Classical foundationalism, Reidian/Plantingian foundationalism, or something else? Why?
I subscribe to a version of classical foundationalism, more specifically, of Aristotelian foundationalism. For more detail, see the post, "Aquinas on the First Principles 1," on After Aristotle (https://afteraristotle.net/2017/08/07/aquinas-on-the-first-principles-1/).
I am partial to Susan Haack's so-called foundherentism, which combines elements of both foundationalism and coherentism in that it allows for experientially justified empirical beliefs without requiring privileged basic beliefs, and allows for widespread mutual dependence among beliefs without resulting in circularity. Her crossword puzzle analogy suggests how there might be such noncircular mutual support among beliefs.
Kirk, is your question about the structure of epistemic justification for each individual belief? Or is it about something broader than that, e.g. about how sets of one's beliefs may or may not be related to each other?
It seems to me that most epistemologists have abandoned talking about the foundationalist/coherentist distinction... At one level, the distinction is uninteresting insofar as coherentists and foundationalists both prioritize certain 'core' beliefs as rational yet (largely) immune to displacement or revocability on the basis of new evidence. E.g. Nancey Murphy's view in *Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning* arguably adopts coherentism inspired by a Lakatosian philosophy of science; yet it's somewhat hard to see how this differs, in ways that matter, from (early) Plantinga's view that propositions about God may be rational while being part of one's epistemic 'foundation'.
A view which I'm somewhat partial to, that is like foundationalism but strictly not foundationalist, is developed in Keith DeRose's "Direct Warrant Realism," in *God and the Ethics of Belief* (ed. Dole and Chignell, Cambridge UP, 2005).
Thanks for your answer, Matthew! My question is primarily about the structure of epistemic justification as it pertains to each individual belief.
To give one an idea of how little foundationalism etc. figure in recent, cutting edge work in epistemology of religion, see this volume, set to come out early next year:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301551584_Knowledge_Belief_and_God_New_Insights_in_Religious_Epistemology_OUP
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-belief-and-god-9780198798705?cc=gb&lang=en&#
Book Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Episte...
hi?
It seems to me that most epistemologists have abandoned talking about the foundationalist/coherentist distinction... At one level, the distinction is uninteresting insofar as coherentists and foundationalists both prioritize certain 'core' beliefs as rational yet (largely) immune to displacement or revocability on the basis of new evidence. E.g. Nancey Murphy's view in *Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning* arguably adopts coherentism inspired by a Lakatosian philosophy of science; yet it's somewhat hard to see how this differs, in ways that matter, from (early) Plantinga's view that propositions about God may be rational while being part of one's epistemic 'foundation'.
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