) .  This is the type of equilibration which, even to the end, Piaget could only say was "due to maturation".  I believe I have found the way to discover the main inception or beginnings and proximate causes of these key parts of cognitive stage shifts.  I complete this important part of Piaget's theory with  strict empiricism: All concepts, constructs, models, etc. are clearly grounded/founded/ or begin with concrete observables -- the evidence is directly observable OVERT behavior patterns/patterning  (and, of course, the relevant aspects of situations or circumstances).

BY the end of reading my 900 pages of my writings HERE on RG, and taking my perspective and approach, one can hypothesize THE proximate causes of stage shifts , the basic innately guided PERCEPTUAL SHIFTS which  essentially are the beginning of shifts to more abstract conceptualization and abstract thinking -- and key to all else major in cognition which relates to this.  I posit, but then outline STRICTLY EMPIRICALLY how to discover these BASIC "perceptual shifts" which are "allowed-for" by long-term memory abilities spanning times and spanning spaces MUCH MORE than has heretofore been imagined (in a real and significant sense: we now lack imagination FOR/OF imagination); and, it is just these that are the inceptions or beginnings of abstract thought.

This perspective and my approach also yields is THE END OF A MAJOR NATURE/NURTURE CONFLICTS (as it has been said it must be for many decades).  AND: It shows when/how "top-down" and "bottom-up" ARE THE SAME THINGS at important junctures.

Dear Brad Jesness,

Thank you for your effective participation in my thread. Your clarifications were welcome and much appreciated.

Dear Kevin Grobman,

Thank you again for your effective participation in my thread. In seems that you want to reconcile Piaget's theory with differential psychology. As you know, Piaget was interested in the epistemic subject, not in the psychological subject. Even so, as the time went by, Piaget also admitted interindividual differences. In his essay on necessity (Human Development, 1986), he make it clear that an individual can manifest formal thinking in certain tasks, but not in other ones. This shows that the Neo-Piagetians, like R. Case, G. Halford and so on, do no go much further than Piaget in their claim that there are interindividual differences in people's cognitive

development.

Stay safe and healthy,

Orlando

Dear Orlando M Lourenço

The theory is scientific if:

1- It is characterized by internal cohesion and logical construction.

2- It is able to interpret the phenomenon better than competing theories.

3- It is verifiable or falsifiable.

Scientific history indicates that the importance of these criteria varies from theory to theory. A theory that meets all these criteria at high levels is respected in the literature for longer periods.

Regards

Dear Abdullah Al-Beraidi.

Thank you so much for your effective participation in my thread. I agree with your three points. Even so, I think that they are partly mentioned in my previous posts.

Regards.

Thanks again Dear Orlando M Lourenço .

We can describe a fourth dimension, and it is related to the fact that the theory solves a puzzle, as Thomas Kuhn says. These criteria are mentioned in the literature, as we all know.

In my own opinion, I believe that a theory is scientific if it is ’stubborn‘ , i.e used widely or/and for a lone time in the literature, and persuades a ‘considerable‘ number in the scientific community, even if it does not meet directly any of these previous ‘epistemological’ criteria.

In this case, we can state that there is perhaps something ontological about the theory itself, that we have to look for!

Regards

Sorry: I meant :

used widely or longly

Dear Abdullah Al-Beraidi.

Thanks again for your previous post and your reference to Thomas Kuhn. I am aware of his influence on the fabric of doing science, his ideas about paradigm, and his distinction between normal science and revolutionary science. I follow you when you say that " a theory is scientific if it is ’stubborn‘ , i.e used widely or longly in the literature ... ". Instead of stubborn‘, I would say "conservative", that is, for a theory to be scientific it has to pass, say, the Popperian test of falsification and, as such, to be accepted by the community scientific at large. I understand your reference to ontology. If ontology means the being domain, all theories are theories about something that exists, either in the external domain as is the case of physics or the internal domain, as is the case of psychology. So, we can say that a scientific theory is a set of knowledge (epistemology) about a given reality (ontology).

