Exactly, Mauro - as described by James Wretch in 'Voices of the Mind' or 'Mind as Action' or Max Bazerman's idea of 'predictable surprise' or the thought process described by Robert Burton in his book 'On Being Certain'... The classical idea or notion of rational decision making is not really what happens happen anyway.

Evolutionary theory blends harmoniously with the divine tenets. Creator laid the foundation for all that exists. Evolution multiplies the created form.

It is probable that animals, occupied in every instant of their life with facing the challenges posed by the environment, do not ask themselves if their choices are right or wrong. They just take action. It is the task of nature to “promote” their actions on the basis of their adaptive success. In other words, the choices are “right” if the organism survives, develops, and reproduces with success. Animals, however, live in a real world that requires rapid choices, in which often the rapidity of the decision is an advantage with respect to a choice that would perhaps be better, but that often ends up remaining only hypothetical. In a different way, our behavior manifests itself as a result of the critical and self-critical functions of the mind (an “organ” with computational capacities and a finite memory) that evolution has made available to us. Beyond the possible errors in functioning, the mind is able to retain in its long-term memory, and especially in its short- term memory, only a limited quantity of information. Moreover, its capacity to process this information requires time and is effective only up to a certain level of complexity. The external environment also imposes severe restrictions, especially of a temporal nature: decisions must be made before those of potential competitors. This implies a limitation in the search for cues from the environment that can help us to resolve our problems.

Thanks, Vladimir e Silvia, for yours comments. Sure, Silvia, for the purposes of survival all of these factors are decisive, as are the interpretation of the information and the inferences made. The general economy of the mind avails itself of both slowness as well as rapidity in the carrying out of operations essential to survival, such as measuring quantities, distances, and still more. Without the use of efficient and effective cognitive strategies that allow for the choosing and the simplifying of problems within brief time limits, our processing of information would be (would have been) without success. Such strategies have represented an essential tool for the successful functioning of the cognitive economy of our species. These strategies have, in fact, enabled us to face the limits of our mind (minimizing the work) and to respond to the most pressing internal and external necessities (accumulating rapidly, directly or by inference, the necessary information). Therefore, if it is true that evolutionary pressure urged the human mind to accumulate information by means of a significant quota of rational decisions, the vast majority of human choices have been favored by quick and simple decision strategies. It is probable that these strategies developed starting from those very human cognitive limitations (and from their influence on the knowledge of reality), from human drive, and from environmental pressures. The adaptive value of these strategies was revealed in the use of the potential offered by the environment, the strategies proving not only to be remarkably flexible when facing new situations, but above all ecological for the suitable use of environmental resources.

There is no pre-existing data in the world. The human fate of having abstract thoughts may be the result of evolutionary processes, but without any survival obvious benefit for our species within the current context of the Anthropocene. Rationality is a relative term, scale and context dependent. I'm not sure it is the best unit of analysis for the research you describe. You might consider 'complexity of cognitive tools' as an alternative?

Peter, however rationality is fragile and limited, it has delivered us from terrible diseases, lengthened our lives, made us explore unknown worlds. Of course, we pay very high prices. But can we say that this short time on earth is for us only pain and suffering? I believe that an evolutionary perspective can defend ourselves from the dangers of metaphysics, even when it occurs in the forms of materialism.

Mauro - But so far it has not. Don't confuse rationality with intelligence. Rationality has to do with the degree of rigour used to apply certain principles, however flawed they may be. Economics provides the classic example but the scientific method is also missing any moral compass. Antibiotics may have temporarily lengthened life expectancies by as much as 10 years, but also induced the emergence of superbugs that may eventually shorten life expectancies by more than 10 years. Rational maybe, but intelligent? I think not. Or consider the Earth's capacity to support human life in say 1400 AD compared to today - I'm not talking about technology, but simply ecological carrying capacity or natural capital. The value of the Earth has been greatly diminished, not only in an economic sense but also in a psychological sense and we see rates of mental illness rising accordingly. Rationality is a term that thrown around far too loosely. 

By using intelligence, humans have succeeded to survive  adapting the environment to their needs by manufacturing adequate instruments. This creates an alienation from nature, seeing it through the concepts and the instruments of an industrialized, artificial world. All other surviving species have evolved biologically, by self-adaptation. Thus they are connected directly, without mediation , to reality. A way to overcome human alienation was taught by Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1463) using a method he called          "learned ignorance". This method is similar to the one proposed by Plotinus, known as religio negativa; it allows an intuitive approach to reality..

Harry, totally agree. Just for the debate, I add that one thing is formal logic, another is rationality.

Mauro, please explain.

Harry, it was a clarification to the debate that precedes your intervention 

Mauro, i thought that you were referring to Hegel's Logic. According to Hegel, . logic begins with the postulate of the simple unity of thought and being - a unity that is initially no more than the indeterminate thought of sheer, immediate being -, an indeterminate thought thinking the immediacy of being.

The late Professor Donald Campbell has written about this topic in his Evolutionary Epistemology papers. As his student at Northwestern in the 1970s I continued his work, albeit with a different focus. I summarized these issues in my book: "Knowledge and knowledge Systems: Learning from the Wonders of the Mind" (IGI 2008).

Elsewhere I have tried to show that since Aristotle, formal logic — that is to say, the study of procedures that allow for the making of inferences and, therefore, the drawing of conclusions from premises — has been considered to be at the basis of both lines of reasoning in everyday life (when they concern the drawing of a conclusion from data, the solving of problems, the making of decisions, the assessment of the coherency of our knowledge or still more), and of the sciences and mathematics where it is taken for granted that a correct argumentation must invariably follow procedures and logical canons. The term rationality has assumed different meanings over the course of time: reason itself, reasonableness, that which has as its object the form and procedures of reason, and coherence with a system of values and of adopted objectives. For the theorists of decision making rationality pertains to the choice of the most suitable means and conduct in order to pursue the goals that one proposes to reach. Criteria of rationality are, in fact, coherence between thought and action and between means and end; transitivity that allows for the passing from a plan to its execution through the pathway of preferences judged in order of their functionality (in such a way that if A is more functional than B, and B than C, then A is preferred to C) and optimization, which allows for the reaching of a goal with the least use possible of means. This, naturally, requires both the most ample information possible on the feasible alternatives, and a certain level of creativity, especially when there is a significant imbalance between the possibilities of information and of processing and the complexity of the situation in which one finds oneself. The development of a strict theory of utility, in the choices made in conditions of risk or uncertainty, is owing to, as is known, the pioneering work of the mathematician von Neumann and of the economist Morgenstern. In the Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (1944) — an essay that marked the intellectual development of generations of economists and others — these authors demonstrated the existence of a function of utility able to provide a prescriptive perspective for the analysis of risky behavior, describing in addition a decision-making path that follows a clear table of preferences in which the best choice is that which always maximizes the expected utility.

Such a model presents four main characteristics: a cardinal utility function; a complete group of alternative strategies; a distribution of probabilities of future scenarios linked to each alternative; a policy of the maximization of expected utility. According to the normative model, a decision is rational when it is stamped by formal criteria and by coherence expressed through a strict sequence of axiomatic demonstrations that represent not just a model, but a true paradigm. It must be said that the tendency of neoclassical economic theory of adopting mechanistic models has not only had the effect of a progressive downgrading of the concepts of choice and of decision making to mere problem solving, but also that of their segregation to a misunderstood methodological value-neutrality, as lacking in explanatory conviction, as it is distant from the real dynamics of human behavior. Describing the decision-making process and human reasoning through the formula of the maximization of expected utility is like describing a complex physical system with a simple formula. The variables in play are so numerous and based on only a few verifiable and measurable dimensions as to render such an attempt completely irrelevant.

