I am now going to go "out on a limb" and maximize my chances of looking stupid (if just because of omissions or editorial errors): (these standards are not meant to be unrealistic):
Overview: If you cannot unambiguously show key, directly observable proximate causes indicating the clear (and, as far as you know certain) relevance of concepts in your theory _AND_ also show the present setting clearly addressed by your theory, _AND_ show the specific results predicted HERE by your theory: then the theory should be abandoned.
To try to be a bit more specific: (also, you will note that different statements below address different portions of ALL that must be present):
In the brief overview summary above, there are issues of proximate [(real, direct, observable)] causes, ALWAYS ONE OF WHICH AT ANY POINT IS REQUIRED: one or more specific (and specified) thing(s) causal of/for another _OR_ mechanisms possible AND seemingly objectively explainable from previous clear* direct observations and/or present observations _*AND*_ (in either case) presently associated with some key 'triggering' observable(s); _OR_, minimally, one or more specific, clear* thing(s) at least invariably associated with another *_AND_* THIS minimum WITH with clear empirical (testable) hypotheses for discovering more about ALL of these external and internal factors cited as involved -- with the clear goal of yielding a good theory (as described above and below). (Having predicted effects is addressed in the statements below.)[ * FOOTNOTE: 'clear' means proven, as always understood in the same way, as can be shown with excellent inter-rater reliabilities. ]
If it is because the theory cannot, in ANY given context where it is necessarily relevant, show the hypothesized specific, directly-observable predictions, then it is wrong (bad theory). And/OR, if clear specific behavior(s) or pattern(s) of directly observable behavior which are necessarily in-line with the conceptualizations of the theory OR if the theory's specified consequences supposed to be present cannot be directly shown, both as when (in the flow of behavior) and as where (given specific, and specified, environmental features) they are supposed to occur, then the theory is wrong. If the actual (demonstrable and observably-proven) processes involved in building-up the conceptualizations in the theory (i.e. the how of the coming-to-be of the theory) cannot be indicated (at least that which is necessary SHOWN during closely related observable development specified) the theory is wrong. If related processes triggering the functioning of the related products of the theory cannot be shown in directly observable behavior (were/when) predicted and having the predicted effects, then the theory is wrong.
ANY ONE of these is/are enough to be fatal flaw(s) of a theory and indicate bad theory.
Obviously, if because of how it is built-up and/or because otherwise there is nothing without ambiguity, it is obviously built up wrong and it is wrong (bad theory). Very bad. (This kind of case is only particularly noted only because it does not infrequently occur -- it clearly includes more than one of the fatal flaws.)
One of the motivations (and first "hopes") I have had is to be able to locate where everyone is in psychological conceptual space -- I think you'll know what I mean. (We all no doubt work hard and strive to do this on our own. ) More clarity, needless to say, would likely be immensely helpful. It would also be nice to be able to gauge how "far along" different theories are, and know exactly what they are about, and judge their quality (and not just be forced to conclude and accept that others simply have untenable positions, though some may). Standards, such as I try to cite, would show if we can "live together" in psychological conceptual space. I think we should be able to (if we "shed" needless assumptions/conclusions and are more explicit about our procedures and assumptions/conclusions and where they "came from", doing so in an unambiguous manner).
I wrote this essay on theory very quickly, perhaps just barely (if) adequately inspired and barely (if) adequately mindful (I can tell you that it doesn't make me happy, but I don't know why). And I did not write it when I was at my best, but (as old as I am) cannot seem to do better today (though with any kind of prodding or inspiration, I may be able to do better -- or we can do better). By all means, if you can do altogether better or if you can offer any improvements, please do so. After all, this is supposed to be a Question. Re-write/add/replace all you don't like; this would not offend me (after all, my copy will still be there). It seems certain that some things still need to be expanded on, I think mainly for clarity and not so much for inclusiveness.
One of the points I was trying to make was that we even have to show the objective observable procedures in the composing of a theory, per se. In General (personality/developmental) Psychology, we are floating in the same "sea" as our subjects and others and all must be able to see where we are; all possible actual information relating to that must be shared; if the best you can do is the crude clearer "statement of assumptions", we'll have to settle for that -- but I, for one, want more.
To me, without strict standards and cautions and clear* and reported observations, we are just in large part playing around with philosophy (much like the many poorer philosophers do). And, though we can be guided by some philosophy, we are supposed to be better than that and clearly offer more, including clear findings that can be built upon. (We have the advantage of actual subjects we work with, that's why -- so no offense to those few philosophers I happen to like.)
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