A more neuroscientifically appropriate speculation would be to have the same neurons mediate both processes, with the more active neurons participating in the stream of consciousness (Tehovnik 2017). By surpassing the threshold of consciousness, which can be defined as the magnitude of aggregate neocortical activity (Graziano et al. 2016), one is made aware of all the details of task execution, which accompanies the learning of all new tasks (Hebb 1949, 1968). Indeed, hyperactive neocortical activity induced by extreme tinnitus can hijack consciousness by disrupting both wakefulness as well as sleep (Axelsson and Sandh 1985; Han et al. 2009; also see Tehovnik 2017). Furthermore, Parkinson’s patients, who characteristically have reduced levels of striatal and neocortical dopamine (which induces slow-wave sleep, Sacks 2012), are known to be frozen or locked into movement/thinking loops for extended periods of time (Sacks 1976, 2012). Since these frozen states and loops can be recalled declaratively following L-DOPA administration, which potentiates neocortical activity [Sacks 2012; perhaps by titrating neocortical GABA thereby enhancing network connectivity, Lew and Tseng 2014.], this reflects consciousness rather than unconsciousness. Finally, during automated states—when conscious participation is reduced—the amount of neocortical tissue dedicated to a response is also reduced (Chen and Wise 1995ab; Hikosaka et al. 2002; Lehericy et al. 2005; Ojemann 1983), such that the mere glance of a keypad, which would activate the visual cortex (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015), is sufficient to summon the correct code by executing, unconsciously, the precise sequence of finger movements. This could be done efficiently by bypassing the association cortices to make the response reflex-like, much like an overlearned classical conditioning response, which depends on an intact cerebellum, but not the neocortex if the sensory conditions are simple enough (Tehovnik, Hasanbegović, Chen 2024).