It seems to me that the empirical and predictive fragility of normative theories with respect to real decision-making dynamics becomes clearer and clearer in the second half of the 1900s. The matter of “Olympic” rationality, worthy of the Platonic “Sky of Ideas,” according to the ironic words of Simon, enters into an umbra shadow because of substantial difficulties that make its application to everyday decision- making contexts and to real behavior impossible. Although consumer conditioning generates market behavior that is in many cases close to the conventional model, when we ask consumers direct or unusual questions regarding beliefs or values, a strong departure from the conventional versions of the economists can be noted.

it seems important to use two different words to indicate, on the one hand the choices based on simple and quick decisions, on the other those developed with the aid of a slow and weighted rationality. For the latter I'd give the word "decision" that, in common parlance, refers to a range of rational and conscious processes aimed at creating order in the chaos of information. As regards the former, I would give the word "active determinations"; they are aware but not derived from rational processes. For which the word "decision" only has a metaphorical meaning. To studing these "active determinations" we should move on a phenomenological grounds to investigate the costitution of the process in its inseparable totality Individual/Environment

I would agree, Rafaele, except that whatever slow and weighted cognitive process we are talking about is only as good as the cultural tools / mediators available to the decision maker. If 'invisible hand' or 'an eye for eye' is internalized, shit will happen.

Perhaps we could speak of an adaptive decision maker ... Many experimental evidence has shown that, in the act of making a decision, a large number of individuals take what can truly be called “short-cuts” of the mind, easy and fallacious at the same time, but above all ones that cannot be traced to simple equations. In human action, that is to say, the algorithmic inference schemas of deductive theories prove to be ineffective. 

Exactly, Mauro - as described by James Wretch in 'Voices of the Mind' or 'Mind as Action' or Max Bazerman's idea of 'predictable surprise' or the thought process described by Robert Burton in his book 'On Being Certain'... The classical idea or notion of rational decision making is not really what happens happen anyway.

I would add that if the logical deductive thinking produce coherent results (when applied correctly, it is too slow for the cognitive work and for the magnitude of the memory space required. Differently, a heuristic grid that filters decisions spares the subjects from calculations that are too long, which would make human reasoning completely inefficient. This concerns real behavioral stratagems that, compatible with the difficulty of the task, introduce great savings into decision-making processes. However, exactly because of the fact that they shorten and simplify our reasoning processes, they are the cause of (self) deceptions and perceptive biases because they lead our rationality toward gross, systematic, and persistent failures. In this sense, knowing the heuristics and the potential biases in play means understanding the ways in which we respond to environmental issues, in accordance with our cognitive system. There is yet another limit that the decision-making optimization process must face: the fact that it is not able to optimize itself, nor its own procedures. The rules of optimization are not able to explain and justify the search for the information necessary to the making of a decision.

The evolutionary basis of rationality may be a matter of objective anchoring of cognition which may be crucial to avoid irreversible harm. Emotion-based "approach" behavior may be effective in the achievement of positive life-outcomes, but mere emotion-based avoidance reactions may make less for survival. For instance, intense avoidance reactions may interfere with adaptive approach actions (an animal that is hiding all the time in a safe place may die by lack of food). Hence rationality has emerged in that it enables to substitute "accurate control" for mere (emotion-based) avoidance . The broader evolutionary psychological theory relates to the concept of "positive-negative asymmetry" and its  implications regarding normative logical thinking have been established by Maria Lewicka, particularly in the following chapter.

 Lewicka, M. (1988). On subjective and objective anchoring of cognitive acts. How behavioral valence modifies reasoning schemata. In W.J. Baker, et al.  Recent trends in theoretical psychology.Springer-Verlag, 285-301.

Possibly interesting as well:

Lewicka, M., Czapinski, J. & Peeters, G. (1992). Positive-negative asymmetry or 'When the heart needs a reason'. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 425-434.

The author and her publications are available in Researchgate

Guido, I agree with you. I have read some papers of Maria Lewicka. I would add that on a subjective level perceived emotions put us on our guard from the choices that associate themselves with negative sensations and they make us favor those choices that are anchored in positive sensations. In particular, when faced with making decisions or judgments in particularly complex contexts, putting one’s trust in an emotive impression can prove to be much more efficient than evaluating all of the pros and cons, or trying to remember, in their entirety, past analogous experiences. Most of the time, in the decision-making process — especially when dealing with problems that have multiple individual and social implications — we use strategies based on the results of past experiences in which we recognize some analogy with the present situation. The traces (often unconscious) that such experiences have left behind in us recall emotions and positive or negative sentiments whose physiological equivalents are defined by Damasio as somatic markers. In other words, the memory of the past emotion “marks” and, therefore, influences the final decision. This mechanism, which can follow a conscious path just as it can follow an unconscious one, precedes any cost-benefit analysis that, instead, in order to unfurl requires the intervention of other cortical regions and more time.

To simplify: reason has survival value--way above what is possible to animals--it seems this had to be a product of gradual brain development, starting with the most primitive post-chimps and evolving as those with better brains survived better--the intermediate species, of course, died out, presumably because they could not compete-

We should ask ourselves: is rationality a natural attribute of the human race? This is a dilemma which has been passed down through the centuries, and still confronts the scientific community today. Over the last 30 years a systematic analysis of human reasoning has come up with new and surprising answers. The questions traditionally posed by philosophers have given way to experimental investigations which, by analysing concrete cases which can be reproduced and verified, have contributed to clarifying a series of standard phenomena in our mental processes. People have been seen to unconsciously adopt rules that diverge from rationality. Moreover, this is not a reflex, psychological effect but a complex exercise achieved (and maintained) only at a specific psychological cost. The analysis of biases shows how cognitive illusions are indeed mere illusions, and ideal rationality nothing other than an ideal. The faculty of rationality is not innate to our species. Rather, we seem to be innately gifted at identifying certain contradictions, analysing and verifying them, and absorbing or rejecting them. The exercise of rationality obliges us to recognise our limits, to get to know better its haphazard geography, to elaborate new theories concerning the mind, and to improve our judgements.

But how are these natural limits and their function in our cognitive activity to be considered? While there can be no doubt that our knowledge has its biological roots in the brain, it is also certain that we are able to describe ourselves at a number of different levels. The biological and cognitive modalities intersect in the nervous system to produce that most familiar and elusive of all experiences: ourselves. Certainly we cannot go beyond the boundaries of ourselves or our mind. When we are pursuing a perception, an idea or a thought we have the sensation of being, as Francisco Varela put it on one occasion, in an «ever receding fractal». Whichever direction we take we inevitably find ourselves confronted with an enormous quantity of details and inter- relations, with no beginning or end.

Regarding rationality: there is a misunderstanding here. Reason is a human capacity but it is activated (used) by choice--it is not an instinct, not automatic and not guaranteed to be correct--that is why we need the science pf epistemology.

Of greater survival value, I think, is the capacity for social cognition - the capacity and practice of sharing cultural/cognitive tools such as frames, metaphors, paradigms, etc. to create thought communities. Such communities of practice are generally 'rational' from within but can at the same time be incomprehensible and completely irrational from the outside. Rationality always depends on some particular 'rules of the game'. Also, what may seem rational at one scale may in fact be suicidal at a different scale. Social cognition can, in other words, be an advantage or a trap. 

Peter Graham: "Social cognition can be an advantage or a trap". 