A scientific theory should meet many criteria, including: - complexity, building on the basis of many categories, laws, dependencies, correlations, etc. related, verified, scientifically tested components, - verifiability in various independent research and scientific centers, - it was created as a result of scientific research using modern research methods, - it may be supplemented and extended as a result of the progress made in the field of scientific research, - increases the scope of scientific knowledge, - explains new elements, categories, components, processes, etc. on specific knowledge topics, - can be helpful in solving specific problems, issues, etc. in a given field, scientific discipline.

Best regards,

Dariusz Prokopowicz

Dear Dariusz Prokopowicz,

Thank you your effective participation in my thread. You make very goods points, even though they are, say, a bit amalgamated. I wonder whether the points you raised are not summarized in one of my previous posts, that which points to five criteria of a scientific theory. I do not think that complexity is a criterion for a good theory. Echoing an by A. Einstein, I think that simplicity (not to confound with simplism) is a good criterion for a scientific theory.

Be that as it may, your points were welcomed and much appreciated.

Best regards,

Orlando Lourenço

Dear Orlando M Lourenço Dariusz Prokopowicz

When we say "scientific theory", is the semantic weight (i.e. essential meaning) on the side of "theory" or is it on the side of "science"?

I think searching for an answer to this question may give us a deeper perspective.

Regards

Dear Abdullah Al-Beraidi.

Thanks for your participation in this thread. Regarding your question, what I had in mind is your second alternative. So, when I say "scientific theory" I mean on the side of science.

I truly apologize If I am misinterpreted you post.

Regards

Solid scientific background and knowledge base with reasonable rationale.

Dear Abdullah Al-Beraidi.

What you say sounds good to me. Thanks for your new contribution. Simplicity, not to confound with simplism, is an an important criterion of a scientific theory. A. Einstein emphasized this characteristic in a scientific theory.

Kind regards.

Orlando

It must be systematic, rational and based on observation with reasonable ideas and thoughts.

Dear Zahid Fazal ,

Thanks for your effective contribution to this thread. What you say --- It must be systematic, rational and based on observation with reasonable ideas and thoughts.-- sounds good to me. What you say reminds me of the Kantian idea that empirical intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts with intuitions are empty. So, a theory is a set of facts seen at the light of our conceptual lenses.

Common features of a scientific theory are:

1) objective character (theory is a description of a certain reality, object);

2) systematicity (theory is a system of knowledge);

3) logical or rational justification. The statements and conclusions of the theory are (logically) rationally substantiated statements, i.e. the corresponding laws of logic. The laws of logic are the objective laws of mental activity;

4) the objectivity of the description of the subject. This means that in a scientific theory, the subject must be presented in its objectivity, i.e. as it is in itself, regardless of our subjective attitude towards it. It is achieved through the use of scientific methods and corresponding concepts, adequate to the subject.

Any theory is based on an "elementary particle" - a concept.

Concepts:

1) empirical and theoretical;

2) initial and derivatives (from initial);

3) philosophical, general scientific and subject (specific science).

Assessing the truth of a theory is one of the key questions of cognition.

The history of the development of science testifies to the fact that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scientists and philosophers stubbornly sought to find a certain universal criterion for scientific character. As you know, positivism, which considered facts to be its main support, recognized verification as the main criterion of scientificity - verification, empirical confirmation of the theoretical positions of science. The post-positivism that replaced it revealed disagreements on this issue. K. Popper considered the main method of evaluating the scientific character of a theory to be the possibility of its refutation - falsification - a procedure that establishes the falsehood of a theory or hypothesis as a result of empirical verification. I. Lakatos, not agreeing with the criteria of verification and falsification, proposed a research program as a model for the development of science with a rigid core surrounded by a belt of hypotheses. T. Kuhn defined the prevailing paradigm as the criterion of scientific character - the acceptance of the theory by the scientific community, and M. Polanyi assigned an important role to personal knowledge. P. Feyerabend, believing that science does not stand out from other methods of cognition, completely bypassed the question of the criteria of scientific character.

