It is well established through animal research that mammals (and other vertebrates) exhibit both short- and long-term memory. It takes about one month of training to finalize the change from short-term memory to long-term (declarative) memory via hippocampal pathways such that the final storage location within neocortex depends on the content of the memory (Burgess 2014; Corkin 2002; Knecht 2004; Marr 1971; Morrison and Hof 1997; Munoz-Lopez et al. 2010; Pavlides and Winson 1989; Roux et al. 2021; Scoville and Milner 1957; Squire et al. 2001; Wilson and McNaughton 1994; Xu et al. 2016). In humans, color memory and its contents linked to objects are stored in V4 and various modules throughout the temporal cortex (Namima et al. 2014; Schiller and Tehovnik 2015; Tehovnik, Patel, Tolias et al. 2021; see Footnote 1). The same is true of objects suspended in depth, e.g., faces are stored within several modules spanning from the temporal cortex to the orbital cortex (Brecht and Freiwald 2012; Bruce et al. 1981; Freiwald and Tsao 2010; Romanski 2012; Schwarzlose et al. 2005; Schwiedrzik et al. 2015). In the case of language, storage is distributed between Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas plus sensory motor areas that permit speaking, writing, and reading; different languages are concatenated by distinct ‘memory’ networks, but there is cross-talk between them all of which are connected in parallel with subcortical neurons involved in response execution (Kimura 1993; Penfield and Roberts 1967; Ojemann 1991).
So, what distinguishes short-term memory intelligence from long-term memory intelligence? Someone with short-term intelligence would exhibit the following characteristics (let’s remove ‘memory’ from the descriptor since without memory there cannot be intelligence, e.g., patient HM, Corkin 2002): if a speaker delivers a 50 minute lecture someone with short-term intelligence (but not long-term intelligence) would be able to, for example, identify a discrepancy between the first slide (or comment) of a talk and a subsequent slide (or comment) of a talk. Such individuals can greatly irritate speakers, thereby suggesting to the audience that they are very intelligent. On the other hand, someone with long-term intelligence would be able to spot a discrepancy between a slide (or comment) of a lecture and a figure published by a speaker months (or years) before the lecture. This type of intelligence requires that a person reads lots of scientific literature and puts the contents into long-term storage. This individual is more lethal than someone with only short-term intelligence since such a person (if intelligent and driven by purpose) can trigger a paradigm shift in science in the way Albert Einstein did in the field of physics (but such persons must be able to discriminate between facts and non-verified notions). Of course, if someone is blessed with both short-term and long-term intelligence (and highly motivated), they will eventually turn the world upside down with their creativity or destruction. In closing one might ask ‘what type of intelligence does Donald Trump possess?’ since it is clear that his command of the electorate has created a paradigm shift in current US politics.
Footnote 1: There is no ‘what’ and ‘where’ separation for color which is typically associated with the ‘what’ channel, for lesions confined to the ‘what’ channel by V4 damage does not abolish color vision (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015), since color is a highly distributed function in neocortex (Namima et al. 2014). In fact, the what-where hypothesis as formulated by Mishkin and later by Goodale (Goodale and Milner 1992; Mishkin et al. 1983) is intellectually bankrupt and does not hold up to empirical scrutiny (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015; Tehovnik, Patel, Tolias et al. 2021), even though it has been imported into mouse neocortex as a heuristic by investigators who do not read the literature. In short, the hypothesis fails for color, depth, and object perception but is sufficient for motion perception given the necessary role of the medial temporal cortex (MT) in motion perception (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015).