Kropotkin (see below) is only aware of the advantage but not of the trap part of social conditioning. The individual struggle for life sublimated into achievement of individual excellence is indispensable for the progress of a society. A true democratic society provides a medium promoting both individual and social integration, 

“In the animal world we have seen that the vast majority of species live in societies, and that they find in association the best arms for the struggle for life: understood, of course, in its wide Darwinian sense – not as a struggle for the sheer means of existence, but as a struggle against all natural conditions unfavorable to the species. The animal species, in which individual struggle has been reduced to its narrowest limits, and the practice of mutual aid has attained the greatest development, are invariably the most numerous, the most prosperous, and the most open to further progress. The mutual protection which is obtained in this case, the possibility of attaining old age and of accumulating experience, the higher intellectual development, and the further growth of sociable habits, secure the maintenance of the species, its extension, and its further progressive evolution. The unsociable species, on the contrary, are doomed to decay”. (from Peter Kropotkin, ”Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution” 1902).

Edwin, we must not confuse logic with rationality. From the seventies onward a large quantity of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the heuristic principles and cognitive strategies that individuals use to deal with risky and uncertain situations. This research has shown how the asymmetries between the models of rational choice and people’s concrete behavior can be explained by rules of rationality and informal choice criteria determined by the interference of cognitive and contextual elements in the assessment of the problem and the available information.

If it is true that rationality is conditioned by severe evolutionary limitations, the difficulty in deciding and facing up to uncertainty is not only linked to the inadequacy of the architecture of our minds but also to an “external” model of uncertainty that does not correspond to the way in which our mind naturally functions. In brief, the difficulty is not “inside” but “outside” our head, that is, in the model of risk that we adopt. New conceptual paradigms and new programs for experimental research are called for in order to redefine the role of external restrictions on human action (concerning resources and available information) and reinstate the importance of the internal restrictions (limitations on calculation ability, on the capacity of memory, and so on). All this should be contemplated in a more general theoretical framework — natural logic — based not on metaphysical assumptions but on the concrete evidence provided by cognitive neurosciences. It is surely not far-fetched to imagine individuals adopting rules of behavior enabling them on one hand to simplify their own decision-making models and on the other to coordinate with other agents so as to reduce the degree of uncertainty that characterizes any complex system. 

Certainty is a subjective feeling. Risk is most often an incidental consequence of the operation of a meaning system.

Dear Harry! Remarkably, You still remember the wonderful idea of Peter Kropotkin on mutual assistance in the process of evolution. Violation of this law is fatal to nature and society.

In a large number of decision-making processes the brain does not use general models — which would be difficult and time-consuming, and not always adaptable to specific decision-making problems — but rather a sort of natural logic of inferential strategies, conscious or subconscious. This system is quite different, as said before, from formal logic, and its “rules”, though certainly fallible and less rigorous, have shown themselves, since the beginning of the species, to be adaptively more effective. Thanks to theoretical studies and to experimental research into the psychology of decision making, the idea that formal tables of inference exist in the mind which are able to lead to valid conclusions regardless of the premises has been proven false. It has in fact been observed that individuals do not rely on innate formal rules of inference, but rather on their ability to understand the premises of a line of reasoning.

Silvia, these conclusions have had very important consequences: on the one hand they have revealed the fallacy of the theory of a perfect rationality, while on the other they have highlighted the role played by factors such as unpredictability and uncertainty in individual economic decisions. Herbert Simon was among the first to confute the theory of normative rationality — according to which the rational decision maker maximizes the expected benefit — pointing out how, in conditions of uncertainty, such rationality is not evident in the actual behaviour of individuals. As a matter of fact, every time unexpected variables intervene between an ideal decision maker and the environment, such a model reveals itself to be inadequate. 

The anti-normative character of Simon’s theory expresses itself in the concept of bounded rationality, according to which the decision maker, because of his/her cognitive limits, adopts simplified models in the solution of problems. It is important to consider, moreover, that distorted representations and perceptions of risk strongly influence the decision-making process. Variables of this type — generated by chaotic and fluctuating conditions — make optimal responses highly improbable. In addition to the objective data at hand — statistical information on adversity, competitors, accidents and so on — subjective and inter-individual factors also impinge on the decision-making timelines; these factors include the willingness to assess and undertake risks, the impact of the environment, the fear of possible future consequences, the courage of the decision maker, and so on. Further, numerous analyses of risk perception have shown that human risk assessment is subjective and complex, very distant from rational calculations. In the majority of cases, in evaluating the risk the decision maker does not have sufficient statistical data or other information available. In some cases, then, the individual calls upon information and knowledge deriving from his/her experience, from casual news, from specialized knowledge, or from prejudices and suppositions. In other cases, the individual relies on deductions based on what he/she perceives at the moment, on the urgency of the situation, on what the individual remembers, or has heard, or has already attempted in situations involving the same sources of risk.

The great differences between models of rational decision making and the concrete behaviour of individuals can be explained by the presence of distorted rules of inference and decision-making criteria, determined by the interference of cognitive elements and of context in the evaluation of the problem and of the available information. It is the undeniable merit of Kahneman and Tversky to have recognized the causes of suboptimal deci- sions, both in the ploys and in the contrivances of thought with which the individual processes information, as well as in the representation of the problem. Their research shows how individuals tend to interpret events not through reasonable, objective, and verified assessments, but according to the experiences they first recall, more structured memories, or fear.

Very interesting, Silvia and Raffaele! It has been noted that the reasoning of ordinary individuals in conditions of uncertainty is similar to reasoning founded on supposed certainties. In reality, when the mind constructs one or more models that define the context or the problem, each possibility represents an equal alternative. Immersed in the formulation of their own mental models, decision makers do not concentrate on the implicit information, but rather on the explicit information of such models. This could explain some of the oversights and distractions that cause accidents which are sometimes serious or deadly. It must also be said, then, that in the decision-making process efforts to bring the problem into focus themselves generate considerable distortions. Individuals, in fact, tend to create alternative models of action or inaction. In order to reach a decision, one focuses one’s attention on the possible outcomes of that particular action, looking for evidence that validates a certain course of action, but avoiding the search for detailed information on the different alternatives. Even in everyday life, in situations in which one must make decisions without significant risks (such as buying one product or another, going to see a certain film or not), and when one is faced with a predominant option and an absence of significant alternatives, there emerges a spontaneous tendency towards focalization on that predominant option: a tendency which contrasts with the ideal of the decision maker, before deciding, rationally examining the alternatives. An appreciation of the tendency to focalization is important in understanding that the human mind operates in a way very different from rigid, rationalist formalisms. A person who ignores the alternatives is unable to consider and compare the advantages and disadvantages of the different choices.

Mauro, in my opinion, there is an additional element to consider. Various studies have shown that excessive trust in one’s own judgements arises from the tendency to look for proof in favour of an initial idea rather than evidence to the contrary. When people are instead forced, before expressing their own judgement, to consider the pros and cons of the decision to be made, this propensity is reduced. Often excessive trust in one’s own judgements betrays the decision maker’s ignorance of information available at the moment of decision making, and of other information necessary to the making of decisions relating to uncertain and risky situations.

Silvia, our reasoning would remain part without considering another source of problems is statistical data, which are generally considered to be objective and a good basis for making economic and other decisions, but which all too often reveal themselves to be fallacious and illusory. Many problems derive from believing statistical data to be a kind of objective photograph of reality which reflects the “plain facts” and excludes any subjective evaluation. In fact, the chosen criteria and perceived probabilities are almost always different from a reality which is many-sided and dynamic, and which cannot be repre- sented well by mathematical systems. As Darrell Huff demonstrated in his classic book How to lie with statistics, not only do statistical data not photo- graph reality, they often deform it. In this sense, common statistical procedures, rather than providing a tool for living with uncertainties, tend to create new “illusions of certainty” or even “false certainties”. In contrast to what is widely believed, numbers hardly ever “speak for themselves”; rather, they almost always support the position of the person presenting the numbers. “Reading” and “interpreting” the data of reality is essential to decision making in many fields of human activity. In medicine, for example, diagnoses and care are very often delivered on the basis of statistical data; and in the legal domain DNA tests and some statistical data are accepted as proof of guilt during trials. In difficult cases such as situations of uncer- tainty, our behaviour — as Gerd Gigerenzer has pointed out — distances itself systematically from the predictions of normative models of decision making. What is more: such behaviour shows an irrational characteristic that — in the presence of information which has not been analyzed critically — can make a bad situation worse, with potentially dramatic consequences, in particular for the work of doctors and lawyers. 

