I have a few questions and I am interested in your thoughts on the subject.
To what extent can the phenomena of consciousness be effectively modeled within the constraints imposed by limitative theorems? Can we devise a computational framework that adequately captures the nuances of conscious experience, or do these theorems suggest an intrinsic limitation to such endeavors?
How do limitative theorems affect our understanding of time within formal logical systems, and what consequences does this have for our subjective experience of time? Can formal models of time ever fully align with the phenomenological aspects of temporal perception?
In light of the constraints identified by limitative theorems, how can we refine or develop new meta-theoretical structures that allow for a more nuanced exploration of time and consciousness? Are there specific informal approaches that could complement formal methods in this context?
What are the broader consequences of these theorems for interdisciplinary research into time and consciousness? How can insights from mathematics and computer science inform philosophical and cognitive science inquiries into these topics, and vice versa?
How do limitative theorems inform the debate between physicalism and dualism in the philosophy of mind? Do they suggest that certain aspects of consciousness are inherently non-computable or beyond the reach of formal systems?
António José Rodrigues Rebelo
I agree with you. My concern, however, is that this new metatheoretical framework does not seem to fit the principle of methodological naturalism, which is a problem for the philosophy of science. And it is a problem that may be relatively difficult to circumvent, but at the same time necessary for the development of science, but it is nevertheless a sensitive issue, because this type of metatheoretical framework could provide fodder for all sorts of sects and religious movements that would try to use it as proof of the truth of the claims they make.I also support your statement about the need for cooperation between the various sciences. I believe that the new metatheoretical framework should be a kind of methodological synthesis. This is a relatively obvious conclusion when we look at the modeling in the various scientific disciplines and the differences between the models and their methodological foundations.
Cosmin Visan
Thank you and I will familiarize myself more deeply. I admit that initially the work appears to me as interesting and inspiring. I also wonder what would happen if some aspects of multiplicity theory were replaced by category theory. I see some structural advantages in this theory over multiplicity theory.- Badges
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