Isn't it true "embodied" 'theorists' and "META-cognition", etc. people just do not put 'enough stock' into the various memory capacities? AND THUS, they loose "track of" types of possible aspects of the environment that the human may respond to and the major changes (in 'learning' and development) that may well be triggered thereby. (AND they feed a homunculus.)
How is it even possible to talk so much about what's "embodied" and somehow not SHOW (at least at some point) the CORRESPONDING embedded-ness within the environment? It is simply a flagrant lack of empiricism (in outlook, at the outset).
Plus with a full empirical-looking perspective the "meta'a" are not NECESSARY (though they may occur at times, like in social interaction); rather, at least most can basically be accounted for by cognitive processes and the various memory capabilities ALONE. PERIOD.
I submit both these two areas of 'theory' in psychology have, at major points, abandoned possible, likely, and/or necessary contacts with aspects of the environment and are inherently UNempirical, if just because they didn't try (which is not "ok") -- they could not 'bother themselves' to conceive of possibilities associated with our memories (as THOSE develop).
The way I try for a valid perspective, I cannot violate empiricism in those ways, as my large paper shows (and as my many Questions and Answers, under Contributions, in my Profile SHOW). Psychology is "tired" of the old theories of personality and development, but cannot come up with anything that can be viewed as clearly science/more science/something better. I, for one, am sick of this; just new games, with rules, and lackies "playing along". (Many of the new 'theories' are not even seen by adherents as theories, but rather as "frameworks." PEOPLE, WE NEED THEORIES !!! I offer a start, a new start (nothing wrong with a new start): Ethogram Theory. )
GENERAL FOOTNOTE: There is no reason that a new rather general (and in ways more inclusive) theory needs to be very complex. Few things would be more complex than the contorted thinking (and imagined things) in coming up with some of the "embodied" 'theories' .
Article A Human Ethogram: Its Scientific Acceptability and Importanc...
To get an idea of the tremendous memories of even animals we see as quite lowly, psychologists should read about this.. Then ask, if they have such abilities based on types of memory, what might our various memories be providing for us (re: view of the environment) and ability to see more/new things (aspects) in the environment (or to see things differently) (AND we must not forget the types of memory that enable temporal/spacial thought/conceptualization and (some of) which may perhaps lead to (or follow) some new perception(s) or some change in salience(s)).
NOW, ABOUT RESEARCH. We absolutely have to stop trying to put "an elephant in a thimble".
Now, let me describe what 'much better' research (which we can do NOW and as good theory, with its BASIC research goes on, separately). Here RIGHT NOW is what better research would very likely look like (especially, since we are apes too):
Good experiments (and studies more generally) in ape research involve as much a naturalistic setting FOR the behavior to still likely be performed and still be as meaningful as possible AND allows us to see what actually occurs -- which, even if not expected, is often not uninterpretable, and is interesting TOO! The "openness" of such a study (which MAY be an experiment) is clearly an asset. Maybe this feature, just described, is a description of a good study set-up: whatever you get in a close-to-as-possible naturalistic setting, though now some factors controlled or set-up (perhaps, as they may be in reality too), the results will very likely be meaningful or interpretable (OR, if not trivial, at least stimulate the formulation of other new good hypotheses) -- the unexpected is ok and YET you may still get a LOT of the expected responses, too (perhaps WAY exceeding p
- Badges
- Science topic
- Similar topics
- Psychology
- Developmental Psychology