I would add that the calculation of probability makes both the overcoming of the illusion of certainty and the rational acceptance of uncertainty possible. Guiding us in our uncertainty is a logic of the uncertain made up of rules of action and of rational assessment based on the laws of probability. This logic is held to be at the foundation of a probabilistic conception of the mind, of which an essential part is what is known as Bayesian reasoning, in which the probability of a cause must be deduced from an observed effect. This reasoning prompts us to re-examine our beliefs and specifically our attributions of probability. In this way, according to Gigerenzer, we could soon reach a second probabilistic revolution which would convert the image of an omniscient mind into a more plausible one of a limited mind able to generate effective decisions in conditions of uncertainty. In this model we could achieve a more accurate understanding of the data with which we are presented, our environment, and also the limits of our rationality.

Raffaele, despite its undeniable appeal, such a hypothesis presents considerable problems. The primacy assigned by Gigerenzer to uncertainty excludes the theoretical relevance of probability from an account of rational behaviour, and by the same token, the very idea of a logic of uncertainty. He is convinced that the incapability to reason in probabilistic terms results from representations of risk which are difficult to interpret. In other words, individuals commit fewer errors in the evaluation of data when the information is presented to them in familiar and concrete terms, rather than in conditional terms or in terms of probability. It follows that if before learning to reason in a different way was believed to be useful in order to correct specific “irrationalities”, now by relying on quick and frugal heuristics it is possible to reformulate the data according to a different model.

In reality, there is to say that Gigerenzer has described all of the strategies with which each organism is equipped as an adaptive toolbox: a toolbox whose instruments are precisely those various heuristics. In other words, the toolbox is a repertory of heuris- tics with which each species is equipped at a particular moment of its evolution. Each one of us chooses to use the heuristic best suited to the specific task at hand, just as a blacksmith chooses from among his tools the one that is most suitable for the work in which he is engaged. In some cases one initially choses the wrong heuristic or tool, but this can be changed during the execution of a task. 

Dear Mauro, what is interesting in the perspective of Gigerenzer is that the “toolbox” has a set of simple heuristics, designed for quick and easy application; indifferent to formal coherence, but oriented rather towards adaptive effectiveness; well suited to the environ- ment in which they evolved; and helpful in the solution of problems linked to the challenges presented by the environment (procuring food, avoiding predators, finding a partner and a safe refuge, but also, on a higher level, exchanging goods, realizing profits, and so on). Such tools work well in natural situations, where the constraints in terms of time, knowledge and computational capacities make the adoption of quick and efficient strategies a preferable and winning solution. The toolbox is regulated by motivations and emotional impulses. In addition, it must be equipped with learning models for the application of heuristics to unusual and unforeseen situations that derive from changes in the environment.

I agree, To describe the nature of the “toolbox”, Gigerenzer adopted the metaphor of a mechanic and salesman of used car parts in a remote region, who, not possessing all of the tools or parts he needs to fix a vehicle, invents solutions with what he has available. In order to solve the problem the mechanic will first try one thing and if that does not work he/she will try another and then another, until, using everything at his/her disposal, an appropriate solution is found to the problems that present themselves on each occasion. In the “toolbox” there are also the means for constructing new heuristics which can then be reutilized when a similar situation arises. Gigerenzer considers three main types of rules which govern the decision-making process: searching rules, which direct the search for alternatives (the set from which to choose) and for the cues (the considerations on the basis of which the alternatives are evaluated); rules of termination, which establish when to terminate the search for alternatives and cues; and rules of decision making, which direct the choice between the alternatives.

Dear Mauro, it is probable that animals, occupied in every instant of their lives with challenges posed by the environment, do not ask themselves whether their choices are right or wrong. They just take action. It is the task of nature to “promote” their actions according to their adaptive success. In other words, the choices are “right” if the organism survives, develops and reproduces with success. Animals, however, live in a world that requires rapid choices, in which a somewhat inferior decision made rapidly is better, that is, offers higher survival value, than a hypothetically superior decision made more slowly. In a different way, our behaviour is the result of the critical and self-critical functions of the mind (an “organ” with computational capacities and a finite memory) that evolution has made available to us. In addition to possible errors in reasoning, the mind is able to retain only a limited amount of information in its long-term memory, and even less in its short-term memory. Moreover, its capacity to process this information requires time and is effective only up to a certain level of complexity. The external environment also imposes severe restrictions, especially of a temporal nature: decisions must be made before those of potential competitors. This implies a limitation in the search for cues from the environment that can help us solve our problems. 

Silvia, try to imagine this decision scenario: a) decisions in the presence of known values for each alternative which do not involve probabilities (for example, for the purchase of a house, in which for each of the alternatives one knows with exactitude the price, the distance from work or school, the dimensions, and so on); b) decisions in the presence of probability or conditions of risk, typical of most situations of everyday life; c) decisions in conditions of certainty and decisions in conditions of risk — that is to say, when we are not even able to assign a probability to each one of the possible outcomes of a specific action. These decisions are particularly important and also common, because in life very few decisions are made in conditions of certainty. The majority of human decisions, in fact, involve a certain degree of uncertainty which varies from risk to ignorance. Here it is possible to distinguish decisions in conditions of risk (when in the basic information the prob- abilities are also present) from decisions in conditions of uncertainty (when in the basic information the probabilities are not present). 

Anyway, not all authors make the same distinction between risk and uncertainty. For some, the concept of risk should be limited to particular types of attri- butions of probabilities; for others, there is no difference between risk and uncertainty, or at most, the words reflect different types of uncertainty, measurable in probabilities which reflect the degrees of trust that the subject puts into different contexts. Individuals always calculate probabilities, even when they find themselves facing situations in which calculations do not help to assign values to different outcomes or the differences are small. What do you think?

Mauro, there are other scholars who identify four categories — risk, uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance — classifiable on the basis of the knowledge of the possible outcomes of each decision and of their probability of occurrence. It is possible to further distinguish: decisions in conditions of certainty (no need to consider probabilities); decisions in conditions of risk (known probabilities); decisions in conditions of uncertainty (probabilities unknown or difficult to determine). These are the different types of decisions. In reality, the attribution of probability to an event is consistent with Lindley’s conclusion that there is a continuum between situations of pure risk (known probabilities) and those that are more uncertain, in which the attribution of risk is more complex. In real situations — namely outside of gambling establishments and laboratories — the distinction between risk, uncertainty and ignorance is never clear-cut. Thus, making a decision in conditions of uncertainty means deciding which course of action to follow, among those that are possible, without any certainty of its possible consequences.

Aristotle has introduced an ontology of action in which reality is activity. In this perspective, decision making requires phronesis, practical wisdom acquired by experience in addition to episteme, scientific information acquired by learning. Then decisions are made intuitively by a continuous process where prudent action is continuously adapted and controlled by feedback mechanisms, somewhat attenuating the subject-object dissimmetry. Everything happens as if the action progressively clarifies the situation..