Gnoseological analysis clearly demonstrates that only empirical laws and empirical theories can be confirmed and refuted, since they can be easily compared with facts. As for purely theoretical studies, they cannot be refuted by empirical data, since they are not subject to verification in principle. Theory is not built by inductive generalization of experience. Theories of this kind include Darwin's theory, Oparin's theory, V.I. Vernadsky's theory, the Big Bang theory, as well as numerous theories of anthroposociogenesis.

Thus, if the theory is based on empirical research (Mendel's laws), it is not difficult to confirm or refute them. If a theory or law is formulated on the basis of idealized objects (Hardy-Weinberg's law), they cannot be confirmed or refuted. No matter how much we analyze this law in the language of mathematics, in reality we will not get an idealized object - an unlimitedly large population with free interbreeding of individuals.

Regards, Pushkin Sergey Viktorovich

Dear Pushkin Sergey Viktorovich

Thanks you for your effective contribution to this thread. You make very good points, namely when you summarize the key issues of the main epistemologists in the recent history of science, such as K. Popper, I. Lakatos, T. Kuhn. M. Polanyi.

Your elaborations on the topic at issue could be an excellent lecture for graduate students. When I speak to undergraduate students about a scientific theory, I use to say that a scientific theory is a set of conjectures that has been corroborated by data and findings. I say corroborated, not verified, because I am in favor of the Popperian principle of falsification, but non in avor of the principle of verificationism espoused by logical positivists.

Dear Orlando M Lourenço

Thanks for your comment. I agree with you. That's a good question. I think if colleagues from different fields of scientific research spoke on it: sociology, natural sciences, philosophers, etc. This would be a very productive discussion.

Regards, Pushkin Sergey Viktorovich

Dear Pushkin Sergey Viktorovich.

Good to hear from you that you agree with my previous post. When I say that a scientific theory is a set of assumptions, propositions or conjectures that were corroborated by findings, data or results I was thinking mainly of the natural sciences such as physics, biology, and of some of social sciences such as experimental psychology. Formal sciences, such as logic and mathematics, are axiomatic and formal sciences and hence here we have not facts. I hope that scientists of other domain participate in this discussion. After D. Hume's attack on the idea of causality, it is difficult to espouse the principle of verificationism advocated by logical positivists. I am a supporter of the Popperian principle of falsifiability. I have got the impression than many scientists and researchers confound the two principles.They say that their hypotheses were verified, even though no hypothesis is ever verified. It only passed the Popperian test of falsification-

Let's wait for other posters' reaction to the initial question. In the meanwhile I had much appreciated your points in this discussion.

Kind regards,

Orlando M. Lourenço

I want to thank all who have participated effectively and cogently in this thread.

I wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.

I am not sure if I have clear idea about the question. But when I think of fourmulating a scientific theory its first charecterin my mind is in its capabilty of discovering some thing new. In order to obtain that charecter the theory has to based on systematic analysis of previous findings and a strong logic that points out the missing link and shows prospect to novel finding or atleast threading some of the missing link.

Dear Chowdhury/Chaudhury Meshkat Ahmed.

With all respect, the initial question is quite clear, to mention the criteria for a theory to be considered as scientific because not all theories are necessarily scientific. I think I understand what you mean while saying that the first characteristic (it is people, not theories, who have character) of a scientific theory is its capabilty of discovering some thing new. I wonder whether what you wanted to say is that a scientific theory results from a discovery of new things, I follow you when you say that "the theory has to (be) based on systematic analysis of previous findings and a strong logic that points out the missing link and shows prospect to novel finding or at least threading some of the missing link"

Thanks for your effective participation in this thread.

Dear Orlando, thanks for the words ' theory to be considered as scientific' which make me understand that I actually could understand your question. Thanks for taking care of other corrections.