Absolutely agree, Harry! How can we not recall Aristotle’s debate with Plato that saw the Stagirite affirm that each practical choice comes from a deliberate desire, that is, from the interweaving of reasoning and desire? The strategy you are referring to are used by systems with a high adaptive value and provide results which are generally better that those generated by sophisticated algorithms which are more costly from a computational point of view. Naturally, elegant as it may be, this evolutionary model of rationality does not clarify how animals (and, with notable distinction, also human beings) can easily face new situations. These adaptive capacities must now confront a significant difficulty in the management of new situations, a difficulty completely attributable to the specificity of our cultural and genetic evolution, which has not prepared us to face critical aspects of the environment which derive from the high degree of human control of the planet.

It must be said that our ancestors gradually passed from horizontal cultural transmission, i.e. imitation of similar individuals, which is characteristic of other species, to vertical cultural transmission, i.e. transmission from one generation to another. Vertical cultural transmissions has obvious advantages, but does require a substantial continuity between one generation and the next. In fact, if there is a discontinuity between generations it can come to pass that the younger generation receives knowledge and strategies which are inadequate for the new environment. Certainly the flexibility and the adaptability of our mind, together with some degree of horizontal cultural transmission, can rectify such a discontinuity. But what happens when there is a sudden reversion to principally horizontal cultural transmission? It is reasonable to presume that responses would be strongly influenced by mimetic behaviours of the majority or of successful individuals. 

I think another important issue is the decision in conditions of uncertainty and of risk. Theorists of decision making have for some decades been engaged in analysis of the logical-formal process of choosing in the presence of incom- plete information and in conditions of risk or of uncertainty. The formal theory of decision making was introduced in the first half of the twentieth century by Abraham Wald and was developed above all for use with Bayesian statistics which had as their objective the definition of the best strategy on the basis of a predetermined criterion of optimality. Over the course of time, various types of optimal results were identified for the analysis of decision making strategies: the choice which minimizes the maximum loss (which calculates for each choice the maximum loss that could derive from it, opting for the minimum one); the choice which maximizes the maximum gain (which calculates for each choice the maximum gain that could derive from it); the choice which tends towards the smallest average loss (according to the criterion of Bayes–Laplace); the choice which tends towards the smallest average loss (according to the criterion of Bayes–Bernoulli).

Mauro, we certainly have an unlimited respect for  the knwledge received by what you call vertical and horizontal transmission. They have instilled into our minds self-control, self-criticism and suppression of arrogance. You are right, we can of course use the existingcomputational algorithms but only at the condition that they do not inhibit the flexibility and adaptability of our minds in our direct, interactive connection with the world: there is no existence without coexistence.

completely agree, Harry!

I think that an issue of great interest here is the decisions in conditions of risk and uncertainty. During the 20th century economists and mathematicians went to great lengths to neutralise risk and associated concepts such as uncertainty and unforeseeability. The demonstration of the limits of the neoclassical paradigm based on the simple calculation of costs and benefits made it more difficult to arrive at a scientific evaluation of risk and uncertainty. From the seventies onwards a large quantity of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the heuristic principles and cognitive strategies which individuals use to deal with risky and uncertain situations. This research has shown how the explicative and predictive shortcomings of normative risk analysis depend in many respects on undervaluing the continuous interaction between the individual and the environment. These are factors which day by day represent significant obstacles in decision making. Conventionally, when one speaks of uncertainty one refers to situations in which the individual knows the outcomes of the choice but not the probabilities involved. The problem of uncertainty is central to the study of decision-making processes because the consequences of the actions an individual undertakes are often prolonged into the future, and one can never be completely sure that the hoped-for outcome will in fact be achieved. Although uncertainty is a key concept in discussions of decision making, there is no real consensus of opinion as to its meaning. One can find as many definitions of it as there are ways of approaching it. The table gives a good illustration of the proliferation of definitions of uncertainty and associated terms (for example, risk, ambiguity and equivocality) that can be found in 30 years of literature on decision making. In order to clarify the nature of the uncertainty, Lipshitz and Strauss identified three basic situations:

- uncertainty is the sense of doubt that blocks or delays action. We can identify three essential features in this definition: 1) it is subjective (different people can be subject to different doubts in identical situations); 2) it is inclusive (no particular form of doubt, such as ignorance of future results, is specified); 3) it conceptualises uncertainty in terms of its effect on action (hesitation, indecision, procrastination).

- the uncertainty with which decision makers must cope depends on the model of decision making adopted. In other words, models implemented which have different informational requisites will be blocked or delayed by different doubts;

- different types of uncertainty can be classified according to their issue (what the decision maker is unsure about) and source (what determines the uncertainty). The fundamental problems include results, situations and alternatives. As for the causes, incomplete information is the most commonly cited cause of uncertainty. On occasions, however, decision makers are incapable of acting not so much out of lack of information but because they are disoriented by conflicts generated by the surfeit of meanings the information gives rise to. Moreover the causes of uncertainty are not limited to incomplete information and inadequate comprehension. Decision makers may be prevented from acting even if they have understood the alternatives perfectly but are unable to differentiate between them. 

Very interesting, Silvia. I think that the concept of uncertainty goes hand in hand with that of risk: a risky situation is always determined by a certain degree of uncertainty concerning the results of future actions. If the outcome of a course of action is guaranteed, risk is non-existent. The assessment of the degree of risk and uncertainty is one of the main components of every decision-making process. From the terms of insurance on the first transatlantic crossings to the development of the welfare state, the calculation of risks and efforts to make the contingencies foreseeable and manageable are part of the epic narratives of human history. As we have said, there are many definitions of risk in the literature, some of them contradictory. While some, closely linked to the theory of probability, seek to give an objective definition – as the probability of loss – others favour a subjective and contextual investigation. From a conceptual standpoint it is important to distinguish between risk and danger, which are often treated as synonyms. If a danger has highly probable negative consequences and indicates a characteristic of the harmful object or situation [e.g. fire, electricity, virus, radiation, speed and so on], risk incorporates the danger, the probability of its occurrence and the potential seriousness of the damage. Thus in general, risk indicates the probability that, using a certain instrument or implementing a certain behaviour, an individual will encounter danger.

Reason is our basic means of survival--but it does not alienate us from nature except in the sense that it enables us to master nature by dis coverings its laws-e.g., animals have to search for gifts of nature to find food--we grow our own--animals have to get well on their own or die--we invent the field of medicine-we are not perfect decision makers because we are not omniscient--we have to develop specific methods (e.g. probability theory)-

Economics has attempted, on one hand, to reduce uncertainty, and on the other to make the perception of risk objective by applying mathematical models to economic problems deriving from games theory and decision-making theory. Economics undoubtedly deals with risk but not with uncertainty. On his part, Keynes held that it is by no means enough for similar events to have happened in the past for them to recur. In a statement verging on paradox, the great British economist affirmed that our confidence in a hoped-for outcome can be reinforced only when we can find a situation in which a new series of events differs significantly from any encountered previously.

I guess that risk assessment became a topic of scientific enquiry in the last half century, as a result above all of public concern about the increasingly dangerous consequences of the use of nuclear energy. The first scientific study on the perception of risk was carried out by the director of the Atomic International Division, Starr. Published in Science in 1969, it looked at safety in nuclear power stations and proposed a procedure for calculating the level of technological risk acceptable to society in view of the attendant social benefits. Even though it relied on a mathematical/probabilistic evaluation of risk, the results revealed an enormous discrepancy between the objective risk and the perception on the part of the population. The variant of “social acceptance” soon proved to be complex, eluding concrete estimates and classifications, leading researchers to talk about different levels of risk. In particular, it was shown that the risks perceived as voluntary (such as risks associated with smoking or the failure to prevent certain illnesses) were considered more accept- able and less probable than the risks perceived as involuntary or imposed (as for example those of nuclear power stations). Moreover, as is shown by Starr’s correlation function, when the events are very familiar, objective and perceived risk coincide; as they become less frequent, the perceived risk increases unduly; and finally, in cases of extreme rarity, it diminishes unduly.

It it like a fashion to try and apply evolutionary thinking outside biology. Evolution is a very slow process that has basically been replaced by cultural, psychological and social processes and developments regarding those last few millenia of human history. Especially the technological revolutions of the last decades have brought challenges that should better be tackled and answered by experts qualified in appropriate field. Biological methods and views do not help much in field like economy, politology and sociology.

Rationality only can govern in as much people are conscious of what factors are involved in a process of evaluation. As condciousness is still a rare ressource, compared to the challenges of our time, especially when we take into account, that crowds may be uneducated, frustrated and thus ridden by emotions.

Mauro, the gist of your question may be too optimistic. We have not understood well enough how and why totalitarian regimes came into power, nor do we understand violence and war mechanisms. We live a world that is getting smaller, but globalisation and new technologies bring challenges that are not mached by an edaquately growing consciousness.

We have enormous challenges in Europe these days that are almost unbelievable. How can we explain that unemployment of young people in highly developed countries is so high.

Rationality and reason should enable our societies to prevent such things, but it does not.

This is why I believe we need to understand consciousness better and train everybody to be able to be more aware and be aware of the important things.

Cheers

Hans

Risk analysis requires the following elements: a risk scenario (R), a range of consequences (D = damage) and a probability of the occurrence of the risk phenomenon (P). These factors make it possible to formally define risk as the relation between the entity of a possible damage and the probability of the dangerous event occur- ring (R = P × D ). However, in many cases knowledge of such probabilities is not very exact, and may indeed be non-existent. In the latter case we are dealing with decisions in conditions of uncertainty or ignorance. The first attempt to define the concepts of uncertainty and risk were made by the economist Knight, who, in Risk, uncertainty and profit (1921) distinguished between measurable and non-measurable uncertainty, referring to the former as risk and the latter as uncertainty.

Knight wrote: "Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly sepa- rated. The essential fact is that “risk” means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far- reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the two are really present and operating". (Knight, 1921) 

I think we do know why totalitarian regimes come to power: bad philosophy. See K. Peikoff's The Cause of Nazism. The concept of individual righst took centuries (millenia) to be discovered and applied thanks to John Locke and our Founding Fathers. It later took root in Europe but rarely in the rest of the world, cf. Nazism, Communism, fundamentalist Islam.

I mean just that, Hans. Nothing is more uncertain of our rationality. Nevertheless, we must try to understand it with the tools that we have available.

Dear Mauro, following Starr’s research discussion of risk, which had been restricted to the sphere of technological safety, spread to such sectors as psychology and sociology. Psychology has contributed considerably to risk analysis, progressing from the classic concept of the calculation of probabilities of an undesirabe event to the concept of subjective risk based on perception and individual evaluation. In this line of research the most commonly used methodology is known as the psychometric paradigm, proposed by Slovic and his group. The main aim of this research is to identify the mental strategies people use in formulating risk assessments. These studies have shown how the perception of risk depends on various factors quite apart from the objective risk: degree of control, seriousness of the consequences, previous knowledge and experiences, perceived benefits and others. In everyday life, above all in situations which require specific, contingent evaluations or in situations where time is at a premium, risk perception is based above all on subjective, intuitive judgements and is thus often exposed to distortions or bias, of which the following are the most frequent.

The illusion of control influences a lot of our day to day behaviour, such as driving at high speed or failure to use safety belts. It is a systematic tendency to believe you can control situations so as to influence the outcome, even if it is predominantly a matter of chance. People tend to believe that the risks inherent in such behaviour can be controlled by their own ability. In reality, this betrays an excessive and unjustified belief in oneself (overcofidence), since even an expert driver cannot control all the factors which contribute to causing a road accident. Research carried out into the perception of risk among Italian adolescents showed a clear link between the decisive nature of control and risk perception. Adolescents who regularly drink alcohol believe they can control the related risks, indeed they think they are less at risk than those who never drink. Another very common example is smoking.

It is very interesting what you say, but let me add that unrealistic optimism is closely connected to the illusion of control. It represents the difference between what we consider risky for ourselves and what we consider risky for others. In the face of a specific risk we quite often consider others to be at much greater risk: for example, drivers consider themselves more proficient and less at risk than other drivers. It has to be said that the bias is not a personality trait like character-based optimism but an incongruous evaluation of the probabilities of falling victim to a negative event. Unrealistic optimism derives from two dynamics, one cognitive and the other motivational. The first consists in overestimating the number and efficacy of the precautions you yourself take with respect to those taken by others. In fact one’s own behaviour is more readily accessible in one’s memory than that of others. As a consequence, in assessing one’s own degree of risk exposure, the evaluation is distorted by a recollection that favours oneself. The second dynamic shows how the individual also uses optimistic distortions to safeguard self esteem. If there were no such distortions, in fact, we would perceive the risks inherent in consciously dangerous activities – such as smoking or driving without a seatbelt – and this would reflect badly on our self image. Numerous experiments have shown that this bias increases if the risky activities are considered to be controllable and we believe we are capable of controlling them effectively. On the contrary, the bias diminishes or disappears altogether when we assess situations in which one cannot act to reduce the risk and when the group with whom one is comparing the personal risk is perceived as similar, close or affectively linked to oneself. Finally, in some conditions not only does the optimistic bias disappear but it is replaced by pessimistic bias, a tendency which is apparently correlated to the nature of the risk. If, in fact, the optimistic bias characterises risks which are incidental, potential and familiar, pessimistic bias corresponds to risks perceived as common, real and unfamiliar (for example the health effects linked to radiation following a nuclear accident). In terms of adaptation, in fact, in the first case an optimistic attitude can free us from anxiety and help us to cope more serenely with everyday activities; while in the second case one is induced to pay more attention to the risks and make more of an effort with preventive action.

I fully agree with Silvia. Only, I would not see her "second case" as a matter of "pessimism" but of "realism". As to the distinction between "pessimism" and "realism", I refer to the attached article.

Silvia, I think that level of expertise generally influences risk evaluation, as numerous experiments go to show. In this context “experience” refers not to actual experiences of dangerous situations but to the competence of individuals (insurers, doctors, those responsible for risk technologies, and so on) acquired during their professional activity. In the medical field, that is my field, for example, the influence of the different level of experience has often been the subject of investigation in studies of the psychology of decision-making. Deciding in favour of one particular diagnosis or a specific therapy are paradigmatic examples of decision making in conditions of uncertainty and risk in which the reduction of the degree of uncertainty is closely correlated to the level of competence acquired. Numerous studies have shown a superior performance among experts with respect to non experts in terms of the following factors: a) lower rate of errors recorded; b) better ability to formulate a correct diagnosis; 
c) better ability to correctly attribute the true diagnostic value to each specific symptom; 
d) rapid classification of the available information so as to formulate the diagnosis; e) tendency to be succinct in setting out the motives and reasons which led to the formulation of a specific diagnosis. Research carried out in this sector has shown that expert doctors are also better able to retrieve the knowledge acquired in the course of their training and professional activity. In fact their mental structure for representing dominion specific knowledge is characterised not only by more available data but above all by a higher level of integration of the information acquired. Thus in evaluating the diagnosis which presents itself as a problem solving situation, the identification of symptoms – the value attributed to them and comparison with the full set of knowledge acquired – makes it possible to arrive at more correct and accurate inferences and diagnoses.

Competence is a practical wisdom acquired by learning, training and experience. It is necessary but not sufficient  for decision making. Decisions are not made in a single step. We do not gamble. Our actions have consequences which give us feedback leading to corrective actions. That is particularly true for the drivers considered by Silvia. In the medical practice, mentioned by Mauro, patients usually return when the prescribed treatment does not give the expected results, turning the interaction with the patient into a research project. Difficult cases require hospitalization where teamwork and shared risk improve the working conditions of the physicians and the treatment of the patient.

It is interesting that every discussion of DM asserts that we are not very good at it because we have so many flaws and biases. If so how did homo sapiens sapiens increase in number from a few million a few thousands year ago to about 7 billion today (despite some horrible wars, bacteria, viruses,  and natural disasters). We must have done something right. What was it? I will put forth the philosophical discovery of reason, esp. by the Greeks, and its application to life on earth.

The topic has been decision making, right?

How is Edwin's topic relating to our discussion? Ultimately the discussion is about the question whether an evolutionary theory of rationality is conceivable. Looking at Edwin's consideration, I think that his point is that the ability of rational thinking--that is typical of the human species and has led in ancient Greece to philosophy and, by extension, today to modern sciences—has made that the human species became a most successful species. So he wonders how it is possible that students of decision making are all the time stressing deviations from the normative rational logical courses the actual decision making processes are taking. Are those biases and deviations from normative logical thinking not just fortuitous errors, just some noise because no machine runs perfect all the time? The answer may be that it is not a matter of fortuitous noise. Purely rational logically sound decision making is not always the most appropriate way to produce the most positive life outcomes. Remember the story of the two pupils: the one has a high IQ, the other a low IQ. They decide to become salesmen and to sell products taking 10% profit. After a while they meet each other and the high IQ boy complains that 10% is not enough to make for a decent living. The low IQ boy is surprised: "I buy  products for 100 EURO that I can sell  for 1000 EURO and that 10% profit enables me to have a good life."  Of course, life is not that simple, but the point is that there are circumstances where irrational thought and decision making are productive and make for survival. This is particularly the case in safe circumstances where people can let go their phantasy and creativity ending up, most of the times, with garbage, but sometimes with splendid new ideas and inventions that contribute to survival .  However strictly rational decisions are necessary in circumstances where one cannot afford a bad outcome, for instance because a bad decision would lead to great harm or even death. For more about it one can consult the paper I added higher to my reply to Silvia's answer.

To me the irrational means divorced from reality so I do not see how one can benefit from this. Now I am not opposed to imagination but this is not necessarily irrational as we know from studying great creator.  Rationality, BTW, is not the same as IQ. IQ refers to one's ability to grasp abstractions. This is a potential. But it will not be actualized if the person is irrational.

Dear Guido, it was all perfectly clear. Thanks for interpretation. The problem is that bounded rationality has nothing to do with irrationality. They are completely different things. My question was obviously rhetorical and called everyone to discuss in detail the issues put to the theme. In any case,ignoring the effective capacity for calculation and the human limits of rationality would be like omitting gravitational forces from astrophysical theory. The ability of the human mind to solve complex problems is very limited when compared to the quantity of problems to be tackled and overcome. The real world is made up of a set of chaotic and ambiguous data which do not lend themselves to logico-deductive inferences. To act involves necessarily making do with incomplete information, time constraints and limited computational possibilities. The focus on the decision-making process rather than the outcome of choice has paved the way for studying how decision makers acquire information about the world, re-elaborate it and finally make use of it to formulate their choices. The limited rationality of an economic agent is manifested in the inability of its “internal environment” (the limits of cognition and computation) to process all the information and signals coming from the “external environment”, making it impossible to formulate an optimal choice. 

Mathematics is surely one of the most rational field there is.  When a mathematician provides a new theorem, she has to provide a complete rational proof of it.  But in many reported cases, the mathematician came unconsciously to the theorem and found a proof of it after this first discovery.  So althought the proof follows a rational path from the known to the theorem (deduction), the actual process of discovery (induction) did not necessarily follow this rational path.

''I wanted to represent these functions by the quotient of two series; this idea was perfectly conscious and deliberate; the analogy with elliptic functions guided me. I asked myself what properties these series must have if they existed, and succeeded without difficulty in forming the series I have called thetafuchsian.

Just at this time, I left Caen, where I was living, to go on a geologic excursion under the auspices of the School of Mines. The incidents of the travel made me forget my mathematical work. Having reached Coutances, we entered an omnibus to go some place or other. At the moment when I put my foot on the step, the idea came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it, that the transformations I had used to define the Fuchsian functions were identical with those of non-Euclidian geometry. I did not verify the idea; I should not have had time, as, upon taking my seat in the omnibus, I went on with a conversation already commenced, but I felt a perfect certainty. On my return to Caen, for conscience’ sake, I verified the result at my leisure.''

Henri Poincaré

https://www.brainpickings.org/2013/08/15/henri-poincare-on-how-creativity-works/

Many creative discoveries come unexpectedly but only because you have done conscious mental work before and have stored the material in the subconscious-if there is nothing there nothing will come up- without hard earlier work nothing of value will come out later--many people work for many years before they get an important insight-

Mauro, another model developed in the domain of NDM is known as the recognition-primed model. Analyzing the decisions of experts (doctors, military commanders, fire fighters, pilots and others) Klein and colleagues have shown how in critical situations these experts do not follow normative models. In such contexts the decision making process is characterized by drastic time limits and, in the case of a missed or erroneous decision, by grave consequences. If, for example, in an emergency situation the head fire fighter does not decide efficiently and in a few seconds what to do, he risks putting the lives of many people in jeopardy. Often the objectives are not clear (save the people in the building or quickly put out the fire?), the information is uncertain (the firefighter does not have a clear idea of the building’s floor plan or of the material contained in the building) and the intervention procedures are not always codified (one needs to use one’s imagination in order to find a way to free a wounded person from inside a vehicle after a accident). Experts of all fields make decisions by quickly referring to well-known situations and past experience. In particular, they promptly identify the objectives to be pursued, the most important cues to observe and monitor, the possible situational developments and the plans of action to be followed. In other words, the assessment of the efficiency of a selected course of action (or, better yet, of one automatically recalled by memory) does not come about through a comparison with other actions, but by directly discovering a plausible, and therefore satisfactory, solution. The decision making models based on recognition are inspired by counter-intuitive observation. Experts make decisions without analytically assessing the pros and cons of each option: beginners or individuals without experience are in fact the ones who make decisions on an analytical-comparative basis.

Silvia, I understand what you say. However, individual differences in decision making behaviour are not only related to the decision maker’s level of expertise, but also to other variables such as cognitive and motiva- tional styles, age, sex, socio-economic status and still others. Some authors, for example, have hypothesized the existence of veritable decision making styles, which define styles of individual reaction within given contexts. Now, if it is true that decision making styles exist whereby individuals use some with more frequency than others, it is just as true that these styles are not rigid and unchangeable, but rather flexible and modifiable in response to specific situations. Numerous decision making styles have been identified and described. The simplest ones follow the model of a sort of bipolarity corresponding to specific decision making styles. The deliberative-intuitive dimension is an example of this. This dimension distinguishes between individuals who usually decide in an analytical and reflective manner and others who, instead, decide in a quick and intuitive way. Other typologies of more detailed decision making styles in- stead describe multiple dimensions.

Mauro, I agree. Consider the five decision-making styles identified by Scott and Bruce.

The 'rational style', characterized by a complete search for information, by the consideration of the possible alternatives and by the assessment of their consequences; 
the 'intuitive style' based on the attention to global aspects more than to the systematic processing of information and, in addition, on the tendency to decide on the basis of intuition and feelings;
 the 'dependent style', typical of people who prefer to receive suggestions before making any choice at all;
 the 'evasive style', typical of individuals who tend to put off or avoid decisions and the 'spontaneous style' characterized by the propensity to decide as fast as possible.

I would like to observe that to measure these decision making styles, Scott and Bruce developed the General Decision Making Style Inventory (GDMS) for defining individual decisional profiles. A different approach to distinguishing between the diverse ways of decision making was proposed by Schwartz and his group (2002) and includes, rather than the identification of a specific decision making style, the tendency of an individual to look for the best possible result (the “optimizer”) or to settle for a sufficiently good alternative (the “satisficer”). The Maximization Scale is a tool for distinguishing those who, always looking for the best option, tend to base their own decisions on the comparison with others, and then prove to be unsatisfied with the choice made; from those who, instead, in settling for an option which is good enough, and therefore not necessarily the best, show a fair level of satisfaction with respect to their decision.

Really, more than a century ago William James had already outlined a profile of the decision making types. He offers the following classification. In particular he wrote: "The first may be called the reasonable type. It is that of those cases in which the arguments for and against a given course seem gradually and almost insensibly to settle themselves in the mind and to end by leaving a clear balance in favor of one al- ternative, which alternative we then adopt without effort or constraint [...]. A “reasonable” character is one who has a store of stable and worthy ends, and who does not decide about an action till he has calmly ascertained whether it be ministerial or detrimental to any one of these [...]. In the second type of case our feeling is to a certain extent that of letting ourselves drift with a certain indifferent acquiescence in a direction accidentally determined from without, with the conviction that, after all, we might as well stand by this course as by the other, and that things are in any event sure to turn out sufficiently right. In the third type the determination seems equally accidental, but it comes from within, and not from without [...]. There is a fourth form of decision, which often ends deliberation as suddenly as the third form does. It comes when, in consequence of some outer experience or some inexplicable inward change, we suddenly pass from the easy and careless to the sober and strenuous mood, or possibly the other way [...]. All those “changes of heart”, “awakenings of conscience”, etc., which make new men of so many of us, may be classed under this head [...]. In the fifth and final type of decision, the feeling that the evidence is all in, and that reason has balanced the books, may be either present or absent. But in either case we feel, in deciding, as if we ourselves by our own wilful act inclined the beam: in the former case by adding our living effort to the weight of the logical reason which, taken alone, seems powerless to make the act discharge; in the latter by a kind of creative contribution of something instead of a reason which does a reason’s work".

Here is why I am skeptical of decision style, decision types and other claims about DM. Everyone makes hundreds of decisions every day all day--so a theory of DM would in theory cover everything--but that is impossible--and it is arbitrary to claim that everyone uses one style for everything--and then there is the fact that all decisions involve both the cs and subs in various ways--where would one properly start, what would be the domain? This is something requiring a great deal of thought???

Mauro and Raffaele, empirical and theoretical research developed within the domain of the psychology of decision making suggests that cognitive strategies follow paths that are often different from those postulated by economic rational choice. According to the model of the adaptive decision maker developed by Payne, Bettman and Johnson, the decision making process is a highly contingent form of processing information with which individuals use adaptive decision making strategies and heuristics in response to their limited capacity for processing information as well as to the complexity of decisional tasks. A decision making strategy is a sequence of conative and cognitive mental operations (actions on the environment) used in order to transform the state of initial knowledge into final knowledge in which the decision maker considers the decisional problem to be resolved. Cognitive strategies are selected in relation to a series of factors: the way in which the information in presented, the complexity of the problem, the decision making context and the characteristics of the decision maker. Such variables, regardless of the values of the alternatives, influence the selection of the strategies by modifying the cognitive effort necessary for implementing them.

Silvia, everyday experience shows that, when facing various situations, we make decisions in a non-stereotypical way. A funda- mental characteristic of our cognitive system is in fact the extraordinary flexibility of the decision making strategies at our disposal. First of all, when “deciding how to decide”, individuals consider accuracy and cognitive effort not as absolute attributes connected to a strategy, but rather as properties de- pendent on a specific situation. Such an assessment―estab- lished either beforehand (top-down style) or during the accom- plishment of the task (bottom-up style) and the processing of the decision itself―can influence the choice of the various decision making strategies at one’s disposal. The strategy chosen will be the one that allows the decision maker to make a good decision with the least possible effort. The most frequent simplification strategies are commonly classified as compensatory and non compensatory. Compensatory strategies require a quantitative judgement and are applied when the options or the attributes which describe the various decisional alternatives are commensurable on the basis of their attractiveness/utility values. In other words, an individual chooses the alternative having an attribute that compensates for the sacrifice that she is willing to make by renouncing the consideration of other appreciable attributes.

When facing a problematic situation, we can only solve it with our bag of solution strategy.  The richer is this bag and the more likely that solution may be curtail to the given situation.  THis bag is a combination of inheritance of our species, and cultural inheritance and life experience.  If I have only a hammer in my tool bag of solution, then all problems look like a nail.  The richer is the bag, and the richer and appropriate will be the solutions.

I think that the individuals often have to mediate between accuracy and effort in the selection of a strategy according to the requirements of the task: in such cases a certain flexibility is necessary in the use of the strategies to be adopted. The decision making process, considered as a limited capacity cognitive activity, in fact aims at satisfying several objectives, such as for example minimizing emotional strain due to the presence of conflictual values among alternatives, reaching socially acceptable and justifiable decisions, and making accurate decisions which maximize advantages and minimize the cognitive effort required for acquiring and processing information. Minimizing cognitive effort is defined on the basis of the amount of time and the type of mental operation required for putting a certain decision making strategy into action. Zipf proposes the principal of minimal cognitive effort, according to which a strategy is chosen that ensures the minimum effort in the reaching of a specific desired result. The strategies that involve more accurate choices are often those that entail more effort and this indicates how the choice of strategies is the result of a compromise between the desire to make the most correct decision and the desire to use the smallest amount of effort.

Silvia, non compensatory strategies, instead, are used for those decision making problems in which options and criteria are incommensurable and the limited attractiveness of an option in relation to a certain criterion cannot be compensated by the greater attractiveness of the same option in relation to another criterion. Individuals often have to mediate between accuracy and effort in the selection of a strategy according to the requirements of the task: in such cases a certain flexibility is necessary in the use of the strategies to be adopted. The decision making process, considered as a limited capacity cognitive activity, in fact aims at satisfying several objectives, such as for example minimizing emotional strain due to the presence of conflictual values among alternatives, reaching socially acceptable and justifiable decisions, and making accurate decisions which maximize advantages and minimize the cognitive effort required for acquiring and processing information. Minimizing cognitive effort is defined on the basis of the amount of time and the type of mental operation required for putting a certain decision making strategy into action. Long time ago, Zipf proposes the principal of minimal cognitive effort, according to which a strategy is chosen that ensures the minimum effort in the reaching of a specific desired result. The strategies that involve more accurate choices are often those that entail more effort and this indicates how the choice of strategies is the result of a compromise between the desire to make the most correct decision and the desire to use the smallest amount of effort.

I'm convinced that in the next few years, and with the ever more accurate contribution of the cognitive neurosciences, we could have further elements to reflect upon in this difficult field. However, we can certainly already affirm that without high performance decision making devices like those studied in the paradigm of Naturalistic Decision Making the building of civilization, and perhaps even the evolution of the species, would have been impossible. Perhaps it is not paradoxical to think that decision making devices developed starting from the cognitive limitations of human beings, revealing themselves to be flexible when faced with unexpected situations and, above all, ecological in the use of the environment’s resources. In this sense, if it is true that the human mind has accumulated information and knowledge by means of a significant quantity: of rational decisions, the vast majority of these decisions have been supported by a natural logic whose rules have proved themselves to be advantageous in an evolutionary sense.